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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this Chapter, the object of inquiry is defined. Further, the relevant sources
of international and European law are introduced, and the method and means
of interpretation applied in this study are discussed. 
1.1 The object of inquiry 
[1] Asylum law has been enriched in the last few years by a number of mea-
sures of the European Community that address the legal relation between per-
sons in need of protection and the Member States. These measures make up
the Common European Asylum System – a body of law that covers all aspects
of asylum law: qualification for protection, procedures for qualification, allo-
cation, and secondary rights. Although its impact on asylum law and practice
in the Member States remains to be seen, this system merits description and
analysis, if only because of its comprehensiveness. 
The description and analysis of European asylum law in this study focus
on the relation with international law. The Refugee Convention and some other
instruments of international law entitle certain categories of aliens to protec-
tion from expulsion and to secondary rights. The major part of the Community
measures on asylum implicitly or explicitly addresses interpretation and appli-
cation of this international law. I describe and analyse the rights and obliga-
tions laid down in the Community measures, and compare them to those set
out in international law.
The relation between Community and international law on asylum raises
some complex questions. According to the Treaty on European Community,
these measures must be “in accordance” with the Refugee Convention and
other treaty law on asylum. This requirement seems to establish a clear hier-
archical relation between international law and Community legislation on asy-
lum. Yet the relevant instruments of international law bind the Member States,
not the Community. It is therefore unclear to what extent European law should
secure “accordance” – it may imply an obligation to ensure that the whole
body of international law on asylum is complied with, or merely prohibit
Community legislation that is in outright violation of international law.
Further, the requirement of “accordance” applies only to part of European
legislation, which begs the question whether other legislation may deviate
from international law. The consequences of the transfer of powers on asylum
 
to the Community for the obligations of the Member States under internatio-
nal law are another matter. Could European legislation influence their obliga-
tions under international law? If not, what should happen in case of a collision
between rules of European and international asylum law?
[2] The relation between European law on asylum and international law can be
approached from different points of view. A perfectly suitable one would be
the position of the Member States of the Community. As the grant of asylum
is “only the normal exercise of territorial sovereignty” of states,1 transfer of
powers on asylum to the Community infringes on the sovereignty of the
Member States. Therefore, their position merits attention. Another possibility
would be the position of the Community itself. The project of legislation on
asylum was undertaken in order to facilitate the abolition of border controls
between Member States.2 Focusing on the Community would do justice to this
objective of European asylum law. Moreover, the new area of European asy-
lum law has impact on the Community’s very identity. At some points,
European asylum law appears to conceive of the Community as the recipient
of requests for protection. Thus, European asylum legislation speaks of “per-
sons seeking protection in the Community”,3 and indeed makes it very possi-
ble that a person requesting protection from, say, Greece, is transferred to
Ireland as if the Community, not a state, were approached. 
But I have chosen a third alternative: the consequences for the individual
in need of protection. Safeguarding the rights of aliens is also an objective of
European asylum legislation.4 Other issues such as the division of competen-
cies between the Community and the Member States will also be addressed.
They will not, however, be addressed for their own sake, but only in so far as
they have bearings on the legal position of the individual. 
[3] The analysis is restricted to issues of law. Which instruments count as
“law” and which means and methods of interpretation are applied, will be dis-
cussed in paragraphs 1.4 and 1.5. Here it should be stressed that the analysis
is as far as possible abstracted from policy issues. Policy objectives may have
shaped Community asylum law, but they are addressed only where they enter
the realm of law, especially where they may serve as a means of interpretation.
The same holds true for the decision-making process. Documents reflecting
negotiations are only taken into account when they shed light on enigmatic
provisions. Consequently, projects that have not (yet) resulted in legislation,
such as reception in the region of origin, are not addressed. 
This one sided approach also means that the analysis sticks to legal fic-
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tions. Thus, the Member States as subjects of Community law, the Community
legislator and the masters of the Treaty on European Community are treated
as if they were separate entities. In fact, representatives of the Member States
make up the organ that adopts Community legislation on asylum, and they are
masters of the Treaty. Undoubtedly, the provisions of the Treaty on European
Community on asylum, Community measures and domestic legislation to a
fair extent all reflect the same policy objectives. To a more politically oriented
mind, upholding the fiction that it concerns completely different entities may
seem a distortion of reality. But there are good reasons to stick to those legal
fictions. First of all, Community law itself imposes these distinctions; apply-
ing them is therefore necessary for a sound legal analysis. Secondly, the poli-
cy background of European asylum law has more than once been well
described.5 Thirdly, I lack the skills to produce a sound political analysis. 
Likewise, empirical issues are ignored as far as possible. Particular rules
may have been adopted with a specific situation in mind – for example, rules
on the issue of agents of protection may be based on the situation in certain
countries such as Somalia or Northern Iraq before the American invasion.
Further, rules may have little meaning in the sense that they could apply to a
relatively small number of people, or conversely have great practical impor-
tance. Such considerations are however absent from this study. Numbers of
protection seekers or recognised refugees, or the reception of protection seek-
ers in proportion to reception elsewhere are not addressed The reasons are
again that I lack the necessary knowledge and skills, and that such considera-
tions are alien to the questions stated.
Furthermore, the present inquiry is, in a sense, a-historical. I address the
body of European asylum law as it is with international asylum law as it is
now. Their historical development is in itself not relevant for assessing their
relation. Thus, it has been convincingly argued that the last decades have
shown a growing tendency to exclude group persecution, and that subsidiary
forms of protection next to refugee protection owe their relevance to an ever
more restrictive application of the refugee definition.6 Current European asy-
lum law may be seen as an exponent of these developments: no mention is
made of group persecution, and it grants a prominent place to subsidiary pro-
tection. But such considerations are in themselves not relevant for this inquiry.
The historical development of European asylum may explain its present form;
it cannot explain its legal meaning. 
[4] Finally, domestic law is discussed when relevant for interpretation of inter-
national law, but legislation on asylum of the Member States does not, in itself,
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make part of the object of inquiry. The picture offered in this book is therefore
necessarily incomplete, for Community law and international law presuppose
domestic systems of law for their functioning. But abstraction from the
domestic law systems of the Member States may also have advantages. It
makes it possible to execute a comparison of European with international law
unclouded by notions from domestic law. For example, European asylum law
is very much centred on the issue of residence permits. This entails a distinc-
tion between asylum seekers and persons with a residence permit which is
quite self evident from the point of view of domestic law. But for internatio-
nal law, it is not – it rather distinguishes persons who are in need of protection
from those who are not. 
Nor do I address the reception of international or European law into
domestic constitutional law. Hence, I accept and apply the tenets on the wor-
king of European law and of the European Convention of Human Rights with-
in the domestic legal orders that are developed by the Court of Justice and the
European Court of Human Rights without questioning them (cf. numbers [70]
and [36]), although these tenets may not be accepted in some or most Member
States.7
1.2 Questions and order of discussion 
[5] This study of European law on asylum therefore focuses on its relation
with international law, and in particular on the way it affects the legal position
of persons requesting asylum. Neither the development of European asylum
law or international law, nor domestic asylum law of the member states makes
part of this study. The terms “asylum”, “European asylum law” and “interna-
tional asylum law” will be defined in the following paragraphs (paragraphs
1.3, 1.4 and 1.5). Here, I will identify the questions that should be dealt with
in order to assess this relationship properly. 
To begin with, we should address the nature of this relationship: (1) how do
the systems of European or Community law and international law affect each
other? This question can be approached from two sides. First, the way interna-
tional law may affect Community law (1a): how can rules of international law
on asylum have effect within the Community legal order? Second, the way
Community law may affect the working of international asylum law (1b): does
European asylum law have consequences for the legal position of the indivi-
dual vis-à-vis the Member States in their capacity as party to the instruments
of international asylum law? Both questions are addressed in Chapter 2. 
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Connected to these questions is the scope of Community competencies, or
rather of the division of competencies on asylum between the Community and
the Member States. Hence, a second question is: (2) to what extent is the
Community competent or obliged to adopt legislation on asylum? This issue is
addressed in Chapter 3.
After having defined the relation between both systems of law and the
scope of Community powers and obligations under international law on asy-
lum, we can approach the central question: (3) is European asylum law in con-
formity with international asylum law? The assessment of conformity requires
description and analysis of rules of Community law that may have bearings on
the legal position of persons entitled to asylum, and comparison with relevant
rules of international asylum law. This analysis and comparison is the main
part of this book, and is carried out in the Chapters 4 to 8. 
Finally, the focus on the individual’s legal position introduces yet another
issue (4): which possibilities does Community law offer the individual for
effectuating his claims under international law? This issue is addressed in
Chapter 9. In Chapter 10, I summarise the main conclusions and make some
final observations.
1.3 “Asylum”
[6] Above, the term “asylum” was applied in the terms “European asylum
law” and “international asylum law”. Which instruments are meant when I use
these terms will be discussed in paragraphs 1.4 and 1.5 below. Here, I define
the common element “asylum”. 
The term “asylum” has no determined meaning, and is applied in different
senses in different contexts.8 Instruments of international law allude to asy-
lum, but do not define it or specify its meaning.9 Community law applies the
term in different senses. In the Treaty on European Community, “asylum” is
closely linked to protection offered pursuant to the Refugee Convention,10
which would be too narrow a definition for present purposes. In the term
“common European asylum system” the meaning of “asylum” appears to be
broader, but also quite indeterminate.11 Hence, we should look elsewhere for a
definition.
[7] In academic writing,12 the definition of asylum adopted by the Institut du
Droit International at its Bath Conference in 1950 is often applied: 
“[…] le terme “asile” désigne [1] la protection [2] qu’ un Etat accorde [3]
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sur son territoire ou dans un autre endroit relevant de certains de ses
organes à [4] un individu qui est venu la chercher”13
- “the term “asylum” means [1] the protection [2] offered by a State [3] on its
territory or elsewhere to [4] an individual who came to seek it” (numbers
added, HB). 
For present purposes, this definition is suitable although it needs specifi-
cation. Firstly, the term “individual” (element [4]). As the drafters of this defi-
nition undoubtedly tacitly intended,14 the term asylum applies only to protec-
tion offered to aliens. States owe protection to their nationals on account of
that nationality, which protection hence needs no juridical category. Thus, “an
individual” should be understood as a person not possessing the nationality of
the state he requests protection from. Secondly, the term “protection” (element
[1]). “Protection” suggests some threat or danger from which the individual
needs shelter. As the specification “sur son territoire (…) à un individu qui est
venu la chercher” suggests, asylum concerns protection from some danger
abroad. Hence, asylum concerns protection by a state from a danger that
threatens the alien outside the state’s jurisdiction. Thirdly, the territorial scope
(element [3]). The Bath definition intentionally covers both protection offered
on the territory and protection offered at embassies and consulates.
Diplomatic asylum is not addressed in this book, only requests for asylum
with a view to protection on the territory of the requested state, wherever
lodged (on its territory or at its border, or abroad). Fourthly, the definition
restricts “asylum” to protection offered by “a state” (element [2]), thus exclud-
ing protection by a church or other non-state actors. As the Member States
transferred powers concerning protection to the Community, we should not
exclude beforehand that the Community could be the legal entity to which
aliens should turn when requesting asylum within the European Union. Thus,
asylum might be offered by states or, at least hypothetically, by the
Community. In sum, the term “asylum” applied in this book means “protec-
tion offered to an alien on account of a threat abroad, by a state within its ter-
ritory or by the Community within the European Union”. 
1.4 International Asylum Law
[8] With “international asylum law”, I mean rules of international law that
entail obligations or rights concerning “asylum” as defined above. In para-
graph 1.4.1, I will delimit which types of instruments qualify as “law” for the
purposes of this definition, and which of those instruments contain rules on
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“asylum”. Rules and means of interpretation are addressed under 1.4.2. The
effect of international law within the legal orders of the states concerned is pri-
marily a matter of domestic, not international law. For the present study, the
reception of international law within the Community legal order is of great
importance, and will be discussed in Chapter 2.2.
1.4.1 Sources
The ICJ Statute
[9] Identification of “obligations” and “rights” entails that only binding rules
of international law on asylum will be discussed. The question which rules of
international law are binding is generally answered by reference to Article
38(1) of the Statute of The International Court of Justice, which states:
“The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publi-
cists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination
of the rules of law.15
The International Court of Justice further recognised unilateral declarations as
a source of international law.16
The basis for regarding conventions, custom and principles as binding is
the element of consensus of the states concerned.17 The notion of consent to be
bound as the basis for obligation in international law has been criticised in
academic writing.18 However, no alternative concept appears to be available.19
Moreover, the list in the statute is still predominantly used as the index of
sources of international law. 
Hence, conventions, custom, principles recognized “by civilized nations”
and unilateral declarations are primary sources of international law, and judi-
cial decisions and scientific writings secondary ones.20 The primary sources are
discussed in the present paragraph, the secondary ones under paragraph 1.4.2. 
[10] Which treaties, rules of custom or principles address asylum? In paragraph 1.3,
“asylum” was defined as “protection”. In order to identify the relevant instruments
of international law, we should further delimit the meaning of the term “protection”. 
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In a narrow sense, “protection” is protection from subjection to human rights
violations abroad. In a broad sense, it entails, apart from protection from being
submitted to human rights violations abroad, permission to stay in the requested
state. Further, it would entail permission to stay there under dignified condi-
tions. Finally, if the alien is not yet present in the state he asks asylum from, it
would entail a request for admission.
The right to asylum
[11] Does international asylum law confer a “right to asylum” in this broad
sense? The provision coming closest to it appears to be Article 14(1) of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, stating that 
“Everyone has the right to seek and enjoy asylum”.21
It appears that “everyone” has a claim to enter (“to seek asylum”) as well as a
right to stay there (to “enjoy asylum”). The provision does not, however, entail
a right that aliens can successfully invoke: the Universal Declaration is a
declaration and hence not a primary source of binding international law.
Claims that either the Declaration taken as a whole or Article 14 in particular
have acquired the quality of customary law,22 must be considered to be
unfounded - both general state practice as well as opinio juris are lacking.23
But even if the provision were binding, one cannot base on it a subjective right
to enter or to reside. The ambiguous term “to enjoy”, in the - equally authen-
tic - French language version “bénéficier”, must be read not as a right con-
ferred to an individual, but rather as a privilege eventually accorded by the
concerned state, and thus merely reaffirms the sovereign right to grant protec-
tion.24 The right to “seek” is the right to request, not to receive asylum; it is a
right vis-à-vis the country of origin, not the requested state.25
The only other instrument that speaks of a “right to asylum” is Article 18
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 78 of the Draft Constitution for
Europe). As the provision functions within the context of European law, I will
deal with it in that context (see further paragraph 2.3.5). 
The Refugee Convention
[12] A binding instrument of international law that confers a right to asylum
in the broad sense being absent, we should turn to agreements that partially
address the needs of protection seekers. The instrument of international law
dealing most extensively with the matter is the “1951 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees” (henceforth: Refugee Convention or RC).26 The
Refugee Convention is central to the asylum systems of all Member States,
and to the Common European Asylum System as well. Articles 2-34 RC grant
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all kinds of benefits (referred to below also as “secondary rights”), concerning
such matters as education, gainful employment and the right not to be expelled
to a state where the life or freedom of the alien would be threatened. Together,
these provisions make up to a considerable extent the right to asylum in the
broad sense defined above (number [10]).
Entitled to these secondary rights are “refugees”. Who is a refugee is
defined in Article 1 of the Refugee Convention. According to the first clause
of Article 1A(2), a refugee is any person who 
“owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opi-
nion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country”. 
Although fulfilling these requirements, an alien cannot invoke protection if
one of the other provisions of Article 1 RC applies. The protection afforded by
the Convention ceases when the alien is no longer a refugee (Article 1C).
Excluded from refugee status (from entitlement to the benefits set out in
Articles 2-34 RC) are persons who can turn to certain alternative sources of
protection: to another state whose nationality the alien possesses (Article
1A(2) second clause),27 or whose de facto nationality he possesses (Article
1E),28 or to assistance from United Nations agencies (other than UNHCR,
Article 1D). Finally, persons who have committed certain very serious crimes
are excluded as well (Article 1F). 
[13] The Refugee Convention refers to two limitations of the refugee defini-
tion – a temporal and a geographical one. The text of Article 1A(2) narrows
its scope to “events occurring before 1 January 1951”. But according to
Article I(1) of the 1967 Protocol of New York,29 Article 1A(2) should be read
as if these words were omitted. All Member States of the European Union are
party to the 1967 Protocol;30 the temporal limitation is therefore of no interest
to us. The geographical limitation follows from Article 1B RC. According to
this provision, Contracting States must make a declaration that specifies
whether Article 1A(2) applies to persons who have well-founded fear of being
persecuted due to “events occurring in Europe” only, or to persons having such
fear due to “events in Europe or elsewhere”. All Member States chose the 
second option.31 References to the Refugee Convention below address the
Convention as amended by the New York Protocol. 
[14] The first and foremost condition for enjoying Convention benefits, then,
is being a refugee as defined in Article 1 RC. Most Convention provisions
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state additional requirements; first and foremost, refugees cannot (effectively)
invoke Convention rights if they are not present on the territory of a
Contracting State.32 But the Convention does not explicitly grant a right to
presence or a right of entry into those states. Nor is such a right implicit to the
Convention. The provision coming closest to it is Article 11: 
“In the case of refugees regularly serving as crew members on board a ship
flying the flag of a Contracting State, that State shall give sympathetic con-
sideration to their establishment on its territory and the issue of travel
documents to them or their temporary admission to its territory particular-
ly with a view to facilitating their establishment in another country”.
So, even seamen on board of ships flying the flag of a Contracting State are
entitled to no more than “sympathetic consideration” to their establishment on
the territory; that State is not even bound to allow them temporary admission. 
The prohibitions of refoulement
[15] In the absence of a treaty obligation to provide for entry or condone pres-
ence, the matter is subject to the domestic law of the Member States. But the
sovereign right to control the presence of aliens, among them refugees, is con-
ditioned by the prohibitions of refoulement. “Refoulement” means removal of
an alien to a state where he runs a certain risk of being submitted to certain
human rights violations. Several treaty provisions specify when removal
amounts to refoulement, and explicitly forbid removal in such cases – the so-
called prohibitions of refoulement. Explicit prohibitions of refoulement are
worded in Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention:
“No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, member-
ship of a particular social group or political opinion”,
as well as in Article 3 of the Convention Against torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (henceforth Convention
Against Torture, or CAT):33
“No State shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another
state where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in
danger of being subjected to torture.”34
Further, certain international law norms prohibit refoulement implicitly. For
the Member States of the European Union, the most important implicit prohi-
bition of refoulement is Article 3 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (henceforth:
European Convention of Human Rights, or ECHR), reading
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“[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment.” 35
According to well established case law of the European Court of Human
Rights, 
“whenever substantial grounds have been shown for believing that an indi-
vidual would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to
Article 3 if removed to another State, the responsibility of the Contracting
State to safeguard him or her against such treatment is engaged in the event
of expulsion”.36
Another provision prohibiting indirect refoulement is to be found in the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (henceforth also: Covenant or CCPR): 37
“[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.”
The Human Rights Committee stated that the provision prohibits refoulement
for the first time in its General comment 20,38 and affirmed it in a number of
views.39
[16] The implicit prohibitions of refoulement constitute by nature an open
category. Other human rights than those mentioned above may also prohibit
refoulement. The Strasbourg organs accepted that Article 2 ECHR, the right to
life, implies a prohibition of refoulement.40 The European Court further expli-
citly stated that Articles 5 and 6 ECHR might “exceptionally” contain prohi-
bitions of refoulement as well.41 In academic writing other ECHR provisions
have been mentioned,42 and Article 16(1) CAT has been suggested as a possi-
ble prohibition of refoulement too.43 But neither the European Court of Human
Rights nor the Committee against Torture has (yet) honoured appeal to these
supposed prohibitions of refoulement.44 In this book, I will restrict the discus-
sion to the well-established prohibitions of refoulement – the Articles 33 RC,
7 CCPR, 3 ECHR and 3 CAT.
Other relevant human rights law
[17] Article 1 RC and the prohibitions of refoulement hence define who quali-
fies for protection. These prohibitions of refoulement afford protection in the
narrow sense defined above – protection of aliens from expulsion to the state
where they are in danger. Asylum or protection in the broad sense would entail
a number of additional secondary rights. The only instrument of international
law addressing such secondary rights of in particular persons in need of pro-
tection is the Refugee Convention. Thus, a refugee must, according to Article
4 RC, be treated “at least” as favourable as nationals, as regards his freedom
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of religion and of religious education of his children. Protection seekers and
asylum beneficiaries (refugees or not) may further invoke all kinds of interna-
tional law provisions, including human rights law. But the freedom of religion
or of education ex Article 10 ECHR or Article 2 of the First Protocol to the
European Convention of Human Rights for asylum seekers and asylum bene-
ficiaries is not different from the freedoms of other persons. Any protection
under those provisions would not be on account of the danger threatening
them abroad. Therefore, it falls outside the scope of asylum as defined above
and hence outside the scope of “international asylum law”. 
[18] Three sets of rules of general human rights law are nevertheless addressed
in this study. First, rules on procedures. Upon a request for asylum, the
approached state sorts out whether the alien qualifies for asylum in “asylum
procedures”. Neither the Refugee Convention nor any other treaty explicitly
addresses asylum procedures in particular. But several treaties do address pro-
cedural issues in general. Thus, Articles 6 ECHR, 14 CCPR and 16 RC entail
a right of access to courts, and Articles 13 ECHR and 2(3) CCPR require an
“effective remedy” for persons “whose rights and freedoms” under those
instruments (such as the prohibitions on refoulement) have been violated.
Article 13 CCPR, finally, states specific procedural guarantees on expulsion
of “lawfully present aliens”. These provisions do not address in particular the
need of protection because of a danger threatening the alien abroad. But their
application to refoulement cases is informed by that need. Moreover, asylum
procedures are of decisive importance for the possibility to exercise in an
effective way any right to protection. Therefore, international law that condi-
tions asylum procedures is addressed in this study.45
Second, international law on detention. During the processing of claims for
protection, states may impose restrictions on the freedom of movement of
applicants that may amount to detention. Articles 9 CCPR and 5 ECHR set
conditions on such detention, and address in particular detention in case of
unauthorised entry; application of these provisions is informed by the parti-
cular circumstances of aliens who request asylum.46
Third, rules on family unity laid down in Articles 17 and 23 CCPR and 8
ECHR. As many other provisions of human rights law, they may apply to any
alien. Neither the circumstance that these provisions may block expulsion (or
even warrant entry) of aliens, nor the assumption that claims concerning fami-
ly unity may be of particular interest for persons in need of protection brings
them within the scope of international asylum law. A partial discussion of the
right to respect for family life is nevertheless warranted, as the particular
12 Chapter 1
predicament of persons in need of protection does affect the application of the
international law provisions on family life (see further Chapter 8.3). 
Custom and principles
[19] Next to treaty law, “custom” and “principles recognised by civilised
nations” are primary sources of international law (number [9]). For our pur-
poses, these sources are of only limited relevance. In academic writing, it has
been argued that the prohibition of refoulement is a rule of general or at least
of regional customary law. Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute defines “inter-
national custom” as “evidence of a general practice, accepted as law”.
According to Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, the required “generality” of prac-
tice can be inferred from the great number of states party to the Refugee
Convention or (one of) the other instruments prohibiting refoulement;
Convention Against Torture, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the European Convention of Human Rights.47 The customary rule or “princi-
ple of non-refoulement”, then, is not identical to these treaty obligations, but
their greatest common denominator. Thus, the personal scope of this rule of
custom could not exceed the scope of the prohibitions in treaty law. Next to
obligations under those treaties, the rule of custom would therefore have no
meaning. 
Nevertheless, in one respect the customary prohibition of refoulement may
be relevant for this study. The Community is not bound under international
treaty law to observe the prohibitions of refoulement. International customary
law does, however, work within the Community legal order. The relevance of
the (alleged) customary prohibition of refoulement for European asylum law
will be addressed under number [105]. 
As far as I know, neither in state practice nor in academic writing, have
principles of international law on asylum been identified. But principles, espe-
cially the principle of effectiveness, do play a role in the interpretation of
treaty law on asylum, and will be addressed accordingly (see par. 6.2.2). 
Concluding remarks
[20] The Refugee Convention and the prohibitions of refoulement, then, are
the main constituents of international asylum law. Together, the rights con-
ferred in the Refugee Convention bestow, to a considerable degree, asylum in
the broad sense (cf. number [10]), and hence offer protection in the broad
sense suggested above. Article 3 ECHR, 3 CAT and 7 CCPR have meaning
next to the Refugee Convention, as they offer protection to persons not enti-
tled to Refugee Convention protection. For example, Article 33 RC restricts
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the application to human right violations inflicted “on account of […] race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opi-
nion”- a condition absent in the other prohibitions of refoulement. Also, per-
sons who committed serious crimes (as meant in Article 1F RC, cf. number
[12]) are excluded from refugee protection, but they may still be entitled to
protection from refoulement offered by Articles 7 CCPR, 3 CAT and 3 ECHR.
In other respects, however, the protection offered by the last mentioned provi-
sions is more restricted. It concerns only protection from expulsion, not enti-
tlement to those other benefits laid down in the Refugee Convention. In fact,
most Member States do grant certain secondary rights to persons who do not
qualify for refugee status but who cannot be removed because Article 3 CAT,
3 ECHR or 7 CCPR applies – so called “subsidiary forms of protection”48 - ,
but there is no indication that they regard the grant of secondary rights to sub-
sidiary protection beneficiaries as an obligation rather than a discretionary
competence.49
Other human rights law is addressed only if its application to aliens in need
of asylum is strongly informed by their need of protection. This holds true for
international law on procedures, on detention and on family unity. As these
rules do not specifically address asylum, I will not label them as “internatio-
nal asylum law”. 
1.4.2 Interpretation
1.4.2.1 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
[21] The meaning of treaty law must be established autonomously from
domestic law, and interpretation rules can therefore be found only in interna-
tional law.50 Two means of interpretation relevant for the present study are
identified by Article 38(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice:
“judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of
the various nations”. The Statute labels them as “subsidiary means for the
determination of the rules of law”, which implies that they are not sources of
law, but rather serve as means to clarify the obligations flowing from treaty
law, customs and principles. 
For the interpretation of treaty law, Articles 31, 32 and 33 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (henceforth also: Vienna Treaty
Convention or VTC) provide for interpretation rules.51 In their quality as treaty
law, they apply only to States party to the Vienna Treaty Convention, i.e. to
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only 20 out of the 25 Member States,52 and only to treaties concluded after the
entry into force of the Convention in 1980,53 which excludes application to the
Refugee Convention, the European Convention of Human Rights and the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. But the interpretation rules in Articles
31, 32 and 33 VTC are generally seen as a codification of customary law.54
States not party to the Vienna Treaty Convention are therefore bound to apply
identical rules.55 Hence, Articles 31, 32 and 33 VTC can be safely applied to
all instruments of international asylum law. 
[22] Article 31 and 32 VTC list the means of interpretation. Article 31 runs as
follows:
“General rule of interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordi-
nary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and
in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall com-
prise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the
parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connex-
ion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other par-
ties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the inter-
pretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which esta-
blishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the
parties so intended.”
[23] First of all, a treaty should be interpreted “in good faith”. As interpreta-
tion by Contracting States is part of the performance under the concerned
treaty, assessment of its meaning should be in accordance with the principle
pacta sunt servanda. Hence, if interpretation of a provision in accordance with
text, object and purpose and other means mentioned in Article 31 VTC leads
to manifestly absurd or unreasonable results when applying the provision,
another interpretation should be sought.56 The “general rule of interpretation”
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further states that interpretation should be based on text, object and purpose,
the context, including agreements and instruments concluded “in connection”
with the treaty, as well as later agreements among and state practice of the
Contracting States, and relevant rules of international law. 
[24] Should we assume that a strict hierarchical order prevails among these
various means, in the sense that context, object and purpose should be
addressed only in case the ordinary meaning does not yield a clear result?57
The text of Article 31(1) does not imply a strict distinction; rather, it suggests
that the ordinary meaning can be established only within the context and in the
light of its object and purpose. Elias points out that the four main elements
mentioned in Article 31(1) – (3) VTC (i.e. ordinary meaning, context, object
and purpose, subsequent agreements and practice between the states party to
the treaty and applicable general rules of international law),
“are not to be regarded as hierarchical, but are to be applied as an integra-
ted or interdependent whole. It contains a statement of the elements in a
general rule, not series of rules. The use of the word “context” in all three
paragraphs of the Article is designed to emphasize this integrated
scheme”.58
The case law by the International Court of Justice confirms this approach: 
“The rule of interpretation according to the natural and ordinary meaning
of the words employed “is not an absolute one. Where such a method of
interpretation results in a meaning incompatible with the spirit, purpose
and context of the clause or instrument in which the words are contained,
no reliance can be validly placed on it.”59
Thus, the interpretation does not stop when a meaning compatible with the
wording is reached: this meaning has to be put against the background of the
object and purpose of the treaty concerned. The International Court of Justice
further has clarified that 
“[…] in accordance with customary international law, reflected in article
31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty must be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
Interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty. As a sup-
plementary measure recourse may be had to means of interpretation such
as the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclu-
sion.”60
So, emphasis should be put on the text of the treaty. This does not imply a
preference for the ordinary meaning above interpretation to object and pur-
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pose, as object and purpose are mostly explicitly laid down in treaties (for
example, in the preamble). Indeed it is hard to see how a term can be attributed
any specific meaning at all out of its context, or what the ordinary meaning
is.61 In fact, it may often work the other way: a provision whose terms have a
very clear ordinary meaning, may turn out to have an unclear meaning if read
in its context.62 The very determination of the clarity of the result attained by
reading a provision to its ordinary meaning involves the context as well as the
object and purpose of the provision.
[25] Article 32 introduces “supplementary means of interpretation, including
the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion”.
These means are “supplementary”, as, according to Article 32, 
“Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation […] in
order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or
to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: 
a. leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
b. leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”
It follows that in two instances recourse may be had to supplementary means.
First, in order to confirm an interpretation arrived at by application of the
“general rule” of Article 31 VTC. Second, if no satisfying result has been
reached in that way (application of the general rule led to “ambiguous”,
“obscure”, “manifestly absurd” or “unreasonable results”), to determine the
meaning of the concerned treaty provision. In both situations, the means are
“supplementary” in the sense that the general rule must be applied first. But
it should be observed that in the second situation the means are not supple-
mentary in the sense that they may merely confirm a reading identified by
means of Article 31 VTC.63
[26] Article 32 VTC mentions one supplementary means of interpretation “in
particular”: the travaux préparatoires or preparatory works to the treaty con-
cerned. Their value depends on various factors. An important one is, obvious-
ly, the availability of the material. The preparatory works for the Refugee
Convention, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention
against Torture and the European Convention on Human are all accessible.
This condition met, the preparatory works can be invoked against states that
acceded to the treaty (but did not take part in its preparation).64 Another impor-
tant factor for their value for interpretation is the authenticity of the material.65
Obviously, a statement acclaimed by the preparatory conference has far more
value than a view expressed by an individual representative. 
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But even when the preparatory works express in a clear way the intentions of
the Contracting States, they are still only a supplementary means. In its
Advisory Opinion on the Namibia case, the International Court of Justice
observed: 
“Mindful as it is of the primary necessity of interpreting an instrument in
accordance with the intentions of the parties at the time of its conclusion,
the Court is bound to take into account the fact that the concepts embodied
in Article 22 of the Covenant […] were not static, but were by definition
evolutionary […]. The parties to the Covenant must consequently be
deemed to have accepted them as such. That is why, viewing the institu-
tions of 1919, the Court must take into consideration the changes which
have occurred in the supervening half-century, and its interpretation can-
not remain unaffected by the subsequent development of the law […].
Moreover, an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied
within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the
interpretation.”66
Especially the preparatory works to the Refugee Convention are frequently
invoked in academic literature on international asylum law. When addressing
this material that dates back more than half a century, we have to take due
account of the observation by the International Court of Justice in the Namibia
case quoted above. Circumstances have changed; moreover, the 1967 New
York Protocol to the Refugee Convention had profound influence on the appli-
cation of the Refugee Convention’s provisions (cf. Article 31(3)(a) VTC). This
is not to discard the value of the preparatory works as a supplementary means,
but calls for caution when basing interpretation of the Convention upon them.
[27] The Refugee Convention, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
Convention Against Torture as well as the European Convention on Human
Rights are laid down in more than one language version, which are equally
authentic.67 Each of those texts has legal force, and their terms are presumed
to have the same meaning; in principle, the rules laid down in Articles 31 and
32 apply.68 Thus, if the meaning of a provision is unclear in one authentic text,
the terms of another text may be clearer. If however comparison of authentic
texts discloses a conflict that the application of Articles 31 and 32 VTC does
not solve, “the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the
object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted”.69
[28] In sum, the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties as well as the deci-
sions by the International Court of Justice support the distinction between the
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“general means of interpretation” on the one hand and the “supplementary
means” on the other. They do not indicate a hierarchical distinction among the
general means of interpretation, mentioned in Article 31 VTC. 
The material discussed above allows for three observations on interpreta-
tion. First, “the primary necessity of interpreting an instrument in accordance
with the intentions of the parties”.70 This principle explains the distinction
between general means and supplementary means: the contracting parties did
not express consent to be bound as to the latter. It follows, secondly, that
“interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty”,71 including
context and object and purpose as laid down in the treaty: they express the
consensus of the contracting parties. Third, interpretation must be consistent
with the entire legal system at the time of the interpretation. 
1.4.2.2 Treaty monitoring bodies 
[29] Any interpreter of a treaty should apply the means of interpretation dis-
cussed above, be it a state, a scholar, or a monitoring body established by the
relevant treaties. Views issued by the latter bodies, however, may have parti-
cular significance for the interpretation, by virtue of an arrangement to that
extent established by those treaties. As much of the following chapters is
devoted to analysis of views of those bodies, the legal significance of these
views for interpretation of the instruments of international asylum law will be
assessed at some length. 
UNHCR and ExCom
[30] The Refugee Convention does not establish its own monitoring body. The
International Court of Justice is competent to rule on the settlement of dis-
putes concerning the content of the Refugee Convention, 72 but it has never
been called upon to do so as only states, not individuals or (international)
organisations can bring cases before it.73 Interpretation of the Convention rests
primarily with the states party to it. 
[31] Apart from state practice, there are two important sources for the inter-
pretation of the Refugee Convention. Firstly, opinions issued by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.74 According to Article 35(1) of the
Refugee Convention, states party to it 
“undertake to co-operate with the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, […], in the exercise of its functions, and shall
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in particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provi-
sions of this Convention”. 
The explicit recognition of the UNHCR as “supervisor” over the application of
the Refugee Convention entails that the Commissioner’s opinions are relevant
for interpretation. But the duty to supervise application does not entail the
power to issue binding decisions on interpretation. Nor do the terms “undertake
to cooperate” imply so. In contrast, the International Court of Justice can “set-
tle” disputes. UNHCR’s opinions are therefore a subsidiary means of interpre-
tation, their relevance depending on the quality of the reasoning.75
[32] The second source is the Conclusions by the Executive Committee of the
programme of the High Commissioner (henceforth: ExCom).76 This
Committee consists of representatives of the Member States of the United
Nations Organisation. Its conclusions are usually adopted in unanimity, but as
neither the Refugee Convention nor any other treaty has conferred law-making
competence to ExCom, the Conclusions are in and of themselves not binding.
But to a certain extent, the Conclusions are indicative of the consent of the
states party to the Convention (cf. Article 31(3)(a) VTC). 
The UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for determining
Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to
the Status of Refugees (henceforth: UNHCR Handbook) has a special posi-
tion.77 ExCom requested78 but did not adopt the Handbook. Consequently, the
Handbook does not (even) share the rank of the ExCom conclusions. But
according to the Handbook itself, 
“practice of States is taken into account as are exchanges of views between
the Office and the competent authorities of Contracting States, and the 
literature devoted to the subject over the last quarter of a century”.79
This reference to state practice suggests that the Handbook reflects “subse-
quent state practice” within the meaning of Article 31(3) of the Vienna Treaty
Convention. But unfortunately, the UNHCR Handbook does not make expli-
cit which parts precisely do reflect state practice, and which parts merely
reflect the view of the High Commissioner. At any rate the Member States of
the European Union do not accept the entire Handbook as codification of state
practice.80 In summary, the UNHCR Handbook is only a subsidiary means of
interpretation of the Refugee Convention in the sense of Article 38(1)(d) ICJ
Statute, albeit an important one.
The Human Rights Committee
[33] The Human Rights Committee (hereafter also: HRC) monitors obser-
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vance of CCPR obligations.81 According to Article 41(4) CCPR it can transmit
such general comments to the state parties as it deems appropriate. The
Optional Protocol to the CCPR (henceforth also: OP CCPR) provides for the
right to lodge complaints with this Committee about alleged non-observance
of those obligations by states party to both instruments.82 The Committee then
may consider the case and issue its “views” on the complaint.83
The legal status of these views is a matter of controversy. According to
Brownlie, the findings of monitoring bodies may be described as “quasi-judi-
cial decisions” if they meet two conditions.84 First, the finding should be bin-
ding, and not merely a recommendation; second, the monitoring body should
apply rules of law to facts established by due process. The Human Rights
Committee itself states its views bind the states concerned, hence fulfil the
first condition:
“Bearing in mind that, by becoming a State party to the Optional Protocol,
the State party has recognized the competence of the Committee to deter-
mine whether there has been a violation of the Covenant or not and that,
pursuant to article 2 of the Covenant, the State party has undertaken to
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction
the rights recognized in the Covenant to provide an effective and enforce-
able remedy in case a violation has been established, the Committee wishes
to receive from the State party, within ninety days, information about the
measures taken to give effect to its Views [emphasis added].”85
But neither the Covenant nor the Optional Protocol justifies this assertion.
They do not confer on the Committee the competence to “determine” whether
or not the Covenant has been violated, but to issue “views”, a term that sug-
gests non-binding rather than binding rulings.86 In the absence of an explicit
treaty provision to the latter effect (or the establishing of some organ super-
vising the implementation of those views), there is no reason to assume that
the Contracting States restricted their sovereignty in this respect. The obliga-
tion to guarantee the rights and freedoms in Article 2 CCPR in itself does not
have any bearings on the Committee’s competence. And there is no further
indication that the states party to the Covenant and the Optional Protocol
regard the views as binding.87
[34] Some authors state that views of the Committee qualify as quasi-judge-
ments by virtue of guarantees of due process in the Covenant and the Optional
Protocol, rather than as political decisions,88 and hence fulfil the second con-
dition mentioned by Brownlie. But this quasi-judiciary status is questionable,
as the Committee rules on procedures lack some very basic guarantees of due
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process. Although the members of the Committee are elected and serve in
their personal capacity,89 the Covenant does not stipulate that they are inde-
pendent from their governments – and the membership of the Human Rights
Committee has included senior government representatives, members of par-
liament and so on.90 Sessions are held in private.91 Finally, many views are not
restricted to the finding whether or not a violation of a Covenant right has
occurred. The Committee may comment on states’ “obligations” as to amend
legislation,92 or even offer recommendations on the interpretation of other
treaties.93 MacGoldrick points out that the very ambiguity of the term “views”
allows the Human Rights Committee to venture into such issues.94
The views of the Committee are therefore not binding, and cannot be
regarded as quasi-judicial decisions. They should be categorised as subsidiary
means for establishing the meaning of obligations under the Covenant, their
value depending upon the quality of the reasoning; interpretation at variance
with the Committee’s view need explicit foundation.
The Committee against Torture
[35] The observance of the Convention Against Torture is monitored by the
Committee against Torture (henceforth also: CaT). Article 22 CAT establishes
a facultative right of complaint: states can acknowledge the Committee’s com-
petence “to receive and consider” complaints of violations, and to issue
“views” thereupon.95 Here, a similar issue arises as with regard to the views of
the Human Rights Committee discussed above. 
According to the Committee against Torture itself, its views are binding
pursuant to Article 22 CAT.96 The ordinary meaning of the term “view” applied
in this provision however suggests otherwise.97 In contrast, Article 30(1) CAT
addresses the “settlement” of disputes on interpretation or application by arbi-
tration or by “referring” the matter to the International Court of Justice.98
Further, there is no indication that states conceive of the Committee’s views as
binding case law. And as in the case of the Human Rights Committee, the pro-
cedure before the Committee against Torture lacks basic guarantees. Those
guarantees are mostly laid down in the Rules of Procedures.99 The procedure
is not public,100 and the rules for challenge and exemption of Committee mem-
bers are incomplete. Thus, the Committee must exclude a member from the
examination of a complaint if that member has some personal interest in it,
participated in the decision-making or is a national of an involved state.101 The
rules are silent, however, on the question of whether the applicant can chal-
lenge the impartiality of Committee members. Rules on forced dismissal are
absent altogether. Consequently, independence and impartiality of the CAT are
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guaranteed only in a limited way. The Committee consists of 10 members, but
if a quorum of six is present it can decide on a complaint.102 The “communica-
tions” wherein the Committee lays down its views do not indicate the names
or even the number of members sustaining or rejecting it. 
Whereas the views of the Committee are therefore not binding and cannot
be regarded as quasi-judicial decisions, denying them any relevance would
also be contrary to Article 22 CAT. The Committee’s views on interpreting an
application of the Convention should therefore be taken into account as sub-
sidiary means of interpretation; divergent readings need explicit foundation.103
The Council of Europe
[36] The European Court of Human Rights monitors observance of the
European Convention of Human Rights. It can rule on complaints of viola-
tions; Article 46 ECHR accords binding force to its final judgements. Do
these judgements also have a binding effect for parties not involved in a par-
ticular case? The Convention does not explicitly confer a general power to the
European Court of Human Rights to authentically interpret the Convention.104
But pursuant to Article 46 ECHR, the European Court bears the ultimate
responsibility in interpreting the Convention, not the involved state (or states).
As precedents, the Court’s decisions and judgements exert influence surpassing
the particular cases. As the Court itself observed:
“[t]he Court’s judgments in fact serve not only to decide those cases
brought before the Court but, more generally, to elucidate, safeguard and
develop the rules instituted by the Convention, thereby contributing to the
observance by the States of the engagements undertaken by them as
Contracting Parties”.105
So it appears that the Court itself views its judgements pretty much as authen-
tic interpretations of the Convention. It refers to judgements reflecting well-
established case law as “authorities”;106 “cogent reasons” are necessary to
change a well-established jurisprudential line.107 Arguably, state practice con-
firms this status of the Court’s decisions. As Lawson observes, no Contracting
State could, since the Soering judgement, assume that its obligations under
Article 3 ECHR cannot be involved in expulsion cases.108
The discussion of obligations under the European Convention of Human
Rights below is based upon the assumption that interpretations of Convention
obligations developed in the case law of the European Courts of Human
Rights make part of the states’ obligations under that Convention.109 Obviously,
not each and every individual judgement has the same binding effect on states
not involved in the dispute. But rules worded in a way that make them fit for
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application in other cases have, such as the prohibition of refoulement under
Article 3 ECHR (cf. number [15]).110
[37] As to the particularities of the Strasbourg procedure, States as well as
individuals can lodge claims of alleged violations of rights and freedoms pro-
tected by the Convention to the Court.111 In each case the Court first takes a
“decision” on the admissibility of the claim.112 If the complaint is admissible,
the Court rules on the merits in a “judgement”. The Convention provides for
a form of internal appeal: the parties to a case can request that the case be
referred to the “Grand Chamber”.113
Below, occasional reference is made to the European Commission of
Human Rights. This institution was involved in the adjudication of violations
of Convention rights before 1 November 1998. Any complaint was first
reviewed by the Commission, who laid down its view on the matter in a “deci-
sion”. The Commission as well as the involved state (but not the individual)
could thereupon bring the case before the Court. If they did not, the
Commission’s decision was final.114
European Law
[38] A final issue to be addressed are the views expressed in European asylum
legislation produced by the European Community, or in the so called asylum
acquis predating this legislation (see paragraph 1.5.1 below). Undoubtedly,
both this European asylum legislation,115 as well as this pre-Amsterdam
acquis116 are valuable sources for the interpretation to the extent that they are
indicative of state practice in Europe (cf. Article 31(3)(b) VTC). Moreover,
European asylum law may very well influence the content of international asy-
lum law (cf. number [730]). 
Nevertheless, I will not take European asylum law or the pre-Amsterdam
acquis into account when assessing the meaning of international asylum law.
To begin with, instruments of European asylum law as well as the pre-
Amsterdam acquis express views of organs of the European Community and
of the European Union. The Member States were involved in their adoption as
constituents of the Council, thus not in their capacity as Contracting states of
the instruments of international law as Article 31(3)(b) VTC requires.
Furthermore, in the present study, rules of international law serve as a touch-
stone for assessing the content of relevant European asylum legislation. If the
latter legislation (and the acquis on which it, partially, builds) would also serve
for interpretation of international law, we would at least partially assess the
compatibility of European law with itself. For example, both the acquis as well
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as Community law express the view that the exception of the safe third coun-
try may be applied without previous assessment of the risk of persecution or
harm in the country of origin (cf. paragraph 7.5). May we assume on that basis
that the prohibitions of refoulement do not require such assessment? I think it
is clearer and more secure to keep international and European asylum law 
separated. Obviously, interpretation informed by state practice always and
necessarily suffers from this somewhat circular kind of reasoning. In the case
of European asylum law, however, there is the opportunity to avoid it:
European asylum law was made over the last few years, thus well after inter-
national asylum law became well-established. 
1.4.2.3 Concluding remarks
[39] Above, the means and rules most relevant for the interpretation of interna-
tional asylum law were identified. It was observed that no strict hierarchy reigns
among the “primary means of interpretation” listed in Article 31 VTC. Even the
opposition between the these primary means and the supplementary ones may
be diffuse, as the latter may determine the meaning of a treaty provision in the
absence of primary means leading to a clear result. As a consequence, applica-
tion of the various means of interpretation may lead to contrary results. 
In practice, the degree of uncertainty is not as great as it may seem, how-
ever, due to differences in the circumstances. In many cases one means of inter-
pretation yields far more explicit results than another does. Thus, the ordinary
meaning of a treaty provision will often lead to far more clear-cut results than
its object and purpose. Moreover, the monitoring bodies may offer guidance.
The latter applies especially to the European Convention of Human Rights. 
Notwithstanding the guidance offered by the various monitoring bodies,
various means of interpretation may give off conflicting signals. Interpretation
then comes down to a balancing of different options. In the absence of a clear
hierarchical order among the means of interpretation, the choice in such cases
must be motivated as solidly as possible.
1.5 European asylum law
[40] European asylum law discussed in this book consists of the provisions of
the Treaty on European Community as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam in
1999, and the legislation based on it. In par 1.5.2, the sources and some features
25Introduction
of Community law that distinguish it from international law are discussed. In
paragraph 1.5.3, the Community measures on asylum that will be discussed in
the next Chapters are identified. In paragraph 1.5.4, I address the decision-making
procedures and the Community institutions involved in it and in paragraph 1.5.5,
the method and means of interpretation that apply to Community law. 
Present European asylum law is partially shaped by co-operation on asy-
lum matters that predates the Treaty of Amsterdam. Moreover, parts of the pre-
Amsterdam acquis may serve as means of interpretation of the present legis-
lation. Therefore, in paragraph 1.5.1 I give a brief sketch of the development
of European co-operation on asylum matters, including developments that
took place since 1999 – the conclusion of the Treaty of Nice and of the Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe.117
1.5.1 The genesis of European asylum law
Before the Treaty of Amsterdam
[41] Asylum entered the field of activity of the European Community as a side
effect of the ambition to create the freedom of movement of persons within the
Community. Before 1993, the Treaty on European Economic Community did
not make any mention of asylum, immigration or even human rights. Rather,
its main objective was the integration of the economies of the Member States.
An “internal market” comprising “an area without internal frontiers” was to
be created.118 This implied shifting controls from the internal borders (borders
between the Member States of the Community) to the external borders of the
Community. Decisions on the entry of third-country nationals (persons who
do not possess the nationality of one of the Member States), including persons
in need of protection, would hence become a matter of common concern. 119
Thus, the creation of the “internal market” would require harmonisation of
visas, immigration policy and asylum law. 
[42] For a time, the Member States of the Community were divided on the
matter. A number of them were unwilling to give up control on the entry of
third country nationals. The abolition of internal border controls of persons
did not take place,120 and border controls as well as the connected issue of asy-
lum stayed for the moment out of the scope of Community law.
The Member States that wanted to achieve the abolition of internal borders
sought means to do so outside the scope of Community law. In 1985 they con-
cluded the Schengen Agreement, a treaty under international law.121 This
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Agreement contained no binding provisions on third country nationals, but
offered a framework for adopting measures compensating for the abolition of
internal border control, such as measures against illegal entry and harmonisa-
tion of rules on visas.122 Such measures were laid down in the Schengen
Implementing Agreement, concluded in 1990.123 The Schengen Agreement,
the Schengen Implementing Agreement and a number of connected measures
make up the so-called Schengen acquis. Gradually, all Member States except
for the United Kingdom and Ireland acceded, as well as the non-Member
States Norway and Iceland (which maintained a passport union with the
Member States Denmark, Sweden and Finland). 
[43] The Schengen Implementation Agreement mainly dealt with border con-
trols and visa’s , but also contained a number of provisions on asylum.124 These
however were eventually overhauled by the Dublin Convention.125 This
Convention (also an agreement under international law) was the product of the
“European Political Co-operation”, conducted by the Council of the Ministers
for Immigration of the European Economic Community. The Dublin
Convention was concluded in 1990 among all Member States of the
Community, including the UK and Ireland (the position of the non-Member
States Iceland and Norway was catered for by yet another treaty)126 and con-
tained binding provisions that concern asylum seekers.127
The Dublin Convention established a system for determining “responsibility”
for examination of asylum claims. After the abolition of border controls, asy-
lum seekers who had entered the Community could easily travel to the state
they preferred, or lodge applications in several Member States. The Dublin
Convention was to put an end to this so called “asylum shopping”.
Henceforth, a request for asylum would be examined by only one Member
State, the one responsible according to the Dublin Convention rules. If an asy-
lum seeker appeared in a non-responsible state, the responsible state would
take care of him. As to the application of asylum law, the Convention only pre-
scribed that it should be “in accordance with its national law and its interna-
tional obligations”.128 Hence, the actual examination of the request, rules on
procedures, reception facilities and so on were all left to domestic law. A
Committee was established that could and did issue rules on the application of
the Dublin Convention.129
[44] The European Political Co-operation endeavoured to issue measures on
(among other things) asylum. In 1992 four “resolutions” were issued, which
dealt with manifestly unfounded applications for asylum, the concept of safe
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third countries, the concept of safe third countries of origin and the expulsion
of illegal third country nationals130. These “London Resolutions” however
lacked binding force.131
Thus, through means of international law the Member States had reached
results currently not attainable within the framework of Community law. But
for a number of reasons, this co-operation under international law proved to
be insufficient for the posed aims. Not all arrangements worked as smoothly
as desired, asylum shopping continued and as long as the asylum policies and
legislation of the Member States differed considerably, this phenomenon was
likely to continue. 132 Non-binding instruments such as the London Resolutions
could not bring about the desired level of approximation of domestic law. 
[45] A cautious attempt to bring border and immigration matters closer within
the ambit of Community law was made in 1992, when the Member States con-
cluded the Treaty of Maastricht (henceforth also: ToM).133 This Treaty esta-
blished the European Union that supplemented the Community and consisted
of the same Member States. 
The European Union was a new legal structure consisting of three parts or
“pillars”. The first pillar was the European Community as established by the
Treaty on European Community, with its own powers and its own specific
legal order. The other two pillars concerned “security and foreign policy” and
“justice and home affairs”. Though the European Union employed the same
institutional framework as the Community, the second and third pillar law
lacked the characteristics of Community law. 
The objective of the third pillar was achieving the objective of the European
Union, “in particular the free movement of persons”.134 Article K.1 ToM
declared asylum as well as control on crossing external borders by persons,
immigration, and entry, residence and family reunification of third country
nationals as “matters of common interest.” On these matters the Council could
adopt measures by unanimity voting. Until the entry into force of the Treaty of
Amsterdam in 1999, the Council adopted two “joint positions”, several “joint
actions” and decisions as well as some decisions sui generis.135 The only one of
direct relevance for the present study is the “Joint position of 4 March 1996 on
a harmonized application of the definition of the term “refugee” in Article 1 of
the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to the status of refugees”.136 The
binding force of those actions and positions was little, if it existed at all.137
[46] The output of the intergovernmental decision making under the Third
Pillar was, at least as far as asylum is concerned, not impressive. Lengthy pro-
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cedures and the need for unanimity made decision making under the third pil-
lar ineffective.138 Apart from the lack of effectiveness, the absence of demo-
cratic and judicial review was felt as another shortcoming of the Maastricht
system.139 The deficiencies that had tainted the intergovernmental approach to
a large extent subsisted in the co-operation under the Third Pillar.
The Treaty of Amsterdam
[47] In 1997 the Member States concluded the Treaty of Amsterdam, that
amended both the Treaty on European Union as well as the Treaty on
European Community. The Treaty of Amsterdam moved the whole area of asy-
lum and immigration from the Union’s third pillar to the first pillar, hence to
the Treaty on European Community. It is the legislation based on this Treaty
that I discuss in the Chapters 4 to 9. 
The provisions relevant for Community powers on asylum and immigra-
tion were placed in Title IV of Part III of the Treaty on European Community
as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam (Articles 61-69 TEC after consolida-
tion; henceforth also referred to as: Title IV). Article 63(3)(a) TEC made the
Community competent to adopt “measures on immigration policy” concer-
ning “conditions of entry and residence, and standards on procedures for the
issue by Member States of long-term visas and residence permits”. Article
63(1) and (2) TEC moreover mentioned a number of asylum matters on which
the Community should issue legislation (see further paragraph 3.3). 
[48] Although the scope of the new Community competencies was consider-
able, two features reveal a certain reticence. First, as Kuijper points out, on all
the mentioned issues either the Council had adopted measures (the Dublin
Convention, the London Resolutions and the Joint Position), or proposals for
third pillar measures were pending before the Council (with the sole exception
of the right of residence in other Member States, required by Article 63(4)
TEC).140 Hence, Article 63 provided a legal basis in Community law for
already existing or drafted measures, rather than envisaging a new, compre-
hensive approach to the issue of asylum in the European Union. Secondly, the
scope of most measures on asylum is restricted to “minimum standards”.141
This entails that the Member States would retain residual power to legislate on
the matter (see paragraph 3.4). This once again reflected the reluctance to
completely hand over powers on asylum and immigration matters. 
[49] Article 63 required the adoption of measures on a number of asylum
issues within five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam,
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i.e. before 1 may 2004.142 The Council could easily have fulfilled its obligation
by adopting or re-adopting drafted or existing measures on asylum, as the
London Resolutions and the Joint Position on the refugee definition. This, in
fact, was indeed very much the core of the Strategy Paper on implementation
of Title IV issued by the Austrian presidency in 1998.143 But eventually, the
European Council144 stated more ambitious aims in the Conclusions of its
meeting in Tampere in 1999.145
The Tampere Conclusions have exerted a profound influence on shape and
content of European asylum law.146 To begin with, the European Council
defined asylum policy as an independent objective, no longer as a mere flan-
king measure to the establishment of the freedom of movement for Union citi-
zens.147 Further, asylum measures should not be a bundle of independent rules
on isolated topics, but form a whole: the Common European Asylum System
(henceforth also: CEAS). This CEAS is, according to the Tampere Conclusions,
to be established in two phases. In the short term (that is, within the five-year
period set by the Treaty of Amsterdam) it should include 
“a clear and workable determination of the State responsible for the exami-
nation of an asylum application, common standards for a fair and efficient
asylum procedure, common minimum conditions of reception of asylum
seekers, and the approximation of rules on the recognition and content of
the refugee status. It should also be completed with measures on subsidiary
forms of protection offering an appropriate status to any person in need of
such protection […]”, 
and as to the second phase, 
[i]n the longer term, Community rules should lead to a common asylum
procedure and a uniform status for those who are granted asylum valid
throughout the Union.”148
Thus, the European Council also formulated material standards for the mea-
sures to be adopted: the determination of the state responsible for an asylum
request should be clear and workable, procedures “fair and efficient”. Overall,
the Tampere Conclusions express strong commitment to human rights obliga-
tions under international law. The objective encompasses full commitment to
obligations under the Refugee Convention and the relevant human rights
treaties, and establishment of the CEAS is based on “absolute respect for the
right to seek asylum”, and “on the full and inclusive application of the Geneva
Convention, thus […] maintaining the principle of non-refoulement.”149
[50] Hence, the Tampere Conclusions made the objective of Community
measures on asylum concrete, urged for coherence among them and insisted
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on compliance with human rights standards. These facets exerted their influ-
ence on asylum measures as the Commission took the Tampere Conclusions
as a starting point. The Council reinforced this view on European asylum law
in the conclusions of later meetings150 and, moreover, in each asylum instru-
ment successively adopted.151
As to the order of adoption of the required measures, the Tampere conclu-
sions referred152 to the (previously adopted) Vienna Action Plan.153 But in fact,
the order of adoption proved to be dictated rather by political feasibility. Most
conspicuously, the measure on procedures was called for in the Vienna Action
plan within two years, but was not yet adopted in July 2005. Still, the Vienna
Action Plan priority list has had important consequences for the content of
European asylum law. Legislation on peripheral issues (temporary protection,
reception standards) was adopted before the core issues of asylum law (defi-
nition of beneficiaries of refugee and subsidiary protection status, the defini-
tion of the content of those statuses and the rules on procedures) were decided
on. This odd order of adoption left its mark on the content of European asy-
lum law, and partially explains some of the inconsistencies in the Common
European Asylum System (see further Chapter 4). 
[51] In summary, the Treaty of Amsterdam finally moved asylum policy from
the intergovernmental co-operation among the Member States into the
Community legal order. Its arrangements on asylum bear the marks of a com-
promise. According to Protocols adopted together with the Treaty of
Amsterdam, the United Kingdom and Ireland retained their special position –
they can partake in asylum measures at will; furthermore, European asylum
legislation does not at all apply to Denmark (see further paragraph 3.5). Further,
decision making and other constitutional arrangements show some peculiarities
that can be traced back to the intergovernmental origins of the policy area – for
example, measures on asylum are to be adopted by unanimity, and Member
States could issue proposals – both rare requirements in Community law.154 And
the choice of subject matter appears to be inspired by the previously developed
asylum acquis. But the European Council of Tampere formulated quite ambi-
tious objectives for the asylum legislation that was to be adopted in its Tampere
Conclusions –a Common European Asylum System was to be established that
would, ultimately, encompass “a common asylum procedure” and “a uniform
status for those who are granted asylum, valid throughout the Union.” 
The Treaty of Nice 
[52] Already before the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the
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Member States had started negotiations on yet another treaty that should amend
both the Treaty on European Community as well as the Treaty on European
Union. In 2000 the Member States concluded the Treaty of Nice.155 As to
Community legislation on asylum, the Treaty of Nice brought only minor
changes. It stipulated that measures on asylum would be adopted by majority
voting, “provided that the Council has previously adopted […] Community
legislation defining the common rules and basic principles governing these
issues”.156 Hence, new legislation amending or replacing the presently adopted
first generation of European asylum law can be adopted far more easily. 
Of greater relevance for present European law was the proclamation of the
“Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union” by the Nice
European Council.157 It conferred inter alia a “right of non-refoulement” and
even a “right to asylum.”158 This Charter did not make part of the treaty of
Nice, and its legal status was unclear.159
The Constitution for Europe
[53] The question of institutional reform was taken up by the Treaty establishing
a Constitution for Europe, amending both the Treaty on European Union as
well as the Treaty on European Community. It was concluded on 29 October
2004 and will enter into force after ratification by all Member States.160
The Constitution for Europe (henceforth also: Constitution or CfE) merges
the European Community and the European Union into the “European
Union”, or the “Union”. As to asylum, the Constitution brings important
modifications to the scope of competencies. Incorporating the policy objec-
tives laid down in the Tampere Conclusions, it calls for the establishment of a
“Common European Asylum System.” Further, instead of “minimum stan-
dards”, a “uniform status” for asylum as well as subsidiary protection is called
for, and “common procedures” for the grant of those statuses.161 These compe-
tencies are backed up by the general obligation to develop a “common policy
on asylum and temporary protection”. All asylum related measures are to be
adopted by the qualified majority voting rule. Further, the provisions of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights make part of the Constitution. Hence, the pro-
visions on non-refoulement and on the right to asylum would rank as
Community or rather, as Union law. But in one respect, the Constitution does
not bring change: the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark retain their spe-
cial position according to the relevant protocols attached to the new Treaty.162
Concluding remarks
[54] From the Single European Act to the Constitution, a steady development
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towards ever closer co-operation among the Member States on asylum matters
is visible. Starting as a mere side effect of the gradual abolition of obstacles
to the fundamental freedoms, asylum became an area of European law in its
own right - the Constitution for Europe even encompasses a “right to asylum”.
From the point of view of the Constitution, the history of co-operation in asy-
lum matters can be viewed as a development from intergovernmental decision
making in the Schengen framework to full-fledged Community law. The
Treaty of Amsterdam then presents a transitional stage. Indeed, many com-
mentators point out the intergovernmental traits of Title IV.163 But these pecu-
liarities should not obscure that present day European asylum law is
Community law, with the legal effects of Community law and subject to judi-
cial supervision by the Court of Justice. 
The Treaty basis for current European asylum legislation is Title IV of the
Treaty on European Community. It will be replaced by the Constitution after
ratification. Therefore, I will address the Constitution provisions on asylum in
Chapter 3 next to Title IV TEC as the future basis for powers on asylum. The
content of the Charter as far as it is relevant for asylum legislation will be
addressed in Chapter 2.3. 
1.5.2 Features of Community law
[55] From the perspective of international law, the European Community is an
international organisation established by the 25 states party to the Treaty on
European Community (the “Member States”). But although established by an
instrument of international law, the Community presents “a new legal order”,
a legal order sui generis, both different as well as independent from interna-
tional law.164 In order to distinguish this special character of Community law
from common international law, it has been labelled as “supranational”. In the
present paragraph I briefly introduce the main features of this supranational
law, as far as relevant for this study, and then the instruments of Community
law (also: European law) relevant for asylum.
Basic tenets 
[56] The subjects of Community law are, next to the Community institutions,
the Member States as well as individuals. On what kind of Community law
provisions individuals can rely, and under which conditions, will be discussed
below (number [58]). Presently I address the relationship between Community
law and the Member States.
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This relationship is shaped by three tenets. Firstly, the principle of “supremacy”
of Community law. It entails that all Community law has precedence over all
domestic law. This means that Community law applies in the Member States
on its own terms, not subject to conditions set out by domestic law.165 It also
means that domestic law contrary to primary or secondary Community law
does not apply. 
Secondly, the principle of loyal co-operation. According to Article 10 TEC
“Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or
particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty
or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They
shall facilitate the achievement of the Community’s tasks”.
The Article addresses not only the Member States as such, but also the organs
of those states – the government, the judiciary, government agencies, and so
on. The impact of the principle is particularly manifest in connection with the
tenets of direct effect (see paragraph 9.2) and the obligation of the Member
States to provide for remedies for breaches of rights protected by Community
law (see Chapter 9.1). 
Thirdly, the division of powers between the Community and the Member
States. The far-reaching consequences of the principles of supremacy and
loyal co-operation should not obscure the fact that Community competencies
are fundamentally limited in scope: 
“[t]he Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon
it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. […] Any action
by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the
objectives of this Treaty.”166
If an area falls outside the scope of the Treaty, the Community cannot act, as
was the case with asylum before the entry into force of the Treaty of
Amsterdam. But also if an area falls within the scope of Community compe-
tence, Community action may not be justified. According to the “subsidiarity
principle”, in areas which do not fall within the Community’s “exclusive”
competence (such as asylum law, as we will see),
“the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidia-
rity, only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be suffi-
ciently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale
or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.”167
Application of the principle is further determined by the Protocol on sub-
sidiarity. The practical legal consequences of this principle are, however, mod-
est as the Community organs enjoy considerable discretion in this context. The
principle is complied with if the preamble to a piece of Community legislation
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establishes the reasons why Community action was needed.168 Closely con-
nected is the principle of proportionality: Community action must be under-
taken in a way that is proportionate to the aim pursued. This principle for
example forbids the Community to adopt a regulation if the purpose could
also be achieved with a directive.
Sources
[57] The rules of Community law on asylum stem from several sources.
Among these sources of Community law a strict hierarchical order prevails:
inferior legal norms must comply with superior ones. At the top of this hierar-
chy stands “primary Community law”, consisting of the Treaty on European
Community, those provisions of the Treaty on European Union that have bear-
ing on Community law, and the Protocols attached to both Treaties.169
Legislation adopted pursuant to this primary law, such as directives, regula-
tions and decisions, is called “secondary law”. 
Agreements to which the Community is party, as well as unwritten law (the
“general principles of Community law”) enjoy ranking superior to secondary
law.170 The position within the Community legal hierarchy of general princi-
ples, international customary law and international treaty law to which the
Community is not party raise some intricate questions of great importance for
asylum law. Therefore, these sources of law will be discussed at length sepa-
rately, in paragraph 2.2.2. 
[58] Secondary law is laid down in “regulations”, “directives”, “decisions”,
“recommendations” and “opinions”.171 Most European asylum law has been
laid down in regulations and directives. Both kinds of instrument are general
normative measures: they are binding, and not addressed at specific individu-
als. The feature distinguishing regulations from directives is their “direct
applicability”.172 That is, regulations need and may not be transposed by the
Member States into domestic legislation.173 Regulations therefore have legal
effect independently of any national law, and apply within the Member States
in very much the same way as domestic legislation. 
Directives on the other hand are “binding as to the result to be achieved”
but leave “to the national authorities the choice of form and methods”.174 In
contrast to regulations, they require implementation, transposition into domes-
tic law. In principle, it is not the directives but the domestic legislation imple-
menting them that works within the domestic legal order and affects the legal
position of individuals. In principle, for this rule suffers many exceptions (see
further paragraph 9.2).
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As to the other instruments mentioned above, recommendations and opinions
have no binding force, and play a minor role in European asylum law as
means of interpretation of directives and regulations (see paragraph 1.5.5
below). Regulations and directives may further delegate legislative powers.
Delegated standards may be laid down in regulations as well as in measures
sui generis.175
1.5.3 Instruments of European asylum law 
[59] Having discussed the sources of Community law, we should define which
instruments make part of “European asylum law” as addressed in the following
Chapters. Only law that explicitly addresses “asylum” as defined in paragraph
1.3 is addressed. As to primary Community law, Article 63 (jo 61) TEC pro-
vides a legal basis for adopting “measures” (which leaves the choice between
regulations and directives) on asylum. These provisions are discussed in
Chapter 3, together with other TEC and TEU provisions and Protocols
attached to them that have bearings on these provisions or on the legislation
based on them. 
Legislation based on other Treaty provisions than Article 63 TEC may be
relevant for asylum practice in Europe as well, such as legislation based on
Article 62 TEC, concerning visa requirements and other rules on the entry of
the European Union. But for two reasons I address only legislation based on
Article 63 TEC. First, most of that other legislation is not intended to address
the need for protection of persons within the scope of international asylum
law. Second, it does not show sufficient coherence with the main body of
European asylum legislation – the directives and regulations based on Article
63 TEC.
[60] On the basis of Article 63 TEC, hitherto nine measures have been adop-
ted that explicitly and specifically deal with asylum. For the present study, the
most important ones are the following four measures: 
- Council Directive 2004/83 of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the
qualification and status of third country nationals and stateless persons as
refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection, hence-
forth: the Qualification Directive (or QD; cf. Article 63(1)(c));176
- Council Regulation 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the crite-
ria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for
examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a
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third-country national, henceforth: the Dublin II Regulation (or DR; cf.
Article 63(1)(a));177
- Council Directive 2003/9 of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum stan-
dards for the reception of asylum seekers, henceforth: the Reception
Standards Directive (or RSD; cf. Article 63(1)(b));178
- Council Directive 2001/55 of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving
temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and
on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in
receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, henceforth
the Temporary Protection Directive (or TPD; cf. Article 63(2)(a).179
Not yet adopted is the 
Amended proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards on pro-
cedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status,
henceforth: the Procedures Directive or PD (see number [61]; cf. Article
63(1)(d).180
Of considerable importance for persons eligible for protection in the Common
European Asylum System is further 
- Council Directive 2003/86 of 22 September 2003 on the right to family
reunification, henceforth Family Reunification Directive (or FRD; cf.
Article 63(3)(a)).181
These measures will be discussed extensively in Chapters 4 to 8. 
[61] The other measures adopted on the basis of Article 63 do not have impor-
tant or direct implications for the enjoyment of international asylum rights, but
some of them are sideways addressed in the present study. It concerns:
- Commission Regulation (EC) No 1560/2003 of 2 September 2003 laying
down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No
343/2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the
Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in
one of the Member States by a third-country national, henceforth also: the
Dublin Application Regulation (or DAR, cf. Article 63(1)(a));182
- Council Regulation 2725/2000 of 11 December 2000 concerning the esta-
blishment of “Eurodac” for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective
application of the Dublin Convention, henceforth also: Eurodac
Regulation;183
- Council regulation 407/2002 of 28 February 2002 laying down certain
rules to implement Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000 concerning the esta-
blishment of “Eurodac” for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective
application of the Dublin Convention;184
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- Council Decision 2000/596 of 28 September 2000 establishing a European
Refugee Fund,185 and Council Decision of 2 December 2004 establishing
the European Refugee Fund for the period 2005 to 2010.186
[62] All mentioned directives state a period for transposition into domestic
law. Before the expiration of this period they cannot, in principle, be relied
upon by individuals in the Member States.187 The transposition terms of the
Directives on Temporary Protection, Reception Standards and Family
Reunification expired on 31 December 2002, 6 February 2005 and 3 October
2005 respectively; the transposition terms of the Qualification Directive will
expire on 10 October 2006.188 The Dublin Regulation applies to applications
lodged since 1 September 2003, the Dublin Application Regulation applies
since 6 September 2003.189 In the discussion below, I will discuss all instru-
ments as if the transposition terms had all expired. As to the Proposal for the
Procedures Directive, the Council had “reached a general approach”, which
arguably amounts to consent, on most of its provisions by 29 April 2004, and
made a few changes before sending it to the European Parliament for advice
(cf. number [65]). Below, I will discuss the text of the Amended Proposal as
if it were adopted and implemented, referring to the Proposal as it read in the
version of 9 November 2004 as ‘the Procedures Directive’.190
In the near future, European asylum law will encompass a few more mea-
sures. The Directives on Qualification and Procedures delegate power to the
Council to adopt certain “acts” or “decisions” concerning asylum (addressed
under numbers [316], [446] and [533]).
[63] Most relevant for the European law on asylum are further “general prin-
ciples of Community law”, discussed in Chapter 2. The discussion further
includes a number of instruments that are not sources of Community law. In
Chapter 7 I address the Dublin Convention and related agreements with
Norway, Iceland and Switzerland on allocation of asylum requests, as these
instruments function in the immediate context of Community rules on such
allocation. Finally, I address the Charter on Fundamental Rights. As will be
argued in paragraph 2.3.7, Community law does provide for a justification for
doing so. 
The term “European asylum law” (or “Community law on asylum”), then,
refers to all sources mentioned above: Article 63 TEC and other relevant pro-
visions of primary law as identified in chapter 3; the legislation based on it,
and standards adopted pursuant to delegation by those instruments (see the
previous paragraphs); relevant “general principles of Community law” as
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identified in Chapter 2.2; relevant Charter provisions identified in Chapter
2.3, and the Dublin Convention and related instruments mentioned in Chapter
7. The ten measures listed above are referred to below as “European asylum
legislation” (or as “Community legislation on asylum”). According to their
Preambles, the first five measures serve to establish the “Common European
Asylum System”. The term “Common European Asylum System” or CEAS as
applied below refers to the system established by these five measures.
1.5.4 Institutions and decision-making procedures
Procedures
[64] The Treaty on European Community establishes for each policy area how
and by which Community institutions secondary legislation is to be adopted. For
the measures mentioned in Title IV, the relevant rules are to be found in Articles
67, 64(2) and, in conjunction with the former, Article 202 TEC. These Articles
provide for no less than five procedures for adoption of measures on asylum.191
[65] All regulations and directives on asylum (except for the Dublin
Application Regulation, see below) presently in force were adopted according
to (1) the procedure laid down in Article 67(1):192
“During a transitional period of five years following the entry into force of
the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Council shall act unanimously on a proposal
from the Commission or on the initiative of a Member State and after con-
sulting the European Parliament.”
These measures were thus adopted by the Council, voting unanimously. It
decided upon a “proposal” by the Commission or upon an “initiative” by a
Member State,193 and after “consultation” of the European Parliament. The role
of the latter is hence confined to mere advice. 
[66] Since 1 May 2004, asylum and immigration are subject to different regimes
of decision making. For asylum (the measures pursuant to Article 63(1) and
(2)(a) TEC), the procedure (2) is laid down in Article 67(5). It states that “pro-
vided that the Council has previously adopted, in accordance with [Article
67(1)], Community legislation defining the common rules and basic principles
governing these issues”, measures based on Article 63(1) and (2)(a) will be
adopted according to the “co-decision” procedure laid down in Article 251
TEC.194 By virtue of a Council decision pursuant to Article 67(2) TEC, the co-
decision procedure also applies to measures based on Article 63(2)(b) TEC.195
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The co-decision procedure differs in important respects from the Article
67(1) procedure. Only the Commission can submit proposals, the Council
decides by “qualified majority”, not by unanimity, and the European Parliament
has not merely an advisory role, but can reject proposed legislation.196
Since 1 May 2004, the Article 67(1) TEC still applies to measures meant
in Article 63(3) TEC, except for one minor change (3): the Member States do
not any longer enjoy the right of initiative.197
[67] Article 64(2) states that in case of “an emergency situation characterised
by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries”, the Council can take mea-
sures by qualified majority on a proposal by the Commission (4). In contrast
to the Article 67(1) procedure, unanimity is not required; different from the
co-decision procedure, the European Parliament has no say. 
Finally, (5) pursuant to Article 202 TEC the Council can delegate regulato-
ry powers to the Commission as to “certain requirements in respect of the
exercise of these powers”.198 The Council indeed delegated power in the Dublin
Regulation. On that basis, the Commission adopted the Dublin Application
Regulation. The adoption of certain standards delegated in the Procedures
Directive is subject to specific decision making procedures. 
Institutions
[68] With an eye to the assessment of the value of certain types of documents
for the interpretation in the next paragraph, we should briefly address here the
Community institutions that were involved in the making of present legislation
on asylum (in the Article 67(1) TEC procedure, see above). All present asylum
measures are based upon a “proposal” by the Commission.199 The Commission
has, as its primary role, promoting the Community’s objectives. Though the
Commissioners are appointees of the Member States,200 they are expected to
promote the objectives and interests of the Community, not to represent the
interests of “their” Member States. 
The Community organ deciding on each proposal, the Council, on the
other hand consists of a representative of each Member State, at ministerial
level,201 who can (and are expected to) pursue national interests. The actual
constitution of the Council depends on the subject matter to be discussed.
European asylum law is a matter of the “Justice and Home Affairs” (JHA)
Council, consisting of the ministers of the Member States on the concerned
subject. Actual Council negotiations are in fact often done by civil servants in
various committees such as the Committee of permanent representatives
(Coreper) and, specifically for asylum and immigration issues, the Strategic
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Committee for Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA) and the High
Level Working Group on Asylum and Immigration.202
Council negotiations are in fact steered to a large extent by the Council
Presidency. Each Member State holds the Presidency for six months.203 It sets
the agenda for Council meetings, identifies issues for discussion, and propo-
ses solutions, in fact amendments to the proposal, if it does not meet with
unanimous approval. 
Distinct from the Council of the European Community is the European
Council: an organ of the European Union, consisting of the heads of state or
government of the Member States, and the president of the Commission.204
The European Council cannot adopt legislative measures on asylum, but it sets
out the “general political guidelines” of the European Union.205 It addressed
asylum policy in its Tampere Conclusions that partially shaped the present
body of European asylum law (see number [49]), and again in the “the Hague
Program”, on future immigration law and policy (see paragraph 10.3).
[69] Pursuant to Article 67(1) TEC, the Council had to “consult” the European
Parliament on each piece of asylum legislation. Most discussions of legisla-
tion proposals took place in the “Committee on Citizens’ Freedoms and
Rights, Justice and Home Affairs” or LIBE Committee. The Assembly of the
European Parliament “adopted” the proposals as “amended” as suggested by
the Committee’s “raporteur”. 
Finally, the Council “consulted” other organs of the European Community,
the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee on the Regions, on
all proposals.206
1.5.5 Interpretation 
The Court of Justice
[70] The Court of Justice has the final say on all matters concerning validity and
interpretation of all Community law.207 It is assisted by the Court of First
Instance (CFI; both henceforth also referred to as the Luxembourg Courts).
Direct approach to these courts by litigants is possible only in specific types of
cases, and for specific parties (see further paragraph 9.1.2). Next to trying direct
appeals, the Court of Justice has the task of answering “preliminary questions”.
These are questions submitted by domestic courts on the interpretation or vali-
dity of Community law.208 Under what conditions preliminary questions on
European asylum law can or must be stated is discussed in Chapter 9.1.4.
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Finally, Article 68(3) TEC provides for a procedure specific for Title IV: 
“The Council, the Commission or a Member State may request the Court
of Justice to give a ruling on a question of interpretation of this Title or of
acts of the institutions of the Community based on this Title.”
As yet, this competence has not been made use of. 
A Court official occasionally referred to below is the Advocate-General,
who delivers an “opinion” on each case brought before the Courts.209 These
opinions do not bind the Courts, but the usually lucid style of these opinions
can shed light on less transparent parts of the Courts’ reasoning.
Means
[71] Do Articles 31, 32 and 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties apply to Community law? The Luxembourg Courts explicitly refer to
the Vienna interpretation rules only when interpreting agreements under inter-
national law.210 But where the internal legal order of the Community is con-
cerned, the matter is different. We saw above the Court of Justice conceives of
the Community as a new legal order, different and independent from ordinary
international law. The Treaty on European Community that “created” this legal
order is therefore conceived of as an instrument with constitutional traits
rather than an agreement governed by the rules of international law.
Consequently, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not apply.
Indeed the Court does not refer to the rules laid down in the Vienna
Convention where interpretation of provisions of the Treaty and secondary
legislation is concerned. Moreover, the Court’s approach to interpretation
deviates from the rules in Articles 31-33 VTC. I will therefore briefly discuss
the Court’s approach to interpretation of both secondary and primary
Community law, in order to sort out which means of interpretation may be
applied to Community law. 
[72] The Court bases its interpretation of Community law on wording, context
and purpose.211 These means are the ones mentioned in Article 31(1) and (2) first
clause VTC as the “primary means of interpretation”. But the Court’s use of
these means, especially its well-known propensity for teleological interpretation,
leads to results unlikely to be achieved when strictly adhering to the Vienna
Convention rules. Most revealing is the Court’s conclusion in Van Gend en Loos,
the judgement in which the Court launched the concept of direct effect:
“[…] according to the spirit, the general scheme and the wording of the
Treaty, Article 12 must be interpreted as producing direct effects and cre-
ating individual rights which national courts must protect.”212
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Hence, interpretation to wording and context are very much supplementary to
the purpose.213 Moreover, it is not the purpose of the provision, but rather the
purpose of the Treaty as a whole that guides the interpretation. In Van Gend
en Loos, this approach revealed “obligations” and “rights” not explicitly men-
tioned in the Treaty text. In Van Duyn the Court concluded that directive pro-
visions could have direct effect – which finding puts considerable strains with
both text and context of the relevant provision.214
[73] As to the other means of interpretation laid down in the Vienna
Convention, Article 31(2) states that agreements and instruments made by the
contracting parties relating to a treaty make part of its context. It appears that
such instruments are not to be taken into account when interpreting
Community law. In Antonissen the Court ruled on a “declaration” recorded in
the Council minutes on a directive provision that
“such a declaration cannot be used for the purpose of interpreting a provi-
sion of secondary legislation where, as in this case, no reference is made to
the content of the declaration in the wording of the provision in question.
The declaration therefore has no legal significance.” 215
A declaration as such on the interpretation of Community legislation is there-
fore devoid of any value for interpretation. But it should be noted that the
Court speaks of reference to the content of the declaration, not of reference to
the declaration itself. This leaves open the possibility that a document expres-
sing the intent of the legislator (the Contracting parties if the Treaty is con-
cerned, the Council as to Community legislation) has some meaning for inter-
pretation of a provision, if that intent finds expression in the relevant provi-
sion. Arguably, the declaration should then be treated as akin to a preparatory
work as meant in Article 32 VTC (to be discussed below).
A reason for this refusal to take agreements as meant in Article 31(2) VTC
into account has been provided for in connection with the Wijsenbeek case.
The litigant parties, explicitly referring to Article 31(2) VTC, invoked a dec-
laration adopted by all Member States contained in the Final Act of the Single
European Act on Article 7A TEC (now 14 TEC, the freedom of movement).216
The Court solved the case without addressing the declaration, but Advocate-
General Cosmas commented:
“once provisions of primary Community law have been inserted into the
text of the Treaty and made applicable in the Community legal order, they
acquire autonomous value in relation to the will of their authors, just as the
provisions of a constitutional act acquire autonomous value in relation to
the will of the constituent legislature which enacted them. The will of the
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author of a provision of Community law is but one of the parameters in the
interpretation of that provision, and far from the most important one; the
value of this interpretative criterion is significantly less than that which the
will expressed by the States has in public international law when they draw
up a normative international text”.217
Although the Advocate-General does not exclude that declarations might have
some value for the interpretation of Treaty provisions, that value cannot be the
one attributed by Article 31(2) VTC because of the constitutional character of
the Treaty. 
[74] On the basis of apparently the same kind of reasoning the Court has cate-
gorically ruled out that state practice subsequent to the conclusion of the
Treaty on European Community, or to the adoption of secondary law, could be
relevant for interpretation (cf. Article 31(3)(b) VTC).218 The same holds true
for later agreement on the interpretation of the Treaty (Article 31(3)(a) VTC),
because in Defrenne II, the Court stated that a declaration by all Member
States delaying a time limit laid down in a Treaty provision “was ineffective to
make any valid modification” of that time limit.219 The Court clarified:
“In fact, apart from any specific provisions, the Treaty can only be modi-
fied by means of the amendment procedure carried out in accordance with
Article 236 [old, cf. Article 48 TEU].”
As to applicable rules of international law as a means of interpretation, the
Court does refer to both custom as well as agreements to which the
Community is party when interpreting both primary and secondary
Community law, in conformity with Article 31(3)(c) VTC (quoted under num-
ber [22]).220 As an international organisation, the Community is, as well as
states, a subject of international law. Interpretation of internal law
(Community law) in conformity with international law merely bears evidence
to the monistic reception of international law within the Community legal
order. 
[75] As to the preparatory works as a means of interpretation (cf. Article 32
VTC), the Court could not take them into account as far as the Treaties are
concerned as these were never published.221 But for interpretation of secondary
Community law, the legislative history does play a rôle. 
Above, the institutions involved in the adoption of asylum legislation were
identified. Each of them issued documents that could be relevant for the inter-
pretation of that legislation. The Commission proposals contain, next to the
proposed Directive or Regulation provisions, an “Explanatory Memorandum”
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on the scope and objectives of the measure and a “Comment on Articles”. The
Council produces working documents that contain the outcome of meetings on
proposals, usually in the form of amended provisions or proposals for amend-
ments and occasionally reasons for amendments. The European Parliament,
the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee on the Regions
issued opinions on all pieces of legislation. Of these documents, only the draft
articles and the mentioned opinions are published in the Official Journal; the
other documents are all accessible on the web-sites of the various institutions. 
[76] In case law of the Luxembourg Courts, the explanatory memoranda to
Proposals are occasionally referred to.222 Views laid down in a proposal are not
to be taken into account if not expressed in the final text,223 and, if taken into
consideration, only as supplementary means.224 Opinions by the European
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee are also applied for inter-
pretation.225
As to amendments (and their explanatory notes) by Member States during
Council negotiation, the situation is unclear. I have not found references to
them in case law. One could argue they should not serve as supplementary
means of interpretation because in contrast to Commission proposals and
opinions of the Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, such
Council documents are not explicitly referred to in the concerned directive or
regulation.226 Further, the Court has shown a tendency of keeping a distance
from the Council’s decision making.227 On the other hand, the Court takes
Explanatory memorandums to Commission proposals into account although
they are not published in the Official Journal. The easy access to Council
documents by means of its register is a new phenomenon (since 2002), which
may explain why the Court has never alluded to them. And from the
Antonissen judgement we can, arguably, deduce that if a regulation or direc-
tive provision refers to the content of a Council document, it can be applied
for interpretation.228 Finally, amendments proposed by Council members and
their explanatory notes express as well as Commission proposals the intent of
the legislator. For these reasons, I think publicly available Council documents
containing amendments expressed in the adopted text can be applied as sup-
plementary means of interpretation. 
[77] Finally, as to the value to be attached to different language versions, the
Court’s approach is consistent with Article 33(3) and (4) VTC: 
“the various language versions of a provision of Community law must be
uniformly interpreted, and thus, in the case of divergence between those
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versions, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the
purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part”.229
According to the Court of Justice, domestic courts must, when interpreting
Community law, take into account “the different language versions”.230 At
present, no less than 21 language versions of both the treaties as well of
Community legislation are equally authentic.231
Conclusion
[78] The Court is the supreme authority on all matters concerning interpreta-
tion of both primary and secondary law.232 Hence, when interpreting European
asylum law the Court’s approach must be followed. This entails interpretation
as to the literal meaning, read in the context and, emphatically, to the purpose.
The context encompasses the preamble as well as documents or instruments
explicitly referred to. For European asylum legislation, this means that the
Commission proposals including explanatory memorandum and the com-
ments by the European Parliament and the opinions issued by the Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. The Comment on
Articles and, arguably, publicly accessible Council documents can be invoked
on the same footing as Commission proposals. Comments on drafts have value
for interpretation only if their content is reflected in the actually adopted text,
and then only as supplementary means. Finally, as many language versions as
possible should be taken into account. 
The method of interpretation applied by the Community judiciary deviates
in some important respects from the rules laid down in Article 31 VTC.
Agreements reached or instruments adopted in connection with the conclusion
of the Treaty or the adoption of Community legislation, subsequent agree-
ments on interpretation and subsequent state practice (Article 31(2)(a) and (b)
and (3)(a) and (b) VTC) are denied any rôle. 
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The working of international asylum law in
European law
In this Chapter, I discuss whether and how far the Member States and
Community institutions are bound to comply with international law on asylum
when they adopt or apply European asylum law. Most international asylum
law consists of treaty law binding the Member States (cf. paragraph 1.4.1). In
paragraph 2.1, I address the question whether the transfer of powers on asy-
lum matters to the Community (or the Union) has affected the scope or con-
tent of the Member States’ obligations under international law, and how the
Member States should solve conflicts between their obligations under
European law and those under international asylum law. In paragraph 2.2, I
address the various ways how international law may work in the Community
legal order: as treaty or customary law, as general principles of Community
law or by reference to primary or secondary Community law. In paragraph 2.3,
the Charter of Fundamental Rights (and its successor, Part II of the
Constitution for Europe) is addressed as far as its provisions have bearing on
rights or obligations under international asylum law. Each paragraph ends with
a summary of conclusions; in paragraph 2.4, I make some concluding obser-
vations. 
2.1 The Member States as states party to international
treaty law
2.1.1 The Vienna Treaty Convention rules on treaty conflicts
Pacta sunt servanda
[79] By the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Member States transferred powers on
asylum to the European Community. Did the transfer of power on asylum to
the European Community have consequences for the scope of the Member
States’ obligations under international asylum law? Relevant international law
suggests that the Member States’ obligations under international law remained
unaltered after the conclusion or entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
According to the basic rule on the issue, pacta sunt servanda, states must
keep to their agreements.1 Changes to international asylum law can be brought
only by the consent of all Contracting states, not by a treaty that only some of
those states conclude among each other. It is well-established customary law
that pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt, that is 
“[a] treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State with-
out its consent.”2
The states party to the Treaty on European Community form only a minority
of the states party to the Refugee Convention, the Convention Against Torture,
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or even the European Convention
of Human Rights. No consent was asked from, let alone granted by the other,
“third” states for any change to obligations under these instruments when the
Treaty of Amsterdam was concluded. Therefore, the obligations of the
Member States under the relevant treaties on asylum remained unaltered after
the conclusion or entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam.3
Conflicts
[80] Thus, the Member States must comply with their obligations under inter-
national asylum law and these obligations are not altered by the Treaty of
Amsterdam. But at least in theory, obligations under European asylum law
may diverge from those under international asylum law. As a consequence,
Member States may face conflicts between European asylum law and interna-
tional asylum law. In this paragraph, I will discus the rules on conflicts
between European asylum law and international asylum law. The matter
addressed here should be distinguished from the one addressed in Chapter 2.2:
the question whether and if so, to what extent the Community is bound to com-
ply with international law on asylum. That issue affects not only the acts of
Community organs, but also acts of Member States as “executive agents” of
the European Community. In this paragraph, I discuss the impact of
Community law on the obligations of the Member States under international
law, that is, in their capacity as states party to the instruments of international
asylum law. 
From the point of view of international law, in case of a conflict between an
obligation under Community law and an obligation under, say, the Refugee
Convention, the supranational character of the former is, in itself, not relevant:
the conflict concerns obligations under two competing treaties, two instru-
ments of international law. For relevant rules we may therefore turn to the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The applicability of these rules to
the issue at stake presents no problems, as they codify, at least partially, cus-
tomary law and international case-law.4 Further, the relevant rules are recog-
nised and applied by the Court of Justice (see number [88]).
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[81] The Vienna Treaty Convention provision that deals with treaty conflicts is
Article 30. It states different rules for different types of conflict, using two
parameters to distinguish types of conflict. First, the identity of the
Contracting states involved - are they party to the same treaties or not? We
observed above that apart from the Member States, many other states are party
to the relevant instruments of international law. The second parameter con-
cerns the “antecedence” of the concerned treaties, i.e. the question of which
treaty was first. In our case, the antecedence does not present many problems.
The relevant point in time is the moment of ratification of the treaty text.5
Competence on asylum was transferred to the Community by the Treaty of
Amsterdam, concluded on 2 October 1997, and, where the new Member States
are concerned, by the treaties on their accession, concluded on 16 April 2003.6
All Member States were party to the Refugee Convention, the Covenant, the
Convention Against Torture and the European Convention of Human Rights
well before the relevant moment, save for Belgium and Ireland – they had
signed but not ratified the Convention Against Torture (see for the conse-
quences of this belated ratification number [89]). 
[82] From the perspective of international treaty law therefore, European asy-
lum law stems from a treaty to which the international asylum law instruments
are anterior agreements, to which third states are party. Article 30 VTC offers
explicitly or implicitly two ways of solving conflicts in such a situation. 
First, solution of the conflict by means of conciliatory interpretation, which
is addressed in paragraph 2.1.2. Second, application of rules of precedence
laid down in one of the concerned treaties. Rules on precedence may work in
two ways. A rule may require precedence over other rules (see paragraph
2.1.3), or a treaty may grant precedence to other treaty law, that is, state that
in case of a conflict with another treaty, the latter prevails. The Treaty on
European Community indeed states such a rule, which is discussed in para-
graph 2.1.4. In paragraph 2.1.5 I will address what happens if none of these
devices solve the conflict. In paragraph 2.1.6, I discuss the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights on conflicts between the European
Convention and Community law.
2.1.2 Conciliatory interpretation
[83] According to Article 30(2) VTC,
“When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be consi-
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dered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that
other treaty prevail.”
Article 307 TEC expressis verbis states that the provisions of the Treaty on
European Community do not affect certain anterior agreements (see para-
graph 2.1.4). Brownlie and Mus argue, however, that in the absence of such an
explicit provision (or if such a provision does not apply), the solution of
Article 30(2) VTC may also apply: in case interpretation of a treaty leads to
the conclusion that it cedes precedence to another treaty.7 Although the text of
the Vienna Convention does not necessarily imply so, it certainly does not rule
out this wider scope.8 Moreover, the Article’s position immediately before the
Articles 31 and 32 on treaty interpretation imply that Article 30(2) VTC may
apply and the preparatory works, especially the International law Commission
(henceforth also: ILC) reports put it beyond doubt.9
[84] Does the treaty on European Community grant precedence to the instru-
ments of international asylum law in this implicit way? Here, the references to
relevant international law in the Articles 6(2) TEU, 63 under (1) and 63 second
last clause TEC are of interest. According to these provisions, the Community
“respects” relevant human rights law, legislation based on Article 63(1) must
be “in accordance with” relevant international law and legislation based on
Article 63(3) and (4) TEC must be “compatible” with international agree-
ments. Scope and content of the commitment to international asylum law pur-
suant to these Treaty provisions will be discussed in more detail below (para-
graphs 2.2.4 and 2.2.5). At present, we are concerned with the light these pro-
visions shed on the intentions of the Member States as masters of the Treaty
on European Community. By means of these references, they very explicitly
affirmed their anterior obligations under international asylum law:10 they did
not intend that the transfer of obligations would impair those international law
obligations.
2.1.3 Jus cogens 
[85] Precedence for rules of international law may be claimed by the instru-
ment that states the rule.11 The treaties relevant for asylum do not contain
clauses that require precedence. Rules of international asylum law may never-
theless enjoy precedence pursuant to general international law if they rank as
peremptory norms, or jus cogens.
According to Articles 53 and 64 VTC, a treaty that is in conflict with an
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anterior or posterior “peremptory norm” or rule of jus cogens is void. A
peremptory norm is defined as 
“a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States
as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can
be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having
the same character”.12
Requisite for a jus cogens norm is hence a twofold opinio juris: firstly, a vast
and representative majority of states must consider that the rule is binding, and
secondly, they must hold that the rule does not allow for derogation. 
[86] Do rules of international law relevant for asylum fulfil these require-
ments? A few authors argue that Article 33 RC does so.13 Assuming that
Article 33 RC has been accepted by the international Community as a whole,14
we should consider the other requirement for peremptory character: that it
does not allow for derogation. There are two reasons for considering that
Article 33 RC does allow for derogation. First, Article 33(2) RC allows for
refoulement of refugees who are a danger to national security or public order.
Allain states that these exceptions do not deny peremptory character to the
provision, as states should observe the principle of proportionality when they
apply these exceptions.15 Even if it were true that a proportionality test
applies,16 this would rather indicate that the rule is not peremptory, for, accor-
ding to the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, applicability of a pro-
portionality test to a provision precludes jus cogens character.17 No jus cogens
“core” can hence be distinguished within Article 33 RC.18
And second, there are not sufficient indications of opinio juris that the pro-
vision does rank as jus cogens. As far as I know only one has explicitly
expressed the opinion that the rule has peremptory character.19 The other indi-
cations for opinio juris that have been adduced are not convincing.20
In summary, there are not sufficient grounds to assume that Article 33 RC
has peremptory force. 
2.1.4 Article 307 TEC
[87] Pursuant to Article 30(2) VTC, when a treaty states that “it is not to be
considered as incompatible with an earlier or later treaty”, the other treaty has
precedence. According to Article 307 TEC, 
“The rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before 
1 January 1958 or, for acceding States, before the date of their accession,
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between one or more Member States on the one hand, and one or more third
countries on the other, shall not be affected by the provisions of this Treaty.”21
Obligations flowing from certain earlier agreements under international law
hence enjoy precedence over obligations under Community law. The provision
may therefore be relevant for conflicts between European asylum law and
international asylum law, but, in order to assess how relevant, we must address
two issues. First, the scope of agreements under international law to which the
provision applies. Second, the scope of rights and obligations under Article
307 TEC. 
Scope of anterior agreements
[88] The rule of precedence laid down in Article 307 TEC applies to “agree-
ments”. The Court of Justice has never ruled on the applicability of the provi-
sion to agreements on asylum or even agreements on human rights. But
according to its well-established case-law, 
“Article 234 [now 307, HB] of the Treaty is of general scope and applies
to any international agreement, irrespective of subject-matter, which is
capable of affecting application of the Treaty”.22
Hence, international asylum law is not excluded ratione materiae from the
scope of the provision. 
The provision grants precedence to “agreements” dating from before the
entry into force of the Treaty on European Community in 1958, as far as the
original six Member States are concerned. This time limit seems to exclude
application of Article 307 TEC to the 1967 Protocol to the Refugee
Convention, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (concluded in 1966),
and the Convention Against Torture (concluded in 1984). But arguably, read in
the context and to object and purpose and in the light of relevant rules of inter-
national law, Article 307 TEC cedes precedence to agreements that are anterior
to the Treaty of Amsterdam (concluded in 1997). According to Article 307
TEC, for states that later acceded to the European Community, the relevant
date is the date of accession. This shows that the relevant moment is not the
date of birth of the European Economic Community, but the moment of trans-
fer of power to it. Holding otherwise would create an odd asymmetry in the
application of Article 307 TEC between the six original Member States and
those that acceded later – an unreasonable result. 
Further, it follows from case-law of the Court of Justice that 
“the purpose of the first paragraph of Article 234 [now 307, HB] of the
Treaty is to make it clear, in accordance with the principles of internatio-
nal law (see, in that connection, Article 30(4)(b) of the 1969 Vienna
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Convention on the Law of Treaties), that application of the EC Treaty is not
to affect the duty of the Member State concerned to respect the rights of
third countries under a prior agreement and to perform its obligations
thereunder.” 23
Article 30 VTC is, according to its heading, concerned with successive treaties
relating to the same “subject matter”. Thus, the purpose of Article 307 TEC is
to make “clear” that application of the Treaty on European Community does
not affect the duty to perform under a “prior agreement” on the same subject
matter.
It is therefore the transfer of competence on the relevant “subject matter”.
Another outcome would be incompatible with the principles of international
law concerned here, pacta sunt servanda and pacta tertiis nec nocent nec pro-
sunt. When concluding agreements with the Member States on issues that lie
outside the scope of competence of the European Community, third states do
not have to reckon with an eventual future transfer of power on that issue to
the European Community.
In sum, where the competencies on asylum are concerned, Article 307 TEC
should be read as follows. For the ten Member States that acceded on 1 May
2004, Article 307 TEC cedes precedence to agreements that they concluded
before that date (or to which they acceded before that date). According to
Article 307 TEC read in its context, to object and purpose and in conjunction
with the relevant principles of international law, for the other fifteen Member
States the relevant date is 1 May 1999, the entry into force of the Treaty of
Amsterdam. 
[89] Which of the instruments of international asylum law were concluded
before 1 May 1999, or 1 May 2004, as far as the ten new Member States are
concerned? All twenty-five Member States were party to the Refugee
Convention, the 1967 Protocol, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the European Convention on Human Rights before 1 May 1999.24
As to the Convention Against Torture, all Member States were party to it
before 1999, except for Belgium and Ireland that ratified it only on 25 July
1999 and 11 May 2002. This begs the question whether the latter two states
can invoke Article 307 TEC and withdraw from Community law obligations if
they collide with their obligations under this Convention. The Court of Justice
has never ruled on the question at which moment exactly an agreement is
“concluded” for the purposes of Article 307 TEC. Belgium and Ireland signed
the Convention Against Torture already in 1985 and 1992.25 The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties does not define the term “conclusion”, but
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it follows from Article 8 read in conjunction with Article 7 VTC that the term
“conclusion” encompasses the “adoption” or the “authentification” of the
agreement.26 And according to Article 18 VTC,
“A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose of a treaty when: […] (b) it has expressed its consent to be bound
by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the treaty and provided that
such entry into force is not unduly delayed”. 
It follows that Belgium and Ireland had obligations towards (among others)
non-Member States flowing from the Convention Against Torture before the
entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam. In accordance with the applica-
ble rules of international law, Article 307 TEC therefore also cedes precedence
to the Convention Against Torture where Belgium and Ireland are concerned. 
Scope of obligations under Article 307 TEC
[90] What does the precedence that Article 307 TEC grants to anterior agree-
ments entail? According to the first paragraph of the provision, “rights and
obligations” flowing from these agreements are not “affected” by the Treaty.
The “rights” are those of third states, not rights that Member States have under
the anterior international agreement; correspondingly, the “obligations” meant
in the Article are those of the Member States.27 If the obligation concerns the
granting of rights to individuals, the latter can rely on the provision on the
same footing as third states: 
“since the purpose of the first paragraph of Article 234 [now 307, HB] is
to remove any obstacle to the performance of agreements previously con-
cluded with non-member countries which the accession of a Member State
to the Community may present, it cannot have the effect of altering the
nature of the rights which may flow from such agreements. From that it fol-
lows that that provision does not […] adversely affect the rights which indi-
viduals may derive from such an agreement.”28
It follows that if a rule of European asylum law “adversely affects” an alien’s
rights deriving from international asylum law, he can ensure performance of
those rights by appeal to Article 307 TEC.
[91] Remarkably, Article 307 TEC, first paragraph, also entails obligations for
the European Community. In Burgoa the Court considered that Article 307,
read to its purpose, imposes upon the Community institutions the obligation
“not to impede” the Member States’ obligations under prior international
agreements.29 To be sure, the Community does not take over the Member
States’ obligations under these agreements30 (the topic to be discussed in para-
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graph 2.2.1). The obligation is restricted to taking due account of those prior
obligations under international law.
[92] Finally, in what sense does Article 307 TEC protect rights derived from
international agreements from being “afflicted” by Community law? The
Court of Justice ruled in Lévy that when confronted with colliding obligations,
the domestic court 
“is under an obligation to ensure that [the directive provision concerned] is
fully complied with by refraining from applying any conflicting provision
of national legislation, unless the application of such a provision is neces-
sary in order to ensure the performance by the Member State concerned of
obligations arising under an agreement concluded with non-member coun-
tries prior to the entry into force of the EEC Treaty”.31
Thus, in case of a conflict, the Community law obligation does not apply. The
extent of the obligation under the anterior agreement, and hence the existence
of a collision, are to be decided upon by the domestic court, not by the Court
of Justice.32
[93] It appears that Article 307 first paragraph grants precedence to virtually
all international asylum law, and that aliens can hence rely on international
asylum law in case of a collision with Community law. There are, however,
two caveats. First, according to the second paragraph of Article 307 TEC, 
“To the extent that such agreements are not compatible with this Treaty, the
Member State or States concerned shall take all appropriate steps to eli-
minate the incompatibilities established.”
In Commission v Portugal, the Court of Justice ruled that this obligation to
“take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities established” may
under circumstances entail a duty to adjust or, if necessary, even denounce the
anterior agreement.33 Thus, in case of a collision of Community law with
instruments of international law that the Member States cannot solve in any
other way, Member States may face the obligation to “adjust” or denounce
those instruments. But such a situation is not likely to occur with the present
state of European asylum law, as it implies few, if any obligations for the
Member States that conflict with their obligations under international law (see
number [675]). Moreover, we should note that the Court speaks of the obliga-
tion to denounce as a way to solve the conflict “that cannot be excluded”,
hence as an ultimum remedium. Furthermore, the case of Commission v
Portugal concerned an agreement binding only one Member State, and more-
over an agreement that had adverse effects on the freedom of movement. Most
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international asylum law binds all Member States, and is not in opposition to
but rather reinforced by primary Community law (Articles 6(2) TEU and 63(1)
TEC). Therefore, when a collision between Community law and asylum law
threatens to occur, the obligation of the Community “not to impede” perfor-
mance by the Member States of their obligations under international asylum
law becomes especially prominent. 
Secondly and importantly, it may be argued that Member States cannot
invoke Article 307 TEC when their obligations under international law collide
with obligations that flow from legislation adopted on the basis of in particu-
lar Article 63(1) TEC. This issue will be discussed in paragraph 9.4. 
2.1.5 Insoluble conflicts
[94] In case the above-mentioned devices for solving conflicts do not apply,
the Member States face a conflict for which international law on treaties does
not offer a solution.34 Third (non-Member) states that are party to the instru-
ments of international asylum law can require performance, according to
Article 30(4)(b) VTC:
“When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the ear-
lier one: 
[…]
(b) as between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only one
of the treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties governs their
mutual rights and obligations.”
But this circumstance does not affect the obligation to perform under the
Treaty, for Article 30(5) VTC stipulates that 
“Paragraph 4 is without prejudice to (…) any question of responsibility
which may arise for a State from the conclusion or application of a treaty,
the provisions of which are incompatible with its obligations towards
another State under another treaty”. 
So it follows from the rules on conflict laid down in the Vienna Treaty
Convention that in case of a conflict between European law and international
asylum law that cannot be solved by conciliatory interpretation or by Article
307 TEC, the Member States are responsible under both treaties.
In the absence of international law that solves this type of conflict, the mat-
ter is left to domestic law. One way out of this predicament might be political
negotiations. The Soering case provides for an example.35 Jens Soering had
committed murder in the USA, for which he could be sentenced to death, and
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fled to the United Kingdom. The United States required his extradition from
the United Kingdom under an extradition agreement between the two states.
The European Court of Human Rights however ruled that as a result of extra-
dition, Soering ran a real risk of being exposed to death row, which would
amount to a breach of Article 3 ECHR (). Hence, the United Kingdom faced
a treaty conflict that could not be solved by application of the Vienna Treaty
Convention: it was bound to observe the European Convention and hence not
to extradite Soering, but the United States could require performance under
the extradition agreement, which was not affected by the UK’s ratification of
the European Convention. Eventually, the United Kingdom obtained the com-
mitment from the United States that Soering would not be exposed to death
row, which allowed it to extradite the man without violating Article 3 ECHR.
In other cases, such a solution may not be at hand and the Member State
that faces the conflict may have to decide to comply with one treaty and vio-
late the other one. No rule of international law suggests that in such a situa-
tion it should rather comply with instruments international asylum law than
with the Treaty on European Community, or vice versa. 
2.1.6 The European Court of Human Rights
It follows from the Vienna Treaty Convention that the transfer of powers to the
Community has no consequences for the scope of the Member States’ obliga-
tions under international asylum law. Do the bodies that monitor state per-
formance under the instruments of international asylum law hold the same
view? Neither the Human Rights Committee nor the Committee Against
Torture has ever addressed the question, as far as I know. The European Court
of Human Rights on the other hand has done on several occasions, and quite
recently issued a very principled judgement on the matter: the Grand Chamber
Judgement Bosphorus v Ireland.36 Before addressing this judgement I will first
discuss the European Court’s previous rulings on the matter. 
[95] The scope of Member State responsibility under the European
Convention of Human Rights is determined by Article 1: Member States must
“secure” the rights laid down in the European Convention to persons “within
their jurisdiction”. In a number of cases, the Strasbourg organs had to decide
on complaints about acts by Member States that were conditioned by
Community law, where the involved Member States stated that they could not
be held responsible for acts of Community institutions. In the terms of Article
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1 ECHR, those states argued that these acts fell outside scope of their “juris-
diction”; in the terms of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, they
argued that the posterior Treaty on European Community had altered the
scope of their obligations under the European Convention.37
The Court addressed the matter at length in Matthews v UK.38 The act that
Mathews complained of was the refusal to register her as a voter in the elec-
tions for the European Parliament (and this refusal was allegedly in breach of
Article 3 of the First Protocol attached to the European Convention on Human
Rights).39 The decision by the UK authorities to refuse the registration was
based on an agreement (the “1976 Act”) that in its turn was based on a Council
decision and that left the United Kingdom no discretion.40 The United
Kingdom stated that the impugned act was conditioned by Community law
completely, “and could not be revoked or varied unilaterally by the United
Kingdom”; therefore, control by the United Kingdom authorities’ was not
“effective”, and for that reason did not amount to “jurisdiction” as meant in
Article 1 ECHR.41
The Court did not follow this reasoning. Having observed that the United
Kingdom exerts territorial jurisdiction in the sense of Article 1 ECHR over
Gibraltar, the Court still had to 
“consider whether, notwithstanding the nature of the elections to the
European Parliament as an organ of the EC, the United Kingdom can be
held responsible under Article 1 of the Convention for the absence of elec-
tions to the European Parliament in Gibraltar, that is, whether the United
Kingdom is required to “secure” elections to the European Parliament
notwithstanding the Community character of those elections. […] The
Convention does not exclude the transfer of competences to international
organisations provided that Convention rights continue to be “secured”.
Member States’ responsibility therefore continues even after such a trans-
fer. […] Legislation emanating from the legislative process of the
European Community affects the population of Gibraltar in the same way
as legislation which enters the domestic legal order exclusively via the
House of Assembly. To this extent, there is no difference between European
and domestic legislation, and no reason why the United Kingdom should
not be required to “secure” the rights in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 in
respect of European legislation, in the same way as those rights are
required to be “secured” in respect of purely domestic legislation. In par-
ticular, the suggestion that the United Kingdom may not have effective
control over the state of affairs complained of cannot affect the position, as
the United Kingdom’s responsibility derives from its having entered into
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treaty commitments subsequent to the applicability of Article 3 of Protocol
No. 1 to Gibraltar, namely the Maastricht Treaty taken together with its
obligations under the Council Decision and the 1976 Act.”42
Hence, the Contracting states cannot change the scope of their obligations
under Article 1 ECHR by “subsequent” agreements. If a subsequent agree-
ment entails that the state looses in fact control over an act, its control remains
nevertheless “effective” for the purposes of Article 1 ECHR. As a conse-
quence, as far as responsibility under the European Convention is concerned,
there is no difference between Community legislation and domestic legisla-
tion. 
[96] The Court adopted the same approach in a number of subsequent rulings.
Of particular interest for asylum law is the Court’s decision on admissibility
T.I. v UK.43 It concerned the decision by the United Kingdom to remove an
asylum seeker to Germany. T.I. stated that this removal was in breach of
Article 3 ECHR, as it was likely that Germany would expel him to Sri Lanka
where he would suffer inhuman or degrading treatment or torture. The United
Kingdom held that it could rely on the Dublin Convention, according to which
Germany would examine the case; it was therefore certain that the prohibition
of refoulement ex Article 3 ECHR would be observed. The European Court of
Human Rights rejected this argument:
“[w]here States establish international organisations, or mutatis mutandis
international agreements, to pursue co-operation in certain fields of acti-
vities, there may be implications for the protection of fundamental rights.
It would be incompatible with the purpose and object of the Convention if
Contracting States were thereby absolved from their responsibility under
the Convention in relation to the field of activity covered by such attribu-
tion (see e.g. Waite and Kennedy v. Germany judgment of 18 February
1999, Reports 1999, § 67)”.44
The last sentence is a word for word quote from the judgement Waite and
Kennedy.45 This quote is somewhat ambiguous, for in Waite and Kennedy, the
“attribution” concerned attribution of competencies and immunity to an inter-
national organisation (the European Space Agency),46 whereas in T.I. v UK the
“attribution” concerns the transfer of responsibility for the examination of the
asylum claim to another state. However this may be, the decision fits in well
with the approach adopted in Matthews. It would seem to follow that by
attributing the competence to legislate on asylum to the Community, the
Member States are not absolved from their responsibility under the European
Convention of Human Rights. 
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[97] In the judgement Bosphorus v Ireland, however, the Court ruled that
transfer of powers does after all influence the extent of Member State respon-
sibility under the Convention. The circumstances of the case were as follows.
In 1992, the Turkish firm Bosphorus had leased an aircraft from Yugoslav
Airlines. Shortly thereafter, in view of the escalating war in Yugoslavia, the
United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution calling for sanctions
against the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, inter alia impoundment of aircraft.
The European Community implemented this sanction and adopted a
Regulation that obliged the Member States to impound all aircraft owned or
controlled by undertakings from the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (such as
Yugoslav Airlines). When Irish authorities complying with the Regulation
impounded Bosphorus’ aircraft, the firm complained that its right to “peace-
ful enjoyment of its possessions” (here: enjoying the benefits from its lease)
as protected by Article 1 ECHR Prot 1 had been violated.
As to the scope of Ireland’s obligations under Article 1 ECHR, the Court
stated 
“[…] that a State’s jurisdictional competence is considered primarily terri-
torial […], a jurisdiction presumed to be exercised throughout the State’s
territory […].”47
As the act complained of was executed by “the authorities of the respondent
State on its territory”, the firm fell within Irish jurisdiction for the purposes of
Article 1 ECHR – just as was decided in Matthews. But in marked distinction
from Matthews, the Court did not proceed in Bosphorus to address the other
element of the provision, the obligation to “secure” Convention rights. It
rather observed that considerations concerning “the scope of the responsibili-
ty of the respondent state go to the merits of the complaint under Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1”. 
[98] Article 1 ECHR Prot 1 prohibits interference with the peaceful enjoyment
of one’s possessions, except (inter alia) when control of the use of a property
is necessary in the common interest. Having found that an “interference” with
Bosphorus’ right to peaceful enjoyment of its property had taken place, the
Court addressed the legal basis for this interference and found, that 
“the impugned interference was not the result of an exercise of discretion
by the Irish authorities, either under EC or Irish law, but rather amounted
to compliance by the Irish State with its legal obligations flowing from EC
law”. 48
Subsequently, it addressed the question whether or not the impoundment was
justified, that is, whether Ireland had struck a fair balance between the gene-
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ral interest and the interests of Bosphorus. The Court identified compliance
with Community obligations as the general interest pursued by Ireland. 
In order to decide whether compliance with Community obligations did
justify the interference with Bosphorus’ right to peaceful enjoyment of its
property, the Court had to “reconcile” two “positions” or rather, two compe-
ting interests: “the interest of international co-operation” and “the
Convention’s role as a “constitutional instrument of European public order” in
the field of human rights.”49
How are these interests to be reconciled? The Court states that
“In reconciling both these positions and thereby establishing the extent to
which State action can be justified by its compliance with obligations flowing
from its membership of an international organisation to which it has trans-
ferred part of its sovereignty, the Court has recognised that absolving
Contracting States completely from their Convention responsibility in the
areas covered by such a transfer would be incompatible with the purpose
and object of the Convention: the guarantees of the Convention could be
limited or excluded at will thereby depriving it of its peremptory character
and undermining the practical and effective nature of its safeguards ([…]
Waite and Kennedy, at § 67). The State is considered to retain Convention
liability in respect of treaty commitments subsequent to the entry into force
of the Convention […; emphasis added, HB].”50
[98a] Thus far, the reasoning seems quite similar to that in Matthews and Waite
and Kennedy: the Member States are and remain liable under the European
Convention when they apply Community law that leaves them no discretion (in
the terms of Matthews: over which they exert no effective control). There is how-
ever an important modification. In Waite and Kennedy and T.I. v UK, the Court
ruled that a transfer of powers could not “absolve” the Member States from their
obligations under the Convention.51 In contrast, in the above-cited consideration
in Bosphorus the Court states that Member States are not completely absolved
from their Convention obligations when complying with Community law – but
they may be partially absolved. Indeed, the Court does draw a distinction
between “full responsibility” and partial responsibility. Member States are “fully
responsible” inter alia when they implement Community law that leaves them
some discretion52 - in the terms of Matthews, when they keep (a certain amount
of) effective control. But if Community law leaves them no discretion, their
responsibility is partial – as in the case of Bosphorus.
What does this partial responsibility entail? 
“In the Court’s view, State action taken in compliance with such legal obli-
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gations is justified as long as the relevant organisation is considered to pro-
tect fundamental rights, as regards both the substantive guarantees offered
and the mechanisms controlling their observance, in a manner which can
be considered at least equivalent to that for which the Convention provides
[…].If such equivalent protection is considered to be provided by the
organisation, the presumption will be that a State has not departed from the
requirements of the Convention when it does no more than implement legal
obligations flowing from its membership of the organisation. However, any
such presumption can be rebutted if, in the circumstances of a particular
case, it is considered that the protection of Convention rights was manifest-
ly deficient.”53
Thus, if and in so far as the Community legal order provides for protection of
fundamental rights that is “equivalent” to that under the European Convention,
Member States are absolved from their responsibility, their obligations under
that Convention, unless the applicant can show that in the particular circum-
stances of his case this protection was “manifestly deficient”. 
[98b] The notion of “equivalent protection” as applied by the Court in
Bosphorus addresses both material guarantees and protection mechanisms,
i.e. judicial control over compliance with those guarantees. The material fun-
damental rights standards that apply within the Community legal order are
addressed in paragraph 2.2, the Community system of judicial control in
Chapter 9. I will therefore address the “equivalent protection” criterion and its
application later, in paragraph 9.5.2. Here, we are concerned with the implica-
tions of the Bosphorus judgement for the effect of Community law obligations
on the scope of Member States’ obligations under the European Convention. 
Bosphorus endorses the pacta tertiis rule (cf. number [80]) as the basic rule
on the relation between obligations under the European Convention and those
under the Treaty on European community: Member States are “considered to
retain Convention liability in respect of treaty commitments subsequent to the
entry into force of the Convention”.54 But complaints of breaches of
Convention rights by Member State acts complying with Community obliga-
tions that leave no discretion are susceptible to review only if they meet the
“manifest deficiency” test. As this test does not apply to complaints of other
acts by the Member States, or to any act by Contracting parties that are not
Member States of the European Union, the subsequent treaty did bring change
to state responsibility under the European Convention. 
Does this change detract from the basic principle, the pacta tertiis rule?
One may maintain that this conditional suspension of responsibility under
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Convention does not alter content or scope of the Member States’ commit-
ments under the ECHR, as the condition (the equivalent protection) requires
that those obligations are materially complied with. Arguably, though, this
view is flawed. In Bosphorus the Court states that for the purposes of the
“equivalent protection” criterion, 
“By “equivalent” the Court means “comparable”: any requirement that the
organisation’s protection be “identical” could run counter to the interest of
international co-operation pursued.”55
The pacta tertiis rule however requires that protection of Convention rights
should remain unaltered, hence “identical” after the transfer of power to the
Community. Arguably, then, the very notion of “equivalent protection” is at
odds with it. And in paragraph 9.5.2, I will argue that the same holds true for
its application by the Court - “protection” of fundamental rights in the
Community is not even “comparable” to that under the Convention.
[98c] In summary, it follows from Bosphorus that obligations under
Community law do affect Member States’ responsibilities under the
Convention. The implications of this judgement for European asylum law are,
however, very modest for two reasons. First, the restriction on Member States’
responsibilities formulated in Bosphorus applies only when Community law
leaves Member States no discretion – as we will see, a type of case that could
only very rarely, if ever, occur under present European asylum law (cf. num-
ber [223]). Second, it is unclear whether the “equivalent protection” approach
would also apply to the Convention provision most relevant for asylum law –
Article 3, the prohibition on (expulsion resulting in) ill treatment. In
Bosphorus, the Court first establishes that an interference with the applicant’s
right has taken place. Here, the scrutiny is full – the European Court does not
apply a “manifest deficiency” test to the qualification of the Member State‘s
act as an interference. Subsequently it addresses Ireland’s duty to comply with
Community legal obligations (that partially absolve Ireland from its responsi-
bility under the Convention) as a justification for the interference. According
to well-established case-law, the prohibition laid down in Article 3 ECHR is
“absolute”: once it has been established that a state “interfered” with this right,
no justification is possible. Obviously, in Article 3 ECHR cases the Court
could apply the “equivalent protection” approach to the determination of the
scope of responsibility under Article 1 ECHR. But if so, why does the defini-
tion of scope in Article 1 ECHR not apply in case Article 1 of Protocol 1
ECHR is appealed to? Should we infer that the scope of responsibility under
Article 3 ECHR is different from the one that applies to right to enjoyment of
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property? Whatever the answer may be, it is clear that the definition of
Member States’ responsibilities under the Convention set out in Bosphorus
cannot simply be transposed to refoulement cases. 
2.1.7 Conclusions
[99] In this paragraph, I have addressed the question of whether the scope of
obligations of the Member States under international law is affected by the
transfer of powers to the Community by the Treaty of Amsterdam. All instru-
ments of international asylum law are anterior to the Treaty of Amsterdam,
and non Member States are party to them. It follows from international treaty
law that the conclusion of the Treaty of Amsterdam therefore could not alter
scope or content of obligations under the former instruments. The matter may
be different however as far as the European Convention of Human Rights is
concerned. It follows from the European Court of Human Rights’ judgement
Bosphorus that as the Community provides for human rights protection that is
“equivalent” (in fact, “comparable”) to that under the Convention, member
states are responsible under certain Convention provisions for acts that imple-
ment Community law that leaves them no discretion only if in the particular
circumstances of the case, human rights protection was manifestly deficient.
It is unclear whether or not this reasoning applies to the prohibition of refoule-
ment ex Article 3 ECHR. Moreover, there is little if any European asylum law
that does not leave discretion.
For practical purposes, two rules of treaty law are relevant. First, Article
30(2) VTC read in conjunction with Articles 6(2) TEU and 63 under (1) and
second last clause TEC implies that European law on asylum should be inter-
preted in accordance with international human rights law. Second, Article 307
TEC grants precedence to agreements that are anterior to the Treaty of
Amsterdam (or to the treaties of accession for the Member States that acced-
ed later) - in fact, to all treaties relevant for international asylum law. Article
307 TEC has the effect that third states party to such anterior agreements, as
well as individuals who derive rights from those agreements, can rely on those
agreements. Article 307 TEC enables the Member States to comply with their
international asylum law obligations, and entails for the Community itself the
obligation “not to impede” such performance. To a very considerable extent,
Article 307 TEC seems to solve conflicts that may emerge between European
and international asylum law. 
However, the provision may not solve any conflict where European asylum
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law is involved. Then, Member States are responsible under both treaties – a
situation for which the Vienna Treaty Convention does not offer a solution. 
For the present, conflicts between international and European asylum law are
highly improbable. One reason is that the concerned rules of international law
work within the Community legal order. To a considerable extent, Community
law sustains rather than impedes Member States’ performance of international
asylum obligations. How international asylum law works within the
Community legal order is the subject of paragraph 2.2. Another reason is the
character of most European asylum law: it states ‘minimum standards’ that
cannot impose obligations that conflict with obligations under international
law, as we will see in paragraph 3.4. 
2.2 The working of international asylum law within the
Community legal order
[100] In the previous paragraph, we discussed how far the Member States are
bound by international asylum law when they act within the sphere of
Community law, according to the rules of treaty law. The discussion therefore
concerned scope and content of their responsibility in their capacity as sub-
jects of international law. In the present paragraph, we will discuss to what
extent the Community is bound to comply with international asylum law. The
discussion concerns obligations that rest on Community institutions, such as
the Council and the Commission, but also obligations for the Member States
as executive organs of the Community, when they implement or apply
Community law. 
The discussion is structured as follows. In paragraph 2.2.1 I discuss how far
the Community as a subject of international law must comply with rules of
international law on asylum. It concerns the working of international treaty
law and customary law within the Community legal order, as well as substitu-
tion of Member States’ obligations under international law by the Community.
As we will see, the scope of obligations of the Community as a subject of
international law on asylum is very modest.
Therefore, other ways in which international law may affect Community
law must be addressed. Article 63 TEC requires that asylum measures based
on its paragraphs (1) and (3) are “in accordance” or “compatible” with inter-
national asylum law. No such reference applies to Article 63(2) TEC, but
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general principles of Community law imply similar obligations. As the well-
established case law of the Court of Justice sheds light on the references to
international law in Article 63 TEC, the discussion of these general principles
in paragraph 2.2.2 precedes the discussion of Article 63 TEC, in paragraph
2.2.3. Obligations by virtue of references to international law in secondary
Community law are briefly addressed in paragraph 2.2.4, and alternative models
for construing obligations of the Community under international law in para-
graph 2.2.5.
2.2.1 Effect as international law 
International law has effect within the Community legal order in various ways.
First of all, the Community is bound by treaties to which it is party. Secondly,
it can become bound to treaties to which all Member States are party. And
thirdly, certain rules of customary nature bind the Community.
Treaty law
[101] As the Community has legal personality,56 it is able to conclude agree-
ments under international law. But it did not accede to any instrument of inter-
national law relevant for asylum. Treaties to which the Community has not
acceded do not serve as a source for review of legality of Community acts.57
Hence, individuals cannot invoke rules of international asylum law on this
footing against Community acts.
[102] Could the European Community accede to the relevant treaties in the
future? At present, accession is not possible. All relevant treaties allow only
states as parties, not international organisations.58 Besides, the Court of Justice
has stated that the Treaty on European Community should make explicit pro-
vision for accession to the European Convention of Human Rights, which the
present Treaty does not. 59
But in the future, this may change, as far as the European Convention of
Human Rights is concerned. After the entry into force of the 14th Protocol, the
European Convention of Human Rights will be open for accession by the
Union.60 And according to Article 9(2) of the Constitution for Europe,
“The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.”
Would the Union be competent to accede to other instruments of international
asylum law as well? According to an explanation to Article 9(2) CfE from the
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Praesidium of the Convention that drafted it, the provision does not imply that
the Union could never accede to other human rights treaties.61 Still, amend-
ment of those treaties would be necessary to make accession of international
organisations possible. 
Substitution
[103] For the present as well as the near future, then, the Community is not
bound under international treaty law to any of the instruments of international
asylum law. But by substitution, the Community can take over rights and obli-
gations flowing from treaties to which the Member States are party. In the case
of International Fruit III, the Court of Justice ruled that 
“in so far as under the EEC Treaty the Community has assumed the powers
previously exercised by Member States in the area governed by the General
Agreement, the provisions of that agreement have the effect of binding the
Community”,
although it had not signed this instrument.62 The Court based its conclusion
that “substitution” of the Member States by the Community had taken place
on two grounds. First, the Member States’ apparent willingness to bind the
Community to the GATT and second, the apparent acceptance of the
Community by the other states party to the GATT (not part to the EC).63
The willingness to bind the Community appeared from the complete and defi-
nite transfer of power on the subject matter covered by the GATT (international
trade) in the Treaty on European Community.64 Article 110 TEC(old) showed that
the establishment of the Community pursues the objectives of the GATT, and the
intention of the Member States to bind the Community further followed from
declarations to that effect to the other states party to the GATT.65 That the other
states party to the GATT had accepted the Community as a party, followed from
their “recognition” and from the fact that they accepted that the Community
appeared in negotiations on agreements within the GATT framework.66
[104] Is the Community bound to international asylum law by substitution
according to the conditions set by the Court in International Fruit? As to the
first condition, Article 63(1) first clause TEC requires that measures on asy-
lum be “in accordance with the [Refugee Convention]”. This clause bears wit-
ness to a willingness on the part of the Member States to bind the Community
to international asylum law; so the first of the two criteria in International
Fruit seems satisfied. Still, in this respect a major difference with the GATT
situation must be noted. The transfer of power on asylum measures is far from
complete. In most of these areas concerning asylum, the Community is com-
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petent to adopt only “standards”, which implies that the competence to grant
asylum and so on has not been transferred. Most of those standards are “mini-
mum standards” at that, which implies that Member States remain competent
to set additional domestic standards (see numbers [218], [256]- [258]). Article
63(1) TEC is therefore not indicative of the will of the Member States to
impose upon the Community the obligations they have under international
asylum law, for example, to make sure the principle of refoulement is respec-
ted throughout the European Union. 
Will this be different under the Constitution for Europe? The scope of
Union competence on asylum matters in the Constitution for Europe is con-
siderably broader than the present scope of Community powers on the matter,
but not complete (cf. number [231]). In particular, Article 266(2)(g) explicit-
ly states that examination of requests is the “responsibility” of Member States,
not of the Union (cf. number [240]). Hence, the Constitution does not express
the will of the Member States that the Union takes over their responsibilities
under international asylum law.
As to the second requirement, there is no indication whatsoever that the
third states party to the relevant instruments of international law accepted sub-
stitution of the Member States’ obligations to the Community. The
Community never played any role in any of the conventions on asylum, nor in
the bodies linked to those conventions. It follows that the EC is not bound to
international asylum by substitution. 
Several authors have proposed variants of the substitution model according to
which the Community is bound to comply with international law. These are
not reflected in the case law of the Court of Justice. They will be discussed in
par. 2.2.5.
Custom 
[105] Rules of international customary law do work within the Community
legal order. In its judgement Van Duyn, the Court observed that
“it is a principle of international law, which the EEC Treaty cannot be
assumed to disregard in the relation between Member States, that a state is
precluded from refusing its own nationals the right of entry or residence”.67
Thus, “principles of international law” which primary Community law “can-
not be assumed to disregard” can be invoked. This reading is confirmed in
Foglia, where the Court stated that
“in the absence of provisions of Community law on the matter, the possi-
bility of taking proceedings before a national court against a Member State
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other than that in which that court is situated depends both on the laws of
the latter and on the principles of international law”.68
In Poulsen, the Court went one step further.69 In this case on the territorial
scope of a regulation on the conservation of fisheries resources, the Court
observed that
“the European Community must respect international law in the exercise of
its powers and that, consequently, [the regulation provision] abovemen-
tioned must be interpreted, and its scope limited, in the light of the relevant
rules of the international law of the sea.”70
So the Community must “respect international law”. This encompasses at any
rate compliance with “customary international law”.71 The Court confirmed
this in its judgement Racke, where it stated:
“It should be noted in that respect that, as is demonstrated by the Court’s
judgment in (… ; Poulsen), the European Community must respect inter-
national law in the exercise of its powers. It is therefore required to comply
with the rules of customary international law when adopting a regulation
suspending the trade concessions granted by, or by virtue of, an agreement
which it has concluded with a non-member country. It follows that the
rules of customary international law concerning the termination and the
suspension of treaty relations by reason of a fundamental change of cir-
cumstances are binding upon the Community institutions and form part of
the Community legal order.”72
Apparently, international law that the Community must respect encompasses
provisions of treaties to which it is not party but which codify custom (Racke),
and custom that has not been codified (Poulsen). 
[106] What are the consequences of this case law for European asylum law?
It may be assumed that the prohibition of refoulement is a rule of internatio-
nal custom (cf. number [19]). Insofar as Articles 33 RC, 3 CAT, 7 CCPR and
3 ECHR express this rule of custom, they would apply within the Community
legal order. But the scope and content of this customary rule of non-refoule-
ment is indeterminate (number [19]). In Racke, the Court of Justice stated that 
“because of the complexity of the rules in question and the imprecision of
some of the concepts to which they refer, judicial review must necessarily,
and in particular in the context of a preliminary reference for an assessment
of validity, be limited to the question whether, by adopting the suspending
regulation, the Council made manifest errors of assessment concerning the
conditions for applying those rules.”73
The content of the prohibition of refoulement laid down in treaty law suffers
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far less from this “imprecision”, not in the least because of clarifications by
treaty monitoring bodies. As we will see in the following paragraphs, through
Articles 6(2) TEU and 63(1) TEC international treaty law on asylum serves
very much as a standard for secondary Community law. 
Conclusions
[107] The European Community is not bound to apply treaty law on asylum
as it is not party to the relevant instruments. Nor has the Community taken
over the relevant obligations from the Member States: the conditions set for
such substitution in International Fruit are not met. Thus, there is no indica-
tion the third states party to the relevant conventions accepted the European
Community as a party. Moreover, the transfer of power on asylum by the
Treaty of Amsterdam (and the constitution for Europe, as to the Union) is only
partial, and not complete, as International Fruit requires. 
But it follows from the case law of the Court of Justice that the Community
is bound to observe international custom (Poulsen). Hence, the customary pro-
hibition of refoulement works within the Community legal order in its capa-
city as international law. 
2.2.2 General principles of Community law
2.2.2.1 Introduction 
[108] According to well-established case law of the Court of Justice, secon-
dary Community law must comply with “general principles of Community
law” that reflect international human rights law. The Court started testing
Community measures to fundamental rights in the 1970’s.74 At that time, the
Treaty on European Community did not contain any provisions relating to
human rights. The absence of Community law standards of human rights
became problematic as the number of complaints that Community measures
infringed on basic human rights that were protected under domestic or inter-
national law grew. Some domestic courts gave signs that if Community pro-
tection of human rights was absent, they were ready to offer this protection
themselves. Evidently, testing Community law to fundamental rights in
domestic constitutional law would threaten the uniform application of
Community law.75 The Court of Justice reacted by developing the concept of
human rights protection as a principle of Community law. According to now
firmly established case law of the Court, 
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“fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of
Community law whose observance the Court ensures. For that purpose, the
Court draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the
Member States and from the guidelines supplied by international treaties
for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have col-
laborated or of which they are signatories. The European Convention of
Human Rights has special significance in that respect.”76
Thus, in an appeal against Community law for alleged infringement upon
human rights, only Community principles, not provisions from domestic (con-
stitutional) law or international law can be invoked. As sources of “inspira-
tion” for those Community principles however those domestic and internatio-
nal law provisions can in fact be invoked indirectly.
[109] The Court never indicated the Treaty basis of these Community princi-
ples. In academic writing the term “law” in Article 220 (ex 164) TEC has been
suggested.77 Since the Treaty of Amsterdam,78 primary Community law does
offer an explicit basis. According to Article 6 TEU, 
“(2) The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they
result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as
general principles of Community law”,
and Article 46 TEU provides that 
“The provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Community
[…] concerning the powers of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities and the exercise of those powers shall apply only to the
following provisions of this Treaty: […] (d) Article 6(2) with regard to
action of the institutions, insofar as the Court has jurisdiction under the
Treaties establishing the European Communities and under this
Treaty”. 
Thus, since 1999 primary European law offers a basis for testing Community
acts to human rights. Do these provisions limit the Court’s jurisdiction? In
some respects Article 6(2) TEU has a narrower scope than the Community
principles as established by the Court had (cf. numbers [110] and [113]).
Possibly, the Contracting states intended to reduce the scope of sources for the
case-law of the Court of Justice on human rights by phrasing Article 6(2) as
they did. If so, the Luxembourg Courts have not followed this lead. According
to Luxembourg case-law, these codifications “embody”79 or “reaffirm”80 the
principles of human rights protection set out in its case-law, and the Courts
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apply these principles in the same way as they did before the entry into force
of Article 6(2) and 46(d) TEU. 
The case law on general principles has raised much comment.81 For the present
study, three topics are of particular interest. First, the scope of international
law the Court applies. Article 6(2) TEU mentions only one instrument of inter-
national law, the European Convention of Human Rights. Is scrutiny therefore
restricted to the European Convention? This issue will be discussed in para-
graph 2.2.2.2. The second topic that deserves attention is the scope of the
Court’s scrutiny. Obviously, acts by Community institutions are under human
rights review from the Court. But Member States acts may also be subject to
that review. The limits of the application of Article 6(2) TEU to Member
States’ acts will be discussed in paragraph 2.2.2.3. The third issue concerns the
extent to which the relevant norms must be complied with. The Treaty speaks
of “respect” for the European Convention of Human Rights, which might
imply an obligation falling short of compliance. This issue will be discussed
under paragraph 2.2.2.4. In paragraph 2.2.2.5 the main conclusions of the pre-
ceding paragraphs are summarised. 
2.2.2.2 Sources 
[110] Which rights are protected as “general principles of Community law”?
Article 6(2) TEU refers to two sources of human rights law: “fundamental
rights, as guaranteed by” the European Convention of Human Rights and
“constitutional traditions common to the Member States”. The provision does
not explicitly require respect for fundamental rights laid down in the Refugee
Convention, the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and the Convention
Against Torture. But before the entry into force of the provision, the Court
occasionally invoked provisions from other treaties than the European
Convention82 and it still feels free to do so:
“According to settled case-law, fundamental rights form an integral part of
the general principles of law observance of which the Court ensures. For
that purpose, the Court draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions
common to the Member States and from the guidelines supplied by inter-
national treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member
States have collaborated or to which they are signatories. The ECHR has
special significance in that respect” [emphasis added; HB].83
Indeed, for example the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights has been
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applied since the entry into force of Article 6(2) TEU.84 Consequently, notwith-
standing the wording of Article 6(2) TEU, all “international treaties for the
protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or
to which they are signatories” supply guidelines for the formation of the
Community law fundamental rights. 
[111] Which of the provisions of international law concerning asylum identi-
fied in Chapter 1.3.2 as the framework for European asylum law could consti-
tute fundamental rights whose observance the Court ensures? Well-established
are general principles on effective judicial protection, which are inspired by
Articles 6 and 13 ECHR (see paragraphs 6.3.1 and 9.1.2). The other provisions
of international asylum law never figured in the Court’s case-law. But in other
connections, the Luxembourg Courts addressed the European Convention and
the Protocols attached to it as well as the Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights85 as sources of fundamental rights. It was safe for the Court to base itself
on them, as at the time of the concerned rulings all Member States were party
to those conventions. The Refugee Convention and the Convention Against
Torture have never been adduced as sources of fundamental rights before the
Luxembourg Courts. But as all Member States are bound by them, nothing hin-
ders their application. Hence, all rules of international law on asylum may
serve as sources of inspiration for general principles of Community law.
[112] Could the other source of inspiration for general principles of communi-
ty law, constitutional traditions common to the Member States, also be of rele-
vance for asylum? In one respect, they may. In 2002, from the then fifteen
Member States,86 ten explicitly recognise a right to territorial asylum, and at
least five of them laid down this right in their constitution.87 The explicit recog-
nition of the right to asylum in Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
may be read as a “reaffirmation” of this tradition (cf. number [159] below). 
2.2.2.3 Scope of application
[113] According to Article 46(d) TEU, the powers of the Court of Justice apply
“only” to Article 6(2) TEU “with regard to actions of the institutions, insofar
as the Court has jurisdiction under the Treaties establishing the European
Communities and under this Treaty”. Thus, the Court is competent to test deci-
sions, regulations, directives and measures sui generis adopted by Community
institutions to general principles of Community law.
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Article 46(d) TEU does not explicitly confer a competence to the Court of
Justice to apply Article 6(2) TEU to Member States’ acts. But before as well
as after the entry into force of the provision, the Court did apply Community
principles on fundamental rights to Member States’ acts. Apparently, Article
46(d) only partially codifies the Court’s case law, analogous to the situation
with the scope of Article 6(2) TEU.88 The scope of application as to Member
States’ measures therefore has to be assessed on the basis of the Court’s case
law.89
Which Member State acts fall within the scope of the Court’s review of
compliance with fundamental rights? The Court itself has applied various
terms when defining the area of Community human rights review: “field of
Community law”,90 “scope of Community law”,91 and “field of application of
Community law”.92 It did not, however, indicate how the “field” and “scope”
of Community law relate. In the English language version of some of its case-
law the Court applied only the term “scope”, whereas other language versions,
notably the French, retain the distinction between the “field of application”
(“cadre du droit communautaire”) and the “scope” (“champ d’application”).93
It seems that the terms are applied interchangeably.94 At any rate, the Court has
never attached legal consequences to this distinction. Below, I will not distin-
guish between field and scope but apply the term “scope”.
If the Court’s terminology may be somewhat unclear, two categories of
Member State acts to which the Court of Justice applies the Community prin-
ciples can be neatly distinguished. First, Member State acts that serve to exe-
cute Community rules, and second, Member State acts that infringe upon the
market freedoms.95 I will discuss both categories subsequently below.
Review of implementation acts
[113] In the first situation, Member States act as “agents” or the “executive
branch” of the Community.96 In Wachauf, the Court ruled that Community
principles concerning human rights do apply when Member States implement
Community rules. The case concerned a regulation for milk quotas, providing
for financial compensation if a farmer stops producing milk. The regulation
stated that if a tenant farmer (lessee) applied for compensation, the lessor
should give written consent. Wachauf was a lessee whose landlord had never
contributed to the milk production, but refused to give consent. The German
Federal Office refused compensation. The Court of Justice ruled that 
“Community rules which, upon the expiry of the lease, had the effect of
depriving the lessee, without compensation, of the fruits of his labour and
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of his investments in the tenanted holding would be incompatible with the
requirements of the protection of fundamental rights in the Community
legal order. Since those requirements are also binding on the Member
States when they implement Community rules, the Member States must, as
far as possible, apply those rules in accordance with those requirements”.97
Thus, the Member States are bound to apply the Community principles when
they implement Community rules.98
The rationale for this extension of the scope of application of Community
principles seems obvious. If review of compliance with these principles were
restricted to Community measures, it would be quite easy for the Member
States, the executive organs, to evade them when they implement those mea-
sures, and thus, in many cases, render the protection afforded by those princi-
ples meaningless. The Court could have relied on application of domestic or
international human rights law provisions to the implementing measures by
the domestic courts (for to be sure, the Court in fact applies the Member
States’ own human rights standards to their own acts!). But if the Court had
left this test to domestic courts, it would not have had any certainty that the
states would apply these standards, and that they would equal the protection
afforded by the Community principles. Moreover, leaving the matter to
domestic law would threaten the uniform application of the concerned mea-
sures.99
[114] The obligation to comply with Community principles on fundamental
rights applies not only to regulations (as in Wachauf), 100 but also to legislation
implementing directives 101 and even opinions leading to a commission deci-
sion.102 Does it matter for the application of Community principles how much
discretion the rule of Community law leaves the Member States? 103 I don’t think
so. The question of compatibility with Community principles in Wachauf could
come up only because the regulation did leave the Member States considerable
discretion on attribution of the compensation to lessees. For if the regulation had
mandated the deprivation, the regulation itself would have been found incompa-
tible with the concerned Community principle.104 And it follows from the judge-
ment Fogasa that even if implementation is left explicitly to the Member States,
it falls within the scope of Community law.105 This case concerned a directive on
the protection of employees in the case of insolvency, which obliged the
Member States to “take the measures necessary to ensure that guarantee institu-
tions guarantee payments” in case of insolvency of an applicant’s employer.
Under Spanish law, employees could only get payments determined by judicial
decision from the guarantee institution. This Spanish rule was challenged suc-
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cessfully for breach of the Community principle of equality - although the direc-
tive explicitly left the definition of the term “payment” to national law. Thus, dis-
cretion is not a hindrance to application of Community principles to Member
States’ acts. The only thing that matters is whether or not the national measure
falls within the scope of the Community rule. 
[115] Hence, the scope of review of implementation acts by Member States to
general principles of Community law depends on the scope of application of
the Community measure concerned. How must this scope be delimited? The
Court’s reasoning in Maurin offers some guidance.106
Maurin was charged with selling food after the expiry of the use-by date.
He stated that the domestic criminal proceedings that followed were in breach
of some procedural right protected by the European Convention of Human
Rights. The referring French court asked the Court of Justice whether the rele-
vant French criminal law was compatible with the relevant Community law
principles. Thus, the Court of Justice had to decide whether or not the natio-
nal legislation fell within or outside the scope of Community law. It assessed
the scope of the invoked Community measure, the directive on the labelling of
foodstuffs, in two steps. First, it observed that the directive represented,
according to its Preamble, 
“the initial stage of a harmonization process which is designed pro-
gressively to eliminate all obstacles to the free movement of food-
stuffs resulting from the differences […] with respect to the labelling
of those products.”107
Secondly, it observed that the directive provided that the use-by date must be
indicated on food-stuffs, but that the directive contained no provisions on sale
of foodstuffs complying with the provisions on labelling. It concluded that the
national legislation concerned fell outside the directive’s scope and hence, the
scope of Community law. 
Hence, the limited degree of harmonisation envisaged by the directive
restricted its scope to the issues it explicitly addressed. And as we will see,
most of European asylum legislation is likewise explicitly restricted in scope.
For example, the prohibition on expulsion ex Article 3 ECHR for “humanita-
rian” reasons as meant in the judgement D v UK by the Strasbourg court is not
addressed by the Community rules on interpretation and application of Article
3 ECHR (see number [296]). In view of the degree of harmonisation that the
Community measure seeks to establish, we must assume that humanitarian
cases fall as yet outside its scope, and hence outside the scope of Community
law (see number [678]). 
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In summary, general principles of Community law apply to Member State acts
that serve to implement or apply Community law. Whether or not the rule of
Community law leaves discretion is not relevant for the applicability, but the
degree of harmonisation that the Community rule is intended to establish, is. 
Review of restrictions on the “common market freedoms”
[116] The second category of Member States’ measures that fall within the
scope of Community human rights review concerns restrictions on the free-
dom of movement of capital, goods, services and persons in the European
Union, the so-called “common market freedoms”. Member State rules that
restrict or obstruct these freedoms are allowed for only when they are justified
by the Treaty on European Community. For example, the freedom of move-
ment of workers entails that workers have the right to travel from one Member
State to another and stay there for the purposes of seeking employment, but
this right may be subjected “to limitations justified on grounds of public poli-
cy, public security or public health”.108 In the ERT case and subsequent case-
law, the Court of Justice ruled that restrictions to common market freedoms
must also be “compatible with the fundamental rights the observance of which
the Court ensures”.109 Thus, a domestic measure that is not based on a provi-
sion of Community law, and hence is not an implementation act, is neverthe-
less subject to review of compliance with general principles if it constitutes a
restriction to a common market freedom.
ERT and subsequent case-law on the matter have inspired diverging inter-
pretations. The most radical view was presented by Coppell and O’Neill, who
inferred from ERT that the Court of Justice no longer observes “any distinc-
tion between Community acts and Member State acts, in relation to funda-
mental rights protection”. 110 Thus, the mere fact that a Member State measure
is at variance with Community human rights would already suffice to bring it
into conflict with Community law and, as far as that conflict is concerned,
within the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction.
Other authors have pointed out that the present case law of the Court offers
little if any ground for such a broad application of Community principles.111 It
follows from this case-law that the national measure can be tested against
Community principles only if a “connection […] sufficient to justify applica-
tion of Community principles” can be established.112 The case of Kremzow
provides for an example. Kremzow was an Austrian judge who had murdered
a lawyer. He held that the criminal proceedings against him in Austria were not
in accordance with Articles 5 and 6 ECHR. He stated that the Court of Justice
had jurisdiction on the matter, as his detention affected his right to freedom of
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movement ex Article 18 TEC. The Court of Justice however held that “a pure-
ly hypothetical prospect of exercising” the right to freedom of movement did
not establish the required connection with Community law, and his case there-
fore fell outside the scope of Community law.113
Thus, a solid connection with the market freedoms is required to bring a
national measure within the scope of application of Community principles. 
[117] Could such a solid connection be established in asylum cases? For asy-
lum, the relevant common market freedoms would be the freedom of move-
ment for persons. But the personal scope of this freedom is restricted to
Member State citizens (and third country nationals affiliated to them).114 I can
not think of circumstances in which infringements on a third country natio-
nal’s rights under international asylum law might impede an EU citizen’s fun-
damental freedoms. Therefore, it is unlikely that the Court’s jurisdiction over
the compatibility of restrictions on common market freedoms with fundamen-
tal rights will have major consequences for review of domestic acts in the
realm of asylum. 
Conclusions
[118] It follows from Article 46(d) TEU and relevant case-law that all acts by
Community organs must be compatible with general principles of Community
law. Regulations, directives, decisions and other acts by Community institu-
tions concerning asylum matters are subject to judicial review as to their com-
pliance with international asylum law. Further, Member State acts are also sub-
ject to review of compliance with the general principles when they fall “within
the scope” of Community law. National legislation that implements directives,
legislation that falls within the scope of regulations or directives, and enforce-
ment of Community law provisions all fall within the scope of Community law.
The degree of discretion that the relevant piece of Community legislation
leaves the Member States does not affect the applicability of Community prin-
ciples on human rights. But if Community legislation explicitly limits its ambi-
tions to initial harmonisation, review of domestic legislation is limited to areas
explicitly addressed by the Community legislation.
It is most unlikely that national measures on asylum for third country
nationals can be construed as restrictions on common market freedoms.
Consequently, it is unlikely that the Court is competent to review the compli-
ance of national measures with principles of Community law on this basis.115
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2.2.2.4 The intensity of the test
[119] In the previous paragraphs (2.2.2.2 and 2.2.2.3), we saw that all provi-
sions of international law that concern asylum can be ‘sources’ for the
Community principles, and that those principles must be applied to both
Community measures on asylum as well as to Member State acts implemen-
ting such measures. In the present paragraph, I will discuss to what extent pro-
tection by Community principles covers protection offered up to the standards
of international law .
The extent to which acts within the scope of Community law must comply
with international human rights law is somewhat uncertain, due to the wording
employed in the Court’s case-law. This wording is a cause for uncertainty in
two respects. First, the Court does not apply international law, but rather “prin-
ciples” based on it. Secondly, according to Wachauf and later case-law, the
Court applies these principles “as far as possible”. I will first discuss the vari-
ous conclusions that may be drawn from these phrasings, and then take a look
at the way in which the Court of Justice in practice treats international treaty
law, with special attention for the role assigned to the case law of the European
Court of Human Rights. 
The phrasing of the test
[120] Article 6(2) TEU demands the Community to “respect fundamental
rights, as guaranteed by the” European Convention of Human Rights. The
Court’s standard phrase is more ambiguous:
“[…] fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of
law observance of which the Court ensures. For that purpose, the Court
draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the
Member States and from the guidelines supplied by international treaties
for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have col-
laborated or to which they are signatories. The ECHR has special signifi-
cance in that respect.”116
It might be inferred from this wording that human rights protection as offered
by the Court necessarily falls short of human rights protection under the men-
tioned international treaties. The Court does not apply, but “draws inspiration
from” the “guidelines” those conventions supply; the European Convention of
Human Rights merely has “special significance” in that respect.117 Moreover,
according to several authors the transformation of international human rights
law to “principles” entails dilution of the protection those rights offer.118 An
analogy may be drawn to the distinction between principles and custom (or
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treaty law): though binding, international principles are not as clear-cut as cus-
tom. For example Besselink contends that no matter how strictly the Court of
Justice may base its findings on actual formulations of human rights in for
example the European Convention, 
“[t]here remains a qualitative difference between, on the one hand, a gene-
ral principle which must inherently suffer exceptions and, on the other hand,
well-defined fundamental rights which may be restricted only under speci-
fied circumstances. […] With general principles of law […], even if its has
been established that a certain case falls within the scope of the relevant
principle, a court has to determine the weight of the principle should be in
the light of the other competing principles […., emphasis added, HB]”.119
According to this view, “general principles” by their very nature allow for
balancing human rights with competing principles (the common market free-
doms, for example) in cases where the underlying provisions of international
law do not. 
[121] It is however questionable whether such a conclusion can be based
exclusively on the mere phrasing by the Court. In the case of Steffensen, the
Court stated that
“[…] according to settled case-law, fundamental rights form an integral
part of the general principles of law whose observance the Court ensures
(see, inter alia, [Wachauf, Connolly v Commission and Roquette Frères]).
According to the Court’s case-law, where national legislation falls within
the field of application of Community law, the Court, in a reference for a
preliminary ruling, must give the national court all the guidance as to inter-
pretation necessary to enable it to assess the compatibility of that legisla-
tion with the fundamental rights - as laid down, in particular, in the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms - whose observance the Court ensures [emphasis
added, HB].”120
And in Akrich, it observed that respect for family life as laid down in Article
8 ECHR
“is among the fundamental rights which, according to the Court’s settled
case-law, restated by the preamble to the European Single Act and by
Article 6(2) EU, are protected in the Community legal order [emphasis
added, HB].”121
So, acts within the Community legal order must be “compatible” with rights
laid down in the European Convention of Human Rights; these are “protected”
within the Community legal order. The references to “settled case-law” in both
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Akrich as well as Steffensen show that these cases do not entail a deviation
from the jurisprudential line indicated above.122 Rather, these cases show that
a shorthand rendering of the Court’s case-law indicates a relationship between
Community principles and international human rights law, which is not that
loose at all. At any rate, it suggests that the laborious definition of the effect
of the European Convention of Human Rights within the Community legal
order does not or not necessarily imply that those rights can be balanced
against competing principles. 
[122] In Wachauf, the Court stated that Member States implementing
Community rules must “as far as possible” apply those rules in accordance
with the requirements of the protection of fundamental rights.123 According to
Coppell and O’Neill, this shows that fundamental rights serve “only as a prin-
ciple of interpretation, and only to the extent that this is compatible with the
wording of the Community legislation.”124 Other commentators however
argued that this does not necessarily follow from the Court’s reasoning in
Wachauf. Duijkersloot suggests that the words “as far as possible” refer
instead to the scope of discretion Member States have.125 Weiler and Lockhart
point out that fundamental rights do indeed function as principles of interpre-
tation, but that this does not exclude that they function as principles of valida-
tion of the relevant rule of Community law. In other words, the quoted phrase
does not obstruct invalidation of the measure involved by the Court if it found
that there is no way to interpret that measure without violating human rights.126
The wording of the Court of Justice, therefore, does not allow for definite
conclusions as to the extent to which fundamental rights laid down in interna-
tional conventions have to be observed. To assess the level of protection
offered by Community principles, we therefore have to examine the applica-
tion of international law provisions in the Court’s case law. As far as interna-
tional human rights law is concerned, only the European Convention of
Human Rights offers sufficient material from which to draw conclusions. 
The actual test
[123] Viering conducted an investigation of this issue in 1998 on the basis of
about 40 judgements issued by the Court of Justice on appeals to provisions
of the European Convention of Human Rights. He found that when it applied
Community principles, the Court of Justice drew inspiration from those pro-
visions, but at least occasionally made use of criteria that diverge from those
laid down in the European Convention of Human Rights. But this does not
necessarily mean that the level of protection is lower. Viering found that where
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comparison of judgements issued by the Court of Justice with judgements
from the European Court of Human Rights is possible, the outcomes do not
differ markedly.127
In its more recent case-law, it seems that the Court quite scrupulously tests
against Community principles, in full accordance with the criteria laid down
in the provisions of the European Convention as well as the relevant
Strasbourg case-law. More restrictive readings of European Convention provi-
sions by the Court of Justice seem to be unintentional.128 Well-known is the
case of Hoechst, where the Court of Justice had to decide whether or not the
protection of the home ex Article 8 ECHR applies to undertakings, and con-
cluded that it did not.129 Three years later, however, the European Court of
Human Rights came to the opposite conclusion in its judgement Niemietz.130
The Court of Justice had to address the same issue again nine years later in
Roquette Frères. It considered that
“For the purposes of determining the scope of that [general principle of
Community law] in relation to the protection of business premises, regard
must be had to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights sub-
sequent to the judgment in Hoechst. According to that case-law, first, the
protection of the home provided for in Article 8 of the ECHR may in cer-
tain circumstances be extended to cover such premises […] and, second,
the right of interference established by Article 8(2) of the ECHR ‘might
well be more far-reaching where professional or business activities or
premises were involved than would otherwise be the case’ (Niemietz v.
Germany […] § 31).131
Thus, “regard must be had to the case-law of the European Court of Human
Rights”. It follows from Roquette Frères that the Strasbourg case-law may be
relied upon, regardless of previous deviating rulings by the Court of Justice.
Indeed, in much of its recent case-law on human rights, the Court of Justice
explicitly and extensively refers to the case-law of the European Court of
Human Rights.132
As to the other bodies connected with instruments of international asylum
law, the Court of Justice involved in its reasoning, as far as I know, only views
of the Human Rights Committee. The Court did so in the case of Grant v.
South-west Trains, wherein Grant relied on the meaning of a Covenant provi-
sion as interpreted by the Human Rights Committee. The Court dismissed the
reading; it noted that the Committee’s views have no binding force and that the
Committee had not stated any reasons for its reading.133 As we saw in Chapter
1.4.2.2, the Committee’s views indeed lack binding force, and therefore derive
their relevance from the quality of their reasoning.134 The Court of Justice’s
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assessment of their relevance is hence well in line with relevant international
law. 
Application of the European Convention of Human Rights by the Court of
Justice? 
[124] In summary, the Court of Justice does not balance human rights with
competing principles such as the market freedoms, and it does not (willingly)
depart from readings of the Convention rights by the European Court of
Human Rights to the detriment of individuals. Can we conclude that testing
against fundamental principles of Community law, inspired by the European
Convention of Human Rights, in fact entails application of Convention provi-
sions? Vermeulen observes that many ECHR provisions are inapt for direct
application within the Community legal order as they do not set homogeneous
standards.135 Thus, many provisions such as Article 8 ECHR, allow the states
a certain ‘margin of appreciation’ for the assessment of the necessity of
restrictions. As a consequence, the same type of rule may be appreciated dif-
ferently in several states. One state may accept it if it is in accordance with the
minimum level of protection prescribed in Strasbourg case-law, whereas
another state may reject it as incompatible with the European Convention on
the basis of an optimising interpretation. This differential approach is however
hard to reconcile with the tenet of uniform application of Community law. The
Court of Justice avoided such problems by testing against ‘general principles
of Community law’ instead of applying ECHR provisions.136
Hence, we cannot equate the testing to against general principles that are
inspired by ECHR provisions with application of those provisions. This obser-
vation does not detract from the findings above. In particular, it does not imply
that the Court of Justice would allow a broader margin of appreciation for the
Member States under a general principle than the relevant provision of the
European Convention of Human Rights would. 
Conclusion
[125] What, then, is the material scope of the general principles of Community
law that are based on the Member States’ obligations under international
human rights law? The Court persistently emphasises that the Community is
not bound by the European Convention of Human Rights and other relevant
treaties: it does not apply their provisions, but rather “draws inspiration” from
them when formulating “principle”, not rules of Community law concerning
human rights. Moreover, these principles have to be complied with only “as
far as possible”. But paraphrases of this test by the Court of Justice itself on
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the other hand suggest that there is little if any difference between application
of principles of Community law and application of the corresponding interna-
tional law norms. 
Where it comes to the Court of Justice’s practice, it appears that in the past
both method and criteria that the Court applied at least occasionally diverged
from the wording of Convention provisions, and from the application by the
European Court of Human Rights. In recent case law however the Court of
Justice seems to follow the Strasbourg case-law. As far as is relevant for asylum,
application of general principles of Community law in practice leads to results
equivalent to application of the concerned human rights law provisions.137
2.2.2.5 Conclusions
[126] The well established practice of the Court of testing acts within the
sphere of Community law to human rights through general principles of
Community law finds an explicit basis in the Articles 6(2) and 46 TEU. The
scope of adjudication is broader than these provisions suggest. It follows from
the Court’s case law that “respect” is required not only for the European
Convention of Human Rights, but for the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights too. The Court’s criteria suggest that the Convention Against Torture
and the Refugee Convention can serve as sources of inspiration for general
principles of Community law as well. All international asylum law can there-
fore serve as basis for those principles.
All acts by Community institutions must comply with general principles of
Community law, as Article 46(d) TEU requires. Further, Member State acts
within the scope of Community law are subject to such review. In the realm of
asylum law, it concerns Member State acts that implement or apply
Community legislation on asylum. Whether or not an act by a Member State
implements or applies Community legislation (and hence falls within the
scope of review of compatibility with general principles) depends on the scope
of the relevant Community legislation. The circumstance that a rule of
Community law leaves the Member States (some) discretion in a certain
respect does not remove that aspect from the scope of review of compatibility
with the general principles of Community law. It follows from Maurin that
explicit limitation of harmonisation ambitions leads to a correspondingly
restricted scope of review. 
Finally, it appeared that the test against standards that general principles on
human rights set amounts to application of the treaty provisions that
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“inspired” them. In particular, the case-law of the European Court of Human
Rights serves to define scope and content of the Community principles. 
2.2.3 Article 63 TEC 
[127] International law on asylum may have effect within the Community
legal order by virtue of the direct references to it in Article 63 TEC. Measures
on asylum that are adopted on the basis of Article 63(1) TEC must, according
to the first clause of the provision, be “in accordance with the [Refugee
Convention] and other relevant treaties”. According to the second last clause
of Article 63, 
“Measures adopted by the Council pursuant to points 3 and 4 shall not pre-
vent any Member State from maintaining or introducing in the areas con-
cerned national provisions which are compatible with this Treaty and with
international agreements.”
These explicit requirements of “accordance” and “compatibility” with inter-
national asylum law have no precedents in either the Treaty on European
Community or the Treaty on European Union.138 The Court of Justice has not
yet ruled on it. Scope and meaning of the clause therefore have to be assessed
on the basis of the context as well as by analogy with the established case law
on human rights. 
I will subsequently address which instruments of international asylum law
are relevant, the scope of application of these provisions and the intensity of
review that they require, all as compared to the general principles of
Community law.
Relevant treaties and agreements
[128] Article 63(1) TEC, first clause demands compliance with an open group
of treaties: apart from the Refugee Convention, all “other relevant treaties”.
These treaties should be relevant for “asylum”, more specifically the subject
matter listed in 63(1)(a) till (d) TEC. All instruments of international asylum
law that were mentioned in paragraph 1.4 may be “relevant” for legislation
pursuant to Article 63(1) TEC.139
Hailbronner points out that treaties to which not all Member States are
party are not included, as it would be most unlikely that Member States wan-
ted to bind the Community to obligations they did not take upon themselves
under international law.140 Does this bar application of (otherwise relevant)
international law on asylum? 
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All Member States ratified the instruments of international law relevant for
asylum, but Belgium and Ireland ratified the Convention Against Torture only
after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam (cf. number [89] above).
As the purpose of the requirement of accordance with “relevant treaties” is the
prevention of conflicting obligations, treaties that entered into force for all
Member States after the Treaty of Amsterdam should also be regarded as
“relevant” for the purpose of Article 63(1). We may further observe that not
only treaties to which the Member States are signatories, but also “treaties on
which the Member States have collaborated” serve as sources of inspiration
for general principles of Community law (see number [110]). 
Arguably, the requirement of “compatibility” with international agree-
ments likewise concerns agreements that are “relevant” for the subject matter
mentioned under 63(3) and (4) TEC. The requirement is relevant for rules on
safe third countries and secondary rights of refugees, including claims to
family reunification, as these are all based on Article 63(3)(a) (cf. number
[201]). The prohibitions of refoulement and the Refugee Convention are rele-
vant treaty law for rules on the safe third country, Article 8 ECHR for family
reunification and procedural standards if they are implied by measures on
these issues. 
Scope of application
[129] Which acts fall within the scope of Article 63(1) TEC? It follows from
the text that all measures adopted by Community institutions on the basis of
Article 63(1) TEC must be in accordance with international asylum law. Does
this wording exclude application to Member States’ actions?141 Here, the scope
of application of Community fundamental rights must be taken into account.
We have seen that the Court has held since Wachauf, that Member State acts
that implement or apply Community law fall within the scope of Community
law, and must therefore comply with general principles of Community law. It
should be noted that the ground for the application of Community principles
to Member State acts is the circumstance that these acts implement or apply
Community law.142 The Court has continued to do so although Article 46(d)
TEU explicitly speaks of testing “action of the institutions” of the Community
to Article 6(2) TEU. The reason for this extension of the scope of application
of general principles of Community is the unity in application of Community
law (cf. number [113]). 
Arguably, the same reasoning applies to the requirement of “accordance”
with the Refugee Convention and other relevant treaties. Thus, measures
adopted by Member States to apply regulations or directives as well as
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enforcement action by Member States fall within the scope of review under
Article 63(1) TEC. 
[130] Article 63 second last clause TEC defines the scope of acts that must be
“compatible” with international treaty law differently: 
“Measures adopted by the Council pursuant to points 3 and 4 shall not pre-
vent any Member State from maintaining or introducing in the areas con-
cerned national provisions which are compatible with this Treaty and with
international agreements”. 
It follows from the text that “national provisions” must be compatible with
international law, and it would appear that the Court of Justice is competent to
review this compatibility. The text of the provision does not explicitly address
compatibility of acts by Community institutions with international law. 
Hailbronner argues that the Court of Justice can review neither acts by
Community organs nor Member State acts as to their compatibility with inter-
national agreements as meant in Article 63 final clause. As to review of
Member State acts, he states that it is unlikely that the Member States intended
to establish jurisdiction for the Court of Justice competing with that of the bod-
ies monitoring those agreements, or to establish such competence as to agree-
ments that do not provide for judicial review themselves.143 However, Article
6(2) jo 46(d) TEU very explicitly reaffirms the Court’s case-law on human
rights that competes with the supervision by the European Court of Human
Rights. And Article 63(1) TEC obviously renders the Court of Justice compe-
tent to review compliance with the Refugee Convention and other treaties that
do not provide for similar judicial review. Moreover, we should observe that the
clause requires compatibility “with this Treaty and with international agree-
ments”. Obviously, compatibility of Member State legislation with the Treaty
on European Community is under review by the Court. Exclusion of such
review as to international agreements cannot be reconciled with the text of the
clause. Finally, if the compatibility of neither Community action nor Member
State acts with international agreements can be reviewed, the question is what
meaning the reference could have. In summary, we may assume that the Court
of Justice is competent to review the compatibility of “national provisions” as
meant in Article 63 second last clause TEC with “international agreements”.
[131] As to review of Community acts, Hailbronner states that
“taking into account the language of Article 63(1) ECT and Article 6(2)
TEU whereby the Community is bound to respect the standards contained
in international agreements it must be concluded a contrario that delibe-
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rately Member States have not included a similar clause into the second
paragraph of Article 63 ECT. Accordingly, the Community is not bound by
the agreements in question.”144
Thus, whereas the text of Article 63 second last clause TEC does not require
that Community institutions are bound by international agreements, it follows
from an a contrario reading of the context that this omission was intentional
and serves to preclude that Community institutions are bound by that interna-
tional law.
But arguably, this a contrario reasoning is not conclusive. Article 6 TEU
does not address Community (or Union) institutions in particular, but “the
Union” in general, which may encompass next to Community institutions the
Member States as executive agents of the Union. It is true that Article 46(d) TEU
restricts review of compliance with Article 6 TEU to acts by Community insti-
tutions, but we saw that in fact the review of compliance with Article 6 TEU by
the Court of Justice encompasses Member State acts as well. Thus, the context
shows that the absence of an explicit reference to acts by Community institu-
tions is not conclusive: this review might be implied. And there are grounds to
assume that it is indeed implied by Article 63 second last clause TEC. 
One of the objectives of Community action pursuant to Article 63 TEC is
“safeguarding the rights of third country nationals” (see number [175]). Rules
of Community legislation based on Article 63(3) TEC serve this objective (cf.
number [254]). Arguably, the review of compatibility with international agree-
ments does so as well. If so, review of acts by Community institutions is
necessarily implied. We should observe that Member States are bound to com-
ply with general principles of Community law because these principles apply
to Community rules [cf. number 113]. The Court of Justice’s competence to
review compatibility of “national provisions” with international law would
lack any justification if it could not exercise the same review of the
Community acts from which those national provisions deviate. Besides, the
Court could hardly review compliance of Member State acts with internatio-
nal law if it could not review Community acts. If a directive based on Article
63(3) TEC imposes an obligation that “prevents” the Member States acting
under their international agreements, those Member States could maintain leg-
islation at variance with that directive pursuant to Article 63 second last
clause. The Court of Justice, called upon to assess the conformity of the
national provisions in question with Community law, would have to assess
whether the directive does indeed prevent the Member State acting under the
“agreements”. In fact, it would have to assess whether or not the directive
imposes obligations that are incompatible with the agreements, that is, assess
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the “compatibility” of the directive with international law. Hence, these agree-
ments necessarily function as a standard of review for Community measures
based upon Article 63(3) and (4) TEC. 
Thus, it follows from object and purpose that Article 63 second last clause
TEC requires that Community institutions observe “international agree-
ments”. The absence of a more explicit requirement of respect is not conclu-
sive – after all, before the Treaty of Amsterdam all testing of measures to fun-
damental rights took place without an explicit Treaty basis (and the testing of
Member States’ acts to general principles of Community law still lacks this
explicit basis). 
In summary, the scope of the requirement of respect for international asylum
law in both point (1) and in the second last clause of Article 63 TEC must be
construed in the same way as the scope of application of general principles.
Both provisions apply to acts of Community institutions as well as to imple-
mentation acts of Member States. 
Accordance and compatibility
[132] Article 63(1) TEC requires that measures should be “in accordance
with” with relevant treaty law. By virtue of this reference in primary
Community law, international asylum law is a source of law within the com-
munity legal order.145 In this respect, the testing against international asylum
law under Article 63(1) differs from a testing against general principles of
Community law referring to the same rules of international asylum law. The
Refugee Convention and other relevant treaties can serve as a “source of legal
knowledge” for identifying general principles of Community law; then, inter-
national law serves as an indirect standard of decision. But pursuant to Article
63(1), they serve as a direct standard of decision.146 The wording of Article
63(1) TEC thus serves to put beyond doubt that there is no space for alterna-
tive criteria or assessment of scope of international law under Article 63(1)
TEC, for which the text of Article 6 TEU seems to allow. 
[133] As to the interpretation of the relevant rules of international law,
Hailbronner observes:
“the Court of Justice will be autonomous when interpreting the Geneva
Convention. At the same time, Member States’ practice under the
Convention will inform the interpretation of Article 63(1) ECT. When
ascertaining the meaning of Geneva Convention provisions the Court of
Justice should apply a technique similar to the elaboration of general
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principles of Community law. In that course the Court will have to con-
sider that the Geneva Convention has left state actors a large margin of
appreciation. In particular, the Court may not prefer restrictive interpre-
tations as developed by the judiciary in some Member States over inter-
pretations dominant in other Member States which have retained more
political, and administrative discretion under the relevant domestic
jurisprudence.”147
In other words, as the Refugee Convention allows a large margin of apprecia-
tion to the states party to it, the Court of Justice should do so too when asses-
sing the accordance of acts by Member States or Community institutions with
the Refugee Convention. It should therefore not impose a “restrictive” inter-
pretation, that is, subject such acts to full judicial scrutiny. 
Indeed, where the Refugee Convention does leave a margin of appreciation
to the Contracting states, these states act “in accordance” with it when they
comply with the standards set by the instrument, even though other states may
apply an optimising interpretation (cf. number [124] above). But the
Contracting states enjoy a margin of appreciation only if and in so far as it fol-
lows from the Refugee Convention. And the question whether or not the
Convention does so cannot be answered by mere reference to the practice of
some Member States. Rather, it is a matter of treaty interpretation, governed
by relevant rules of international law. As Steyn LJ put it in Adan and Aitsegur:
“the Refugee Convention must be given an independent meaning derivable
from the sources mentioned in articles 31 and 32 [VTC] and without taking
colour from distinctive features of the legal system of any individual con-
tracting state. In principle therefore there can only be one true interpreta-
tion of a treaty. [...] In practice it is left to national courts, faced with a
material disagreement on an issue of interpretation, to resolve it. But in
doing so it must search, untrammelled by notions of its national legal cul-
ture, for the true autonomous and international meaning of the treaty. And
there can only be one true meaning”.148
The Court of Justice has on numerous occasions acknowledged that interna-
tional treaties to which the Community is bound are to be interpreted and
applied according to the rules laid down in the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties.149 When it interprets the Refugee Convention pursuant to Article
63(1) TEC, it therefore will assign state practice the role that Article 31(3)(b)
VTC assigns to it. It follows that Member States can not rely on their state
practice, no matter how long standing, if it is at variance with the true mea-
ning of a Convention provision established according to the relevant rules of
the Vienna Treaty Convention. 
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[134] Arguably, the Refugee Convention does indeed leave a margin of appre-
ciation to the Contracting states in certain respects. For example, it bestows
many benefits to “lawfully present” or “lawfully staying” refugees, that is, to
refugees whose presence or stay is in accordance with domestic law (see par.
8.2.2). The Refugee Convention does not in general state when or on what
conditions the states should deem the refugee’s presence or stay as “lawful”
for the purposes of those benefits; arguably, the Contracting states enjoy a cer-
tain margin of appreciation in this respect. This margin of appreciation is
granted because the Refugee Convention endeavours to balance the burden of
protection for the states to the needs of refugees.
But in many other respects, the Refugee Convention does not leave such a
margin. In particular, the text of Article 1 RC in no way suggests a margin of
appreciation. Further, object and purpose of the Convention do not justify the
assumption that the refugee definition leaves a margin. In general, the instru-
ment serves to secure protection for refugees and to prevent the problem of
refugees “from becoming a cause of tension between States”.150 Assuming that
persons qualify for refugee status in one state but not in another would run
counter to both objectives: certain categories of aliens would be denied pro-
tection by the first state, and this in turn might lead to a heavier burden upon
the other one. 
Whether or not a person qualifies for refugee status under the Refugee
Convention is therefore subject to full judicial scrutiny. The Court of Justice
should assess the “accordance” of acts by Community institutions and
Member State with the Refugee Convention accordingly. 
[135] Like Article 63(1), the second last clause of Article 63 TEC sets inter-
national agreements as a direct standard of decision. The application of the
term “compatible” raises the question of whether a distinction from “accor-
dance” as required in Article 63(1) was intended. The term “compatible”
seems to require a lesser degree of compliance than “accordance” in 63(1)
does.151 But it is difficult to imagine what exactly this variation would entail –
one complies with an obligation, or one does not, a middle way is not easily
imaginable. It is unlikely that this terminological subtlety has practical conse-
quences. It should be remembered that the much vaguer term “respect” in
Article 6(2) TEU in fact amounts to requiring full compliance. 
Concluding remarks 
[136] Comparison of the findings on Article 63(1), Article 63 second last
clause TEC and Article 6(2) TEU gives the following results. Both references
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in Article 63 address only treaty law that binds all Member States. General
principles of Community law in contrast may also be based on treaties that do
not bind all Member State. As to the scope of application, all three apply to
acts by Community institutions as well as to Member States’ implementation
acts. 
The most important difference concerns the way in which the several pro-
visions give working to international asylum law. By requiring “accordance”
and “compatibility”, Article 63 sets international asylum law as a direct stan-
dard. Under Article 6(2) TEU, international law works only indirectly, through
general principles of Community law. The latter construction seems to allow
for some discretion. But as we saw above, compliance with general principles
entails in fact accordance with rules of international law. 
[137] Strikingly, “accordance” or “compatibility” of measures pursuant to
Article 63(2) TEC is not explicitly required. In order to properly assess the
reason for absence of such a reference in Article 63(2), we should bear in mind
that the general principles of Community law apply. Thus, accordance with
relevant international asylum law is required, but only in a less explicit way.
What could have been the reason that the Masters of the Treaty considered a
more explicit requirement unnecessary for Article 63(2) TEC? 
It is unlikely that they considered international law irrelevant for measures
pursuant to this provision.152 Temporary protection beneficiaries may be
unrecognised refugees to whom most Refugee Convention provisions apply -
among them, the prohibition of refoulement ex Article 33 RC (see paragraph
8.8.1). The Masters of the Treaty were well aware of this, as they applied the
term “refugees” in Article 63(2) TEC; likewise, the term “international protec-
tion” renders it unlikely that the relevance of “other relevant treaties” for sub-
sidiary protection was not realised.
Arguably, the reason should rather be sought in the scope of legislation that
the Masters of the Treaty expected. Article 63(1) TEC requires adoption within
five years of measures on quite detailed subject matter. Hence, a relatively
detailed legislation on matters concerning international asylum law was
expected. In order to make clear that any possible conflict with international
law should be avoided, “accordance” with relevant rules was prescribed. The
same holds true for specific issues mentioned under points 3 and 4 of Article
63, especially family reunification and repatriation of illegally present third
country nationals. Article 63(2) on the other hand requires “measures” on tem-
porary and subsidiary protection, and on burden sharing. This non-specific
description of subject matter warranted the expectation of only a modest scope
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of legislation and a modest degree of harmonisation. The chance of conflicts
with international law was therefore estimated as low, and accordance with
international law was not required in a more explicit way. 
2.2.4 References in secondary Community law
[138] Several instruments of secondary law refer to instruments of interna-
tional asylum law as a standard of decision. For example, Article 3(3) Dublin
Regulation states that “the right […] to send an asylum seeker to a third coun-
try” should be used “in compliance with the provisions of the” Refugee
Convention.153 These references make international law a direct standard of
review, in much the same way as Article 63(1) TEC does. As the relevant pro-
visions of secondary law are subject to the requirement of “accordance” in
Article 63(1) TEC, these references in secondary law are primarily of interest
for the delimitation of the scope of judicial review of this accordance (see
Chapter 9.3). 
2.2.5 Concluding remarks
[139] The norms of international law on asylum may have effect within the
Community legal order in various ways – as international customary law, as
sources of inspiration for general principles of Community law, and by virtue
of reference in primary or secondary Community law. The findings on these
matters were summarised in concluding paragraphs (numbers [107], [126],
[136] and [138]; see also par. 2.4). Here, another issue will be discussed.
The discussion of the working of international asylum law within the
Community legal order in the preceding paragraphs is entirely based on posi-
tive law. Several authors have construed alternative models according to which
the Community is bound to international law, and specifically to human rights
law. According to Lawson, these models all fall in either of two categories.154
First, the hierarchically superior status of human rights provisions. In para-
graph 2.1.3 however, we saw that no rule of international asylum law is jus
cogens.
The second category consists of succession or substitution models.
According to the succession approach, the Community is successor to the
human rights obligations of the Member States. According to the substitution
approach, the obligation to observe human rights was transferred together
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with the powers they concern, as no one can transfer more powers than he had
before.155 Both approaches therefore amount to the same thing.156 These
approaches seem the more convincing as the Court of Justice accepted the
principle of substitution in International Fruit (see par. 2.2.1). Still, applica-
tion of this reasoning at large is untenable on several grounds, so Lawson
argues.157
First, substitution and succession find no basis in international treaty law.
As we saw in Chapter 2.1.1, Article 30 VTC is based on the premise that
states can enter conflicting obligations when successively concluding
treaties. Hence, restriction of state powers by the anterior treaty does in no
way affect that state’s capacity to enter conflicting obligations in a later treaty.
Second, succession or substitution models are too static. They give no satis-
factory solution for treaty obligations engaged in by the Member States after
the transfer of power, such as the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the Protocols to the European Convention, concluded after the Treaty of
Rome of 1957. The same holds true for treaty obligations that appeared only
after the transfer of power to the Community, such as those that emanate from
dynamic interpretation of the European Convention of Human Rights by the
Strasbourg organs. This problem is even greater when it comes to the
Member States that acceded later to the Community (all relevant instruments
of international law date from before 1 May 2004). The powers they trans-
ferred when acceding were further limited by those later human rights obli-
gations, but at the same time, they could accept the complete acquis commu-
nautaire.
When it comes to asylum, we may observe that Article 63 TEC explicitly
states that European asylum law should be in accordance with relevant treaty
law. It follows that the Masters of the Treaty did not assume that the obliga-
tions under those treaties were transferred as inherent limitations to the powers
mentioned in Article 63(1), (3) and (4) TEC.
[140] Finally, case law of neither the Court of Justice nor the European
Court of Human Rights gives support for succession or substitution theories.
The latter reviews Member States’ acts within the scope of Community law
as their own acts, and holds the states fully responsible for them (cf. para-
graph 2.1.3). This approach is not compatible with the succession model. 158
As to the Court of Justice, in International Fruit it indeed accepted the prin-
ciple of substitution, but at the same time limited its application to areas
where the transfer of powers is complete. As Lawson argues, it is unlikely
that substitution effects occur in areas where this transfer is incomplete
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(such as asylum law), as Article 307 TEC addresses that situation.159 And the
Court of Justice made it quite clear in Burgoa that the Community is in no
way bound to the anterior treaty obligations of the Member States under
Article 307: 
“Although the first paragraph of Article 234 [now Article 307, HB] makes
mention only of the obligations of the Member States, it would not achieve
its purpose if it did not imply a duty of the part of the institutions of the
Community not to impede the performance of the obligations on the
Member States which stem from a prior agreement. However, that duty of
the Community institutions is directed only to permitting the Member State
concerned to perform its obligations under the prior agreement and does
not bind the Community as regards the non-member country in question.
[emphasis added, HB]”.160
Nor can the general principles of Community law concerning human rights be
based on succession or substitution theories. For the very concept is based on
the premise that constitutional traditions and human rights treaty provisions in
international law binding the Member States do not affect Community powers
on their own force. It is the general principles of Community law inspired by
them, which work within the Community legal order. We saw above (in para-
graph 2.2.2) that whereas the testing of Community acts against provisions of
the European Convention in many respects seems equivalent to application of
the latter, the Court of Justice persistently calls it application of general prin-
ciples of Community law inspired by those provisions. It may very well be that
this somewhat laborious description of the Community law basis of the test is
inspired by the wish to avoid the impression that Convention provisions apply
through succession. 
[141] If succession is not the basis for Community principles on human
rights, the question remains what their basis is. We saw that the Court of
Justice never addressed the issue. Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, Article
6(2) TEU provides for a basis. But according to the Community judiciary,
this provision merely “reaffirms” its case law on general principles (cf. num-
ber 109]). Moreover, these principles have a broader scope of sources and
application and require more intense testing than Article 6(2) and 46(d) TEU
suggest (cf. numbers [110] and [113]). As testing against human rights norms
can neither be based on the hierarchically superior position of those norms
nor on succession or substitution models, unilateral recognition of obligatory
effect by the Community as expressed in Article 6(2) TEU is the most viable
alternative.161
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2.3 The Charter on Fundamental Rights
2.3.1 Introduction
[142] At the Nice European Council in 2000, the “Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union” (henceforth: the Charter) was proclaimed.162
The whole Charter, including its Preamble has, with some amendments, been
inserted into the Constitution as its Part II. 
The Charter and Part II CfE both consist of two parts. First, material provi-
sions stating rights and obligations. Second, “General provisions governing the
interpretation and application” of these provisions (Articles 51-54 Charter, and
111-114 CfE). Guidance on interpretation and application is further provided for
by “explanations” relating to the Charter provisions that were drafted on instiga-
tion of the Presidium of the Convention that drafted the Charter. The Presidium
stated that these explanations “have no legal value and are simply intended to
clarify the provisions of the Charter”,163 but according to Article 112(7) CfE
“The explanations drawn up as a way of providing guidance in the inter-
pretation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights shall be given due regard
by the courts of the Union and of the Member States.”164
Because of this explicit reference, these “explanations” serve as means of
interpretation of the Charter provisions as laid down in the Constitution (cf.
Article 31(2)(b) VTC, see numbers [73] and [76] above).
The text of and explanations to the provisions relevant for asylum law in
the Charter do not differ significantly from their successors in the
Constitution. Therefore, I will discuss both instruments together. First, I dis-
cuss the “general provisions” that address the relation between Charter or Part
II CfE provisions and international law (paragraph 2.3.2) and those that
address their scope of application (paragraph 2.3.3). Then, I address the sub-
stantive scope of some provisions of particular relevance for asylum law: the
“right to human dignity”, “the right to asylum”, and the provisions that
address protection from refoulement (in paragraphs 2.3.4 to 2.3.6). The impor-
tant “right to an effective remedy and a fair trial” (Article 47 Charter, 107
CfE) is discussed in the context of appeal procedures, in Chapter 6.3.1. The
legal effect of the Charter is addressed in paragraph 2.3.7. 
2.3.2 General provisions on Charter provisions and international law
[143] The codification of human rights in the Charter is markedly different
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from, inter alia, the European Convention of Human Rights and the Covenant
of Civil and Political Rights in that conditions for limitation are not defined
for each right separately, but laid down in a general limitation clause that may
apply to all rights laid down in the Charter.165 It allows for limitations not pro-
vided for in the European Convention on Human Rights or other instruments
of international asylum law. But pursuant to Article 52(4) Charter (Article
112(3) CfE),
“Insofar as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaran-
teed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the
same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not
prevent Union law providing more extensive protection”. 
According to the Explanation, 
“The reference to the ECHR covers both the Convention and the Protocols
to it. The meaning and the scope of the guaranteed rights are determined
not only by the text of those instruments, but also by the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights and by the Court of Justice of the
European Union. The last sentence of the paragraph is designed to allow
the Union to guarantee more extensive protection. In any event, the level of
protection afforded by the Charter may never be lower than that guaranteed
by the ECHR.”166
Hence, Charter provisions that “correspond” with provisions of the European
Convention should be interpreted and applied in accordance with them, as
“determined” in the case law by both the European Court of Human Rights
and the Court of Justice.167 Moreover, in Article 112 CfE a new paragraph
(112(4)) was inserted, that states: 
“Insofar as this Charter recognises fundamental rights as they result from
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, those rights
shall be interpreted in harmony with those traditions”. 
Together, these provisions state the same standards for interpretation of
Charter rights as Article 6(2) TEU does for general principles of Community
law as applied by the Court of Justice. 
[144] Are the other instruments of international asylum law than the European
Convention of Human Rights also relevant for the interpretation and applica-
tion of Charter provisions? According to the Preamble (fifth recital), the rights
laid down in the Charter and Part II CfE “result” from (inter alia) “interna-
tional obligations common to the Member States”. This is in line with the
case-law of the Court of Justice on general principles of Community law (see
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number [110]). The purpose of the Charter to enhance rather than restrict
human rights protection in the Community (or the Union), further indicates a
reading of its provisions in accordance with those other instruments; the
explanation to Article 19(1) Charter (Article 79(1) CfE) confirms it.168
Finally, according to Article 53 Charter (Article 113 CfE):
“Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely
affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their
respective fields of application, by Union law and international law and by
international agreements to which the Union or all the Member States are
party, including the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by the Member States’ constitu-
tions.”
Thus, Charter provisions cannot adversely affect the working of international
asylum law within the Community or Union legal order. It follows that Charter
provisions may not be interpreted as restricting the effect of the references to
international asylum law in Articles 63 TEC (and its successor in the
Constitution, Article 266 – see paragraph 3.8.3). Further, we should note that
the provision explicitly acknowledges the relevance of “international agree-
ments to which […] all the Member States are party” for interpreting Charter
provisions. 
2.3.3 Scope of application 
[145] Article 51(1) Charter (111 CfE) defines the “field of application” as fol-
lows:
“The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions and bodies
of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the
Member States only when they are implementing Union law.”169
Charter provisions thus apply to acts by Community or Union institutions,
such as legislative acts, as well as to Member State acts when implementing
Community (or Union) law.170 According to Article 51(2),
“[t]his Charter does not establish any new power or task for the
Community [or the Union], or modify powers and tasks defined by the
Treaties”. 
According to the Explanation, this provision draws “the logical consequences”
of the subsidiarity principle and of the principle of conferral.171
Community or Union institutions and Member States when implementing
Community (or Union) law must “respect” the “rights” laid down in the
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Charter, “observe” the principles and “promote” their application. Under the
Constitution, the distinction between “rights” and “principles” is relevant for
judicial review :172 it appears that principles lack direct effect, in contrast to
“rights”.173 The provisions relevant for asylum are characterised either by the
Charter text or in the Explanation as “rights”.
2.3.4 Human Dignity
[146] Article 1 of the Charter (Article 61 CfE) reads:
“Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected”.
Several pieces of European asylum legislation explicitly seek to ensure com-
pliance with this provision (see number [254] below). The Explanation states
that “[t]he dignity of the human person is not only a fundamental right in itself
but constitutes the real basis of fundamental rights”; therefore, it “is part of the
substance of the rights laid down in this Charter” and must “be respected, even
where a right is restricted”.174 The substantive scope is hence inherently
unclear. The provision however appears to be relevant for scope and content of
secondary rights of persons in need of protection, as the Preambles to the
Directives on Qualification and Reception Standards explicitly refer to it.175
2.3.5 The right to asylum
[147] Articles 18 Charter and 78 CfE state that 
“The right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of
the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January
1967 relating to the status of refugees and in accordance with the Treaty
establishing the European Community [or with the Constitution, HB]”. 
The provision consists of two elements. First, it determines the existence of
“the right to asylum”. Secondly, it imposes the obligation to “guarantee” this
right, “with due respect for the rules of the” Refugee Convention, and “in
accordance with” the Treaty on European Community (or the Constitution). I
will first determine the substantive and personal scope of the element “right
to asylum”, and then address the scope of obligations defined by the second
and element.
Substantive scope
[148] What does “the right to asylum” entail? Article 63 TEC, on which pro-
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vision Article 18 Charter is “based” according to the Explanation,176 as well as
Article 266(1) Constitution oppose “asylum” to “temporary protection” and
“subsidiary protection”; for the purposes of those provisions, “asylum” means
durable international protection for refugees (numbers [183] and [234]
below). This seems to be in line with the normal meaning of the term “asy-
lum”: according to Grahl-Madsen it refers to a durable solution for persons in
need of protection, as opposed to temporary refuge.177
“The right to asylum” is distinct from protection from refoulement, as the
latter issue is addressed separately by Article 19 Charter (Article 79 CfE). The
(exclusive) reference to the Refugee Convention also implies so: the feature
distinguishing this Convention from the other instruments of international law
is the conferral of secondary rights. And according to well-established case-
law of the European Court of Human Rights, the “right to political asylum” is
not contained in the European Convention or its Protocols,178 in contrast to
protection from refoulement – which opposes “asylum” to “non-refoulement”.
The reference to the Refugee Convention in the Charter provision implies
that “the right to asylum” encompasses a claim to secondary rights. But “asy-
lum” and protection owed under the Refugee Convention cannot be equated.
Asylum is protection granted by a state that may be conditioned by the
Refugee Convention. The Preamble to the latter instrument implies the same
distinction.179
In the context of Union law, we should read Article 78 CfE in conjunction
with Article 266(1) CfE that mentions the offer of an “appropriate status to
persons in need of it” as one of the aims of Union law on protection. Thus, the
“status” is a constituent of “protection”, and a material standard for these sta-
tuses is stated: “appropriateness”
Literal meaning and context hence suggest that the right to asylum is the
right to a durable solution. It entails protection that should be “appropriate”,
and includes a claim to secondary rights. 
Personal scope
[149] By virtue of the reference to the Refugee Convention, the personal scope
of Article 18 encompasses Convention refugees, but is not necessarily restric-
ted to them. There are good reasons to assume that the term “asylum” in
Article 18 addresses protection for non-refugees in need of protection as well. 
Neither the technical meaning, nor the Refugee Convention implies the
limitation of “asylum” to Convention refugees. Moreover, the Spanish Protocol
renders this restriction unlikely. This Protocol, attached to both the Treaty on
European Community and the Constitution, is relevant context of Article 18
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Charter, as the latter provision is not restricted to third-country nationals.180 The
Sole Article of the Spanish Protocol addresses “asylum” applied for by EU
nationals (see par 6.4.5). The Spanish Protocol does not refer to the Refugee
Convention. Nor does it otherwise suggest that “asylum” concerns only
Convention refugees. Such a restriction would arguably be contrary to object
and purpose of the Protocol (cf. number [453]). And we may not assume that
the close association between Refugee Convention protection and asylum in
Articles 63 TEC and 266 CfE applies to “asylum” for Union citizens as well,
as they are excluded from the scope of both treaty provisions (number [184]
and [229]). Finally, the term “asylum” as applied in Article 266(2) CfE first
clause (“the common European asylum system”) encompasses “subsidiary”
and “temporary” next to refugee protection (see number [232] below).
In sum, the right to asylum applies to refugees, and may apply to others in
need of protection as well. 
The obligation to guarantee
[150] The recognition of the right to asylum as a claim to protection including
secondary rights seems a bold step – in international law, this right has not
been recognised (cf. number [11] above). However, the provision does not
impose an obligation to “grant asylum”: according to the second element of
Article 18 Charter (Article 78 CfE), the addressees of the provision are mere-
ly obligated to “guarantee” this right to asylum. Hence, we must distinguish
between the refugee’s claim to asylum, which the Charter recognises, and the
obligation to grant asylum, which the Charter does not impose. Reading the
provision otherwise to the effect that, say, each refugee has a right to a status
and can hence not be expelled to a safe third country (cf. Chapter 7) would run
counter to Article 63(1)(a) TEC (and its successor 266(2)(g) CfE), that presup-
poses that the Member States can expel refugees.
The obligation to guarantee is conditioned by the obligation to pay “due
respect” to the Refugee Convention and the obligation to act in accordance
with the Treaty on European Community (or the Constitution). The require-
ment of respect for the Refugee Convention sets a material standard.181
Arguably, the requirement of “accordance with the Treaty on European
Community (Constitution)” has the same meaning as Article 52 Charter
(Article 112 CfE, see number [143] above). A similar clause does not occur in
other Charter provisions (or provisions of Part II CfE) laying down rights.
Maybe it was inserted in order to make clear that the “right to asylum” cannot
be invoked against the Spanish Protocol that substantially conditions this
right.182
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[151] What, then, does the “right to asylum” in fact entail? Arguably, it has at
least two important implications. First, when expelling refugees (or other persons
within the scope of Article 18 Charter or 78 CfE) to a third country (i.e. to a coun-
try other than the one where they fear being persecuted), the Member States must
“guarantee” that those refugees have access to asylum, that is to a durable solu-
tion and appropriate secondary rights (see paragraph 7.5.6). Second, when the
alien entitled to asylum is not expelled, the Member States must offer this durable
solution themselves. This entails that those who are not refugees but are entitled
to protection on other grounds (Article 3 ECHR for example) must be granted a
status and appropriate secondary rights. For refugees, it means that the grant of a
long-term residence permit (as opposed to asylum seeker status or temporary
protection status) cannot indefinitely be postponed (see further Chapter 8.9). 
Conclusion
[152] In summary, ordinary meaning as well as the context imply that “the
right to asylum” has a remarkably broad meaning: it implies that those in need
of international protection have a right to an appropriate status. But the obli-
gation resting on Member States as regards this right is left somewhat vague
– they must merely “guarantee” this right, not “grant asylum”. The Refugee
Convention sets a material standard for this obligation. The implications of the
obligation to guarantee the right to asylum differ depending on the situation.
The implications for the protection statuses established by European law will
be discussed under paragraph 8.9, those for the application of the safe third
country exception in paragraph 7.5.6.
2.3.6 The prohibition of refoulement
[153] Article 19(2) Charter (Article 79(2) CfE) runs as follows:
“No one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is
a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture
or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 
The Explanation states that Article 19(2) “incorporates the relevant case-law
from the European Court of Human Rights regarding Article 3 [ECHR]”;
explicit mention is made of the judgements Ahmed and Soering.183 According
to the latter judgement, Article 3 ECHR prohibits “action (taken) by a
Contracting state which has as a direct consequence the exposure of an indi-
vidual to ill-treatment”.184 A comparison of Article 19(2) with this case law
reveals significant differences. 
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First, Article 19(2) states that “no one may be removed, expelled or extra-
dited”. In a literal reading, this prohibition does not encompass other forms of
“action” than removal, most notably, refoulement in the technical sense, i.e.
return at the border.185 Second, Article 19(2) refers to “the death penalty” next
to the forms of ill-treatment mentioned in Article 3 ECHR. The provision
therefore codifies the prohibition of refoulement implicit in Article 1 of the
Sixth protocol to the European Convention as well (see number [16] above).
Third, and most remarkable, Article 19(2) requires that the “risk” of subjec-
tion to ill-treatment is “serious”. According to the case law of the European
Court of Human Rights, Article 3 ECHR prohibits removal if the risk of ill-
treatment in the receiving state is “real”. Arguably, the qualification “serious”
is at variance with Article 3 ECHR, as it requires a higher degree of foresee-
ability than the qualification “real” implies. 
[154] Thus, whereas Article 19(2) aims to “incorporate” the relevant case-law
of the European Court of Human Rights on exposure to ill-treatment,186 its
wording suggests a different scope. The scope of the Charter provision is
wider, where it concerns the “treatment” risked, but considerably narrower as
to the other elements of the prohibition. Should we assume that under the
Charter (and the Constitution) the substantive scope of the prohibition on
exposure to ill-treatment is hence narrower than under the European
Convention of Human Rights? This is unlikely, for three reasons. First and
foremost, Article 52(3) Charter requires that scope and meaning of the right to
“protection in the event of removal, expulsion or extradition” is “the same” as
the corresponding right under Article 3 ECHR, as identified by the European
Court of Human rights (see number [143] above). Second, any person falling
outside the scope of Article 19 Charter may invoke Article 4 Charter (Article
64 CfE): 
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment.” 
Scope and meaning of this provision are “the same” as those of Article 3
ECHR as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights.187 And there is
no reason to assume that Article 19(2) is intended to exclude expulsion from
the scope of Article 4 Charter. Other Charter provisions show similar overlap,
obviously without implying such exclusion.188
[155] Neither text nor explanations refer to other prohibitions of refoulement
than Article 3 ECHR. Protection under Article 33 RC is provided for by
Article 18 Charter (78 CfE). The wording of Article 7 CCPR is almost identi-
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cal to Articles 3 Charter (and 62 CfE (the former makes mention of “cruel”
treatment). As an “international obligation common to the Member States”
referred to in the Preamble (see number [144]), Article 7 CCPR should be
taken into account when reading or applying the mentioned Charter (Part II
CfE) provision. Arguably, the same applies to Article 3 CAT, notwithstanding
the difference in wording. 
2.3.7 The legal effect of the Charter 
[156] The legal effect of the Charter as Part II of the Constitution raises no
questions: after the entry into force of the Constitution, all its provisions will
rank as primary Union law. Although the Charter (in its present form) was
drafted as if it had full legal effect (cf. Article 51 Charter, quoted under num-
ber [145]), its legal effect is as yet unclear. The European Parliament, the
Council and the Commission “solemnly proclaimed” the Charter;189 its legal
status may be defined as an “inter-institutional agreement”190 that binds them
vis-à-vis each other.191 The Member States did not attribute the Charter legal-
ly binding force. 192
Nevertheless, the Charter may exert legal force under the Treaties of
European Union and on European Community in two ways. Firstly, through
Article 6(2) TEU, and thus on the same footing as “fundamental rights, as
guaranteed by” the European Convention and “constitutions common to the
Member States”; or secondly, by virtue of references in Community legisla-
tion. 
The Charter as source for general principles of Community law
[157] Charter provisions may serve to identify or define general principles of
Community law.193 In fact, the Convention that drafted the Charter was man-
dated to codify existing general principles.194 And the mere circumstance that
the Member States did not entreat the Charter with binding force is in itself
not an insurmountable obstacle: the Court of Justice identified general princi-
ples deriving from the “constitutional traditions common to the Member
States”, even though the right in question had not been recognised in all
Member States.195
[158] The Court of First Instance has indeed referred to Article 47 Charter as
a “reaffirmation” of a general principle of Community law.196 The President of
the European Court of Justice also referred to the Charter.197 It appears that
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several domestic courts made reference to the Charter when identifying obli-
gations under international law198 – that is, on much the same footing as the
Court of First Instance. The Advocates-General to the Court of Justice have
issued conflicting views.199 But the Court of Justice has not expressed itself on
the issue, also in cases where applicants referred to the Charter, and even when
reviewing a judgement of the Court of First Instance whose reasoning relied
on a Charter provision.200 As matters stand, it is unclear whether or not Charter
provisions can successfully be invoked on the basis of Article 6(2) TEU before
the Community judiciary.
[159] We should observe that if we assume that Charter provisions have legal
effect in the way proposed by the Court of First Instance, it does not follow
that each Charter provision will necessarily serve as a standard for legality
review. The Court of First Instance did several times refer to Article 47
Charter, but only as “reaffirmation” of the existence of a general principle
identified on the basis of Articles 6 and 13 ECHR (and the constitutional tra-
ditions of the Member States). It observed in this context that “[a]lthough
[the Charter] does not have legally binding force, it does show the importance
of the rights it sets out in the Community legal order”.201 Arguably, Charter
rights that have no backing in international law or constitutional traditions
may not be viable means for identification of general principles of
Community law.202
Articles 19 and 47 Charter (the prohibition of refoulement and the right to
a fair trial) have a firm ground in international law. This does not hold true for
the “right to asylum”, but arguably, Article 18 Charter has counterparts in the
constitutional traditions of the Member States (cf. number [112]). I do not
know of a similar basis for the right to human dignity (Article 1 Charter). 
References in secondary Community law
[160] The second way in which Charter provisions may work within the
Community legal order is through references in secondary Community law.
Most European asylum legislation contains a consideration in the Preamble
stating that the relevant piece of legislation “respects the fundamental rights
and observes the principles recognised in particular by the charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.”203 In particular, this legislation
further “seeks to ensure full respect”204 or “observance”205 of the right to asy-
lum (Qualification Directive, Dublin Regulation, and Reception Standards
Directive), and of the right to human dignity (Qualification Directive,
Reception Standards Directive). Obviously, these references to the Charter do
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not render its provisions directly effective. But where secondary Community
legislation itself states that the Charter at large, and the mentioned provisions
in particular, serve as standards of review, relevant Charter provisions may
serve for interpretation of that legislation. Arguably, where reference is made
to the Charter in this way, its provisions have indirect effect.
2.3.8 Concluding remarks
[161] How does the protection as to asylum issues offered by the Charter and
Part II of the Constitution, if and when they are binding, relate to the protec-
tion offered by general principles of Community law? The prohibitions on ill-
treatment, refoulement and mass expulsion (Articles 4 and 19) have not been
addressed in case-law of the Community judiciary, but, presumably, they are
fit for recognition as general principles of Community law. In a sense, they
have been codified in anticipation. As to Article 18, the matter is different: the
Member States’ “common constitutional traditions” may imply a similar obli-
gation, but a “corresponding” obligation in international law does not exist. In
this, Article 18 calls into existence a new right - to have one’s right of asylum
guaranteed. 
In sum, Articles 4 and 19 are valuable as (anticipatory) codification of
general principles of Community law. Article 18 is even more valuable, as a
codification of a hitherto (at least partially) non-existent right.
[162] As to the scope of application of the Charter, Article 51 seems to codi-
fy current practice of the Community judiciary in terms of general principles:
acts of Community institutions as well as Member States’ implementing
activities must comply with the rights concerned (the uncertainty as to appli-
cability of the Charter to Member States’ derogations from Community or
Union law is not relevant as far as asylum is concerned. The same holds true
for the requirement that Charter provisions be interpreted and applied in full
accordance with relevant rules of international law, in particular the European
Convention of Human Rights as interpreted by the Strasbourg Court. 
As to the binding force of the Charter, currently Charter provisions cannot
be successfully invoked before the Court of Justice. For most Community law
on asylum legislation, however, the Charter arguably serves as a standard of
review, by virtue of references to it in the Preambles to the mentioned instru-




[163] All instruments of international asylum law are anterior to the transfer
of powers on asylum to the European Community. It follows from relevant
rules of international law that European asylum law does not affect the scope
or content of the obligations of the Member States in their quality as signato-
ries to the instruments of international asylum. International law offers two
solutions for conflicts between obligations under international asylum law and
obligations under Community law. First, Community law should be read and
applied in a manner that conciliates it with international asylum law (Article
30(2) VTC). As Community law itself requires in various ways “accordance”
of Community legislation and its application with international asylum law,
this device may solve most conflicts. If conflicts cannot be solved this way,
Article 307 TEC cedes precedence to international asylum. In case neither of
these solutions applies, the conflict is insoluble under international law.
[164] Within the Community legal order, international asylum law may have
effect in five ways. First, by virtue of reference to it in primary Community
law (paragraph 2.2.3). According to Article 63(1) TEC, measures on “asylum”
based on Article 63(1)(a) – (d) must be “in accordance” with the Refugee con-
vention and “other relevant treaties”, and measures based on points (3) and (4)
of the same provision must be “compatible” with “international agreements”.
In this way, international asylum law is set as a direct standard of decision.
Both “accordance” as well as, arguably, “compatible” entail that full compli-
ance is required. Both Article 63(1) and the second last clause of Article 63
TEC set a standard of review for acts by Community institutions and for
implementation and application acts by Member States. 
[165] Second, international asylum law works within the Community legal
order as a source of inspiration for general principles of Community law
(paragraph 2.2.2). Any international treaty on human rights protection to
which all Member States are party or in which they collaborated can serve as
a basis for Community principles. It follows from the case law of the
Luxembourg Courts that they apply to acts of Community institutions and to
acts of Member States within the scope of Community law. As to the degree
of observance they require, in recent case law the Court quite precisely applies
international human rights law, carefully taking heed of pertinent case law
from the European Court of Human Rights. In practice, the obligation to
observe the general principles amounts to an obligation to act in accordance
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with international treaty norms. Meanwhile, the Court’s phrasing - “princi-
ples” which are “inspired” by international law - suggests a rather loose tie
between principles and treaty provisions. This ambiguity is the main differ-
ence between the commitment to international asylum law through general
principles on the one hand and the references to it in Article 63 TEC on the
other. 
For European asylum law, the general principles of Community law may
have practical relevance in two respects. First, as standards for measures based
on Article 63(2) TEC, as the treaty does not explicitly require that these are “in
accordance with” or “compatible” with relevant treaty law. Second, general
principles may be relevant for measures pursuant to Article 63(1), (3) and (4)
TEC as well, as far as they entail rights that are not implied by the requirement
of conformity with international law laid down in Article 63(1) and 63 second
last clause TEC. 
[166] Third, it appears from the case law of the Court of Justice that the
Community is directly bound by international customary law (paragraph
2.2.1). Hence, the prohibition of refoulement works as a rule of international
custom within the Community legal order. Its practical relevance for European
asylum law next to the two above-mentioned ways of working of international
asylum law is, arguably, modest, as the customary rule is much vaguer than the
treaty norms on refoulement.
Fourth, international asylum law works through reference to it in secon-
dary Community legislation (paragraph 2.2.4). The relevance of these refer-
ences will be assessed in the discussion of the pieces of legislation concerned,
in Chapters 4 till 8. 
Fifthly and finally, international asylum law may work within the
Community legal order as a means of interpretation of provisions of the
Charter (paragraph 2.3). The legal status of this Charter is, currently, quite
uncertain. Arguably, by virtue of references to the Charter in secondary
Community law, it applies as a means of interpretation of these instruments.
[167] After the entry into force of the Constitution for Europe, international
asylum law may still work in the same five ways within the Union legal order,
but the relevance of the several ways will presumably be reversed. Of first and
foremost importance will be the Charter provisions, which will apply as pri-
mary Union law. The provisions most relevant for asylum law, Articles 61, 78,
79 and 107, on human dignity, ill-treatment, asylum, expulsion and (as we will
see in paragraph 6.3.1) procedures, must be interpreted and applied in accor-
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dance with the European Convention of Human Rights, and of other relevant
instruments of international law. These Constitution provisions address the
major part of international asylum law. Moreover, they extend the scope of
claims of persons in need of international protection. Article 78 recognises the
right to asylum and requires that this right is guaranteed. Arguably, this entails
additional requirements on the application of the exception of the safe third
country: refugees should have access to a durable solution, and the conditions
awaiting them should meet basic human rights standards. Further, it entails a
claim on an appropriate status for those persons that remain within the
European Union. 
As far as international asylum law may warrant claims not covered by the
Charter as incorporated into the Constitution, international asylum law may
have effect within the Union legal order in the first and second ways discussed
above: Article 266(1) requires compliance with international asylum law, and
general principles may still apply, pursuant to Article 7(1) CfE (the successor
to Article 6 TEU). 
[168] How should we appreciate the proclamation of Charter of Fundamental
Rights and its incorporation into the Constitution? One’s appreciation will, at
least partially, depend on the appreciation of the Court’s testing of general
principles of Community law. If one is sceptical about, in particular, the inten-
sity of the testing of acts to those principles, one will welcome the Charter and
the Constitution as they unambiguously commit the Community to the obser-
vance of human rights. As argued above, I think that the human rights case law
of the Court of Justice already bears witness to such commitment: testing
against general principles in fact amounts to an application of standards of
international law. Still, the Charter and Part II of the Constitution are most
valuable as codification of this practice. Besides, they appear to extend the
scope of protection beyond the standards of international asylum law. Mutatis
mutandis, the same applies to the importance of the direct references to inter-
national asylum law in Article 63(1) and Article 63 second last clause TEC.
[169] With the above-mentioned in mind, we can return to the questions stated
in paragraph 1.2. First, European asylum leaves the claims of individuals to
the Member States in their capacity as signatory states to the instruments of
international asylum law unaffected (question 1b). Second, Community law
must indeed be in accordance with international asylum law. The obligation to
comply rests with Community institutions that adopt legislation on asylum as
well as with the Member States (or Community institutions) that apply this
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legislation (question 1a). This outcome has bearing upon a third issue, the
opportunities that Community law offers the individual for giving effect to his
claims under international law (the fourth question). With the obligation for
the Community to act in accordance with international asylum law, these
opportunities can only extend. The question of how claims to international law
within the Community legal order can be given effect will be addressed in
Chapter 9. Here, we should observe that the Community judiciary is not com-
petent to review each and every Member State act with respect to its accor-
dance with international asylum law. The scope of review of accordance with
international asylum law is delimited by the scope of Community legislation
on the matter. Thus, not every aspect of “qualification as a refugee” (Article
63(1)(c) TEC) falls within the scope of review of accordance with internatio-
nal law, only those aspects that fall within the Community legislation on the
matter. We saw that the harmonisation ambitions as defined in the legislation
are a relevant factor for delimiting the scope of this legislation, but the fact
that a measure explicitly leaves the Member States discretion as to some
aspect addressed in the measure does not remove that aspect from the scope
of review of compliance with international law. 
The content of the legislation on asylum, and its accordance with interna-
tional law, will be discussed in Chapters 4 to 8. First, in Chapter 3, I will dis-
cuss the legal basis of this legislation in the Treaty on European Community,
and in the Constitution. 
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NOTES
1 Art. 26 VTC: “Pacta sunt servanda - Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it
and must be performed by them in good faith.”
2 Article 34 VTC.
3 This holds true not only in situations where third states are involved, as the wording of
Article 34 VTC might seem to suggest, but also if individuals invoke their rights under
international asylum law. The European Commission of Human Rights observed already at
an early date that “the obligations undertaken by the other High Contracting Parties are
essentially of an objective character, being designed rather to protect the fundamental
rights of individual human beings from infringement by any of the High Contracting Parties
than to create subjective and reciprocal rights for the High Contracting Parties themselves”
(EComHR 10 January 1961, Yb. 1961, pp. 138-140 (Austria v. Italy)). The European Court
of Human Rights has reaffirmed this “objective” character of the obligations under the
ECHR (ECtHR 18 January 1978, Ser. A vol. 25 (Ireland v. UK), par. 239 and ECtHR 23
March 1993, Ser. A vol. 310 (Loizidou v. Turkey), par. 70)). See Lawson 1999, pp. 62-64. 
4 Mus 1996, p. 35; cf. par. 1.4.2.1.
5 Sinclair 1984, p. 98. The issue has raised some debate, as some authors, notably Vierdag
1988, p. 93f , hold that the (subsequent) entry into force is the relevant moment. Mus 1996,
pp. 46-48 argues that Sinclair’s vision is correct, drawing amongst other things on the dis-
cussions in the International Law Commission that prepared the VTC. For present purposes
the issue is of little consequence, as the relevant date is defined in Article 307 TEC as the
conclusion of the treaty; see par. 2.1.4 below. 
6 Why the Treaty of Amsterdam rather than the Treaty of Rome from 1957 is the relevant
treaty will be discussed below, in paragraph 2.1.4.
7 Brownlie 1990, pp. 624-625; Mus 1996, pp. 42-44. 
8 Where the English text speaks of “specifies”, the French language version applies the term
“précise”. The - equally authentic – Russian language version implies the wider scope:
“Eлси в договоре устанавливается […]” – litterally: “if it is stated in the agreement […]”. 
9 Mus 1996, pp. 42-44. 
10 Hailbronner 2000, p. 38.
11 An example is Article 103 of the UN Charter, whereto Article 30(1) VTC refers: “In the
event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the
present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obli-
gations under the present Charter shall prevail”. 
12 We may observe that France never signed the Vienna Treaty Convention, precisely because
of its persistent objections to the definition of jus cogens in Article 53 VTC. It appears how-
ever, that France does not object to the concept of jus cogens as such, but rather to the form
of the first requirement (Hannikainen 1988, p. 212). Importantly, it did not object to the
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acceptance of peremptory character of fundamental human rights (Lawson 1999, p. 171,
quoting a statement by the French delegation to that extent).
13 Allain 2001; Gilbert 2003, somewhat implicitly, pp. 431-432 and 462. 
14 Cf. number [19]. 
15 Allain 2001, p. 541n.
16 Which is by no means certain. Allain bases the requirement to observe the proportionality
principle on a remark in the preparatory works (see Allain 2001, l.c.). But the text of Article
33(2) RC does not make mention of such a principle. In contrast, Articles 9 and 32(3) RC
do reflect proportionality considerations.
17 Whereas Article 25 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility defines circumstances when
necessity can be invoked as justification for non-compliance with a rule, including a pro-
portionality test, Article 26 states that “Nothing in this chapter precludes the wrongfulness
of any act of a State which is not in conformity with an obligation arising under a peremptory
norm of general international law”.
18 Hannikainen 1988, p. 262. 
19 Switzerland, as it appears from a judgement by the Bundesgericht of 22 march 1983 - Mus
1996, p. 74.
20 Allain 2001, pp. 538-541 refers to ExCom Conclusion 25 (XXXIII) under (b), 1982, where it
is stated that “the principle of non-refoulement […] was progressively acquiring the character
of a peremptory rule of international law”; and to ExCom Conclusion 79 (XLVII) under (i) of
1996, where it is stated that “the principle of refoulement is not subject to derogation”, thus
allegedly hinting at jus cogens character, and to the Cartagena Declaration (1984 Cartagena
Declaration on Refugees, III.5, OAS/Ser.L/V/II.66, doc. 10, rev. 1, pp. 190-193, reproduced 
in Goodwin-Gill 1998, p. 444f), which states that “the principle of non refoulement […] is
imperative in regard to refugees and in the present state of international law should be
acknowledged and observed as a rule of jus cogens.” But ExCom Conclusions cannot duly be
regarded as expressions the opinio juris of the international community as a whole (see num-
ber [32] above), and the Cartagena Declaration even less: the Cartagena Declaration was not
adopted by states. It appears that the General Assembly of the Organisation of American States
has “endorsed” the Declaration (Goodwin-Gill 1998, p. 21n), but it is highly speculative to
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Chapter 3
The Treaty basis for asylum legislation
In this Chapter I describe and analyse the competencies of the Community on
asylum. Community legislation on asylum is, as any Community act, confined
to “the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned
to it therein” (Article 5 TEC). Hence, in order to assess the validity of
European asylum law, the scope of Community competence must be assessed
properly. The analysis thus serves to answer the third question asked in para-
graph 1.2 - to what extent can or must the Community issue legislation on asy-
lum? 
The various aspects of the legal basis for European asylum law in Title IV
are discussed in paragraphs 3.1 to 3.7. In paragraph 3.8, I address the legal
basis for asylum law in the draft Constitution for Europe.
3.1 Title IV in outline
[170] Title IV of Part III of the Treaty on European Community contains the
legal basis for European asylum legislation. The basis of Community migra-
tion law is Article 61:
“In order to establish progressively an area of freedom, security and jus-
tice, the Council shall adopt: 
(a) […] measures aimed at ensuring the free movement of persons in accor-
dance with Article 14, in conjunction with directly related flanking
measures with respect to external border controls, asylum and immigra-
tion, in accordance with the provisions of […] Article 63(1)(a) and
(2)(a) […] 
(b) other measures in the fields of asylum, immigration and safeguarding
the rights of nationals of third countries, in accordance with the provi-
sions of Article 63 […].”
The provision defines the objective of Title IV measures as “progressively”
establishing an “area of freedom, security and justice”. The scope of
Community powers to achieve this objective is further defined by the Articles
62 – 65 TEC. The Community powers on “asylum, immigration and safe-
guarding the rights of third country nationals” (cf. Article 61(b)) are laid down
in Article 63. The provision mentions “areas” concerning “asylum”, “refugees
and displaced persons”, “immigration policy” in which Community measures
should be adopted. 
Other Title IV provisions are also relevant for asylum law. Article 64(1) states
that 
“the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with
regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of inter-
nal security”
is not affected by Title IV. Article 64(2) addresses an issue closely connected
to asylum, Community powers to respond to “an emergency situation charac-
terised by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries”. Article 67 esta-
blishes the legislative procedures that were discussed in paragraph 1.5.4.
Article 68 addresses the scope of jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, to be dis-
cussed in Chapter 9. Article 69, finally, refers to the Protocol on the position
of the United Kingdom and Ireland and the Protocol on the position of
Denmark, which have consequences for the geographical scope of Title IV
measures (see further paragraph 3.5). 
[171] Article 63, then, attributes powers on asylum matters to the Community.
These powers are conditioned in four respects. Firstly, by the objective laid
down in Article 61, the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice.
Secondly, Article 63 defines the degree of harmonisation that Community
measures can produce. Thirdly, Article 63 imposes the obligation to adopt
measures on most asylum issues within five years of the entry into force of the
Treaty, i.e. before 1 May 2004. Fourthly, Article 63(1) sets a standard for
measures adopted on the basis of its sub-paragraphs: they must be in accor-
dance with the Refugee Convention and other relevant instruments of interna-
tional law. In order to assess the scope of Community competencies on asy-
lum properly, these aspects must be taken into account.
Below, I will first address the meaning of the objective laid down in Article
61 first clause for asylum measures (paragraph 3.2). Subsequently, I will dis-
cuss on what aspects of asylum the Community can issue legislation (par. 3.3).
In paragraph 3.4, the degree of harmonisation measures that Community legis-
lation on asylum can produce will be discussed. The geographical scope of asy-
lum measures will be addressed briefly in paragraph 3.5. The consequences of
the delimitation of the scope of asylum legislation in Article 63 for Community
obligations under international asylum law are addressed in paragraph 3.6. 
3.2 The “area of freedom, security and justice”
[172] Article 61, first clause defines the objective of Title IV measures as the
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progressive establishment of “an area of freedom, security and justice”. In the
constitutional architecture of the Treaties on European Community and on
European Union, powers in specific policy areas such as Title IV serve to
achieve the more general goals of the Community and the Union at large.1
Title IV measures serve to achieve the aim laid down in Article 2, fourth
indent of the Treaty on European Union:2
“to maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and jus-
tice, in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with
appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum,
immigration and the prevention and combating of crime”.
Hence, the free movement of persons is the primary aim; the other measures
are called for only in so far as they are “appropriate”.3
The area of freedom, security and justice does not figure among the objec-
tives set out in Part One of the Treaty on European Community itself.4 Article
3 TEC mentions among the “activities” of the Community “an internal market
characterised by the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to the
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital”, and “measures con-
cerning the entry and movement of persons as provided for in Title IV”.5 This
internal market is addressed by Article 14 TEC, which states that the “internal
market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance
with the provisions of this Treaty”. According to Article 61(a), this “area with-
out internal frontiers” is one of the “aims” of Title IV measures.6
[173] But the objective of Title IV is not just the creation of the internal mar-
ket, “an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods,
persons, services and capital is ensured” (Article 14(2) TEC). The creation
of the “area of freedom, security and justice” serves other purposes as well,
such as ensuring the security and safety of the peoples of the Member States.
Those other effects are, in a sense, subsidiary, as they are aspired to because
of the abolition of internal borders, the establishment of the freedom of
movement. Still, those other effects are aspired to for their own sake; they
are not merely instrumental to the establishment of the freedom of move-
ment of persons. Hence, Title IV measures are not restricted to compensa-
tory measures required for the establishment of the freedom of movement of
persons. 
[174] The European Union, then, is to be an “area of freedom, security and
justice”. “Security” and even more so “justice” have only very limited signi-
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ficance as objectives of European asylum law. The term “security” is closely
connected to the prevention and combat of crime by Article 61(e), “justice” to
judicial co-operation in civil and criminal matters by Article 61(c) and (e).7
The primary meaning of the latter term in English, French and German points
at “law enforcement” rather than “equity”.8 Elements of European asylum law
may serve to achieve these objectives; indeed, several provisions of the
Community legislation on asylum serve to establish “security”.9 But the
Preamble to the TEU limits “safety and security” to the peoples of the Member
States, that is, to EU citizens.10 The same limitation figures in Article 29
TEU.11 Security of and justice to third country nationals are hence not objec-
tives of measures on asylum and immigration.12
[175] Asylum and immigration measures hence mainly serve the establish-
ment of an “area of freedom”. It follows from Article 61(a) that this freedom
encompasses the freedom of movement. Importantly, the provision applies the
term “freedom”, not “freedom of movement”. That these notions are not iden-
tical follows not only from their wording, but also from the distinction that
Article 61 draws between measures “directly relating” to the free movement
of persons (Article 61(a) TEC) and “other measures” on asylum and immigra-
tion as meant in Article 63 (Article 61(b)). Apparently, those “other measures”
are not “directly related” to the freedom of movement. 
What kind of “freedom” are the “other” measures meant in Article 63 con-
cerned with? Article 61(b) states that those other measures concern “asylum,
immigration and safeguarding the rights of nationals of third countries, in
accordance with the provisions of Article 63”. This enumeration does not jux-
tapose the “safeguarding of rights” next to asylum and immigration as subject
matter addressed in Article 63, as no sub-paragraph of that provision addres-
ses this safeguarding in particular.13 Arguably, the “safeguarding of rights of
third country nationals” elaborates, rather, an aspect of the objective of cre-
ation of an area of freedom for Article 63. The requirement of Article 63(1),
that measures on asylum be in accordance with the Refugee Convention and
other relevant treaties, reinforces the interpretation of the term “freedom” as
including human rights protection. Furthermore, the European Union and
hence the area of freedom is “founded” on the principle of respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms.14 Hence, the creation of the area of freedom
serves next to the establishment of the freedom of movement of persons also
the respect for fundamental human rights of third country citizens. 
[176] What are the implications for measures pursuant to the separate sub-
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paragraphs of Article 63 TEC? According to Article 61(a), measures pursuant
to Article 63(1)(a) and (2)(a) must serve the purpose of establishing the free-
dom of movement. The phrase “in conjunction with directly related flanking
measures”, however, implies that they may also serve other purposes that
serve the objective of creating the area of freedom, security and justice.15 The
“other measures” pursuant to Article 61(b) are not restricted to the freedom of
movement - they may serve any purpose within the scope of the general objec-
tive. Hence, all measures based on Article 63 may serve both establishing the
freedom of movement as well as the safeguarding of human rights. 
[177] In summary, the objective of Title IV measures is progressively esta-
blishing an “area of freedom security and justice”. The freedom of movement
is obviously the central aim of the creation of this area. It follows from Article
2 and the Preamble to the Treaty on European Union that measures on asylum
and immigration are “compensatory measures”. But this compensatory cha-
racter does not reduce asylum and immigration measures to instruments for
the creation of the internal market. Freedom, security and justice, not freedom
of movement are the aspired results of the creation of the area. Asylum and
immigration measures serve to create an area of freedom, which encompasses
next to the freedom of movement for persons, the safeguarding of rights of
third country nationals. It follows that Title IV empowers the Community to
take measures on asylum and immigration in accordance with Article 63 that
merely serve the protection of rights of third country nationals. 
3.3 The scope of Community powers on asylum
3.3.1 Introduction
[178] Article 63 TEC lists the area of Community powers on asylum in much
detail. It follows from Article 61 and 63 that Community powers are indeed
limited to the issues mentioned. Article 61(a) and (b) confer the power to
adopt measures on asylum and immigration “in accordance with the provi-
sions of ” Article 63. Hence, the Community cannot adopt just any measure
on asylum and immigration serving the objective of progressively creating
the area of freedom security and justice, but only measures for which Article
63 provides a legal basis.16 The scope of Article 63(1), (2) and (3) is defined
by means of rather indeterminate terms (measures on “asylum”, “refugees
and displaced persons” and on “immigration policy”), but then restricted to
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“the following areas”. Community powers on asylum are therefore not com-
prehensive.17
[179] The delimitation of areas in Article 63 must be approached with some
caution for two reasons. First, the provision serves several functions. Read in
conjunction with Article 61, it attributes powers to the Community. These
powers are defined in three respects: as to the subject matter, as to the scope
of harmonisation, and as to the presence or absence of an obligation to adopt
legislation within five years. The consequence of these various functions is
that we must be very cautious with a contrario reasoning. The fact that, for
instance, the issue of responsibility for asylum claims is mentioned separate-
ly in Article 63(1)(a) does not necessarily mean that this area is outside the
material scope of “procedures”, addressed in Article 63(1)(d) – the reason for
existence of the former Article might be the competence to provide for total
harmonisation (cf. number [215]).
The second reason for caution is the occasionally somewhat poor drafting.
For example, the relation between Article 62(1), on measures for abolishing
internal borders, and Article 61 is unclear, as the latter does not mention the
former.18 Further, Articles 61 and 63 TEC define three times which measures
must be adopted within five years after the entry into force, and each time dif-
ferently. According to Article 61(a) read in conjunction with Article 61(b), the
time limit applies only to Article 63(1)(a) and (2)(a) measures. But the first
clause of Article 63 requires adoption within five years for all Article 63 mea-
sures, whereas the final clause of Article 63 exempts Article 63(2)(b), (3)(a)
and (4). Obviously, we should take no heed of other delimitations of the time
limit but the last one – but it shows once again that a contrario reasoning is
precarious. 
In paragraphs 3.3.2 – 3.3.6, I will discuss in some detail the scope of the
sub-paragraphs of Article 63 as far as relevant for asylum. In paragraph 3.3.7,
I briefly address the external competencies of the Community pursuant to
Article 63. The scope of another provision that may have bearings on protec-
tion issues will be discussed in paragraph 3.3.8: Article 64, on measures in
case of sudden inflows. Finally, I briefly address how far other TEC provisions
may serve as legal basis for Community measures on asylum. 
3.3.2 The relation between Article 63(1), 63(2) and 63(3) TEC
[180] According to their first clauses, Article 63(1) addresses “asylum”,
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Article 63(2) “displaced persons and refugees” and Article 63(3) “immigra-
tion”. The material scope of Article 63(3)(a) – “measures on […] conditions
of entry and residence, and standards on procedures for the issue by Member
States of long-term visas and residence permits”- is far broader than the
scopes of the sub-paragraphs of Article 63(1) and, arguably, Article 63(2) (see
pars. 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 below). Article 63(3)(a) specifically requires adoption of
measures on family reunification, but does not exclude other grounds for
entry or residence from its scope. This begs the question whether persons
addressed in Article 63(1) and (2) fall within the scope of Article 63(3)(a)
TEC. In other words, could Article 63(3)(a) serve as the legal basis for mea-
sures on refugees, displaced persons and asylum seekers? 
[181] According to Article 61(a), measures meant in Article 63(2)(a) concern
“immigration”. Hence, “measures on refugees and displaced persons” (Article
63(2), first clause) are measures on immigration, the subject-matter of Article
63(3).19 There is no reason why measures on “refugees” or “asylum seekers”
as meant in Article 63(1) would not concern “immigration” too. At first sight,
it may seem Article 61(a) and (b) oppose “asylum” to “immigration”. But
Article 61(b) also speaks of the “safeguarding of the rights of nationals of
third countries” as one of the elements of Article 63. Obviously, this “safe-
guarding of rights” is not opposed to, but rather concerned with measures on
immigration and asylum (cf. number [175] above). Hence, these elements are
not mutually exclusive. Arguably, the separate mentioning of “asylum” in
Article 61(a) rather expresses that this specific category of “immigration” is
subject to a special regime of international law, and that the measures called
for in Article 63(1) should be dealt with accordingly. Consequently, the sub-
paragraphs Article 63(1)(b), (c), (d) and (2)(a) are not opposed to (3)(a)
ratione materiae.
Article 63(3)(a) read in conjunction with Article 61 thus implies that
Article 63(3)(a) measures may address refugees, asylum seekers and displaced
persons. Why, then, are the measures of Article 63(1) and 63(2) listed sepa-
rately? The exercise of legislative power transferred to the Community is sub-
ject to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (cf. number [56]) –
only if a certain measure is necessary to attain the objective established by the
treaty, can the Community act. Apparently, the masters of the Treaty felt that
legislation on the subject matter defined in Article 63(1) and (2) was neces-
sary to create the area of freedom, and therefore stipulated in some detail that
measures should be adopted on these issues. This they reinforced by imposing
the time limit of 1 May 2004, which does not apply to Article 63(3)(a). In
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addition, the separate listing of issues enabled them to explicitly stipulate con-
formity with international law for the most sensitive issues, and to permit total
harmonisation of the subject-matter defined in Article 63(1)(a) (see paragraph
3.4). 
[182] In summary, refugees and displaced persons fall within the scope of
Article 63(3)(a). Hence, the Council may adopt legislation on both categories
of persons pursuant to the latter provision, if Article 63(1) or (2) does not pro-
vide for a proper legal basis. 
Notwithstanding the existence of the “residual” competence of Article
63(3)(a) for asylum matters, it does make sense to define the scope of mea-
sures under Article 63(1) and 63(2) in some detail, for four reasons. Firstly,
since measures on the issues listed in Article 63(1) and (2)(a) have been adop-
ted, the co-decision procedure applies to the subject matter mentioned in
Article 63(1) and (2)(a), whereas the Article 67(1) procedure will continue to
apply to Article 63(3) and (4) measures.20 Secondly, it appears that different
requirements as to compatibility with international asylum law apply to the
several sub-paragraphs. For measures based on Article 63(1) and (3), compa-
tibility with international law is explicitly required; no such explicit require-
ment is stated as to Article 63(2) and 64(2) (see paragraph 2.2.3). Thirdly, the
Community can pursue total harmonisation on the issues mentioned in Article
63(1)(a) whereas it cannot on the other issues (cf. paragraph 3.4 below).
Fourthly and finally, the definition of scope in Article 63(1) and (2) TEC gives
some directions for the layout of the “Common European Asylum System”
(cf. numbers [247] and [248]). 
3.3.3 Asylum (Article 63(1) TEC)
[183] Article 63(1), first clauses requires the adoption of measures on “asy-
lum”. The reference to the Refugee Convention as well as Article 63(1)(c) and
(d) connect the term “asylum” closely to refugees in the sense of the Refugee
Convention.21 Asylum, then, must be understood as protection for Convention
refugees, and the “asylum seekers” of Article 63(1)(a) and (b) as persons
requesting protection under the Refugee Convention. 
Article 63(2) also addresses “refugees”. Although no explicit reference to
the Refugee Convention is made, given the context of Article 63(1) it is
extremely unlikely that the term “refugees” is used in a colloquial sense.
Moreover, the reference to displaced persons next to refugees would then be
146 Chapter 3
devoid of any meaning. Arguably, Article 63(1) and (2)(a) both concern
Convention refugees, but differ as to the form of protection. Article 63(2)(a)
requires the establishment of a “temporary protection” regime for refugees
and displaced persons (next to a regime for subsidiary protection, see par.
3.3.4). “Asylum” as meant in Article 63(1), then, is protection for refugees of
(a more) permanent character. Indeed the ordinary meaning of “asylum” does
have this connotation (see number [148]). 
Personal and geographical scope 
[184] The definition of the personal and geographical scope in the sub-para-
graphs of Article 63(1) is not uniform. As to the personal scope, both Article
63(1)(a) (criteria and mechanisms for determining responsibility for asylum
claims) as well as Article 63(1)(c) (qualification standards) only concern
“third country nationals”. The personal scope of measures based on Article
63(1)(b) (reception standards) and (d) (procedures) is not explicitly restricted
to third country nationals. Could they apply to Union citizens as well?
According to Article 61(b), measures pursuant to Article 63 are concerned
with “safeguarding the rights of third country nationals”. Further, it is most
unlikely that the scope of Article 63(1)(b), “asylum seekers”, is wider than that
of the third country nationals who “submitted an application for asylum”
(Article 63(1)(a)). It is also unlikely that the “procedures for granting refugee
status” would apply to a wider group of persons than the measures meant in
Article 63(1)(a), (b) and (c). Finally, Article 63(1) concerns “immigration”, as
we saw above. In the context of Title IV TEC, “immigration” can only mean
immigration of third country nationals (cf. Article 61(b)). The Spanish
Protocol, which provides for a special arrangement on EU citizens,22 endorses
this reading of Article 63. Indeed, the legislation based on Article 63(1)
excludes application to EU citizens.23
Could Article 63(1) also apply to stateless persons, notwithstanding the
references to “third country nationals”? The term “immigration”, and a rea-
ding of Article 63 in the context of the Treaty as a whole suggest that the pro-
vision concerns “persons who are not Union citizens”, hence not specifically
persons possessing the nationality of a third country. The object and purpose
of the provision, implying comprehensive measures facilitating the freedom of
movement as well as the safeguarding of human rights, reinforce this reading.
Indeed, the relevant legislation applies to third country nationals as well as to
stateless persons.24
[185] The geographical scope of measures based on Article 63(1)(a), (b) and
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(d) is restricted to the territory of the Member States.25 Article 63(1)(c), on
rules for qualification as a refugee, does not contain such a restriction. Could
the Community legislator adopt rules on qualification that apply to requests
for asylum lodged outside the European Union (for instance, with Member
States’ consulates)? In this case, there are no strong contextual arguments for
assuming an (implicit) limitation to the Union; neither Article 61(b) nor
Article 63(3) contains any restriction to the territorial scope. As we will see
below, measures on temporary protection certainly can apply to persons desig-
nated as their beneficiaries while still outside the European Union (see num-
ber [197] below). Finally, rules on qualification as a refugee for requests out-
side the European Union could be the same as those for persons within the
Member States. But rules on allocation or reception of asylum seekers or pro-
cedures outside the European Union, for example at embassies, concern a
completely different subject matter than the measures called for by Article
63(1)(a), (b) and (d). It therefore follows from the text and purpose of the pro-
vision, read in the context of Article 63(1) and (3), that the Community legis-
lator can adopt measures on the qualification of third country nationals apply-
ing for asylum outside the Member States. It has not yet made use of the com-
petence: the instrument adopted pursuant to Article 63(1)(c), the Qualification
Directive, applies only to applications lodged at the borders and within the ter-
ritories of the Member States (see paragraph 4.8). 
Material scope
[186] Article 63(1)(a) TEC empowers the Community to adopt measures on
“criteria and mechanisms for determining which Member State is responsible
for considering an application for asylum”. This definition is obviously
inspired by the Dublin Convention (cf. number [43]). As this competence is
the only one that is not restricted to minimum harmonisation, the delimitation
of its scope merits examination in some detail. 
At first sight, the provision draws a neat distinction between inter state
issues, namely the determination of “responsibility” on the one hand, and mat-
ters concerning the relation between the Member State and the asylum seeker
on the other (the “considering” of the asylum application). Article 63(1)(d)
(on asylum procedures) addresses the “consideration” of the application.
However, the determination of responsibility also entails some “considera-
tion” of the application - identification of the asylum seeker and the way or
place of entry into the European Union. If the state where the third country
national applied for asylum finds out that another state is responsible, appli-
cation of the criteria entails rejection of the application. Hence, procedural
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issues concerning the relation between the state and the individual are
involved. 
[187] Does Article 63(1)(a) provide for powers on these procedural issues, or
can the Community adopt legislation on the matter solely on the basis of
Article 63(1)(d) (which provides, in contrast to Article 63(1)(a), only for mini-
mum harmonisation)? Article 63(1)(d) addresses procedures for the granting
of refugee status, which encompasses rejection of applications on any ground,
for any rejection of an application for protection under the Refugee
Convention is a decision not to grant refugee status.26 Conversely, Article
63(1)(a) allows for measures on “criteria and mechanisms” only. Rules on pro-
cedures are, obviously, not “criteria”. The term “mechanisms” stands in
marked opposition to “procedures” as applied in Article 63(1)(d) and 63(3)(a).
Arguably, if the drafters had intended that Article 63(1)(a) would cover “pro-
cedures” between Member States and individuals in the context of the deter-
mination of responsibility too, they would have applied the term “procedures”.
For it could perfectly well encompass both “procedures” in the narrow sense
as well as mechanisms. It should further be noted that the Dublin “Convention
determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum
lodged in one of the Member States” did not contain rules on how Member
States should process applications.27 And arguably, Article 63(1)(a) allows for
complete harmonisation just because it does not address the relation between
individual and state: the restriction of Community powers to set “minimum
standards” serves to avoid collision of Community measures with internatio-
nal law (see paragraph 3.6). International asylum law has, primarily, bearing
on the legal relation between individual and state, not to inter-state relations.
The reading proposed above hence makes more sense of the division of power
between the Community and the Member States laid down in the sub-para-
graphs of Article 63. Consequently, legislation on procedural issues cannot be
based on Article 63(1)(a), only on Article 63(1)(d) TEC. 
Article 63(1)(a) serves as the legal basis for three regulations – the Dublin
Regulation, the Dublin Application Regulation and the Eurodac Regulation on
fingerprints. These will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
[188] Article 63(1)(b) addresses “minimum standards for the reception of asy-
lum seekers”. The term “reception”28 is broad enough to encompass distribu-
tion to, and living conditions in reception facilities.29 Both ordinary meaning
as well as the context implies that “asylum seekers” are third country natio-
nals whose request for asylum has not yet been decided upon. 
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The Council has adopted one measure for the implementation of Article
63(1)(b): the Reception Standards Directive, discussed in Chapter 8. 
[189] Article 63(1)(c) empowers the Community to adopt “minimum stan-
dards with respect to the qualification of nationals of third countries as
refugees”. In the light of the reference to the Refugee Convention in Article
63(1) first clause, its scope encompasses standards on the determination of
refugee status. Determination of refugee status concerns all aspects of Article
1 RC, including cessation and exclusion.30
There are good reasons to assume that measures on “qualification as a
refugee” can also encompass legislation on the grounds for expulsion as
meant in Article 33 RC (see paragraph 5.6.2). Persons to whom those grounds
apply (can) qualify as Convention refugees. But importantly, the term “quali-
fication” does not appear in the Refugee Convention; therefore, Article
63(1)(c) measures are not necessarily restricted to interpretation of only
Article 1 RC. Further, it concerns measures on “asylum”, that is, measures on
the grant of protection by a state. A reading in conjunction with Article
63(1)(d) endorses this reading (see under the next number). It follows that the
qualification as a refugee in Article 63(1)(c) should be understood as qualifi-
cation for asylum (Refugee Convention protection) on the ground that the per-
son concerned is a Convention refugee. 
The Council adopted one measure containing standards on the interpretation
of the refugee definition: the Qualification Directive, discussed in Chapter 5. 
[190] Article 63(1)(d) concerns “minimum standards on procedures in
Member States for granting or withdrawing refugee status”. The term “proce-
dures” is sufficiently broad to encompass both the examination of requests for
asylum as well as appeal procedures.31
The term “status” is somewhat misleading as only protection can be gran-
ted or withdrawn, but not Convention refugee status. As recognition of
Convention refugee status is a declaratory act, refugee status is recognised, not
granted (see Chapter 8.2). As Article 63(1)(d) concerns “asylum”, it is reason-
able to read the sub-paragraph as addressing procedures for the granting and
withdrawing of residence permits. Article 63(3)(a) endorses this reading, as it
speaks of “procedures for the issue by Member States of […] residence per-
mits”. Read in conjunction with the term asylum and Article 63(1)(c), the
scope of the provision encompasses qualification for asylum (Refugee
Convention protection) on the ground that the person is a Convention refugee,
including application of the expulsion grounds of Article 32 and 33 RC. 
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[191] The Community legislator assumed that the criteria for assessing the
safety of a third country (not being a Member State) in the Procedures
Directive could be based on Article 63(1)(d).32 This reading puts much strain
on the ordinary meaning of the term “procedure”: “the mode or form of con-
ducting judicial proceedings (as distinguished from those branches of the law
which define rights or prescribe penalties)”.33 Criteria for assessing the safety
of a third country do not concern the mode or form of the handling of a request
for protection, but rather its very content, and concern the alien’s right to a
residence permit. Moreover, Article 63(3)(a) distinguishes between “condi-
tions on entry and residence” and “procedures for the issue […] of […] resi-
dence permits”. Arguably, criteria for assessing the safety of third countries do
concern conditions on entry and residence, to which the term “procedures”,
apparently, does not apply.34 There is no reason to assume that the term “pro-
cedures” applied in Article 63(1)(d) has a different meaning. Hence, Article
63(1)(d) cannot serve as the legal basis for safe third country arrangements.
The same holds true for the sub-paragraphs Article 63(1)(a), (b) and (c)
because of their wording. The only viable legal basis for safe third country
arrangements is therefore Article 63(3)(a), the “conditions on entry and resi-
dence”. 
It should be observed that the above consideration addresses only the cri-
teria for assessing the safety of the third country, not procedural rules on their
application. A rule, according to which a claim for refugee protection is inad-
missible if the safe third country criteria apply, would be a procedural rule on
the grant of refugee protection as meant in Article 63(1)(d). 
3.3.4 Temporary protection, subsidiary protection and sudden
inflows (Articles 63(2) and 64(2) TEC)
Refugees and displaced persons
[192] Article 63(2) addresses “measures on refugees and displaced persons”.
As stated above, the term “refugees” refers to refugees in the sense of Article
1 RC (see par. 3.3.2). The term “displaced persons” also occurs in internation-
al law,35 but has not been defined in a binding instrument. The General
Assembly and other United Nations organs employ the term “displaced per-
sons” to indicate groups of persons in need of “assistance” or “protection”,
next to Convention refugees. According to Article 1A(2) RC, being outside
one’s home country is a requirement for being a refugee. Originally, the term
“displaced persons” referred only to persons still within their country of ori-
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gin, but for a long term, the term has also been applied to persons who crossed
the border.36 Thus, the term “displaced person” may apply to persons in need
of protection outside their country of origin. Article 63(2)(a) employs the term
in this sense as it speaks of “displaced persons who cannot return to their
country of origin”. The context of Article 64(2) corroborates this reading (see
below (number [199]). 
Temporary and subsidiary protection
[193] Article 63(2)(a) speaks of “standards for giving temporary protection to
displaced persons from third countries who cannot return to their country of
origin and for persons who otherwise need international protection”. The pro-
vision can be read in two ways.37 In one reading, it calls for temporary protec-
tion for two categories of persons, but in a second one, for two forms of pro-
tection, each with its own personal scope. In the first reading “temporary pro-
tection” applies, first, “to displaced persons from third countries who cannot
return to their country of origin”, and, secondly, “for persons who otherwise
need international protection.” This last reading is problematic, as it is unclear
what this second category entails. The only category of “displaced persons”
who are not covered by the first category of Article 63(2)(a), “displaced per-
sons who cannot return to their country of origin”, are persons who did not
leave their country of origin. But Article 63(2)(a) concerns “immigration”
according to Article 61(1)(a), not assistance (or protection) abroad. 
According to the second reading, Article 63(2)(a) requires measures on,
first, temporary protection and second, international protection “otherwise” –
usually called “subsidiary protection”. This distinction does make sense (see
below, number [181]). Moreover, in addition to the English one, various lan-
guage versions appear to favour it to the first reading.38
[194] “Temporary protection” applies to “displaced persons who cannot
return to their country of origin” (Article 63(2)(a)). Can temporary protection
apply to “refugees” in the sense of Article 63(2)? The first clause of Article
63(2), we saw, mentions “refugees” next to “displaced persons”. One could
argue Article 63(2)(a) addresses only displaced persons (and that Article
63(2)(b) covers the “refugees” mentioned in Article 63(2) first clause). But
both ordinary meaning as well as relevant UN documents (referred to above)
suggest that “refugees” and “displaced persons” are not completely distinct
categories. Moreover, object and purpose strongly suggest that temporary
protection should apply to persons who (may) fulfil the requirements of
Article 1 RC as well. Member States employ temporary protection schemes
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in situations of mass influxes, when they are unable or unwilling to examine
the refugee status of all applicants. Hence, in the practice of the Member
States the category of temporary protection beneficiaries includes
Convention refugees whose status has not yet been determined. If European
temporary protection could not apply to Convention refugees, it would pose
offer no alternative to examination procedures meant in Article 63(1). This
would deprive temporary protection of all sense and meaning and hence be
contrary to object and purpose. The “displaced persons who cannot return” to
whom temporary protection applies, therefore encompass (unrecognised)
Convention refugees. 
[195] The second category of protection envisaged by Article 63(2)(a) TEC
concerns “persons otherwise in need of international protection”. The term
“international protection” is not defined in international law. In UN docu-
ments it means protection by international organisations (as opposed to “asy-
lum”, protection by states).39 There is no reason to suppose that this technical
meaning was intended; as will be argued below, Article 63 does not provide
the Community with the capacity to offer protection (see number [221]). It
seems that the term international protection simply means protection by a state
to a foreigner. Importantly, the scope of beneficiaries of this category of pro-
tection is not limited to specific grounds like, for example, applicability of
international asylum law.40 Nor does the definition of its personal scope as
“displaced persons” by Article 63(2) first clause imply this restriction. The
term “otherwise” opposes this category to temporary protection, as well as to
asylum in the sense of Article 63(1). 
The substantive scope 
[196] Article 63(2)(a) TEC does not define on what aspects of temporary or
subsidiary protection Community measures can or must be adopted – it speaks
merely of “measures” on both forms of protection. It would appear that the
provision provides for a legal basis for measures on all aspects of temporary
or subsidiary protection. However, there are good reasons to define its sub-
stantive scope by reference to Article 63(1), and assume that Article 63(2)(a)
provides a basis only for measures on the subject matter listed in Article 63(1)
(allocation, reception, qualification and procedures). 
Since the amendment of Article 67 by the Treaty of Nice, when “common
rules and basic principles” on Article 63(1) and (2)(a) issues were adopted, the
co-decision procedure applies (see number [66]). Measures concerning “asy-
lum” that cannot be based on Article 63(1), such as secondary rights, must be
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based on Article 63(3)(a) (see number [201]), and will therefore still be sub-
ject to unanimous decision-making. If Article 63(2)(a) provides a basis for
measures on (inter alia) secondary rights, these measures would be subject to
the co-decision procedure. As a consequence, the Treaty would make further
harmonisation of residence conditions for subsidiary and temporary protec-
tion seekers far easier than such harmonisation for refugees. This result would
be contrary to the purposes of Article 63. For the detailed definition of subject
matter in Article 63(1) served to make sure that on those issues measures
would be adopted before 1 may 2004; apparently, such extensive harmonisa-
tion was not required for temporary and subsidiary protection (see number
[181] above). Arguably, the substantive scope of Article 63(2)(a) is, in a rea-
ding to object and purpose and within the context, limited to the issues listed
in Article 63(1).
The geographical scope
[197] The scope of temporary and subsidiary protection is not explicitly
restricted to persons “in the Member States” (cf. Article 63(1)(a), (b) and (d),
see number [185] above). Hence, temporary and subsidiary protection can
apply to persons who are still outside the European Union. Article 64(2) cor-
roborates this reading (see number [193] above). But importantly, the provi-
sion concerns “immigration”. Hence, it cannot serve as the basis for schemes
on protection abroad. Temporary protection for persons outside the Union
therefore can only concern resettlement schemes and the like. 
Burden sharing
[198] Article 63(2)(b) concerns measures for “promoting a balance of effort
between Member States in receiving and bearing the consequences of recei-
ving refugees and displaced persons”, better known as “burden-sharing”.41
Burden sharing can take different forms; for present purposes, we may distin-
guish between financial and physical burden sharing, i.e. between distribution
of costs and distribution of persons in need of protection. By decision the
council has established a “European Refugee Fund” that serves to give the
Member States financial support for reception of applicants, refugees, sub-
sidiary and temporary protection beneficiaries, as well as for the costs of
implementation of the various asylum measures.42 This financial support has
no immediate consequences for the compatibility of European asylum law
with international law, and will therefore not be further addressed in this study.
The one measure thus far adopted on physical burden sharing however may
have such consequences; see further paragraph 7.2.2. 
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Sudden inflows
[199] Article 64(2), finally, allows the Community to adopt “provisional
measures” in case of “an emergency situation characterised by a sudden
inflow of nationals of third countries”. This situation bears some resemblance
to the situation of mass influxes in Article 63(2)(a). But whereas the latter pro-
vision addresses the grant of protection, Article 64(2) deals with public order.
This follows from the context of Article 64(1), stating that public order
remains outside the scope of Community power, to which Article 64(2) is the
exception – for it allows the Council to adopt measures in case of an “inflow”.
The “emergency situation”, then, is the situation in the Member State or states,
and the threat to public order is the uncontrolled entry.43 The term “inflow” is
sufficiently wide to cover both the situation in which the third-country natio-
nals have already flowed into the European Union, and the situation that the
inflow is imminent, and the third-country-nationals are still outside the
Member States.44 In summary, Article 64(2) allows for Community measures
combating uncontrolled entry, 45 or the consequences for public order of such
uncontrolled entry. 
Measures
[200] Two measures explicitly refer to Article 63(2)(a) as their legal basis: the
Temporary Protection Directive, and the Qualification Directive as far as
qualification for subsidiary protection is concerned (see Chapter 5). The
Council adopted one measure on physical burden sharing pursuant to Article
63(2)(b), for temporary protection in the case of mass influxes (see Chapter
7.2.2). No decisions pursuant to Article 64(2) have as yet been adopted. 
3.3.5 Immigration (Article 63(3) TEC)
[201] Article 63(3)(a) empowers the Community to adopt 
“measures on immigration policy within the following areas: […] condi-
tions of entry and residence, and standards on procedures for the issue by
Member States of long term visas and residence permits, including those
for the purpose of family reunion.” 
Measures on immigration policy may include, we saw above, measures on
refugees and displaced persons. The material scope is quite broad – conditions
of entry and residence and procedures on the issue of residence permits encom-
pass all subject matter covered by international asylum law. Article 63(3) may
serve as a legal basis for issues concerning refugees or other beneficiaries of
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international asylum law on issues outside the scopes of Article 63(1) and (2)
(cf. number [182] above). One such issue was already discussed: criteria for
assessing the safety of third countries (not being Member States, see number
[191] above). Article 63(3)(a) further serves as the legal basis for standards for
secondary rights for refugees and for subsidiary protection beneficiaries, laid
down in the Qualification Directive, and for rules on family reunification for
refugees, laid down in the Family Reunification Directive (see Chapter 8). 
3.3.6 External competencies
[202] Hitherto we addressed the scope of the Community’s internal powers,
concerning legal relations with the Member States and their subjects. External
competencies concern the Community’s powers to engage in relations with
third states and international organisations. 
On some issues, the Treaty on European Community explicitly confers
external powers to the Community. Of most interest for immigration at large
is Article 310, empowering the Community to conclude “association agree-
ments”. The Community has not concluded any agreement concerning asylum
issues on this basis. 
Of more importance to European asylum law are the implied external 
powers of the Community. According to well-established case law of the Court
of Justice, internal powers may give rise to (implicit) external powers (to so-
called “ERTA-effects”), that is to Community competencies to conclude
agreements and engage in other international activities.46 Such external 
powers flow from Treaty provisions that explicitly confer internal powers, such
as Article 63, as well as from actually adopted internal measures. 
[203] On the basis of Article 63(1) TEC, the Community concluded in 2001
an agreement with Iceland and Norway, 47 that made the provisions of the
Dublin Convention applicable on the transfer of applicants for asylum
between the Member States and these states. The adoption of the Dublin
Regulation and the Dublin Application Regulation, the successors to the
Dublin Convention and related instruments, necessitated new agreements on
the same matter. The Council authorised the Commission to start negotiations
with both Iceland and Norway.48 The Community has negotiated agreements
with Denmark49 and Switzerland50 that should make the arrangements of the
Dublin and Dublin Application Regulations applicable to these states. These
agreements are discussed in Chapter 7. 
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3.3.7 The exception of Article 64(1) TEC
[204] According to Article 64(1) TEC, Title IV 
“shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon
Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the
safeguarding of internal security”. 
As to asylum,51 public order questions could arise concerning several issues,
in particular in the context of a mass influx of third country nationals and ille-
gal entry. As a reservation concerning public policy matters, Article 64(1)
TEC is not a novelty in Community law. According to Article 39(3) TEC, the
freedom of movement for workers can be subjected to “limitations justified on
grounds of public policy, public security or public health”; a similar clause can
be found in Article 46(1), on the freedom of residence. We saw that restric-
tions to the market freedoms must be compatible with general principles of
Community law, and that the Court of Justice can review this compatibility
(see par 2.2.2.3). Should the public order clause of Article 64(1) be construed
in the same way, to the effect that national measures that serve “maintenance
of law and order” or “public security” are subject to human rights review by
the Court of Justice? 
According to Hailbronner, Article 64(1) expresses the premise that the
realm of public order falls outside the scope of Community aliens law alto-
gether.52 In contrast, the public order clauses Articles 39(3) and 46(1) TEC
function as exceptions to the previously established right of free movement.
Therefore, the case-law on the latter provisions cannot be transposed to Title
IV, so he argues. 
However, it should be observed the Court of Justice did apply the Article
39(3) approach to the public order exception to social policy issues under
Article 118(old).53 Non-involvement of fundamental freedoms hence makes
no difference.54 Apparently, the Court of Justice conceives of ordre public as a
uniform concept.
[205] Does Article 68(2) lead to a different conclusion?55 According to this
provision,
“[i]n any event, the Court of Justice shall not have jurisdiction to rule on
any measure or decision taken pursuant to Article 62(1) relating to the
maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security”.
I think that this provision rather implies that public order issues do fall within
the scope of Community law. If the matter fell outside Community law pur-
suant to Article 64(1), there would be no need to deny competence of the
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Court of Justice, as the Court as a matter of course has no jurisdiction on
issues lying outside the scope of Community law. Moreover, Article 68(2)
explicitly restricts the Court’s competence only as to measures pursuant to
Article 62(1), the crossing of the internal borders of the Community. There is
no clause that restricts in a similar way the scope of review of Member State
action on the crossing of external borders because of public order considera-
tions.
Article 64(1) hence functions in the context of Article 63 measures under
the same conditions that apply to the public order clause in Article 39(3). The
provision establishes that Member States can invoke public order considera-
tions that justify exceptions to Title IV legislation. Such action must however
comply with general principles of Community law. Article 68(2) TEC restricts
the review of the Court of Justice only as regards restrictions on the freedom
of movement within the Community, not as regards Member State action
based on public order considerations concerning the crossing of the external
borders. 
3.3.8 Legal basis outside Title IV
[206] Can the Community adopt legislation on asylum on the basis of other
provisions than Article 63 TEC? Obviously, Community powers outside Title
IV do have consequences for third country nationals (that is, non-citizens of
the Member States), hence for asylum seekers and beneficiaries. Article
137(3) TEC explicitly empowers the Community to legislate on “conditions of
employment for third country nationals legally residing in Community territo-
ry”. Further, third country nationals will profit indirectly from Community
measures - the abolition of borders provides for an obvious example.
Moreover, third country nationals may derive rights from provisions that
address EU citizens. Thus, in the quality of family member s or employee s of
EU citizens, a third country national may derive rights from the market free-
doms of the former. But these instances do not concern Community law on
asylum seeker or beneficiaries in that capacity, and therefore fall outside the
scope of the present study. 
[207] Could the freedom of movement of persons required by Article 14 TEC
(Article 7A(old) TEC) serve as a legal basis for measures on asylum? Article
94 TEC provides for a legal basis for the adoption of measures that serve to
establish the freedom of movement of persons as envisaged by Article 14.56
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This provision enables the Community to adopt directives in order to har-
monise domestic law that directly influences the functioning of the common
market.57 Domestic asylum legislation may exert such influence. But the prin-
ciple of lex specialis derogat legi generali forbids the use of the provision in
case the carefully delineated competencies in Title IV do not provide a suffi-
cient basis for Community action. 
Finally, Article 308 enables the Community to take action if “it is neces-
sary to obtain […] the objectives of the Community and this treaty has not
provided for the necessary powers”. But the Court of Justice has ruled that the
provision 
“cannot serve as the basis for widening the scope of Community powers
beyond the general framework created by […] those provisions that define
the tasks and the activities of the Community.”58
As Title IV defines both tasks as well activities of the Community, Article 308
cannot serve as basis for Community legislation asylum.59
3.3.9 Concluding remarks
[208] Contrary to the first impression that Article 63 TEC might give,
Community powers on asylum are not restricted to the areas listed in Article
63(1) and (2). Article 63(3)(a) attributes to the Community the competence to
issue measures on entry, residence and procedures for third country nationals,
including asylum beneficiaries, asylum seekers and persons in need of tempo-
rary or subsidiary protection, addressed under paragraphs (1) and (2) of
Article 63 TEC. 
Article 63(1) and (2) serve to carve out the obligation for the Community
to adopt measures on the areas mentioned there within five years, to exempt
Article 63(1)(a) measures from the limitation to minimum harmonisation
applying to Article 63(3)(a), and, arguably, to state with emphasis the require-
ment of accordance with international asylum law of the issues listed in
Article 63(1). 
[209] Article 63(1) and (2) require Community legislation on three forms of
protection – “asylum”, temporary protection for refugees and displaced per-
sons, and subsidiary protection for persons in need of protection falling out-
side the scope of both asylum and temporary protection. “Asylum” is not (or
not necessarily) of a temporary nature (as opposed to temporary protection),
and reserved for recognised Convention refugees (as opposed to subsidiary
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protection). The sub-paragraph devoted to “asylum”, Article 63(1), also
addresses “asylum seekers”. For practical purposes, we should distinguish
“asylum seekers” from recognised refugees and hence accept asylum seeker
status as a separate, fourth protection category. 
Temporary protection is not restricted ratione personae to a specific catego-
ry of persons under international asylum law. It can apply to any category of
persons who are outside their country of origin, and “cannot return” (cf. Article
63(2)(a) TEC). Article 63(2) first clause explicitly states that this form of pro-
tection may apply to “refugees”. Subsidiary protection does not apply to per-
sons who are entitled to “asylum”, asylum seekers included, and to the bene-
ficiaries of temporary protection. Otherwise, the scope is undefined. Article
64(2), finally, gives a special arrangement for the situation a mass influx cau-
ses an “emergency situation”. It addresses public order and serves as the legal
basis for “provisional measures”, not for a separate protection status.
[210] Whereas Article 63(2) does not indicate which issues should be
addressed by Community law on temporary and subsidiary protection, Article
63(1) requires legislation on four issues concerned with asylum. Article
63(1)(a) cannot serve as legal basis for rules on procedures concerning the
application of criteria and instruments for deciding which Member State is
responsible for considering an asylum claim. Article 63(1)(c) addresses qual-
ification for asylum (Refugee Convention protection) on the ground that the
person is a Convention refugee. Hence, it can serve as the legal basis for not
only the interpretation of Article 1 RC, but also for rules on refusal or with-
drawal of a residence permit because the expulsion grounds of Articles 32 or
33 RC apply. Likewise, Article 63(1)(d) addresses rules on procedures (exam-
ination as well as appeal procedures) on qualification for asylum on the
ground that the person is a Convention refugee, including application of the
expulsion grounds of Article 32 and 33 RC. The provision cannot serve as
legal basis for legislation on criteria for assessing the safety of a third country.
Such rules can be based only on Article 63(3)(a) TEC. The latter provision fur-




[211] Harmonisation is the approximation of domestic law by means of
160 Chapter 3
Community law standards. Harmonisation is only one of the devices for
attaining the Community’s objectives. Common market freedoms like the free-
dom of movement of persons may be established by the elimination of barriers
to that freedom, an effect produced by directly effective Treaty provisions.
Article 18 TEC, for example, requires freedom of movement of Union citi-
zens, and prohibits domestic law requirements inhibiting this freedom. But
domestic law producing those “obstacles” may serve legitimate interests – for
example, the control on entry of non-EU citizens. On such issues, Community
legislation is needed in order to establish the freedom of movement.60 In areas
of exclusive competence, the Community may impose a uniform system of
Community law. In other areas, the Community may provide for harmonisa-
tion of law. Then, the Community sets (usually by way of directives) legal
standards, which protect the concerned interests, while the freedom of move-
ment is secured, because the standards apply equally in all Member States. 
[212] The degree to which secondary Community law pre-empts domestic law
differs in different areas. In some areas, the Treaty on European Community
provides a legal basis for total harmonisation. In that situation, the Member
States are not allowed to derogate from the adopted Community legislation. In
other areas, Community law merely provides for minimum harmonisation.61
Such legislation does allow the Member States to introduce or maintain
domestic regulations on the involved subject matter.62 Minimum harmonisa-
tion most frequently occurs in policy areas where the common market free-
doms meet competing interests, such as environmental protection (Article 176
TEC) or social policy (Article 137(2) TEC).63
A Community measure provides for minimum harmonisation if either its
basis in the Treaty, or because the measure itself states so.64 Thus, Article 176
states that “protective measures adopted pursuant to Article 175 shall not pre-
vent any Member State from maintaining or introducing more stringent pro-
tective measures”; Article 137(2) speaks of “minimum requirements”, and
Article 63 of “minimum standards”. In the absence of indications in the rele-
vant Treaty provision, it may follow from a rule of secondary Community law
itself that it provides for minimum harmonisation, for example, if it employs
the term “at least”.65
[213] Minimum norms, then, leave the Member States the freedom to intro-
duce or maintain alternative domestic standards. This freedom is, obviously,
not unfettered – otherwise, the Community measure would provide for no
legal effect at all. Rather, minimum norms allow the Member States to dero-
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gate in one direction only: domestic standards may deviate from the
Community norms only in favour of the addressee.66 Besides, domestic stan-
dards derogating from Community standards are subject to the requirements
of Community law. In the case law on the “minimum requirements” of Article
137 TEC, two conditions figure. Firstly, national measures may not “under-
mine the coherence of Community action” in the concerned area and second-
ly, they must be in conformity with the Treaty, such as the prohibition of dis-
crimination and the exercise of fundamental freedoms.67 The requirement of
conformity with the Treaty is expressly stated for those measures in Article
137(5) TEC, but arguably, it applies to any domestic measure setting standards
that exceed minimum norms, pursuant to Article 10 TEC (cf. number [56]).
The Treaty may further provide for specific requirements on such domestic
standards.68
[214] The concept of minimum harmonisation addresses the division of 
powers between the Community and the Member States, not the specific con-
tent of Community measures. It does not restrict Community measures to a
particular level of harmonisation. Hence, the minimum norm may set a very
high level of protection.69 The extent to which a Community measure may
regulate a certain issue must be assessed by means of the principles of sub-
sidiarity and proportionality.70 Thus, Article 63(2)(a) for example empowers
the Community to adopt measures on persons in need of subsidiary protection;
a quite generally worded competence if compared to those laid down in Article
63(1). But the Community may adopt a measure laying down a detailed
arrangement on, say, procedural rules for the granting and withdrawal of such
protection only if it is established that this arrangement is necessary to achieve
the objective. Conversely, Community institutions may be liable for failure to
establish the requisite degree of harmonisation.71
It also follows that the Treaty does not require that the measures ex Article
63 set a particular minimum. Consequently, a reading of Article 63(1) TEC in
conjunction with the reference to international law in Article 63(1) TEC does
not entail that measures on reception, qualification as a refugee or procedures
for granting or withdrawing refugee status should at least implement every
relevant rule of international asylum law. Hence, Community measures are not
invalid for violation of the Treaty if they do not or not fully address some rele-
vant international law obligation. Still, the concept of minimum standards
does have important implications for the assessment of conflicts between
European asylum legislation and international asylum law. The issue will be
addressed under number [217] below. 
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Harmonisation of law under Article 63 TEC
[215] Article 63 TEC distinguishes between two levels of harmonisation
Community measures on asylum or immigration may produce. Firstly, it sets
no limits on Community measures based on Article 63(1)(a), on criteria and
mechanisms for determining which Member State is responsible for conside-
ring an application for asylum. These measures therefore can provide for total
as well as for minimum harmonisation. What sort of harmonisation the mea-
sures adopted on this basis – the Eurodac, the Dublin and the Dublin
Application Regulations – provide for, cannot be stated in general. Various
provisions of the same measure may (and indeed do) bring total harmonisation
on one issue, and minimum harmonisation on another one.72
Secondly, measures based on Article 63(1)(b), (c), (d) and (2)(a) are explicitly
confined to setting “minimum standards”. Consequently, Member States may
introduce or maintain legislation exceeding Community standards on reception
of asylum seekers, qualification for refugee status, procedures for the grant or
withdrawal of such status and on temporary and subsidiary protection. Article
63(2)(b) empowers the Community to take measures “promoting a balance of
effort”, which language indicates that the Community’s powers are limited.73
The second final clause of Article 63 sets another standard for measures
pursuant to Article 63(3) and (4). Such measures 
“[…] shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing
in the areas concerned national provisions which are compatible with this
Treaty and with international agreements.”
The requirement of compatibility with the Treaty must be read as compatibi-
lity with the Treaty and the legislation based on it, i.e. the Directives adopted
on the basis of Article 63(3) and (4) TEC, the usual conditions for domestic
measures exceeding minimum standards (see number [213] above).74
Community legislation based on Article 63(3) and (4) therefore can produce
only minimum harmonisation, not total harmonisation, and in this respect
there is little difference with the minimum standards of Article 63(1) and (2). 
[216] Why does Article 63 employ two different wordings for the restriction
to minimum harmonisation in both sets of sub-paragraphs? Arguably, the rea-
son is the existence or absence of previously existing domestic legislation on
the relevant subject matter. The term “minimum standards” in Article
63(1)(b), (c), (d) and (2)(a) supposes that Member States did already operate
legal systems on reception of asylum seekers, qualification as refugees, pro-
cedures, temporary protection and subsidiary and temporary protection. This
is different as to the measures meant in Article 63(3) and (4). The Community
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may adopt legislation formulating conditions for entry of categories of third
country nationals, which has no forerunner in domestic law of the Member
States. It is unlikely this difference entails any legal consequences. 
Minimum standards and accordance with international law
[217] We saw above (numbers [212] and [213]) that Community law imposes
three requirements on domestic law applicable to an area where Community
law provides for minimum harmonisation. First, domestic standards that devi-
ate from Community law standards are allowed for only when they favour the
beneficiaries of the Community legislation. This requirement finds expression
in all Directives on asylum: they all state that “Member States may introduce
or retain more favourable standards [on the subject matter addressed by this
Directive], in so far as those standards are compatible with this Directive”.75
Delimitation of the scope of beneficiaries presents no problem as Article 63
itself defines them – “asylum seekers”, “refugees” and “displaced persons”. 
More intricate is the question of when the Member States can set standards
that are “more favourable” to those beneficiaries. If Community law sets stan-
dards for decisions that benefit the third country national - the grant of recep-
tion conditions, recognition as refugees of third country nationals fulfilling
certain requirements and so on - there is no problem. But what when
Community standards require refusal of reception conditions, recognition et
cetera? A domestic measure that requires the grant of refugee status is obvi-
ously more favourable for third country nationals than a Community law that
requires refusal. It follows that Community measures based on Article
63(1)(b), (c) (d) or (2)(a) and (3)(a) cannot impose the obligation to refuse. For
if they did, they were not minimum standards. Consequently, Community
minimum standards cannot entail an obligation to take a negative decision,
and Community legislation must be interpreted accordingly.76
Community law implies as a second requirement on domestic law devia-
ting from minimum standards, that this domestic law may not undermine the
unity of Community law. What this requirement entails for provisions of mate-
rial European asylum law will be addressed in paragraph 4.5.
Third, the domestic standards must comply with the Treaty. For the present
study, most relevant are those Treaty provisions that require respect for inter-
national asylum law obligations – Articles 6(2) TEU, 63(1) TEC first clause
(accordance with the Refugee Convention and other relevant instruments) and
the second last clause of Article 63 (the requirement of compatibility with
international agreements). The consequences of these Treaty provisions were
discussed in paragraph 2.2.3. 
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Conclusion
[218] In sum, Article 63 provides for two different levels of harmonisation. It
sets no limit to Community measures on criteria and mechanisms for deter-
mining the state responsible for considering asylum applications (Article
63(1)(a) TEC). These measures may comprehensively regulate the matter. 
For the remaining issues, Community measures can only provide for mini-
mum harmonisation (pursuant to the term “minimum standards”, and to the
second last clause of Article 63). This means that Member States may exceed
the level of protection set by Community law to the benefit of the asylum
seeker or beneficiary, if they do not jeopardise the unity of European law and
observe their obligations under the Treaty on European Community. This
implies that European asylum law on the issues mentioned in Article 63(1)(b),
(c), (d), (2), (3) and (4) cannot prohibit the grant of residence permits or of
conditions. If it did, then it did not set minimum standards and would there-
fore be in violation of primary Community law.
The term “minimum” does not address the content of the Community stan-
dards. Thus, the term does not prohibit the Council to set a level of protection
that (far) exceeds the average or even highest level in the Member States (but
the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity may prohibit such legisla-
tion, cf. number [56]). Conversely, the term does not require that Community
standards should at least provide for protection at the level defined by interna-
tional asylum law. 
3.5 Geographical scope of European asylum legislation
[219] In principle, Community law applies to all Member States77 – including
the ten states that acceded on May 1st 2004. For Title IV measures, Denmark,
Ireland and the United Kingdom have secured a special position by means of
Protocols to the Treaty of Amsterdam (cf. Article 69 TEC).78 Further, special
arrangements under international law apply to Norway, Iceland and
Switzerland (see paragraph 3.3.6 and 7.2.1).
According to the Protocol on the Position of Denmark, this Member State
is not bound by Community legislation pursuant to Article 63 or 64 TEC or by
case law from the Community judiciary on them.79 Denmark can at any time
revoke the Protocol; then, all Community measures apply.80
Denmark is involved in European asylum law only in one respect: it does
take part in the Dublin allocation system of applicants. Presently, where the
determination of responsibility for asylum applications is concerned, between
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Denmark and the other Member States, the Dublin Convention still applies;81
in the near future, the Convention will be replaced by a new agreement under
international law between the Community and Denmark, reflecting the con-
tent of the Dublin Regulation (see further paragraph 7.1). 
[220] Title IV measures do not necessarily bind Ireland and the United
Kingdom.82 Either they can participate in (“opt in to”) the adoption of Title IV
measures if they wish. They can take part in the adoption of a measure, if they
inform the Council and the Commission of their wish to do so within three
months of its proposal.83 This entails no commitment to accept the result – if a
measure cannot be adopted with the UK and Ireland taking part “within a reaso-
nable period”, the other Member States may adopt it without them.84 Further, both
the UK as well as Ireland can opt in to measures adopted by the other Member
States (if admitted by the Commission).85 Like Denmark, but in contrast to the
UK, Ireland may withdraw unilaterally from the Protocol.86 Both states participa-
ted in the adoption of most of the measures on asylum (see paragraph 4.8). 
3.6 Community powers on asylum and international 
asylum law
[221] Having analysed the scope of Community powers in some detail, we can
now address their implications for obligations of the Community and of the
Member States under international asylum law. First of all, we should observe
that Article 63 TEC presupposes that the grant of protection is a matter for the
Member States, not for the Community. The Community merely issues standards
on reception, qualification and procedures; the reception, qualification and pro-
cessing are done by the Member States. Article 63(3)(a) speaks of “standards on
procedures for the issue by the Member States of residence permits and long-term
visas”, and Article 63(1)(a) makes clear that “considering” applications for asy-
lum, and hence the grant of them is the “responsibility” of the Member States. 
Secondly, any obligations of the Community under international law pur-
suant to Article 63(1) TEC and so on are restricted to the standards it has set.
Article 63 does not impose an obligation to secure that, for example, reception
of asylum seekers in the Member States is in accordance with international
asylum law – only its standards on the matter must comply. In particular, the
characterisation as “minimum standards” does not imply that Community
standards should minimally secure accordance with international asylum law
(see number [218]). 
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[222] The legal character of legislation as minimum standards also has impor-
tant consequences for the possibility that conflicts occur between such legis-
lation and international law. As the Community is not bound to secure obser-
vance of international asylum law by the Member States, minimum standards
that fall short of the level of protection required by international law can there-
fore not be in breach of the Community’s own obligations pursuant to Article
6(2) TEU, Article 63(1) first clause or second last clause TEC. If the protec-
tion offered by a Community minimum standard falls short of the level
required by international asylum law, the Member States are by definition free
to set a higher protection standard, in conformity with their obligations under
international law. Therefore, Community legislation that sets minimum stan-
dards cannot require Member State conduct in breach of international law. As
a consequence, legislation that sets minimum standards cannot be invalid for
incompatibility with international asylum law.87
Confirmation for this view can be found in Opinion 2/91 by the Court of
Justice, on the compatibility of Convention no 170 of the International Labour
Organization with the Treaty, more specifically, with Article 118a(old)
TEEC.88 The latter provision, now Article 137 TEC, attributes the Community
the competence to set minimum norms on labour conditions (cf. number
[212]). When addressing the question of whether this Community competence
is “exclusive in nature” (relevant for the Community’s treaty making compe-
tence on the subject matter), the Court observed that
“[…] the provisions of Convention No 170 are not of such a kind as to
affect rules adopted pursuant to Article 118a. If, on the one hand, the
Community decides to adopt rules which are less stringent than those set
out in an ILO convention, Member States may, in accordance with Article
118a(3), adopt more stringent measures for the protection of working con-
ditions or apply for that purpose the provisions of the relevant ILO conven-
tion. If, on the other hand, the Community decides to adopt more stringent
measures than those provided for under an ILO convention, there is nothing
to prevent the full application of Community law by the Member States
under Article 19(8) of the ILO Constitution, which allows Members to
adopt more stringent measures than those provided for in conventions or
recommendations adopted by that organization.”89
The same reasoning applies to the relation between asylum legislation setting
minimum standards and international asylum law. The latter does not preclude
the offer of protection that goes further than required.90
[223] Hence, minimum standards on asylum cannot be invalid for incompati-
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bility with international asylum law. It follows that only legislation based on
Article 63(1)(a), the Dublin Regulation, the Eurodac Regulation and the
Dublin Application Regulation could be invalid. 
Does this conclusion deprive the requirement in Article 63(1) first clause
that Community asylum measures be “in accordance with” the Refugee
Convention and other international law of all sense and meaning? Obviously,
it does not. To begin with, Article 63(1) first clause demands that Community
asylum law be interpreted in accordance with international law (a matter to be
discussed thoroughly in Chapters 5 to 8). Further, it demands that European
asylum law be applied in accordance with international law. And as to the
validity of Community instruments, as far as I know no directive or regulation
has ever been declared invalid by the Court of Justice because of incompati-
bility with general principles of Community law. Thus far, Community instru-
ments could always be interpreted in a way that made their application in
accordance with those principles possible. The characterisation by Article
63(1)(b), (c), (d) and (2) TEC of Community instruments on asylum as “mini-
mum standards” simply means that those instruments should be interpreted in
a way that makes their application in accordance with relevant international
law possible. And eventually, it should be noted that the impossibility to suc-
cessfully challenge the validity of minimum standards for incompatibility with
international law in no way affects the protection under international asylum
law required within the Community legal order. Community legislation con-
taining minimum norms must be interpreted in accordance with international
asylum law; the same holds true for domestic law within the scope of
Community asylum law. As the relevant Community legislation sets minimum
standards, it by definition leaves space for such interpretation in accordance
with international law (or should be interpreted as doing so). If it turns out that
Community legislation based on Article 63(1)(b), (c), (d), (2) or (3) TEC
inhibits Member States to comply with their obligations under international
asylum law, that legislation would be at variance with Article 63 TEC as it
does not set minimum standards (and for that reason, is invalid). In such a
case, international asylum law serves to define the “minimum character” of
Community legislation.
3.7 Concluding remarks
[224] The question addressed in this Chapter was the extent whereto the
Community can or must issue legislation on asylum (question 2 under number
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[5]). Conclusions on the various aspects of the basis for asylum legislation in
the Treaty on European Community can be found in the final sections of the
sub-paragraphs (numbers [177], [208], [209] and [218]). Here, I list five fin-
dings of major relevance for the discussion of European asylum law further in
this book. 
First of all, the objective of asylum measures is not only the freedom of
movement of Union citizens, but also the safeguarding of rights of third coun-
try nationals. European asylum legislation must be interpreted and applied
accordingly. 
Secondly, the Community is not bound to secure observance of internatio-
nal law as to the subject matter listed in Article 63 TEC. It must issue “stan-
dards” on those issues, and these standards must be in accordance with inter-
national law. But there is no obligation to set standards on each and any aspect
of “qualification”, “procedures” and so on. 
Thirdly, legislation on the subject matter listed in Article 63(1)(b) – (d), (2)
and (3) TEC set “minim um standards”. These standards cannot detract from
Member State competence to apply standards exceeding the level of protec-
tion set by Community legislation, as long as the domestic standards do not
endanger the unity of Community law and comply with the Treaty. Therefore,
minimum standards cannot impose obligations that adversely affect claims
under international law. If secondary law prohibited observance of internatio-
nal law, it would not be a minimum standard and hence in violation of its
Treaty basis. It further follows that where Article 63(1) TEC requires accor-
dance with the Refugee Convention and other relevant treaty law, it does not
define a minimum level that Community legislation should secure. Rather,
secondary law may only partially address relevant international obligations. 
Fourthly, the substantive scope of Community powers on asylum is not
restricted to the subject matter listed in Article 63(1) and (2) TEC. Article
63(3)(a) provides for a legal basis for legislation on issues that may fall out-
side the scope of Article 63(1) and (2).
Fifthly, Article 63 TEC gives a few directions for the form and further con-
tent of European asylum law. The provision requires standards on four “status-
es”: asylum status for Convention refugees, temporary protection status, sub-
sidiary protection status and applicant status (cf. number [208]). Article 63(1)
TEC requires rules on qualification and on procedures for asylum status, and
rules for allocation and reception of applicants for this status. Article 63 does
not require that all these issues must also be addressed by the standards on
temporary and subsidiary protection. In this, asylum status enjoys a primary
position vis-à-vis temporary and subsidiary protection. This is underlined by
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the explicit requirement that the standards on asylum pursuant to Article 63(1)
TEC are “in accordance with” the Refugee Convention and other relevant
treaty law.
3.8 The Constitution 
The draft Constitution for Europe envisages bringing some important changes
to the Community (or Union) powers on asylum. The discussion below refers
to the discussion of Title IV powers in the previous paragraphs, and focuses
on differences with present Community powers. 
3.8.1 Introduction 
[225] In the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (henceforth also:
CfE), powers on asylum and immigration matters are laid down in Chapter IV
of Part III (henceforth also: Chapter IV), addressing the “area of freedom,
security and justice”. This Chapter is the successor to both Title IV of Part III
of the Treaty on European Community, and to Title VI of the Treaty on
European Union (the “third pillar” provisions on the area of freedom, securi-
ty and justice; see number [172]). Section 1 of Chapter IV states “general pro-
visions” that apply to the remaining three sections. It contains:
- the successor to the provisions that provide for a general legal basis,
Article 61 TEC and its Title VI TEU counterpart Article 29 TEU, in
Article 257;
- the ordre public reservation of Article 64(1) TEC and its Title VI TEU
counterpart Article 33 TEU, in Article 262; 
- a number of provisions on procedural issues, Articles 258-261 and 263-264. 
Section 2 of Chapter IV, the Articles 265-269, is headed “Policies on border
checks, asylum and immigration”. It contains the successor provisions to
Articles 62, 63 and 64(2) TEC.91
[226] The “area of freedom, security and justice” reappears in the Constitution
as one of the objectives of the Union, subject to some changes. According to
Article 3(2),
“[t]he Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice
without internal frontiers, and a single market where competition is free
and undistorted”. 
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Different from the present Treaty on European Community, the Constitution
explicitly appoints nationals of the Member States as the beneficiaries of the
area.92 The relation between the area of freedom, security and justice and the
internal market, still comprising “an area without internal frontiers”, remains
ambiguous. By mentioning both together, Article 3(2) presents them as dis-
tinct, yet closely connected concepts.
According to “general provision” Article 257(1), 
“[t]he Union shall constitute an area of freedom, security and justice with
respect for fundamental rights and the different legal traditions and sys-
tems of the Member States.”93
In this provision (the successor to Article 61 first clause TEC), no mention is
made of the “citizens of the Union” as the beneficiaries of the area. Arguably,
its scope is therefore wider than the scope of Article 3(2) CfE. Further, Article
257(1) CfE makes explicit the connection between the area of freedom, secu-
rity and justice and respect for fundamental rights, only implicit in the present
Treaties. This reference to fundamental rights fits in well with the stress on
human rights protection elsewhere in the Constitution.94 The aim of “safe-
guarding the rights of nationals of third countries” (Article 61(b) TEC) reap-
pears as the stipulation that the “common policy on asylum, immigration and
external border control […] is fair towards third country nationals”.95 The tem-
poral aspect present in Article 61 TEC (which spoke of “progressively” crea-
ting the area of freedom) is absent.
Noteworthy, finally, is the elaboration of the area of freedom, security and
justice in Article 257 (2), (3) and (4) CfE. The latter two sub-paragraphs work
out the notions of “security” and “justice”, without any allusion to asylum or
immigration measures. “Asylum”96 and “immigration” are combined in one
paragraph with the abolition of internal border controls – and hence more
explicitly connected to the notion of “freedom” than under the present Treaties
on European Community and on European Union. 
[227] Union competencies on “asylum” and “immigration” are elaborated in
Articles 266, 267 and 268 CfE. They address three issues for both policy
fields: 
- a common Union policy for “international protection” and for “immigra-
tion” should be developed (Articles 266(1) and 267(1) CfE; see paragraph
3.8.2 below);
- the areas of legislative competencies of the Union in both fields are
defined (Article 266(2) for international protection, Article 267(2)-(5) CfE
for immigration; see paragraph 3.8.5 below);
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- solidarity and burden sharing among the Member States are addressed
(Article 268 CfE; see number [244]). 
Article 266 (3) CfE addresses Union competence in cases of emergency situ-
ations due to sudden inflows of third country nationals. This competence does
in itself not concern asylum or international protection, but is relevant for the
definition of Union powers on the temporary protection (see number [238]
below).
3.8.2 The policy objectives
[228] The Union should “develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary
protection and temporary protection” (Article 266(1)). This policy should
serve a twofold purpose: the offer of an “appropriate status to any third coun-
try national requiring international protection”, and “ensuring compliance
with the principle of non-refoulement”. This policy “must be in accordance
with the [Refugee Convention] and other relevant treaties”. The Constitution
thus positions human rights considerations as the main purpose of asylum
legislation, in a far more explicit way than the present Treaty on European
Community does. 
Article 267(1) requires a “common immigration policy”. This policy
should serve a threefold purpose for “immigration” measures: “efficient
management of migration flows”, “fair treatment of third-country nationals
residing legally in Member States” and “prevention of, and enhanced mea-
sures to combat, illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings.”
Interestingly, human rights considerations on entry of third country nationals
are absent, but Article 257(2) CfE requires that the policy on immigration
should be “fair towards third-country nationals”. Unlike Article 63 second last
clause TEC, Article 267(1) CfE does not explicitly require compliance with
international law. 
The provisions on these “policies” are relevant as Union powers in their
own right. Moreover, they define the “purpose” of Union legislative powers on
international protection and immigration (cf. Article 266(2) and 267(2) CfE,
first clauses). 
3.8.3 Personal and geographical scope
[229] Different from Article 63 TEC (see number [184]), Article 266(1) CfE
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explicitly limits the scope of “international protection” measures to third
country nationals, as Article 267(1) CfE does for immigration measures;97
Article 257(2) CfE last clause explicitly includes stateless persons into the
personal scope. 
The geographical scope of both kinds of measures is not explicitly defined.
Article 267(1) speaks of “efficient management of migration flows”, para-
graph (2)(a) of “the conditions of entry and residence”. Hence, the provision
provides for a legal basis for measures on residence applied for by third coun-
try nationals who are still outside the Union. Article 63(1)(a), (b) and (d) TEC
are explicitly restricted to the territories of the Member States (cf. number
[185] above). In contrast, their successors in the Constitution Article
266(2)(e), (f) and (d) are not. Moreover, the new competence laid down in
Article 266(2)(g), on “partnership and co-operation with third countries for
the purpose of managing inflows of people applying for asylum or subsidiary
or temporary protection” suggests that the “common policy on asylum, sub-
sidiary protection and temporary protection” (Article 266 first clause CfE)
may encompass legislation on asylum applicants and beneficiaries still outside
the Union. This reading is reinforced by Article 266(1), which states that the
measures should serve the purpose of the offering of appropriate status to any
third country national requiring international protection. Hence, the Union
may adopt measures in accordance with Article 266(2) concerning applicants
still outside the Union. 
3.8.4 Harmonisation
[230] A major difference between present Article 63 TEC and Articles 266 and
267 CfE concerns the targeted level of harmonisation. On most asylum issues,
Article 63(1) and (2) TEC requires “minimum standards”. On most issues,
Articles 266 and 267 CfE require adoption of “European laws or framework
laws” – the Union equivalents to regulations or directives that are adopted in
the co-decision procedure. But a restriction of asylum law to “minimum” stan-
dards is absent in the Constitution. 
The sub-paragraphs of Articles 266 and 267 CfE define four levels of harmon-
isation. First, Article 267(4) explicitly excludes harmonisation in integration
matters. Second, Article 267(2) and Article 266(2)(e), (f) and (g) (immigra-
tion, allocation and reception of protection seekers and co-operation with third
countries) do not specify the level of harmonisation – they speak of “stan-
dards”, with no further qualification. Third, for temporary protection and for
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procedures for asylum and subsidiary protection status, the level is defined at
“common” standards (Article 266(2)(c) and (d) CfE). Fourthly and finally,
Article 266(2)(a) and (b) call for no less than a “uniform” statuses for “asy-
lum” and “subsidiary protection”. That the term “common” implies less uni-
formity than “uniform” follows not only from the ordinary meaning, but also
from the preparatory works.98
The difference between the harmonisation level set by Article 266(2)(a) –
(d) CfE and Article 63(1) and (2) TEC reflects the distinction between the first
and the second phases of harmonisation of asylum law as envisaged in the
European Council Tampere Conclusions (cf. number [49]. According to these
Conclusions, in the short term (before 1 may 2004) asylum measures should
lay down “minimum conditions” or cater for “approximation of law” but in the
longer term, for “a common asylum procedure” and “a uniform status”.99 The
latter policy objective has been codified in Article 266 CfE.
[231] What do these terms, and especially the term “uniform status” entail for
the division of powers between the Union and the Member States? The
Constitution explicitly distinguishes areas where it exercises “exclusive com-
petence”, and areas of “shared” competencies of the Union and the Member
States. 100 Asylum law, as part of the “area of freedom, security and justice” is
a shared competence under the Constitution.101 Hence, the principles of sub-
sidiarity and proportionality apply.102 Total harmonisation is for that reason not
very feasible.103
Still, total harmonisation is not excluded – the Union may provide for total
harmonisation in fields of shared competencies, but only if the objectives can
be better achieved in that way,104 and the Member States can exercise their
competence only “to the extent that the Union has not exercised […] its com-
petence”.105
“Uniform statuses” can be established also in the absence of exhaustive
harmonisation. If Union legislation sets high standards for international pro-
tection, Member States will be unwilling to exceed it. Then, the application of
high Union standards on asylum or subsidiary protection status will in fact
result in uniform asylum or subsidiary protection status.106 Hence, the defini-
tion of statuses as “uniform” is not devoid of legal consequences. By calling
for “uniform” statuses, high standards far more easily satisfy the requirements
of subsidiarity and proportionality than further unqualified standards for mere
“standards on statuses” would.
[232] One may argue that total harmonisation on any measure concerning
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international protection is excluded by the definition of the Union policy on
the matter in Article 266(1) CfE, and Article 266(2), first clause CfE, as esta-
blishing a “common European asylum system”, not a uniform one. But read-
ing these terms as definitions of the scope of Union competency leads to unac-
countable results. For the “common European asylum system” comprises next
to asylum also subsidiary and temporary protection. And if the term “com-
mon” in the same phrase had the meaning it has in Article 266(2)(c), the
“common asylum system” could not accommodate the “uniform statuses”.
Finally, we should observe that the present Treaty on European Community
makes total harmonisation on criteria and mechanisms for determining
responsibility for protection claimants possible. A reduction of power by the
Constitution can in itself not be excluded, but would hardly be compatible with
the over-all picture. Arguably, the term “common European asylum system”
does not address the scope of the relevant legislation, but rather establishes the
requirement that the relevant legislation be a “system”, thus form a coherent
whole. 
In summary, total harmonisation in asylum matters is not excluded under
the Constitution. But as the subsidiarity and proportionality apply to asylum
legislation, it is not very feasible. The terms “uniform” and, to a lesser extent,
“common” target a higher level of ambition than their counterparts in Article
63 TEC do. 
3.8.5 Substantive scope
Comprehensive powers
[233] Article 266(2) defines the scope of the Union legislative powers on asy-
lum matters. The provision commissions the Union to lay down legislative
measures for a “common European Asylum system”, and further sets out
under (a) to (g) in some detail what this System should “comprise”. The term
“comprising” suggests that the list of issues that follows is not exhaustive.
This is confirmed by a reading in conjunction with the provision on immigra-
tion, Article 267(2) CfE, that explicitly limits Union powers to the subject
matter listed: 
“[t]o this end [i.e. to establish the common immigration policy, see num-
ber [228]], European laws or framework laws shall establish measures in
the following areas […; emphasis added, HB]”. 
Hence, the Union is competent to lay down measures for the purpose defined
in Article 266(1), also if it concerns an area not specifically mentioned under
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Article 266(2). In notable contrast to Title IV TEC, Article 266 CfE gives the
Union comprehensive legislative powers on the whole field of international
protection – with two caveats. First, Article 262 CfE precludes Union legisla-
tion that affects the exercise of “responsibilities” as regards the maintenance
of law and order and the safeguarding of national security” (see number
[225]). Second, the exercise of legislative power pursuant to Articles 266(2)
CfE is subject to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Measures
on subjects not explicitly mentioned under one of the sub-paragraphs of that
provision require further foundation. 
Although the Union’s legislative powers on international protection are not
confined to the issues listed under the sub-paragraphs of Article 266(2) CfE,
the delimitation of the areas mentioned there is relevant for two purposes.
First, they differ as to the degree of harmonisation that is envisaged. Second,
the sub-paragraphs of Article 266(2) contain directions for the layout of the
Common European Asylum System. Therefore, I will briefly comment on the
substantive scope of Article 266(2). 
Protection categories of the Common European Asylum System
[234] Article 266(1) introduces “international protection” as a generic term
that encompasses “asylum”, “subsidiary protection” and “temporary protec-
tion”. It further introduces a distinction between on the one hand these cate-
gories of protection, and on the other hand “appropriate status” for those cate-
gories. 
All three categories of international protection, as well as the distinction
between “status” and “protection” reappear in Article 266(2) CfE. Sub-para-
graph (a) provides for legislation on “a uniform status of asylum”. The term is
not further defined, but a reading in conjunction with Article 78 CfE makes
clear that asylum is protection for Convention refugees, like “asylum” as
meant in Article 63(1) TEC.107
Article 266(2)(b) calls for “a uniform status of subsidiary protection”. Its
beneficiaries are defined as third country nationals who are in need of inter-
national protection, and did not “obtain European asylum.” The term
“European asylum” is not defined, but obviously refers to “uniform asylum
status” as meant in Article 266(2)(a). Both requirements – need for interna-
tional protection, and non-applicability of “asylum” – are (implicitly) present
in Article 63(2)(a) TEC (cf. par. 3.3.4 above).
Article 266(2)(c) speaks of a “common system of temporary protection”.
Temporary protection applies to “displaced persons in the event of a massive
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inflow”. The latter condition is absent in the present Article 63(2)(a) TEC, but
present in the Temporary Protection Directive (see number [276] below). It
follows from both the ordinary as well as the technical meaning of the term
“displaced person”, that the beneficiaries of temporary protection may encom-
pass Convention refugees and persons eligible for subsidiary protection. Thus,
“temporary protection” differs ratione materiae, not necessarily ratione per-
sonae from “asylum” and “subsidiary protection”, just as under the present
Treaty on European Community (see number [209] above). 
Article 266(2)(e) addresses reception standards for a fourth category:
applicants for “asylum or subsidiary protection” (cf. Article 63(1)(b) TEC that
applies to “asylum seekers” only). 
[235] Thus, the Common European Asylum System, we saw above, should
comprise the four main protection categories of asylum (refugee protection),
subsidiary protection, temporary protection and applicant protection. These
are the same categories we encountered in Article 63 TEC. 
As to the relation between these categories, we saw above that Article 63
TEC positions asylum in a primary position, and subsidiary next to temporary
protection in a secondary one (cf. number [224]). Article 266(2)(b) does the
same where it stipulates that subsidiary protection status applies only to aliens
who did not qualify for refugee status (did not “obtain European asylum sta-
tus”; cf. par. 5.8). But Article 266(2) treats subsidiary protection as quite a full
complement to “asylum”, requiring “uniform statuses”, common procedures
and rules for determining responsibility for applicants for both forms of pro-
tection (Article 266(2)(a), (b), (d) and (e) CfE). Further, Union legislation
should address applicants for both statuses, not only “asylum seekers”, as
under Article 63(1). Temporary protection occupies a secondary position next
to asylum and subsidiary protection. Only for co-operation with third coun-
tries (Article 266(2)(g)), the three forms of protection are on the same footing.
Uniform statuses
[236] “European laws or framework laws shall lay down measures for a com-
mon European asylum system comprising […] uniform statuses of asylum”
and “of subsidiary protection” (Article 266(2)(a) and (b)). The term “status”
refers to a legally defined position,108 thus the position of the alien after the
examination of his application. If read in this way, these provisions only
address the issue of residence conditions, not the requirements for entitlement
to those conditions.109 Thus read, the Constitution does not address the compe-
tence to legislate on the requirements for obtaining refugee or subsidiary pro-
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tection status – the very heart of all asylum law. In a broader interpretation,
“status” concerns both residence conditions as well as grounds for entitlement
to them. That the term “status” can have this meaning follows from the
“Convention relating to the Status of Refugees”, addressing both the defini-
tion of who is a refugee as well as residence conditions.110 Article 266(2)(d)
calls for “procedures for the granting and withdrawing of uniform asylum or
subsidiary protection status”, and hence presupposes that the standards for the
granting and withdrawing of those statuses fall within the area of Union powers.
Obviously, the broad meaning serves the purpose of Article 266(2)(a) and (b)
better than the narrow one does. Hence, the term “status” must be interpreted
as addressing both entitlement to residence conditions as well as standards for
granting or withdrawing them – or in the terms of the Constitution, standards
for “obtaining” them. 
[237] Both statuses should be “uniform”. The meaning of this term was dis-
cussed above (number [231]). The qualification “uniform” applies to the sta-
tuses in both respects: the residence conditions as well as the standards for
granting or withdrawing entitlement to them must be uniform in all Member
States. Obviously, the Constitution does not call for one uniform status for both
refugees as well as subsidiary protection beneficiaries; that is, the content of
the refugee status may differ from that of the subsidiary protection status. 
According to Article 266(1), the statuses should be appropriate. The rele-
vant legislation must be in accordance with the Refugee Convention according
to the same provision. Arguably, “uniform asylum status” should be up to
Refugee Convention standards, whereas subsidiary protection status may con-
vey fewer benefits, if “appropriate”. 
In one respect, the Constitution itself draws a distinction between both sta-
tuses: the asylum status should be “valid throughout the Union”, a require-
ment that does not apply to subsidiary protection status.111 The meaning of this
requirement is not evident from its wording. As subsidiary protection status
must also be “uniform”, it can hardly be “invalid” in other Member States than
the one that issued the status, in the sense that other Member States could deny
that the uniform subsidiary protection status holder is indeed entitled to his
status. It therefore seems that the requirement rather addresses the other com-
ponent of the status, the residential rights of refugees. It follows from Article
267(2)(b) that “the rights of third-country nationals legally residing in a
Member State” include “the conditions governing freedom of movement and
of residence in other states”. Arguably, the requirement that asylum status be
valid throughout the Union elaborates on the last mentioned issue. It then
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entails that uniform asylum status beneficiaries should enjoy the benefits of
Union law, in particular the fundamental freedoms on much the same footing
as Union citizens.112 Apparently, uniform subsidiary protection status should
not or not necessarily convey this benefit. 
Temporary protection and measures for sudden inflows
[238] Article 266(2)(c) CfE asks for “a common system of temporary protec-
tion”. A “status” for this category is not mentioned, but it follows from Article
266(1) that one of its objectives is the offering of “appropriate status” to those
in need of temporary protection.
Article 266(3) CfE states that
“[i]n the event of one or more Member States being confronted by an emer-
gency situation characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals of third coun-
tries, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt
European regulations or decisions comprising provisional measures for the
benefit of the Member State(s) concerned. It shall act after consulting the
European Parliament”.
The provision is the successor of present Article 64(2) TEC. Like the latter
provision, Article 266(3) is primarily concerned with public order, not with
protection: the measures should serve “the benefits of the Member State con-
cerned”, not the interests of the third country nationals. 
As to the personal scope, in paragraph 3.3.4 we noticed that Article 64(2)
TEC can apply to displaced persons inside as well as outside the Union, so in
contrast to Article 63(2)(a) TEC (on international protection). The
Constitution applies the same term “inflow” in Articles 266(2)(c) and 266(3)
CfE as applied in Article 64(2) TEC.113 Further, “displaced persons” are not
defined in Article 266(2)(c) as “persons who cannot return to their country of
origin” (as in Article 63(2)(a) TEC). Arguably, Article 266(2)(c) and 266(3)
CfE may both address displaced persons inside and outside the Union. The lat-
ter provision sets two additional requirements, absent in the former: the inflow
must be “sudden”, and it must cause “an emergency situation”. Only then the
“provisional measures” meant in 266(3) “may” be adopted. Temporary protec-
tion on the other hand applies only when inflow is “massive”. Apparently,
“sudden inflows” in the sense of Article 266(3) need not be “massive”. 
The measures that the Council may adopt pursuant to Article 266(3) are
“European regulations or decisions” – legislative tools for whose adoption consent
of the European Parliament is not required.114 This type of decision-making obvi-
ously allows for a quick response. The measures can only be “provisional”, but the
strict time limit of six months for application (Article 64(2) TEC) is absent. 
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Common procedures
[239] Article 266(2)(d) calls for “common procedures for the granting and
withdrawing of uniform asylum or subsidiary protection status”. Different
from Article 63(1)(d) TEC, the provision addresses “subsidiary protection”
next to “asylum”. The requirement that those procedures be “common” rather
than “uniform” bears evidence of a lower harmonisation ambition (see num-
ber [230] above). The restriction to “uniform asylum or subsidiary protection
status” entails that Member States remain free to operate alternative proce-
dures on the grant or withdrawal of other forms of protection – including “asy-
lum” or “subsidiary protection” not covered by the mentioned statuses. 
As to the set-up of the common procedures, the provision allows both for
separate procedures for asylum and for subsidiary protection, as well as for
one single procedure for both statuses. For the plural “procedures” does not
necessarily imply separate procedures, as it may address the distinction
between the procedure for granting and the one for withdrawing. Nor is the
rest of the clause conclusive. Arguably, the requirement of a single procedure
would have needed explicit wording.
Reception and criteria and allocation
[240] Contrary to Article 63(1)(b) TEC, Article 266(2)(d), the legal basis for
reception conditions, explicitly includes subsidiary protection claimants. The
wording “applicants for asylum or subsidiary protection” allows the Union
legislator both to treat applicants as one group, and to distinguish between
both categories. 
Article 266(2)(e) differs in only one respect from Article 63(1)(a) TEC: the
“criteria and mechanisms for determining which Member State is responsible
for considering an application” concern applications for subsidiary protection
as well as for asylum. 
Co-operation and partnership with third countries
[241] Finally, Article 266(2)(g) CfE calls for “partnership and co-operation
with third countries for the purpose of managing inflows of people applying
for asylum or subsidiary or temporary protection”. It is the only competence
on international protection that has no predecessor in the present Treaty on
European Community.115 The “partnership or co-operation” may only pursue
the managing of “inflows” of protection seekers. This suggests that a nexus
with the functioning of the common European asylum system as established
on the basis of Article 266(2) (a) – (f) is required. This requirement is rein-
forced by the delimitation of the “inflows” ratione personae to “people apply-
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ing for asylum or subsidiary or temporary protection” – not, for example, to
“displaced persons” in general. 
What kind of issues could be addressed by “partnership and co-operation”
with third countries as envisaged by Article 266(2)(g)? An important issue
would be external processing of applications for protection.116 Another issue
for co-operation with third countries could be readmission agreements, but
that matter is addressed by Article 267(3) CfE (see number [242]). 
Immigration
[242] Article 63(3)(a) TEC may serve as the legal basis for measures that
address the persons within the scope of Article 63(1) and (2) – asylum seekers,
asylum beneficiaries and beneficiaries of temporary and subsidiary protec-
tion. The same holds true for immigration measures pursuant to Article 267(3)
CfE: neither the purposes of immigration measures nor the personal scope
excludes third country nationals addressed by Article 266 CfE.117
As to the substantive scope, Article 267(2)(a) addresses “conditions on
entry and residence, and standards on the issue of long term visas and resi-
dence permits, including those for the purpose of family reunion”. This wor-
ding is identical to Article 63(3)(a) TEC, except for the substitution of the term
“standards” for “procedures”, which broadens the substantive scope. Article
63(3)(a) TEC, read in its context and to object and purpose, addresses not only
conditions for acquiring the right to reside, but also the definition of residen-
tial rights (cf. par. 3.3.2 and 3.3.5). Article 267(2)(b) offers a separate legal
basis for the second issue, “the definition of the rights of third country natio-
nals residing legally in a Member State”. This includes “conditions governing
freedom of movement and of residence in other Member States” – the subject
matter of Article 63(4) TEC. 
The scope of both sub-paragraphs overlaps with Article 266(2)(a), (b) and
(c), the “uniform status” for asylum and for “subsidiary protection” and the
“common system for temporary protection”. All three provisions encompass
the definition of residential rights. This includes conditions on freedom of
movement and residence in other Member States (cf. Article 267(2)(b) and the
requirement of validity throughout the Union of the uniform asylum status,
Article 266(2)(a) – see number [237] above). 
[243] As Union competencies on international protection are not limited to the
specific areas listed in Article 266(2) CfE (see number [233]), there is no need
to take recourse to powers on “immigration” as under Article 63 TEC (num-
ber [182]). As far as the delimitation of asylum and immigration powers is
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concerned, the Union competence to provide for standards on family reunifi-
cation for protection beneficiaries is of most practical interest. Legislation on
this matter may be viewed from two angles. As conditions of entry and resi-
dence, they fall within the scope of Article 267(2); as an element of the resi-
dential rights of protection beneficiaries, they fall within the scope of Article
266(2). In their quality as immigration measure those standards should serve
the purpose of “efficient management” and “fair treatment” of uniform asy-
lum and subsidiary protection status holders. As asylum measures, they must
also serve the “appropriateness” of those statuses, and “be in accordance with”
the Refugee Convention and other relevant treaties. In effect, the Constitution
calls for higher standards for family reunification measures for protection
beneficiaries. The same applies to measures pursuant to Article 267(4), mini-
mum standards on integration.
Solidarity
[244] According to Article 257(2) CfE, the common policy on asylum (as well
as the other measures pursuant to Section 2 of Chapter IV) shall be “based on
solidarity between Member States”. Article 268 elaborates the issue as fol-
lows: 
“[t]he policies of the Union set out in this Section and their implementa-
tion shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of
responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member
States. Whenever necessary, the acts of the Union adopted pursuant to this
Section shall contain appropriate measures to give effect to this principle.”
The provision in fact sets an additional standard for all Union asylum legisla-
tion and its implementation: compliance with “the principle of solidarity and
fair sharing of responsibility […] between the Member States”. If only “soli-
darity” would have been required, the provision would have added little or
nothing to the principle of loyal co-operation laid down in Article 5(2) CfE (cf.
Article 10 TEC, see number [56]). But the combination with the principle of
“fair sharing of responsibility” gives the solidarity requirement substance. The
absence of controls on internal borders, the control of external borders, but
apparently also the offering of “appropriate status” to persons entitled to inter-
national protection and the ensuring of the principle of non-refoulement (cf.
Article 266(1) CfE), are viewed as a shared responsibility. The solidarity and
fair sharing hence serve not merely to alleviate unduly heavily burdened
Member States, but also to answer a collective responsibility towards persons
entitled to protection. Giving effect to this principle is not a noncommittal pur-
pose, but a requirement according to the last clause of the provision. 
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3.8.6 The Protocols on the United Kingdom and Ireland and on
Denmark 
[245] Attached to the Constitution for Europe are successor Protocols on the
position of the United Kingdom and Ireland and on the position of Denmark.118
The position of the United Kingdom and Ireland as to Union asylum measures
is the same as it is as regards Community asylum measures. Thus, measures
pursuant to Section 2 and 3 of Chapter IV do not bind these Member States,119
unless they “opt in” which they may do under the same conditions as under
the current Protocol.120
As to Denmark, Articles 1 to 8 of its Protocol contain an arrangement simi-
lar to the one under the present Treaty. Thus, Chapter IV measures do not bind
Denmark,121 and it cannot opt-in to them. As to the future, Denmark may uni-
laterally revoke the content of this arrangement; then, all adopted measures
will apply in Denmark.122 The Protocol attached to the present Treaty on
European Community provides for the same option. But in the preamble of the
new Danish protocol, the “intention of Denmark to avail itself of this option
when possible in accordance with its constitutional requirements” is wel-
comed.123 But according to Article 9 of the new Protocol, Denmark may also
“notify” the other Member States that the arrangement laid down in the Annex
to the Protocol applies. This Annex provides for an opt-in regime as to Chapter
IV measures similar to the one that applies to the United Kingdom and
Ireland. Thus, after this notification Chapter IV measures would not bind
Denmark, unless it decided to take part in the adoption, or, after it has been
adopted, it decides to apply it.124 Hence, under its future Protocol, Denmark
will have the choice of three options: continuation of its present position, the
opt-in regime applying to the United Kingdom and Ireland, or full participa-
tion in asylum and immigration matters on the same footing as the other
Member States. 
3.8.7 Concluding remarks
[246] The Constitution approaches international protection in a more ambi-
tious and comprehensive way than Title IV TEC does. It calls for a “common
policy” on international protection, and a “Common European Asylum
System”. Concern for the rights and interests of those in need of international
protection figure more prominently as the main objectives of both policy and
legislation on international protection. Whereas Community powers on inter-
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national protection are confined to the issues listed in Article 63 TEC, the
Union will have power to issue legislation on any matter that serves the pur-
pose defined in Article 266 CfE. Further, Chapter IV CfE calls for a high
degree of harmonisation on several issues – “uniform” asylum and subsidiary
protection statuses, and “common” procedures for the grant and withdrawal of
uniform asylum or subsidiary protection status. 
As to the content of the legislation on international protection (the layout
of the common European asylum system), subsidiary protection has a central
position next to asylum (refugee protection). The Constitution confines sub-
sidiary protection to aliens not eligible for refugee protection, and temporary
protection to mass influxes. This puts a check on a hollowing-out of refugee
protection by both alternative statuses. Incidentally, this central position of
subsidiary protection is not traceable to the Tampere Conclusions, and even
less to Title IV TEC; it rather reflects relevant rules in the Qualification
Directive (see paragraph 5.8). 
The issues on which the Union should provide legislation differ little from
the issues listed in Article 63 TEC. New are the co-operation with third coun-
tries, and the power to conclude readmission agreements. The provision on
burden sharing (Article 268 CfE) has a predecessor in Article 63(2)(b) TEC,
but it is broader in scope and far less non-committal.
[247] Which consequences would the Constitution have for the position of
aliens in need of protection? The Convention assigns a central position to pro-
tection of their rights for both Union policy and Union legislation on interna-
tional protection, as we saw, and the insertion of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights in the Convention will only reinforce this. Most of the other above-
mentioned features are also likely to have the effect of strengthening the posi-
tion of those in need of protection. However, both new competencies, perhaps,
provide for important exceptions. Partnership and co-operation with third
countries to manage “inflows” of applicants for protection may ultimately
undermine reception of persons in need for protection in Europe, and the com-
petence to conclude readmission agreements may result in a major obstacle to
durable protection in Europe. 
Finally, as to the envisaged degree of unity of asylum law and policy, total
harmonisation is excluded on some, and unlikely on the remaining issues, we
saw above. It follows from the peculiar delimitation of the personal scope that
Member States will remain competent to grant international protection to
aliens outside the scope of beneficiaries defined by the Common European
Asylum system. We should further observe that the Constitution still speaks of
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the determination of “which Member State is responsible for considering an
asylum or subsidiary protection” (Article 266(2)(e). Hence, determination of
eligibility for asylum or subsidiary protection is still conceived as a matter for
the Member States, not for some Union institution. Still, all changes in com-
parison to Title IV TEC point in the same direction: further harmonisation. 
It is doubtful, however, whether such further harmonisation will indeed
occur in the short term after the entry into force of the Constitution for
Europe. For in contrast to Title IV TEC, Chapter IV of the Constitution does
not set a time limit for adoption of the measures it calls for.
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NOTES
1 The language employed by the relevant Treaty provisions is somewhat inconsistent. Article
2 TEC speaks of the “task” of the Community, referred to by Article 3 as “purposes”.
Articles 2 and 29 TEU speak of “objectives”. Article 61 TEC relates the measures men-
tioned under points (a) to (e) by the vague phrase “in order to”. The Dutch language ver-
sion somewhat more specifically speaks of “met het oog op”, i.e. “with a view to”. It seems
that all these phrasings define “objectives” as meant in Article 5 TEC. 
2 It may be a surprise that the objective is laid down in the Treaty on European Union rather
than in the Treaty on European Community. The Treaty of Amsterdam, which introduced the
concept, placed it in the former Treaty, as the objective is to be achieved not solely by Title
IV TEC measures, but also by those set out in Title VI TEU – the “third pillar” of the
European Union (cf. number [45]). Article 2 TEU applies to Title IV TEC by virtue of Article
5 TEU, that states that the Community institutions must (inter alia) exercise their powers
conferred in the Treaty on European Community for the purposes set out in the Treaty on
European Union. Cf. Article 61(a) TEC, that requires measures aimed at securing the free-
dom of movement in accordance with the TEC provision on the basis of Article 31 TEU.
3 This central position of the freedom of movement of persons is further underlined by the
Preamble to the Treaty on European Union: “[The Member States,] RESOLVED to facilitate
the free movement of persons, while ensuring the safety and security of their peoples, by esta-
blishing an area of freedom, security and justice, in accordance with the provisions of this
Treaty” (Preamble TEU, 11th recital), and by the heading of Title IV, which speaks of “Visa,
asylum, immigration and other policies related to the freedom of movement of persons”.
4 Cf. Article 2 TEC: “The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common mar-
ket and an economic and monetary union and by implementing common policies or activi-
ties referred to in Articles 3 and 4, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious,
balanced and sustainable development of economic activities, a high level of employment
and of social protection, equality between men and women, sustainable and non-inflation-
ary growth, a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic performance, a
high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, the raising of
the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity
among Member States”. 
5 Article 3(1)(c) and (d) TEC. 
6 The strong link between asylum and immigration measures on the one hand and the cre-
ation of the freedom of movement of persons as required by Article 14 TEC on the other
was underlined by the Court of Justice in the Wijsenbeek judgement. The Court stated that
the obligation of Member States to abolish border controls pursuant to Article 14(2) “pre-
supposes harmonisation of the laws of the Member States governing the crossing of the
external borders of the Community, immigration, the grant of visas, asylum and the
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exchange of information on those questions”– that is, implementation of Title IV (ECJ 21
September 1999, C-378/97, [1999] ECR, p. I-6207 (Wijsenbeek), par. 40).
7 Article 61(c) speaks of “measures in the field of judicial co-operation in civil matters […]”,
Article 61(e) of “measures in the field of police and judicial co-operation in criminal mat-
ters aimed at a high level of security by preventing and combating crime within the Union
in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty on European Union” – subject-matter
addressed in Articles 65 TEC and 31 TEU.
8 The Dutch language version “rechtvaardigheid”, though, appears to connote somewhat
more strongly with equity. Cf. Barents 1999, p. 319. 
9 Cf. number [253]. 
10 See footnote 3.
11 Article 29 TEU: “[…] the Union’s objective shall be to provide citizens with a high level of
safety within an area of freedom, security and justice […]”. The term ‘citizens’ refers to
nationals of the Member States, cf. Articles 17 TEC and 2, third indent TEU. 
12 Boeles 2001, pp. 6-8 argues that “security” also encompasses security or safety from per-
secution, the major argument being the interpretation of the term “security” in Article 11(1)
TEU. Though attractive, this reading must be rejected. Article 11(1) TEU addresses the
“common foreign and security policy”. Here, the term “security” is very much connected
to defence rather than to asylum, and there is no ground for transferring one aspect of this
notion to the entirely different “area of freedom security and justice”. Finally, Article 11(1)
does not alter the personal scope of the term “security” where this “area” is concerned. In
the same sense see Twomey 1999, p. 371 and Hailbronner 1998, p. 1052.
13 For Article 63(1) addresses “asylum”, Article 63(2) and (3) “immigration” (as to Article 63(2),
this follows from Article 61(a), and cf. number [181] below), and Article 63(4) obviously con-
cerns the freedom of movement. Article 63(4) addresses “measures defining the rights and
conditions under which nationals of third countries who are legally resident in a Member State
may reside in other Member States”. That measures based on it are labelled as “other mea-
sures” by Article 61(b) does not mean they cannot serve the objective of establishing the free-
dom of movement. Rather, it is merely an “indirectly related flanking measure”. 
14 Article 6(1) TEU. A. Vitorino, the Commissioner responsible for the drafting of all
Commission proposals on asylum addressed in this book, even asserts that “the protection
of fundamental rights is the very foundation of the area of freedom, security and justice”
(Exeter Paper 2000/4, http://www.ex.ac.uk/law/cels/publications.html).
15 See Hailbronner 2000, pp. 68-69. 
16 In the Dutch language version, Article 61 first clause runs as follows: “Met het oog op de gelei-
delijke totstandbrenging van een ruimte van vrijheid, veiligheid en rechtvaardigheid neemt de
Raad de volgende maatregelen aan: (a) […] maatregelen […]”- “In order to establish progres-
sively an area of freedom, security and justice, the Council shall adopt the following measures:
(a) […] measures […; my emphasis]” and hence reinforces this interpretation. 
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17 Hailbronner 2000, p. 36. 
18 Hailbronner 2000, p. 68 provides for an elegant explanation: Article 62(1) falls within the
scope of Article 61(a) but is not mentioned there, as Article 62(2) and (3) sufficiently pro-
vide for flanking measures. Though most convincing, the point remains that the relationship
should rather have been expressed explicitly. 
19 In par. 3.3.4, it will be argued that Article 63(2)(a) indeed addresses both refugees as well
as displaced persons.
20 Cf. number [65] above. According to Article 67(2), the Council may decide by unanimity
voting to apply the Article 251 TEC legislation procedure to measures based on Article
63(3)(a), but hitherto it has not done so. 
21 Compare also Article 18 of the Charter (Article 78 CfE), par. 2.3.5 above.
22 See Chapter 6.4.5.
23 See Chapter 4.7.
24 See Chapter 4.7. 
25 Article 63(1)(b) and (d) speak of reception and procedures “in Member States”, and
63(1)(a) of applications submitted “in one of the Member States”. 
26 See on the ambiguous use of the term “status” under number [190]. 
27 Cf. Article 3(3) DC: “[The application for asylum] shall be examined by that State in accor-
dance with its national laws […]”. 
28 The Oxford English Dictionary defines “reception” as : “1. The action or fact of receiving
or getting”; “2.b The action of receiving (esp. persons), or fact of being received, into a
place, company, state, etc.”
29 Hailbronner 2000, pp.79-80. 
30 Cf. Article 63(1)(d), that speaks of “granting and withdrawing refugee status”. 
31 Hailbronner 2000, p. 80.
32 Cf. Preamble recitals (22), (23) and (24) PD.
33 Oxford English Dictionary: “Procedure”, under “1.c. (legal).”
34 Incidentally, Article 63(1)(a) provides explicitly for a legal basis for rules on the application
of the exception of the safe third country among Member States (see paragraph 7.1 below).
But it does not follow that Article 63(1)(d) cannot address the safe third country exception,
as Article 63(1)(a) and (d) define different levels of harmonisation.
35 See Goodwin-Gill 1998, pp. 9f.
36 See Goodwin-Gill 1998, p. 12 with references to relevant documents.
37 See Noll & Vedsted-Hansen 1999, pp. 212-215.
38 Noll & Vedsted-Hansen 1999, p. 214. Indeed reading protection to displaced persons and
for persons who need protection otherwise appears less plausible than measures on tempo-
rary protection and for persons who are otherwise in need of international protection. 
39 The term is thus employed in Articles 1 and 8 of the Statute of the UNHCR (UNGA reso-
lution 428(V) of 1950), see “UNHCR’s Observations on the European Commission’s pro-
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posal for a Council Directive on minimum standards for qualification […]”,
http://www.ecre.org/eu_developments/status/unqual.doc. 
40 There is no reason to assume it “implies a limitation of the scope of the instrument to pro-
tection pursuant to an international law basis” as I erroneously stated in Battjes 2002, p. 169.
41 On burden sharing see e.g. Noll 2000 passim, Hailbronner 2000, pp. 417-425 and
Bouteillet-Pacquet 2001, pp. 261f.
42 Council Decision of 28 September 2000 establishing a European Refugee Fund, OJ [2000]
L252/12; Council Decision of 2 December 2004 establishing the European Refugee Fund
for the period 2005 to 2010, OJ [2004] L382/52.
43 Hailbronner 2000, pp. 81-83.
44 This holds true also for the German “Zustrom”, the French “afflux” and the Dutch
“toevloed”. 
45 Hailbronner 2000, p. 82.
46 See Craig & De Búrca 2003, p. 129f.
47 Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom
of Norway concerning the criteria and mechanisms for establishing the State responsible
for examining a request for asylum lodged in a Member State or in Iceland or Norway, OJ
[2001] L93/40. 
48 COM(2003)291 final, p. 21.
49 A Proposal for a Council Decision on the signing of the Agreement between the European
Community and the Kingdom of Denmark extending to Denmark the provisions of Council
Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the
Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the
Member States by a third country national and Council Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000
concerning the establishment of “Eurodac” for the comparison of fingerprints for the effec-
tive application of the Dublin Convention is pending before the European Parliament (situ-
ation as of 30 march 2005, http://www2.europarl.eu.int/oeil/file.jsp?id=5201542). 
50 On 26 October 2004, the Council signed the Agreement between the European Community
and Switzerland concerning the criteria and mechanisms for establishing the State respon-
sible for examining a request for asylum lodged in a Member State or in Switzerland (cf.
Council doc. 13049/04). A Proposal for a Council Decision on the signature, on behalf of
the European Community, of this agreement is pending before the European Parliament
(situation as of 30 march 2005, cf. http://www2.europarl.eu.int/oeil/, CNS/2004/0200). 
51 Many commentators (Hailbronner 2000, pp. 96f; Guild and Peers 1999, p. 278) approach the
provision from the specific angle of Article 68(2), which limits the jurisdiction of the Court
of Justice on measures pursuant to Article 62(1) (see below in the main text). The intricate
questions that the latter provision raises should not obscure that Article 64(1) explicitly
applies to the whole of Title IV; Article 64(2) confirms this (cf. number [205]). Article 64(1)
is the successor to Article K.2(2) ToM that addressed the policy area of asylum (“This Title
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shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with
regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security”), not
to Article 100c(5) TEC(old) on the determination of third countries whose nationals should
be in possession of a visa (“This Article shall be without prejudice to the exercise of the
responsibilities incumbent upon the Member States with regard to the maintenance of law
and order and the safeguarding of internal security”; cf. Hailbronner 2000, p. 96). 
52 Hailbronner 2000, pp. 96-103.
53 ECJ 9 July 1987, Joined cases C-281, 283, 284, 285 and 287/85, [1987] ECR, p. 3203
(Germany v. Commission), pars. 20f. 
54 Hailbronner 2000, p. 100 in fact appears to draw the same conclusion from the judgement
mentioned in the previous footnote, but suggests that the distinction will apply where the
Treaty establishes a special regime for third country nationals, as Title IV does. Arguably,
the judgement offers no grounds for this assumption. 
55 Hailbronner 2000, pp. 99-101.
56 Article 14 refers to Article 95, but this provision does not apply to freedom of movement of
persons (cf. Article 95(2) TEC). Different from Article 95, Article 94 requires unanimity for
adoption of measures.
57 The “common market” is mentioned in Article 2 TEC (quoted in footnote 4 above), but not
defined by the Treaty. The common market shows considerable overlap with, but is not
identical to the internal market (Hailbronner 2000, p. 112).
58 ECJ 28 March 1996, Opinion 2/94, [1996] ECR, p. I-01759 (Accession by the Community
to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms), par. 30.
59 Hailbronner 2000, p. 120. 
60 See on the relation between “positive” and “negative” integration Slot 1996, pp. 380-382.
61 Slot 1996, pp. 382f and others further distinguish “optional” and “partial” harmonisation.
As they play only a very limited role in European asylum law, I will not discuss them. 
62 ECJ 19 March 1993, Opinion 2/91, [1993] ECR, p. I-1061, par. 18; ECJ 12 November 1996,
C-84/94, [1996] ECR, p. I-5755 (United Kingdom v. Council), par. 17: “In conferring on the
Council power to lay down minimum requirements, Article 118a [now 137, HB] does not
prejudge the extent of the action which that institution may consider necessary in order to
carry out the task which the provision in question expressly assigns to it namely, to work in
favour of improved conditions, as regards the health and safety of workers, while maintain-
ing the improvements made. The significance of the expression “minimum requirements” in
Article 118a is simply, as indeed Article 118a(3) confirms, that the provision authorises
Member States to adopt more stringent measures than those which form the subject-matter
of Community action”; ECJ 17 December 1998, C-2/97, [1998] ECR, p. I-8597 (Società
italiana petroli SpA v. Borsana Srl), par. 35. 
63 Dougan 2000, pp. 857-859. 
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64 Kurcz 2001, p. 297. 
65 Cf. ECJ 14 July 1998, C-389/96, [1998] ECR, p. I-4473 (Aher-Waggon GmbH v. Germany),
par. 5. Freedom of Member States to set more stringent rules may also be stated straightfor-
wardly, e.g. Article 3(1) Council Directive 89/552: “Member States shall remain free to
require television broadcasters under their jurisdiction to lay down more detailed or stricter
rules in the areas covered by this Directive”, cf. ECJ 9 February 1995, C-412/93, [1995]
ECR, p. I-0179 (Leclerc v. TF1), par. 31. 
66 Cf. ECJ 12 November 1996, C-84/94, [1996] ECR, p. I-5755 (United Kingdom v. Council),
par. 17, quoted above in footnote 62; ECJ 17 December 1998, C-2/97, [1998] ECR,
p. I-8597 (Società italiana petroli SpA v. Borsana Srl), par. 35; Opinion A-G Tizzano 8
February 2001, C-173/99, [2001] ECR, p. I-04881 (The Queen v. Secretary of State for
Trade and Industry, ex BECTU), pars. 45 and 46. See also Kurcz 2001, p. 297.
67 ECJ 17 December 1998, C-2/97, [1998] ECR, p. I-8597 (Società italiana petroli SpA v.
Borsana Srl), pars. 37-38, and Opinion A-G Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer 10 December 2002, 
C-103/01, [2003] ECR, p. I-5369 (Commission v. Germany), par. 32.
68 Article 95(4) and (5) TEC state that the Member States can introduce or maintain domestic
deviating from Community legislation aimed at the establishment of the internal market
only allowed if they are justified “on grounds of major needs referred to in Article 30” (such
as public morality, public policy or public security), and under the control of the
Commission. 
69 Opinion A-G Léger 12 March 1996, C-84/94, [1996] ECR, p. I-5755 (United Kingdom v.
Council), par. 75: “Ces mesures, qui peuvent garantir un haut niveau de protection, sont
“minimales” en ce seul sens que les États membres gardent la faculté de prévoir dus
mesures plus protectrices […]”, and pars. 107 and 130f.
70 Cf. ECJ 12 November 1996, C-84/94, [1996] ECR, p. I-5755 (United Kingdom v. Council),
par. 57.
71 Cf. Article 228 TEC. 
72 Cf. ECJ 13 May 1997, C-233/94, [1997] ECR, p. I-2405 (Germany v. European Parliament
and Council), par. 43. 
73 Cf. Hailbronner 2000, p. 419. 
74 It should be recalled that the Court read the requirement of compatibility with the Treaty in
Article 137(5) as compatibility with both primary and secondary Community law – see
number [213] above . My assumption that the second last clause of Article 63 “implies that,
on the point of residence conditions, Member States can adopt or retain national legislation
deviating from the Directive to the detriment of the third country nationals concerned” , was
therefore incorrect. (Battjes 2002, p. 162). 
75 See paragraph 4.5.
76 Cf. Hailbronner 2000, p. 381.
77 This does not necessarily hold true for Directives, that are binding the Member States to
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whom they are addressed (cf. Article 249 TEC). However, on this footing no Member State
has been exempted from the scope of application of any Directive on asylum. 
78 I deal only very succinctly with these protocols. For a study in detail, see Hedemann-
Robinson 1999. 
79 Article 2 Protocol on the position of Denmark.
80 Article 7 Protocol on the position of Denmark. 
81 Preamble recital (19) DR. 
82 Article 1 Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland. Nor do agreements
or ECJ rulings based on Title IV bind those states (Article 2). 
83 Article 3(1) Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland.
84 Article 3(2) Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland. 
85 Article 4 read in conjunction with Article 11(3) of the Protocol on the position of the United
Kingdom and Ireland.
86 Article 8 of the Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland. 
87 Vermeulen 2002, p. 45; Battjes 2002, p. 69.
88 ECJ 19 March 1993, Opinion 2/91, [1993] ECR, p. I-1061 (Convention Nº 170 of the
International Labour Organization concerning safety in the use of chemicals at work). 
89 Opinion 2/91, par. 18. 
90 Explicitly so in the Final Act of the Plenipotentiaries on refugees and Stateless persons
under E (“[Expressing] the hope that the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees will
have value as an example exceeding its contractual scope and that all nations will be gui-
ded by it in granting so far as possible to persons in their territory as refugees and who
would not be covered by the terms of the Convention, the treatment for which it provides”),
Article 5(1) CCPR (Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a
greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant), and Article 53 ECHR
(“Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any of the
human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any High
Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a Party”).
91 Section 3 and 4 address judicial co-operation in civil and criminal matters, and contain the
successors to Article 65 TEC and to Articles 30 and 31 TEU.
92 Cf. Art. 10(1) CfE: “Every national of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union”.
93 Article 257(1) CfE. Different from Article 61, the provision does not state explicitly that
this indeed is the objective of Chapter IV measures; rather, this follows from reading the
provision in conjunction with Article 266, see below. 
94 Article 2 CfE mentions “respect for human rights” as one of the “values” on which the
Union is “founded”, and Part II as we saw is a catalogue of human rights (see paragraph
2.3).
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95 Article 257(2) CfE. 
96 It appears that the term “asylum” in Article 257(2) means “international protection” as
defined in Article 266(1), not “asylum” as meant in Article 266(2)(a) – that is, not only
Refugee Convention protection but also subsidiary and temporary protection (cf. number
[232] below). 
97 The limitation of scope to third country nationals in Article 266(2)(a) and (b) is hence
superfluous. 
98 “A slightly different wording was also adopted for temporary protection [i.e. the replace-
ment of the term uniform by common, HB], given that Union action in this area is mainly
a matter of a common system enabling the Union to cope with massive inflows, but not
necessarily a uniform status for the persons concerned or a uniform procedure in individual
cases” (CV 727/03 ANNEX III, p. 30). Article 190(4) TEC was amended by the Treaty of
Amsterdam to allow for the possibility to establish “common principles” rather than a “uni-
form procedure” for elections for the European Parliament – the latter standard appeared to
be too ambitious (cf. Craig & De Búrca 2003, pp. 76-77). 
99 Tampere Conclusions 14 and 15. 
100 Article 12 CfE; cf. Article 5 TEC. 
101 Article 14(2)(j) CfE.
102 Article 12(2) CfE. 
103 ACVZ 2004, pp. 19-20.
104 Article 11(3) CfE, identical to Article 5(1) TEC. 
105 Article 13(2) CfE.
106 Cf. Hailbronner 2000, p. 36, on the “uniform” result application of minimum standards as
defined in Article 63 TEC may produce. 
107 Obviously, the term “asylum” has a broader meaning in the term “common European asy-
lum system” (Article 266(2) first clause; see number [232]). 
108 The Oxford English Dictionary gives for “status”: “2. a. Law. The legal standing or posi-
tion of a person as determined by his membership of some class of persons legally enjoying
certain rights or subject to certain limitations”. 
109 It seems the European Council employed the term in this meaning in its Tampere Conclusion
14, when speaking of a “uniform status for those who are granted asylum valid throughout
the Union”, that is, defining status as the result of the grant of asylum (cf. number [49]). 
110 Article 2(d) QD even defines “refugee status” as recognition only (cf. number [575]).
111 The requirement already figures in Tampere Conclusion 14 (cf. number [49] above), which
did not address subsidiary protection status.
112 It seems that the Commission interpreted the same phrase in the Tampere Conclusions in
the same way, though somewhat tentatively: the “uniform status valid throughput the Union
might entail the possibility of settling in another Member State after a certain number of
years or travelling there to pursue study or training” (COM(2001)755, p. 13).
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113 The same holds true for the Dutch “toevloed”, the Gernmasn “Zustrom” and the French
“afflux”. 
114 Article 35(2) CfE. Article 266(3) CfE does require that the Parliament is “consulted”.
115 It appears that it goes back to the Tampere Conclusions, cf. Conv 727/03 Annex III, p. 30.
116 Cf. Noll, Fagerlund & Liebaut 2002, Bruin & Teitler 2003.
117 Article 257(2) mentions “asylum”, “immigration” and “external border control” as the sub-
ject matter of the Chapter. Arguably, “asylum” means here “international protection” as
defined in Article 266(1) CfE – just as in Article 266(2) first clause.
118 Protocol 19, on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland on policies in respect of
border controls, asylum and immigration, judicial co-operation in civil matters and on
police co-operation and Protocol 20, on the position of Denmark. 
119 Article 2 Protocol on the Position of the UK and Ireland.
120 Cf. Articles 3, 4 and 8 Protocol on the Position of the UK and Ireland.
121 Article 2 Protocol on the Position of Denmark.
122 Article 8 Protocol on the Position of Denmark.
123 Preamble to the Protocol on the Position of Denmark, fourth clause.
124 Articles 1, 3 and 4 Annex to the Protocol on the Position of Denmark. - There is one differ-
ence with the arrangement for the United Kingdom and Ireland: measures building upon the
Schengen acquis which bound Denmark under international law will bind Denmark as
Union law six months after it made the mentioned “notification” (Article 9(2) Protocol on
the Position of Denmark).
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Chapter 4
The Common European Asylum System 
In Chapters 5 to 8, I describe the rules on international protection laid down in
secondary European law, and analyse how they relate to international law on
asylum. The present Chapter serves as an introduction to that description and
analysis. I discuss how the several pieces of legislation that concern asylum
relate to each other, and address some topics they have in common, such as the
definition of the objectives and aspects of their personal and geographical
scopes. 
4.1 The concept 
[248] In the description and analysis in the present and following
Chapters, the Community measures on asylum are not addressed separate-
ly but as constituents of a system, of an organised body of law, the
“Common European Asylum System” (below also: CEAS). This concept
does not appear in the Treaty on European Community. The notion of a
“Common European Asylum System” was introduced only in 1999 by the
European Council in its Tampere Conclusions as the aim of this legisla-
tion.1 The Community legislator took over this aim: according to the
Preambles to the Qualification Directive, the Procedures Directive, the
Reception Directive and the Dublin Regulation, these measures are
“included” in the Common European Asylum System;2 the Temporary
Protection Directive refers to the concept where it speaks of “common
European arrangements on asylum”.3
Thus, relevant Preamble recitals imply that most instruments addressed
here make part of a whole, the Common European Asylum System. A com-
bined analysis is furthermore warranted because these instruments share a
number of common definitions or concepts, such as the definition of “appli-
cations for asylum” and of the objective. In addition, the discussion of this
legislation as a system enables us to see unexpected connections, inconsisten-
cies or gaps. Moreover, the conception of European asylum legislation as an
integrated system is in some quite important respects necessary to interpret its
rules, including claims on protection relevant for international law.4 Finally,
description and interpretation of Community asylum legislation as parts of a
system is convenient for the assessment of compatibility with international
asylum law. 
The Dublin Convention and the Family Reunification Directive do not refer to
the Common European Asylum System.5 They are therefore not “parts” of this
system. Because of their relevance for claims under international asylum law
I nevertheless include them into the discussion below. But we must bear in
mind that these measures were not intended to form a systematic whole with
the other measures, and that their terms may have a meaning of their own.  
4.2 The lay-out
[249] Article 63 TEC gives some directions for the layout of the CEAS. Points
(1) and (2) of Articles 63 TEC mention four categories of protection (below:
“statuses”): “refugee status”, “temporary protection” for “refugees” and (other)
“displaced persons” (below: temporary protection status), “international pro-
tection” otherwise (below: subsidiary protection), and protection of “asylum
seekers” or “applicants” (below: applicant status).6 As to refugee status, it
requires rules on qualification and on procedures for the granting or withdraw-
ing of it; as to applicant status, it requires “reception standards” and “criteria
and mechanisms” for allocation of applicants. The subject matter of legislation
on temporary and subsidiary protection is not defined in Article 63 TEC.
Finally, Article 63(3)(a) TEC calls for measures on “family reunification”. 
The Tampere Conclusions added one topic to this legislation programme:
the “content of refugee status” (i.e. secondary rights for refugees; see number
[49]). They further specified that the measures on temporary and subsidiary
protection should offer “appropriate status to anyone in need of such protec-
tion”, explicitly calling for legislation on secondary rights, and implicitly for
rules on qualification for these statuses.
[250] According to their headings, the pieces of European legislation on inter-
national protection address all these topics. Thus, the Qualification Directive
sets rules on “qualification” as “refugees” and as “persons in need of interna-
tional protection”, as well as the “content” of the protection granted, the
Procedures Directive on “procedures for granting and withdrawing refugee
status”, the Reception Standards Directive on “reception” or secondary rights
of applicants, the Dublin Regulation on allocation of applicants in the
European Union, the Family Reunification Directive on family reunification,
stating special rules for such reunification with “refugees”, and the Temporary
Protection Directive establishes standards for “temporary protection in the
event of a mass influx”.
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How do these instruments relate? Because of its subject matter, the
Qualification Directive is central to the CEAS – in the terms of the
Commission, it is its “heart”.7 If so, the Procedures Directive should be con-
sidered as the backbone of the system, as it links most of its limbs.
The Procedures Directive addresses procedures for dealing with applica-
tions for asylum, i.e. protection under the Refugee Convention; in terms of
personal scope, it applies to applicants for refugee protection,8 and may apply
to applications for subsidiary protection.9 It defines the beginning and end of
asylum seeker status, and hence conditions entitlement to the benefits set out
in the Reception Standards Directive.10 It further requires examination of
applications, except when a limited number of exceptions apply.11 This exami-
nation must address whether the application is well-founded – again, except
when a limited number of exceptions apply.12 As far as relevant for present
purposes, no examination of whether the claim is well-founded takes place
when the Dublin Regulation is applied,13 that is, if it turns out another Member
State is responsible for examining the claim, or if some other variant of the
safe third country exception applies. But if none of these exceptions apply, the
Member States must address the merits of the application, and may consider it
as “unfounded” only if it is “established that the applicant does not qualify for
refugee status pursuant to Council Directive 2004/83”, the Qualification
Directive.14 If it turns out that the applicant qualifies for “refugee status” or
“subsidiary protection status” as defined in the Qualification Directive, he is
entitled to the benefits attached to this status as set out in the same Directive.
Further, the alien whose refugee status has been recognised may invoke rele-
vant rules in the Family Reunification Directive.15
Hence, the Procedures Directive, the Qualification Directive, the Reception
Standards Directive, (part of) the Family Reunification Directive and the
Dublin Regulation address several aspects of one asylum system. The
Temporary Protection Directive on the other hand establishes a separate
regime. It confers the competence to the Council to issue a decision that
establishes “temporary protection” in case of a mass influx that defines the
scope of beneficiaries.16 Secondary rights, allocation, family unity and
some procedural aspects are all regulated in the Temporary Protection
Directive.
[251] If we abstract a little from the specific instruments, the set-up of the
Common European Asylum System is as follows (see scheme 1 below). It
establishes four “protection statuses”.17 By “protection status” I mean a cate-
gory of protection granted to aliens because of a threat of violation of their
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human rights in their country of origin. These statuses are the “refugee status”,
“subsidiary protection status”, “temporary protection status” and “applicant
status” (or “asylum seeker status”). Further, it sets rules on four topics for all
or some of these statuses. First, rules on the “qualification” for these statuses
that address who is eligible for a certain status and who is not. Secondly, rules
on “procedures”, i.e. procedures for granting or withdrawing the protection
statuses. Thirdly, rules on “allocation”, determining where a claim for asylum
should be examined: by the Member State where it was lodged, by another
Member State, or by a non-EU-Member State. Fourthly, rules defining the
“secondary rights” to which the beneficiaries of the various statuses are 
entitled, among them the right to remain (that is, in terms of international asy-
lum law, protection from refoulement), and the right to family reunification. 
In a scheme, these issues are addressed in the several CEAS instruments as follows: 
Scheme 1 - The Common European Asylum System
refugee status subsidiary status temporary status applicant status
qualification QD QD TPD PD
63(1)(c) TEC 63(2)(a) TEC 63(2)(a) TEC 63(1)(d) TEC
procedure PD - - TPD
63(1)(d) TEC 63(2)(a) TEC
allocation - - TPD PD and DR
63(2)(b) TEC 63(2)(a) and 
(3)(a) TEC
secondary rights QD and FRD QD TPD RSD and DR
63(3)(a) TEC 63(3)(a) TEC 63(2)(a) TEC 63(1)(a), (b) TEC
This scheme is, obviously, a simplification. As to the number of statuses,
European legislation establishes next to the four “protection statuses” men-
tioned above a number of other statuses, categories of aliens to whom it
bestows certain benefits. The Qualification Directive establishes two more
“protection statuses” for refugees in the sense of Article 1 RC, to whom
“refugee status” as meant in the Qualification Directive is denied because the
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grounds for expulsion in Article 33(2) RC or 32(1) RC apply (see paragraph
8.5). Family members of beneficiaries of all four statuses indicated in the
scheme above are entitled to (different sets of) secondary rights, and hence to
dependant statuses.18 Further, the borderlines between the various topics are
not as clear-cut as suggested in the scheme. For example, procedural issues are
covered not only by the Procedures Directive, but in the Qualification
Directive and the Dublin Regulation as well, and the Procedures Directive may
apply to applications for subsidiary protection.  
But notwithstanding these considerations, the discussion of the
Community legislation in the following Chapters is structured along the lines
of the set-up of the CEAS as sketched above (see number [271] for the order of
discussion). Here, I address some topics common to all measures.
4.3 Legal basis
[252] Scheme 1 shows the provisions of the Treaty on European Community
that “in particular” serve as a legal basis for the relevant instrument according
to their Preambles.19 For most rules, the Treaty basis does not raise questions
(cf. paragraph 3.3). We may observe that rules on procedures in the Dublin
Regulation other than those determining the Member State responsible for
processing the asylum claim, find their basis in Article 63(1)(d) (or (3)(a))
TEC, not in Article 63(1)(a) TEC (and are therefore “minimum standards”;
see number [187]). Rules on the qualification of a third country as “safe” find
their basis in Article 63(3)(a), not 63(1)(d) TEC (cf. number [191]). Further,
the legal basis of Procedures Directive rules as far as they address the granting
of subsidiary protection status (see par. 4.7) is Article 63(2)(a) TEC (see num-
ber [196]), although the Procedures Directive does not state so. Finally, rules
on the “reception standards” of family members of applicants can only be
based on Article 63(3)(a), not on Article 63(1)(b) TEC. 
4.4 Objectives
[253] The Directives on Qualification, Procedures, Reception Standards,
Temporary Protection and Family Reunification all explicitly define as their
“purposes” (or “main objectives”) laying down standards on the subject mat-
ter they address.20 All measures further serve the aim of “the progressive esta-
blishment of an area of freedom security and justice”21 – the objective of all
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Title IV measures, laid down in Article 61 TEC. In paragraph 3.2, we saw that
this objective includes establishing the freedom of movement of Union citi-
zens, security, and respect for fundamental rights of third country nationals.
The instruments all make clear in what respects they serve to establish these
aims.
The Qualification, Procedures, Reception Standards and Temporary
Protection Directives as well as the Dublin Regulation all serve “to limit
secondary movements” of applicants (or temporary protection beneficiaries).22
In this respect, they are flanking measures aimed at ensuring the freedom of
movement. The Family Reunification Directive does not likewise refer to the
freedom of movement; its Preamble observes that family reunification 
“helps to create sociocultural stability facilitating the integration of third
country nationals in the Member State, which also serves to promote eco-
nomic and social cohesion, a fundamental Community objective stated in
the Treaty.”23
A number of provisions in various instruments seem to serve the objective of
securing the “security”.24
[254] As to the other aspect of the “area”, securing respect for the rights of
third country nationals, all relevant instruments observe that the “common
European asylum system” is part of the objective of creating the “area of free-
dom, security and justice open to those who legitimately seek protection in the
Community”.25 The latter phrase is the interpretation of the objective set in
Article 61 TEC by the European Council in its Tampere Conclusions (see
number [49]). The Family Reunification Directive states that the objective of
creating this “area” includes “the safeguarding of rights of third country
nationals” (mentioned in Article 61(b) TEC, see number [175]).26
The link between “legitimately seeking protection in the Community” and
observation of obligations under international asylum law is elaborated only
partially. The Family Reunification Directive “respects the fundamental rights
and observes the principles recognised in particular in Article 8 [ECHR]”.27
The Temporary Protection Directive states that 
“temporary protection should be compatible with the Member States’ inter-
national obligations as regards refugees”, 
but continues that
“[i]n particular, it must not prejudge the recognition of refugee status pur-
suant to the [Refugee Convention]”.28
Respect for international asylum law is stated in even more abstract terms in
the other CEAS instruments. They observe that 
200 Chapter 4
“Member States are bound by obligations under instruments of internatio-
nal law to which they are party and which prohibit discrimination.”29
These obligations are therefore not set as a standard for interpretation or appli-
cation of those instruments. It is further observed that
“The European Council at its special meeting in Tampere […] agreed to
work towards establishing a Common European Asylum System, based on
the full and inclusive application of the [Refugee Convention], thus affir-
ming the principle of non-refoulement and ensuring that nobody is sent
back to persecution”.30
But in how far the present legislation aims at securing this “full and inclusive
application” and “the principle of non-refoulement” is not commented on.
Remarkably, none of the CEAS instruments does explicitly refer to any of the
prohibitions of refoulement laid down in other instruments than the Refugee
Convention. Even the Qualification Directive, whose provisions on subsidiary
protection quite clearly address especially the prohibition on exposure to ill
treatment ex Article 3 ECHR (see number [275]), speaks in a general kind of
way of “international obligations under human rights instruments”.31
Less reserved are the various pieces of asylum legislation on the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. With the exception of the
Temporary Protection Directive, they all “respect” this Charter; “in particu-
lar”, the Qualification and Reception Standards Directives “seek to ensure full
respect for human dignity and the right to asylum of applicants for asylum and
their accompanying family members”, or Articles 1 and 18 Charter.32 The
Dublin Regulation also seeks to ensure respect for the right to asylum. The
prohibition of refoulement of Article 19 Charter is left unmentioned in all
European asylum legislation.  
[255] In summary, apart from the Family Reunification Directive, all instru-
ments under discussion serve to preclude secondary movements. Ensuring
respect for (fundamental) rights of third country nationals is also a shared
objective. Only the Family Reunification Directive unambiguously serves to
secure respect for international obligations concerning refugees. The other
instruments all refer to the Refugee Convention, but do not “respect” the
rights recognised in the instrument, and do not even mention the other rele-
vant instruments of international asylum law. In contrast, “respect” for the
Charter is explicitly stated in all instruments but the Temporary Protection
Directive. 
The objectives of the Directives on Qualification, Procedures and Reception
Standards Directives and of the Dublin Regulation are largely couched in iden-
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tical or similar terms. The common references to the Tampere Conclusions on
the establishing of a Common European Asylum System and the common defi-
nitions of their objectives contribute to the unity of that system.  
4.5 Minimum standards
[256] Pursuant to Article 63 TEC, except for the rules on “criteria and mecha-
nisms for determining which Member State is responsible for considering an
application for asylum”, all CEAS legislation sets “minimum standards”.33 We
saw that this “minimum standard” character entails that the relevant legislation
must be observed by the Member States, but allows them to adopt or maintain
domestic standards that are more favourable for the beneficiary of the
Community legislation, if two conditions are met. First, the domestic measure
should not undermine the coherence of Community action and second, they
should be in conformity with the Treaty (see number [213]). It would seem
that the Member States could always deviate from Community law standards
in order to comply with their obligations under international law – or do the
these conditions set restraints? 
[257] Above, we saw that the secondary law on asylum serves two objectives:
safeguarding rights of third country nationals, and precluding secondary
movements. Obviously, domestic standards that serve to secure observance of
international asylum law do not undermine Community action on the safe-
guarding of those rights – they rather reinforce it. As to the other objective,
one could argue that a Member State that states more favourable domestic
rules than the minimum standards in Community law may cause secondary
movements, and therefore undermine the coherence of Community action.
However, there are two objections to make to this reasoning. 
First, as far as it serves the objective of precluding secondary move-
ments, the Community law on asylum is a flanking measure aimed at secu-
ring the freedom of movement of Union citizens. That is, the Community
law is to prevent unwanted inflow of applicants to Member States due to
disharmony of asylum law. By raising protection standards above the mini-
mum level prescribed by European asylum law a Member State may attract
applicants from other Member States. But doing so would not in itself
adversely affect the freedom of movement. Inflow into a Member State due
to higher domestic standards than those that apply in the other Member
States would not be among the secondary movements the Community law
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seeks to prevent, and could therefore not undermine the unity of Community
action in this respect. 
Second, the objective of preventing secondary movements does not detract
from the other objective, safeguarding of rights of third country nationals.
Thus, where Community law serves to counter disharmony in asylum law that
causes secondary movements, it endeavours to do so while safeguarding the
rights of third country nationals. Domestic standards that comply with inter-
national law standards do not undermine the coherence of Community action,
thus defined. Rather, domestic law of Member States that complies with low
minimum standards set by Community law but is not up to international law
causes secondary movements, and undermines the unity of Community action
in that respect. It follows that if and to whatever extent domestic law that devi-
ates from minimum standards secures observance of the Member State’s obli-
gations under international law, it cannot undermine the unity of Community
action. Arguably, the second last clause of Article 63 TEC states that much
where it allows for national provisions that deviate from measures adopted
pursuant to Article 63(3) or (4) TEC, if those provisions are “compatible with
the treaty and international agreements” (see number [130]). 
[258] As to the condition that the domestic standard should comply with
superior Community law, it was observed that only the relevant Treaty provi-
sions and general principles address respect for or accordance with relevant
international law standards (see number [217]). Domestic law that respects or
is in accordance with international law hence complies with this condition. 
In summary, neither condition restrains the competence of Member States
to adopt more favourable domestic law, at least not if that law serves to secure
performance under international law. For practical purposes, minimum stan-
dards on asylum allow for deviating domestic law that sets more favourable
standards of treatment of the beneficiaries of the minimum standards in accor-
dance with international asylum law.  
[259] How do the Directives that set minimum standards convey this Member
State competence to set deviating standards? The Directives on Temporary
Protection and on Family Reunification both state in accordance with the def-
inition above that 
“This Directive shall not affect the prerogative of the Member States to
adopt or retain more favourable conditions”.34
The Directives on Qualification, Procedures and on Reception Standards all
observe that 
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“Member States may introduce or retain more favourable standards [on the
subject-matter concerned], in so far as those standards are compatible with
this Directive”.35
Arguably, the last part of this clause renders the requirement that relevant
national standards should not undermine the coherence of the Community
policy that those standards serve. But the Preambles to the Directives on
Qualification, Procedures and on Reception Standards all observe that 
“[i]t is in the very nature of minimum standards that Member States should
have the power to introduce or maintain more favourable provisions for
third country nationals or stateless persons who request international pro-
tection from a Member State”.36
It follows that standards that are more favourable for applicants, refugee or sub-
sidiary status beneficiaries should not be seen as threats to the unity of
Community action. Thus, all directives on asylum allow for domestic law that
exceeds their standards in order to comply with obligations under international
law.
4.6 Harmonisation
[260] A different matter is the degree of harmonisation envisaged by the
pieces of legislation addressed here (cf. number [214]). The relevant legisla-
tion implies two levels of ambition. First, the Qualification and Family
Reunification Directives aim at “common criteria” (emphasis added), both
“for the identification of persons genuinely in need of international protec-
tion” as well as on “the material conditions for exercising the right to family
reunification”.37 It follows from the term “common” that a relatively high
degree of harmonisation on these matters is intended (cf. number [230]).
Second, the Qualification Directive aims at ensuring that merely “a mini-
mum level of benefits is available for [persons genuinely in need of interna-
tional protection]”.38 The Procedures Directive aims at introducing no more
than “a minimum framework […] on procedures”.39 And the Receptions
Standards Directive intends to set “minimum standards for the reception of
asylum seekers that will normally suffice to ensure them a dignified standard
of living” (emphasis added, HB), which objective emphasises the minimum
standard character: European standards may occasionally allow for an undig-
nified standard of living.40 On these matters, a relatively modest level of har-
monisation is envisaged. The Dublin Regulation and the Temporary Protection
Directive do not define a particular level of harmonisation. 
204 Chapter 4
The envisaged level of harmonisation is relevant for determining the material
scope of the legislation, and henceforth for the scope of review of the
European Court of Justice (see paragraph 2.2.2.3). This scope of review will
be addressed after having discussed the relevant legislation in some detail (in
paragraph 9.3.3).  
4.7 Personal scope
Non-EU citizens
[261] The Common European Asylum System is restricted ratione personae
to third country nationals and stateless persons, i.e. to persons who do not pos-
sess the nationality of one of the      Member States of the European Union.41
The distinction between third country nationals and stateless persons has no
consequences as far as application of European asylum law is concerned. For
briefness’ sake, I refer below to both “third-country nationals” as well as
“stateless persons”, as third country nationals or non-EU citizens. The legal
bases of these measures in Article 63 TEC all state or imply this restriction to
non-EU citizens (cf. number [184] above). For EU citizens, the Spanish
Protocol establishes a separate legal regime (cf. paragraph 6.4.6).
Is the distinction between nationals and non-nationals of the EU at variance
with the various prohibitions of discrimination that may apply?42 I don’t think
so, for the distinction does not necessarily lead to unequal treatment on the
national level, i.e. in the application. This might be different if Member States
set up special regimes for asylum for EU-citizens, justifying the distinction by
European legislation. But then the discrimination would follow from those
national systems, not from the Treaty on European Community or European
legislation itself. 
The personal scope of provisions on refugee, subsidiary protection and tem-
porary protection status is further defined by the definitions of “refugee”,
“subsidiary protection beneficiary” and “persons enjoying temporary protec-
tion”, laid down in the Qualification and the Temporary Protection Directives.
These will be extensively discussed in chapter 5. Here, the definition of the
“applicant” must be addressed, in view of its consequences for the relation
between the several instruments. 
Applicants
[262] The Procedures Directive, Residence Standards Directive and Dublin
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Regulation all apply to “applicants” or “asylum seekers”: third-country
nationals who made an “application for asylum in respect of which no final
decision has yet been taken”.43 The term “application for asylum” is defined
in the Procedures Directive, Residence Standards Directive and Dublin
Regulation as
“the application made by a third-country national which can be understood
as a request for international protection from a Member State, under the
Geneva Convention. Any application for international protection is pre-
sumed to be an application for asylum, unless a third-country national
explicitly requests another kind of protection that can be applied for sepa-
rately”.44
Hence, an application for “international protection” is an “application for asy-
lum”, unless the Member State runs a “separate procedure” for another kind
of protection, and the applicant explicitly requested for that other kind of pro-
tection.
The term “international protection” is not defined in the Dublin
Regulation, the Procedures Directive or the Reception Standards Directive.
The Qualification Directive defines “international protection” as 
“the refugee and subsidiary protection status as defined in [the
Qualification Directive].”45
It is unlikely that the term “application for international protection” as
employed in the other instruments implies a restriction to only refugee or sub-
sidiary protection. In Article 63(2)(a) TEC, the term covers any form of pro-
tection for third country-nationals, including refugees who enjoy “asylum”
and temporary protection beneficiaries (cf. number [195]). It appears that the
Procedures Directive employs “international protection” in the same sense.
Article 3(3) PD states that the instrument must, certain conditions being ful-
filled, apply to requests for subsidiary protection (see the next number);
Article 3(4) PD states that
“Moreover, Member States may decide to apply this Directive in proce-
dures for deciding on applications for any kind of international protection.” 
So for the purposes of the Procedures Directive, “international protection”
may encompass next to protection under the Refugee Convention (necessarily
implied by “applications for asylum”), and subsidiary protection as defined by
the Qualification Directive, other kinds of protection also. 
[263] Consequently, an application for any kind of protection that domestic
law may provide is an “application for international protection”, and therefore
an “application for asylum” for the purposes of the Dublin Regulation, the
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Reception Standards Directive and the Procedures Directive. We saw above
that these instruments apply to applications for all those forms of internatio-
nal protection, unless Member States run a separate procedure for another
kind of protection than refugee protection, and the third country national
requests it. It follows that the personal scope of application of CEAS rules on
“applicants” differs among the Member States, depending on the set-up of
their domestic asylum procedures. For it follows that if eligibility for refugee
protection is examined in combination with eligibility for other forms of inter-
national protection, persons applying for such other forms must be treated as
“applicants” for the purposes of the Dublin Regulation, Procedures Directive
and Residence Standards Directive.46 The Procedures Directive confirms this
for applicants for subsidiary protection:
“[w]here Member States employ or introduce a procedure in which asylum
applications are examined both as applications on the basis of the Geneva
Convention, and as applications for other kinds of protection as defined by
Article 15 of [the Qualification Directive], they shall apply this Directive
throughout their procedure”.47
If the examination is not combined in one procedure, the Member States may
nevertheless apply the Procedures Directive and the Residence Standards
Directive standards to those “separate” procedures as well – procedures for the
granting of subsidiary protection as well as for other forms of “international
protection”.48 Applicants will in the first instance not explicitly apply for other
forms of protection than refugee protection.49 In fact, therefore, those “sepa-
rate” procedures are “subsequent” procedures that apply after it has been
established that the applicant does not qualify for refugee status.50
The Dublin Regulation does not provide for an extension of its personal
scope for states running separate procedures for other forms of international
protection. In those states, a third country national may therefore evade appli-
cation of the instrument by explicitly requesting a form of protection
processed separately. 
[264] In summary, the Dublin Regulation, the Procedures Directive and the
Residence Standards Directive apply to third-country nationals who apply for
refugee protection, but not necessarily to persons who apply for subsidiary
protection. If a Member State runs a separate procedure for qualification for
subsidiary protection, and has not extended the scope of application of the
Procedures and the Reception Standards Directive to this separate procedure,
applicants for subsidiary protection fall out of their scopes. Meanwhile, they
are entitled to the guarantees applying to “applicants for subsidiary protec-
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tion” laid down in the Qualification Directive, as this instrument defines the
“application” as 
“a request [by a third country national] for protection from a Member
State, who can be understood to seek refugee status or subsidiary protec-
tion status, and who does not explicitly request another kind of protection,
outside the scope of this Directive, that can be applied for separately”.51
Hence, an alien is an “applicant” for the purposes of the Qualification
Directive if he applies (or can be understood to apply) for subsidiary protec-
tion, regardless whether the Member State concerned runs a “separate proce-
dure” for the processing of such claims or not. 
The definition of “applicants for asylum” hence allows for diverging personal
scopes in the Member States. This is regrettable for more than one reason.
Such disharmony may cause secondary movements, whereas precluding them
is one of the objectives of the CEAS legislation. As persons eligible for sub-
sidiary protection may fall within the scope of international asylum law, the
absence of rules on (especially) procedures means a gap in their protection,
whereas safeguarding their rights is also one of the objectives of the asylum
legislation. And from the point of view of the CEAS, the divergence of the per-
sonal scopes of especially the Procedures and the Qualification Directives
poses a number of problems, as we will see below.
4.8 Territorial scope
[265] As to the territorial scope, the relevant legislation does not apply to all
Member States. By virtue of the protocol on the Position of Denmark, none of
the Community legislation discussed here applies to this state;52 only the
Dublin Convention (and its successor) applies to Denmark (see number
[219]). 
By virtue of the Protocol on the Position of the United Kingdom and
Ireland, these Member States can decide not to partake in any instrument
adopted pursuant to Article 63 TEC (cf. number [220]). Ireland decided not to
partake in the Temporary Protection Directive and the Reception Standards
Directive;53 both the United Kingdom and Ireland do not partake in the Family
Reunification Directive.54 The Qualification and Procedures Directives as well
as the Dublin and the Dublin Application Regulations all apply to both states.55
As the Dublin Application Regulation “applies” to Norway and Iceland by
virtue of an Agreement with these states, for the purposes of that Regulation
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the term “Member States” includes both non-Member States.56 When I speak
below of “the Member States”, the states bound by the relevant piece of legis-
lation are to be understood.  
[266] The territorial scope of the asylum legislation has yet another aspect: do
the instruments apply only to acts performed by the (bound) Member States
on the territory of the Member States, or also to acts committed outside the
borders? The Procedures Directive, Dublin Regulation and Reception
Standards Directive apply to third country nationals who applied for asylum
at the borders of or within the Member States.57 Both Directives specify that
they do not apply to applications lodged at representations abroad.58 This does
not preclude that the relevant rules (continue to) apply if the third country
national left the Member State, or even the European Union, once the applica-
tion has been made there.59 The restriction to applications that are made at the
borders of or within the territories of the Member States follows from the
Treaty bases of these instruments.60
The Temporary Protection Directive does not restrict its scope of applica-
tion to third country nationals within the Member States, though such a
restriction may in practice follow from the Council decision installing this pro-
tection.61 Several provisions imply obligations towards persons still outside the
European Union.62 The Treaty basis of this instrument does indeed not imply
a restriction to persons within the Union (cf. number [197]). 
The Family Reunification Directive addresses the issue of residence per-
mits to family members of third country nationals (“sponsors”) who are hol-
ders of a residence permit.63 Obviously, the family members whose entry is
requested need not to be present in the Member States, but the same may be
true for the sponsor. 
[267] Remarkably, the Qualification Directive is silent on its territorial scope
of application. Its Treaty basis (Article 63(1)(c) and (2)(a) TEC) allows for
application on the territory of the Member States as well as abroad (number
[185]. Can we assume that obligations, such as the duty to “grant” refugee sta-
tus or subsidiary protection status “to a third country national or stateless per-
son” who qualifies for it,64 apply to any non-EU citizen, no matter where he
lodged his request? 
It is hardly likely that the Community legislator intended such far-reaching
implications. It appears from the Preamble to the Qualification Directive that
its purpose is approximation (or harmonisation) of existing obligations under
international law or current practices, not extension of the scope of Member
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States’ obligations as to protection.65 Thus, the criteria on qualification for
refugee status concern specifically Article 1 RC, and those for subsidiary pro-
tection “should be drawn from international obligations under human rights
instruments and practices existing in Member States”.66 The Refugee
Convention does not impose obligations as regards refugees on foreign soil;67
the same holds true for the prohibitions of refoulement ex Articles 3 CAT and
7 CCPR.68 Several authors have argued that the Member States may incur
responsibility under Article 3 ECHR in case of refusal to offer protection
requested abroad. But it appears from a study by Noll, Faegerlund and Liebaut
that few Member States operate regimes for extraterritorial processing of
applications.69 There is no reason to assume that the Qualification Directive
serves to harmonise the disparate domestic legislation on this matter. Nor do
“practices existing in Member States” give reason to assume that the
Qualification Directive serves to harmonise criteria for dealing with extra-
territorial applications.70
[268] It appears, then, that we must read the Qualification Directive “in accor-
dance with” international asylum law (cf. Article 63(1) TEC): the instrument
applies only to third country nationals who lodged an application in the terri-
tory or at the border of the Member States. Thus, the restrictions on the terri-
torial scope that apply to the Procedures Directive apply to the Qualification
Directive as well.71 If we assume that the various pieces of legislation do form
a “system”, this reading is self-evident. For the Qualification Directive mere-
ly regulates when an alien qualifies for protection, not when the merits of the
application must be considered. That matter is addressed by the Procedures
Directive (read in conjunction with the Dublin Regulation): if the application
is lodged at the border or in the territory, if examination is required and if this
examination must address whether the claim is well-founded (see number
[250]). 
Arguably, then, the Qualification Directive addresses applications
processed in procedures as laid down in the Procedures Directive, and the ter-
ritorial limitation of that instrument applies - although neither instrument
states so in an explicit manner. This reading solves the issue of the territorial
scope as far as qualification for refugee status is concerned. As to qualifica-
tion for subsidiary protection, we saw above that the Procedures Directive nec-
essarily applies to requests for subsidiary protection in Member States that do
not run a separate procedure (number [264]). Arguably, the restriction to the
territorial scope laid down in the Procedures Directive and the Dublin
Regulation applies in such cases too. For “subsidiary protection should be
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complementary and additional to the refugee protection enshrined in the
[Refugee Convention]”.72 A reading of the scope of Member State obligations
on subsidiary protection as if they exceeded the scope of obligations towards
refugees would run counter to this consideration. 
[269] In summary, CEAS legislation applies only to persons who do not possess
the nationality of a Member State, and only in the case that an application was
lodged at the border or in the territory of the Member States. The personal
scope raises two issues. First, the scope of obligations on “applicants for asy-
lum” may vary among Member States, depending on the question of whether
they happen to have separate procedures for other forms of protection than
refugee protection. If they do, the CEAS rules on applicants for subsidiary pro-
tection do not (or not necessarily) apply. Hence, the scope of protection affor-
ded by the CEAS may differ among Member States; such differences are at odds
with the objectives of the asylum legislation. Second, the scope of obligations
as regards “applicants for asylum” as defined in the Procedures Directive is
decisive for the scope of obligations as regards “applicants for subsidiary pro-
tection” as addressed in the Qualification Directive. The gap in protection for
applicants for subsidiary protection yields to uncertainty as to the scope of
application of the Qualification Directive. Arguably, it follows from a reading
to object and purpose that even in cases where the Procedures Directive does
not apply to an application for subsidiary protection, the geographical scope
of relevant Qualification Directive provisions must be defined in accordance
with it. 
4.9 Concluding remarks
[270] The Directives on Qualification, Procedures, Reception Standards and
Temporary Protection as well as the Dublin Regulation all refer to the concept
of the Common European Asylum System. As constituents of a system, their
rules must be read in conjunction. Thus, it appeared that the Procedures
Directive determines the geographical scope of the Qualification Directive.
The above-mentioned measures share a number of features. They all apply
to non-EU citizens, i.e. third country nationals and stateless persons (hence-
forth referred to as third country nationals). They all serve two main objec-
tives: preclusion of secondary movements and the safeguarding of rights of
third country nationals. They all represent the initial stage of a harmonisation
process. The Directives on Qualification, Procedures and Reception Standards
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as well as the Dublin Regulation apply to “applications” lodged within the ter-
ritories or at the borders of the Member States. Finally, except for the Dublin
Regulation they all set minimum standards. The wording of the definition of
the nature of these standards varies among the measures, but reflects in all
relevant instruments the same understanding: Member States may adopt or
maintain domestic standards that are more favourable for the third country
national than the standards set by the Directives on Qualification, Procedures,
Reception Standards, Temporary Protection and Family Reunification. This
definition is in accordance with the concept of minimum standards as
analysed in paragraph 3.4. 
In two important respects the legislation does not establish a regime com-
mon to all Member States. First, none of the Community measures applies to
Denmark; and some do not apply to Ireland or the United Kingdom. Second,
the definition of “application” leads to differences in scope of application. In
states that operate a single system for processing both applications for refugee
protection as well as for subsidiary protection, the Dublin Regulation, the
Procedures Directive and the Reception Standards Directive apply to appli-
cants for both forms of protection. In Member States that run separate proce-
dures, these measures do not (necessarily) apply to applicants who specifically
apply for subsidiary protection. 
[271] The legislation making up the Common European Asylum System
establishes four protection statuses: refugee status, subsidiary protection sta-
tus, applicant status and temporary protection status. On four issues, the CEAS
sets rules for all or some of these statuses: qualification, procedures for quali-
fication and withdrawal of the status, allocation and secondary rights. In the
following chapters, I will describe and analyse the rules on these four issues,
their conformity with relevant international law and, where relevant, how rules
on various statuses relate to each other. 
Chapter 5 deals with qualification for refugee, subsidiary protection and
temporary protection status. The rules on beginning and ending as well as
exclusion from applicant status are so tightly connected with the rules on pro-
cedures that they are better addressed in connection with the latter. Besides, the
qualification for applicants shares few elements with qualification for the other
three protection statuses; a combined discussion would therefore not be fruit-
ful. As the “dependant statuses” of the family members do not concern the need
for protection because of a threat of human rights violations in the country of
origin, I do not address them as separate “protection statuses”, but treat these
categories in the context of the secondary rights of the four types of statuses.  
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Chapter 6 addresses procedures for granting or withdrawing protection status-
es, and Chapter 7, the rules on allocation for applicants and temporary protec-
tion beneficiaries. The discussion of allocation of applicants concerns not only
the Dublin system as established by the Dublin Regulation, the Dublin
Convention and the agreements with Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, but
also the various safe third country arrangements set out in the Procedures
Directive. In Chapter 8 the rules on secondary rights are discussed, including
those that somehow address family unity. Judicial protection and related
issued are addressed in Chapter 9. 
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NOTES
1 Cf. number [49].
2 Cf. Preamble recitals (4) QD, (1) and (3) PD, (3) RSD and (3) DR. The concept is also
referred to in the basis for asylum legislation in the Constitution for Europe – cf. Article
267(2) CfE, see number [232] above.
3 Preamble recital TPD (1). And we may observe that Article 266(2)(c) defines a “common
system of temporary protection” as a constituent of the Common European Asylum System. 
4 Cf. Battjes & Spijkerboer 2005. 
5 The Dublin Convention was concluded in 1990, long before the 1999 Tampere European
Council took place (see number [43]).  The Family Reunification Directive does refer to the
Tampere Conclusions, but serves to “ensure fair treatment of third country nationals resi-
ding lawfully on the territory of the Member States and that a more vigorous integration
policy should aim at granting them rights and obligations comparable to those of citizens
of the European Union” (Preamble recital (3) FRD). 
6 Cf. Article 63(1)(d), (2) first clause jo (2)(a) and (1)(a) and (b) TEC. 
7 Explanatory Memorandum to the QD Proposal, p. 3 (Com(2001)510def, OJ [2002]
C51E/325).  
8 Article 3(1) jo 2(b) PD.
9 Article 3(3) PD, see number [263] below. 
10 Cf. Article 3(1) RSD, see number [600]. 
11 Articles 23(1) jo 24 PD – see number [372].
12 Article 29(1) jo 19, 20 and 25 PD – see number [373]. 
13 Cf. Article 25(1) PD, see number [427]. 
14 Article 29(1) PD, see number [371]. 
15 Cf. Articles 3(1) and 9(1) FRD.
16 Article 5 jo 2(a) TPD. 
17 In earlier versions, the Common European Asylum System encompassed yet another, fifth
category: long term resident refugees (cf. Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the
status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents (COM/2001/0127 final), OJ
C240E/79-87, Article 3(2)). But according to Article 3(2) of the Directive as adopted, it does
not apply to them (Directive 2003/109, OJ [2004] L16/44: “This Directive does not apply to
third-country nationals who:[…] (b) are authorised to reside in a Member State on the basis
of temporary protection or have applied for authorisation to reside on that basis and are
awaiting a decision on their status; (c) are authorised to reside in a Member State on the basis
of a subsidiary form of protection in accordance with international obligations, national legis-
lation or the practice of the Member States or have applied for authorisation to reside on that
basis and are awaiting a decision on their status; (d) are refugees or have applied for recog-
nition as refugees and whose application has not yet given rise to a final decision”. 
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18 Articles 23 QD, 3(1) RSD and 15 TPD; see paragraphs 8.4.3, 8.7.3 and 8.8.3. 
19 Cf. the first clauses of the Preambles to the relevant instruments. 
20 Articles 1 QD, PD, RSD, TPD, DR and FRD, and Preamble recitals (6) QD, (5) PD, (7) RSD,
and cf. Preamble recitals (8) TPD and (4) DR. 
21 Preamble recitals (1) QD, PD, RSD, TPD, DR and FRD. 
22 Preamble recitals (7) QD, (6) PD, (8) RSD and (9) TPD. The Dublin Regulation does not
state so explicitly, but the objective applies by virtue of the reference to the objectives of the
Dublin Convention; see number [478].  
23 Preamble recital (4) FRD. Social and economic cohesion is mentioned as an objective in
Article 3(1)(k) TEC. 
24 Cf. Articles 17(3) QD and 6(2) PD.
25 Cf. Preamble recitals (1) QD, PD, RSD, TPD and DR.
26 Cf. Preamble recital (1) FRD. 
27 Preamble recital (2) FRD. 
28 Preamble recital (10) TPD.
29 Preamble recitals (11) QD, (9) PD, (6) RSD and (12) DR. 
30 Preamble recitals (2) QD, PD, RSD and DR.
31 Preamble recital (25) QD.
32 Preamble recitals (10) QD, (8) PD, (8) RSD, (15) DR and (2) FRD.  
33 Cf. Articles 63(1)(b), (c), (d) and (2)(a) TEC; pursuant to the second last clause of Article
63, measures based on paragraph (3)(a) are also minimum standards – see number [215]. 
34 Articles 3(5) TPD and FRD.
35 Articles 3 QD, 4 PD and 4 RSD.
36 Preamble recitals (8) QD, (7) PD and (15) RSD. 
37 Preamble recitals (6) QD and FRD.
38 Preamble recital (6) QD.
39 Preamble recital (5) PD. 
40 Preamble recital (7) RSD. 
41 Articles 1 jo 2(a) DR define the personal scope as third country nationals by reference to
Article 17(1) TEC, the other instruments speak of “third country nationals and stateless per-
sons” (Articles 3(1) jo 2(b) PD, 1 and 2(c) and (e) QD, 1 jo 2(c) TPD, 3(1) RSD, 1 jo 2(a)
FRD). We may observe that the Common European Asylum System applies the term “third-
country national” in two different meanings: in the Dublin Regulation, the term encompas-
ses “stateless persons”, whereas it does not in the mentioned Directives. 
42 Article 3 RC, 26 CCPR, and 14 ECHR; cf. paragraph 6.4.6. 
43 Articles 3(1) jo 2(c) PD, 3(1) jo 2(c) RSD and 3(1) jo 2(d) DR. Further requirements for
entitlement to benefits laid down in these instruments, such as lawful presence, will be dis-
cussed in paragraph 8.7.1. 
44 Article 2(c) DR, 2(b) RSD, 2(b) PD. 
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45 Article 2(a) QD. 
46 For practical purposes, we may observe that according to K. Hailbronner, Study on the
Asylum Single Procedure (“One-Stop Shop”) Against the Background of the Common
European Asylum System and the Goal of a Common Asylum Procedure, European
Commission 2002 (http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/doc_centre/asylum/studies),
pp. 5-6 and 48-63, of the 15 states member of the EU before 1 May 2004, only five run
separate systems (Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy and Luxembourg), the 10 other states run
procedures combining the requests relevant for European asylum law statuses. I have no
data on the 10 new Member States. 
47 Article 3(3) PD. Incidentally, this provision is awkwardly worded: Article 15 QD does not
define “kinds of protection”, but the kinds of harm that constitute ‘serious harm’ for the
purposes of Article 2(e) QD (see number [275]), the definition of persons who are eligible
for “subsidiary protection”. Article 3(3) PD should hence be read as referring to “the other
kind of protection as defined in Article 2(e) QD”. 
48 Article 3(4) PD and 3(3) RSD; cf. Preamble recital (16) RSD: “[…] Member States are […]
invited to apply the provisions of this Directive in connection with procedures for deciding
on applications for forms of protection other than that emanating from the Geneva
Convention for third country nationals and stateless persons”. 
49 Article 2(e) QD in fact requires that eligibility for refugee status is examined before eligi-
bility for subsidiary protection status – see number [354]. 
50 Cf. Article 3(4) RSD: “Member States may decide to apply this Directive in connection with
procedures for deciding on applications for kinds of protection other than that emanating
from the Geneva Convention for third-country nationals or stateless persons who are found
not to be refugees [emphasis added, HB]”.
51 Article 2(g) QD.
52 As acknowledged in the Preambles to the relevant legislation, cf. the recitals QD (40), TPD
(26), DR (17), DAR (7), RSD (21) and FRD (18). 
53 Cf. Preamble recitals TPD (25) and RSD (20); as to the participation of the UK in both
instruments, cf. recitals TPD (24) and RSD (19). 
54 Cf. Preamble recitals FRD (17). 
55 Cf. Preamble recitals (38) and (39) QD, (32) and (33) PD, (17) DR. 
56 Cf. Preamble recital (8) DAR. 
57 Articles 3(1) PD, DR and RSD. 
58 Presumably, in order to prevent misunderstandings on the meaning of the term “territory”
- Articles 3(2) PD and RSD. Article 4(4) DR states a special rule that applies to applica-
tions lodged with embassies of Member States within the European Union – see number
[480]. 
59 Cf. number [393] below.
60 Cf. Articles 63(1)(a), (b) and (d) TEC, cf. number [185] above.  
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61 According to Article 5(3)(a) TPD, that Council decision includes a circumscription of the
groups of persons to whom the temporary protection regime applies. 
62 Cf. Articles 8(3) and 15(3) TPD, cf. further below under number [622]. 
63 Cf. Article 3(1) FRD. 
64 Cf. Articles 13 and 18 QD, see further numbers [274] and [275]. 
65 Preamble recitals (4) and (7) QD. 
66 Preamble recital (25) QD. 
67 With a few exceptions that do not concern us here (cf. Articles 30 and 28 RC, see number
[566] below). 
68 Cf. Noll 2000, p. 432-438 and 440-441. 
69 Cf. Noll, Faegerlund & Liebaut 2002: out of the then 15 Member States only four did so,
and one of them (The Netherlands) abolished it since. 
70 Ibid.
71 The legislative history of the Qualification Directive also suggests so. Article 3 of the
Commission Proposal defined the geographical scope of the instrument. A number of dele-
gations commented that “the place where applicants lodge their application is a matter for
the Directive on asylum procedures. Anyway, the scope of the present Directive must be con-
sistent with the one to be established in the aforementioned Directive on procedures”
(Council doc. 7882/02, Asile 2002/20, 24 April 2002, p. 5, footnote 4). The provision was
first amended (Council doc. 10596/02, Asile 2002/36, 9 July 2002), then deleted without
any (further) reasons stated (Council doc. 12199/02, Asile 2002/45, 25 September 2002).  
72 Preamble recital (24) QD. 




The Common European Asylum System establishes four protection statuses –
refugee, subsidiary protection, temporary protection and applicant status. The
definition of applicants has been addressed in the previous Chapter (see para-
graph 4.7). In the present Chapter, I discuss the definitions for the other sta-
tuses. Comparison shows that refugee, subsidiary and temporary protection
statuses share a number of elements: requirements on risk, harm, alienage and
exclusion (paragraph 5.2). These elements as well as the requirements on ces-
sation of these statuses will be discussed in combination, in paragraphs 5.3 to
5.6. In paragraph 5.7 I will briefly address a fifth protection status established
by the Qualification Directive. Hierarchy and concurrence among all CEAS sta-
tuses (hence including applicants status) will be discussed in paragraph 5.8.
The discussion of the qualification for asylum in paragraphs 5.3 to 5.6
involves assessment of the compatibility of the CEAS rules with international
asylum law (the central question of this inquiry, see paragraph 1.2). Relevant
aspects of international law are briefly introduced in paragraph 5.1; the fin-
dings on this compatibility are summarised in paragraph 5.9.
5.1 CEAS statuses and international asylum law
[272] Rules on qualification for refugee, subsidiary protection and temporary
protection statuses are laid down in the Qualification and Temporary
Protection Directives. Rules on qualification as refugees and on applicants
must, pursuant to Article 63(1) first clause TEC, be “in accordance with [the
Refugee Convention] and relevant international law”. The Qualification
Directive provisions on qualification for subsidiary protection and the
Temporary Protection Directive are all based on Article 63(2)(a) TEC. These
rules must comply with general principles of Community law reflecting rele-
vant international asylum law (cf. numbers [127] and [137]).
Which rules of international asylum law are relevant for qualification for
CEAS statuses? It follows from Article 63(1) TEC that the rules on “qualifica-
tion as refugees” are rules on qualification as refugees in the sense of the
Refugee Convention (see number [189]); the Preamble to the Qualification
Directive at numerous instances confirms so.1
The rules on qualification for subsidiary protection serve to identify “per-
sons genuinely in need of international protection”,2 that is protection “other-
wise” than Refugee Convention protection.3 Protection “on a discretionary
basis on compassionate or humanitarian grounds” falls outside the scope of
the instrument.4 According to Preamble recital (25) QD, 
“[the] criteria on the basis of which applicants for international protection
are to be recognised as eligible for subsidiary protection […] should be
drawn from international obligations under human rights instruments and
practices existing in Member States.”
So, the scope of “subsidiary protection” may be broader than the scope of pro-
tection under international asylum law other than refugee protection, as it may
encompass criteria based on “practices existing in Member States”.
Conversely, not all forms of protection under international asylum law are
included: protection on “compassionate or humanitarian grounds” falls out-
side the scope of the instruments.5
Neither the Qualification Directive, nor any other CEAS instrument, identi-
fies the European Convention of Human Rights or another instrument of inter-
national law as relevant for qualification for subsidiary protection. But the
Explanatory memorandum to the Proposal for the Qualification Directive
states that 
“[t]he definition of subsidiary protection employed in this Proposal is
based largely on international human rights instruments relevant to sub-
sidiary protection. The most pertinent of them being (Article 3 of the)
European Convention of Human Rights […], (Article 3 of) the UN
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment, and (Article 7 of) the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.”6
Thus, the prohibitions of refoulement ex Articles 3 ECHR, 3 CAT and 7 CCPR
informed the definition of subsidiary protection. 
Temporary protection beneficiaries are defined as persons who may fall
within the scope of Article 1A(2) RC (cf. Article 2(c) TPD, see number [276]
below); consequently, all rules on temporary protection should be “compati-
ble with the Member States’ obligations as regards refugees”,7 that is, with the
Refugee Convention. As its beneficiaries may fall within the scope of the pro-
hibitions of refoulement of other aliens than refugees, temporary protection
should be compatible with Articles 3 CAT, 3 ECHR and 7 CCPR as well. 
[273] Hence, Articles 33 read in conjunction with1 RC, 3 ECHR, 3 CAT and
7 CCPR serve both as sources of, and as standards for assessment of the cri-
teria for qualification for CEAS statuses. We should observe that those CEAS cri-
teria do not, or not necessarily, address the full scope of the prohibitions of
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refoulement. They set minimum standards that do not or not necessarily com-
pletely approximate law on the issues addressed (cf. numbers [213] and
[222]). Further, the objective of precluding secondary movements of appli-
cants (cf. number [253]) may have resulted in a focus on issues where domes-
tic asylum legislation of the Member States diverged, which do not necessari-
ly include all key aspects of qualification for protection under international
law. 
Finally, we should observe that the criteria for qualification for a CEAS pro-
tection status address qualification for a particular form of protection: a set of
secondary rights that includes the right to remain in the Member States and
other benefits (to be discussed in Chapter 8). Articles 3 CAT, 3 ECHR and 7
CCPR on the other hand identify persons who may not be expelled to their
country of origin. Such persons may not be entitled to CEAS protection status,
for example, because they committed crimes as meant in Article 1F RC (see
paragraph 5.6). This distinction is reflected in the Preamble recitals of the
Qualification Directive that define its main objective as the identification of
persons who are “genuinely” in need of protection, and state that the Directive
“seeks to ensure full respect for the right to asylum” laid down in Article 18
Charter.8 In other words, the Qualification Directive rules on qualification
serve to identify persons who are entitled to “asylum” as meant in Article 18
Charter, but not (necessarily) all of the persons who are entitled to protection
from refoulement under Articles 3 ECHR, 3 CAT and 7 CCPR. 
The scope of persons entitled to protection under the prohibitions of
refoulement ex Articles 3 ECHR, 3 CAT and 7 CCPR does therefore not coin-
cide with the scope of persons entitled to subsidiary protection. The CEAS
addresses the Member States’ obligations under the prohibitions of refoule-
ment only partially. Those obligations may apply to persons who cannot qua-
lify for CEAS protection statuses. The terrorist who committed a crime against
humanity as meant in Article 1F RC is not entitled to subsidiary protection,
and hence falls outside the scope of the Qualification Directive. The same
applies to the scope of “temporary protection”.9 Article 3 ECHR may prohibit
his expulsion or extradition, but the Member State’s obligations under the pro-
hibitions of refoulement fall outside the scope of Community law. As regards
refugee status, the issue is somewhat different as the Refugee Convention
itself defines in the exclusion clauses of Article 1 RC who is not entitled to
Refugee Convention benefits, despite any well-founded fear of persecution –
persons to whom Article 1F RC applies are excluded from Refugee
Convention benefits as well as from CEAS protection statuses. But the grounds
for exclusion of refugees from protection from refoulement laid down in
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Article 33(2) RC do serve as criteria for a separate protection status (see para-
graph 5.6.2). 
In the analysis of the rules on qualification I will address the question
whether or to what extent these rules secure observance of Article 1 read in
conjunction with33 RC, 3 CAT, 3 ECHR and 7 CCPR. The legal consequences
of the “gaps” in protection that the CEAS shows in this respect will be
addressed in Chapter 9. 
5.2 Definition elements
[274] Who are entitled to the CEAS protection statuses? The term “refugee” is
defined in 2(c) QD. In this definition, four elements may be distinguished: 
“Refugee” means a third country national who, [1] owing to a well-foun-
ded fear of [2a] being persecuted [2c] for reasons of race, religion, natio-
nality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group, [3] is
outside the country of nationality and [2b] is unable or, owing to such fear,
is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country,
[…]10 and [4] to whom Article 12 does not apply [numbers added, HB]”.
Article 12 QD renders the content of Article 1D, 1E and 1F Refugee
Convention (cf. number [344]). 
Article 2(c) QD deviates from the definition of “refugee” in Article 1 RC
in only one respect:11 it does not refer to Article 1C RC, on cessation of refugee
status. It thus encompasses all elements of Article 1 RC relevant for the deter-
mination of refugee status. Where necessary in order to avoid confusion
between the two definitions, I will refer below to refugees as defined by
Article 2(c) QD as Directive refugees, and to refugees as defined by Article 1
RC as Convention refugees. 
The elements of this Directive refugee definition are elaborated in Chapter
II and III of the Qualification Directive (to be discussed in paragraph 5.3 to
5.6). Article 11 QD in Chapter III renders the cessation grounds of Article 1C
RC (to be discussed in par 5.7). According to Article 13, the Member States
“shall grant refugee status to” a third country national “who qualifies as a
refugee in accordance with Chapters II and III.” It follows that refugee status
must in principle be granted to persons fulfilling the complete refugee defini-
tion of Article 1 RC. In principle, for Article 14 QD states some additional
grounds for refusal of refugee status on first application (that is, additional to
those mentioned in Article 12 QD (Articles 1D, 1E and 1F RC); it concerns
the grounds for expulsion in Article 33(2) RC; see par. 5.8). Article 14 QD fur-
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ther defines grounds for withdrawal of refugee status, among those mentioned
in Article 1C RC (see par. 5.6).
[275] Article 2(e) QD defines “persons eligible for subsidiary protection” as
follows:
“‘Person eligible for subsidiary protection’ means a third country national
or a stateless person [5] who does not qualify as a refugee and [1a] in
respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for believing that
the person concerned, [3] if returned to his or her country of origin, […]
would face [1b] a real risk of [2a] suffering serious harm as defined in arti-
cle 15, and [4] to whom Article 17 paragraph 1 and 2 does not apply, and
[2b] is unable, or owing to such risk, is unwilling to avail himself or her-
self of the protection of that country” [numbers added, HB].
This definition is a hybrid between the prohibition of expulsion flowing from
refoulement as worded by the European Court of Human Rights (elements [1a]
and [1b], [3] and [2a]; see number [15] above and par. 5.3 below), and the
Directive refugee definition (elements [2b] and [4] – Article 17(1) and (2) QD
states grounds for exclusion). In addition, it requires that the person concerned
is not a Directive refugee (element [5]; see par. 5.8). The definition elements
are elaborated in Chapters II and IV of the Qualification Directive. Persons
“eligible for subsidiary protection” in accordance with those Chapters must be
granted subsidiary protection status (Article 18 QD). Article 19 QD states the
grounds for withdrawal or cessation of the status (see par. 5.6). 
[276] Temporary protection status can be granted in case of a “mass influx of
displaced persons”.12 Displaced persons are defined as
“persons who [3] have had to leave their country or region of origin, or
have been evacuated, in particular in response to an appeal by international
organisations, and [2b] are unable to return in safe and durable conditions
because of the situation prevailing in that country, [2a] who may fall within
the scope of Article 1A of the Geneva Convention or other international or
national instruments giving international protection, in particular:
(i) [2a] persons who have fled areas of armed conflict or endemic violence;
(ii) persons [1] at serious risk of, or who have been the victims of, [2a] sys-
tematic or generalised violations of their human rights.”13
The existence of a “mass influx” is established by a Council decision that indi-
cates the specific groups of persons to whom the temporary protection
applies.14 The definition elements are not further elaborated in the Directive.
Article 28 TPD gives one ground for exclusion (element [4], see par. 5.6). The
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protection ends either when the maximum duration is reached or when the
Council decides so.15 The actual granting of benefits is not done by
Community institutions but by the Member States; the same holds true for
exclusion. 
Below, I first address the elements of the definitions of refugee, subsidiary pro-
tection status and temporary protection status beneficiaries and the elaboration
on their elements in European asylum law, in the order as indicated by the num-
bers between [brackets] in the definitions above. In paragraph 5.3, I address
“risk” assessment (element [1]), in 5.4 “harm” (elements [2a] - [2c]), in 5.5
“alienage” (element [3]) and in 5.6 “exclusion” (element [4] and Article 28
TPD). Cessation of the three mentioned statuses is addressed in paragraph 5.7. 
5.3 Risk and proof
[277] The first element of the definition of refugees, “well-founded fear”,
addresses the “risk”: a standard for the chance that the person concerned will
indeed incur persecution or serious harm. The definition of persons eligible
for subsidiary protection requires that “[1a] substantial grounds have been
shown for believing that the person concerned [1b] would face a real risk”,16 a
phrase taken from the standard case law of the European Court of Human
Rights on expulsion (cf. number [15] above). Element [1b] is the counterpart
of the term “well-founded fear” in the refugee definition and establishes the
risk standard at “real risk”. Element [1a] in addition addresses the burden and
standard of proof. These issues will be addressed in par. 5.3.1. The element
(persons who are at) [1] “serious risk of, or who have been the victims of ”
human rights violations in the definition of displaced persons (for the purpo-
ses of temporary protection) will be discussed in par. 5.3.2. 
5.3.1 Refugee and subsidiary protection 
The level of risk
[278] The required level of risk for refugees, “well-founded fear”, is not ela-
borated upon in the Qualification Directive, in contrast to the Commission’s
Proposal for the Qualification Directive.17 According to Carlier, a fixed level
would not even be required as this level varies depending on the severity of the
persecution feared.18
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As to subsidiary protection, article 2(e) QD requires that the “risk” be “real”.
This criterion occurs in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights
(see number [15] above). It can be argued that the real risk criterion sets a
stricter standard than well-founded fear.19 The Qualification Directive does not
elaborate on this standard. But it appears that the distinction in risk assessment
between qualification for refugee and for subsidiary protection status is inten-
tional, as the real risk criterion also replaces the well-founded fear test that
applied to subsidiary protection in the Commissions Proposal for the
Qualification Directive.20
Article 3(1) CAT does not define a particular level of risk – it speaks of a
“danger” that the applicant will be subjected to torture. Arguably, the level of
risk required by the Directive may be higher than the one that applies under
the Convention Against Torture.21 The Human Rights Committee requires in
expulsion cases ex Article 7 CCPR “real risk” taking the form of “necessary
and foreseeable consequence” 22, stricter than “real risk” as applied by the
Strasbourg court.23
Hence, the application of the ‘real risk’ criterion secures compliance with
Articles 3 ECHR and 7 CCPR as to risk assessment. But persons within the
scope of Article 3 CAT may not qualify for subsidiary protection, if the ‘dan-
ger’ of torture does not amount to ‘real risk’. 
Burden of proof
[279] As to the burden of proof, 
“Member States may consider it the duty of the applicant to submit as soon
as possible all elements needed to substantiate the application for interna-
tional protection […; which] consist of the applicant’s statements and all
documentation at the applicant’s disposal regarding the applicant’s age,
background, including that of relevant relatives, identity, nationality(ies),
country(ies) and place(s) of previous residence, previous asylum applica-
tions, travel routes, identity and travel documents and the reasons for
applying for international protection”.24
The definition of subsidiary protection requires that “grounds have been
shown”, and hence explicitly places the burden of proof on the applicant.25
This is in conformity with relevant case law of the European Court of Human
Rights, but at odds with the prohibition of refoulement in the Convention
Against Torture, which is neutral on the matter.26 The Directive definition of
refugees does not elaborate on the burden of proof; arguably, it follows from
Article 4 QD that it lies with the applicant,27 in conformity with the UNHCR
Handbook.28 The terms “may consider” give the Member States discretion not
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as to the burden of proof, but rather as to the duty to submit grounds “as soon
as possible”. It follows from Article 7(1) PD that applications should not 
be rejected “on the sole ground that they have not been made as soon as 
possible”.29
[280] As to the evidentiary standard, Article 4(1) QD merely states that the
application should be “substantiated”. The definition of subsidiary protection
beneficiaries speaks of “substantial grounds”.30 This standard is implied by
both relevant case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on the prohi-
bition of exposure to ill-treatment ex Article 3 ECHR,31 as well as under
Article 3(1) CAT.32 Again, the definition of Directive refugees is silent on the
matter. 
There is one exception to the discretion Member States enjoy as regards the
burden of proof and the evidentiary standard. If the applicant is a national of
a state designated as a “safe country of origin” on the “minimum common
list” of safe countries to be adopted by the Council, the Member States must
consider the application “unfounded” if the applicant cannot adduce “serious
grounds” for considering the country unsafe in his particular circumstances.33
The safe country of origin concept and in particular this standard will be
addressed in paragraph 6.4.5. 
The assessment
[281] How should the risk be assessed? It is the “duty” of the Member States,
“in cooperation with the applicant”, to assess “the relevant elements of the
application”,34 that is, to assess whether or not the application for protection is
substantiated. Article 4(3) QD gives a non-exhaustive list (“assessment
includes”) of issues that should be taken “into account”.35 It concerns 
all relevant facts as they relate to the country of origin at the time of taking
a decision on the application; including laws and regulations of the coun-
try of origin and the manner in which they are applied”.
Article 7(2) PD requires that in order to conduct an “appropriate examination
at first instance”, Member States must secure that “precise and up-to-date
information” is obtained from various sources such as UNHCR on “the gene-
ral situation in the countries of origin of applicants”. Absent, however, is
explicit mention of the obligation laid down in Article 3(2) CAT, which states
that 
“[f]or the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds [for con-
sidering that the applicant is in danger of being subjected to torture upon
removal, HB], the competent authorities shall take into account all relevant
226 Chapter 5
considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State con-
cerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of
human rights”.
Hence, the Directive does not secure observance of assessment in conformity
with the Convention Against Torture. The Qualification Directive does fur-
thermore not elaborate on the relevance of the general situation in the country
of origin for the assessment. In this respect, again, the “safe country of origin”
arrangement provides for an exception (see further par. 6.4.5). 
[282] Next to the general situation, the assessment should address, 
“the relevant statements and documentation presented by the applicant
including information on whether the applicant has been or may be subject
to persecution or serious harm”, 
and
“the individual position and personal circumstances of the applicant,
including factors such as background, gender and age, so as to assess
whether, on the basis of the applicant’s personal circumstances, the acts to
which the applicant has been or could be exposed would amount to perse-
cution or serious harm […]”.36
Pursuant to Article 4(4) QD, 
“The fact that an applicant has already been subject to persecution or seri-
ous harm or to direct threats of such persecution or such harm, is a serious
indication of the applicant’s wellfounded fear of persecution or real risk of
suffering serious harm, unless there are good reasons to consider that such
persecution or serious harm will not be repeated”.37
Hence, previous persecution or serious harm, or “direct threats” thereof, give
rise to a rebuttable presumption that the applicant qualifies for refugee or sub-
sidiary protection. 
As to the individual position and personal circumstances, the Preamble to
the Qualification Directive states as regards the factor of “age” that 
“[t]he “best interests of the child” should be a primary consideration of
Member States when implementing this Directive”,38
which appears to refer to Article 3 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child.39
Finally, we should note that Article 4(3)(c) QD (quoted above) requires that
the assessment of whether acts to which the applicant has been (or could be)
exposed, amount to persecution is conducted “on the basis of the applicant’s
personal circumstances”. Hence, the factors that should be taken into account
in the assessment according to Article 4(3) QD does not address the possibi-
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lity of group persecution, explicitly referred to in Article 2 of the 1996 Joint
Position.40
Credibility
[283] Often, applicants will not be able to substantiate aspects of their state-
ments with documentary or other evidence. According to Article 4(5) QD, 
“those aspects shall not need confirmation, when the following conditions
are met:
(a) the applicant has made a genuine effort to substantiate his application;
(b) all relevant elements, at the applicant’s disposal, have been submitted,
and a satisfactory explanation regarding any lack of other relevant ele-
ments has been given;
(c) the applicant’s statements are found to be coherent and plausible and do
not run counter to available specific and general information relevant to
the applicant’s case;
(d) the applicant has applied for international protection at the earliest pos-
sible time, unless the applicant can demonstrate good reason for not
having done so; and
(e) the general credibility of the applicant has been established.”
Thus, the applicant’s statements should be accepted as facts for the purpose of
the assessment of the application, if his “credibility” has been established.41
But if one of these conditions is not fulfilled, the relevant aspect of the claim
may be regarded as not “substantiated” (with due consequences for the claim
for protection). Apart from the requirement that the applicant should have
reported at the earliest possible moment, all elements relevant for the credibi-
lity assessment seem to be taken from the UNHCR Handbook.42
In themselves, these requirements seem quite compatible with relevant
international law. Absent however is a consideration on circumstances when
Member States should not turn down a claim merely on the grounds that
statements were not “coherent and plausible” or otherwise failed the condi-
tions set out in Article 4(5) QD. Mental disorder, cultural differences and so
on may in individual cases account for vagueness in the applicant’s state-
ments.43 Further, we may observe that pursuant to Article 4(5)(b) read in
conjunction with 4(2) QD, inconsistencies or otherwise which concern other
issues than the flight situation, such as the travel route, may affect the cre-
dibility of the applicant. Finally, the Qualification Directive does not expli-
citly require that applicants for refugee status enjoy the “benefit of the
doubt”.44
It follows from Article 34(2) PD that the benefit of the doubt as laid down
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in Article 4(5) QD does not apply to subsequent applications dealt with in the
‘preliminary procedure’. This exception is discussed under number [439]. 
Concluding remarks
[284] When comparing the requirements on the first element of the refugee
and subsidiary protection definitions, we may observe that the Qualification
Directive makes a distinction as to the required level of risk (“well-founded
fear” versus “real risk”). Neither of these criteria is elaborated upon, so the
Member States may apply identical requirements. For both categories, the bur-
den of proof rests with the applicant. One provision elaborates the element of
risk and proof for both definitions (Article 4 QD). This may further result in
erasing any distinctions between application of the well-founded fear and the
real risk criteria. 
[285] When comparing the Directive standards to relevant international law, it
appears that the standards for assessing the credibility of the applicant or of
how well-founded his fear is, are not at variance with international law. But the
Directive does not ensure that the well-founded fear criterion is applied in
accordance with the Refugee Convention. In particular, a direction for the
level of chance is absent though it appears that in this respect state practice
shows considerable differences.45 Likewise, explicit recognition of group per-
secution is absent. The definition of subsidiary protection is strongly oriented
to the prohibition of refoulement ex Article 3 ECHR. The more lenient or at
least more open standards in the Convention Against Torture both as to the risk
standard as well as to the relevance of the general human rights situation have
been neglected. As a consequence, aliens who fall within the scope of Article
3 CAT may not qualify for subsidiary protection. 
5.3.2 Temporary protection
[286] Risk criteria play a different role in qualification for temporary protec-
tion. Real risk and well-founded fear serve to assess the degree of probability
that a certain individual will be subjected to persecution or serious harm.
Temporary protection on the other hand applies to a whole group of persons
from a certain ethnic background or region, designated by the Council.46 It is
therefore the Council that decides on the risk of infringements on human
rights to be attained for instalment of temporary protection. Individuals apply-
ing for temporary protection do not have to prove any risk they run, merely
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their belonging to the group of persons to whom the temporary protection
applies. 
Still, risk assessment does play a certain rôle in the context of temporary
protection, for the Temporary Protection Directive does not leave the Council
complete discretion when assessing the risk. The definition of displaced per-
sons specifies two situations where temporary protection could be established.
The first situation concerns “persons who have fled areas of armed conflict or
endemic violence”; it does not establish any link between the harm (violence)
and the persons eligible for protection.47 The second however does, where it
speaks of persons at “serious risk or who have been the victims of, systematic
or generalised violations of their human rights”.48 Mere occurrence of syste-
matic or generalised violations of human rights is apparently not enough for
installing temporary protection. There must be a prima facie risk of such vio-
lations - either the aliens are at “serious risk” of being subjected to such vio-
lations, or they were already subjected to it.49 I will come back to the “serious
risk” criterion when discussing Article 15 of the Qualification Directive
below. 
5.4 Harm 
[287] Element [2] in the definitions of refugees, persons eligible for sub-
sidiary protection and persons eligible for temporary protection defines the
predicament that entitles the alien to international protection. It consists of
several parts. First, a harmful act, that is (roughly speaking) a serious viola-
tion of human rights (element [2a]); second, inability to get protection from
such acts from the authorities of the country of origin (element [2b]). The
refugee definition employs yet a third element: the predicament must be due
to “reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a
particular social group”, the ‘Convention grounds’ (element [2c]). 
The Qualification Directive elaborates on several aspects of the element
“harm”. Article 9 QD defines which harmful acts constitute “persecution” for
the purposes of the refugee definition, Article 15 QD defines the acts that
amount to “serious harm” as required by the definition of persons eligible for
subsidiary protection (discussed in paragraph 5.4.1). The issue of the “actors
of harm”, the identification of the agents whose actions may count as harmful
acts, is elaborated for both refugee and subsidiary protection in Article 6 QD
(see paragraph 5.4.2). The definition of protection and actors of protection
(agents that afford ‘protection’ for the purposes of both definitions) in Articles
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7 and 8 QD also applies to both definitions (paragraph 5.4.3). The Convention
grounds, relevant for refugee protection, are elaborated upon in Articles 9 and
10 QD (paragraph 5.4.4). 
Various types of harmful acts may give rise to temporary protection (see
number [306]). The definition of displaced persons does address the issue of
protection, but not the agents of protection or harm; these issues are addressed
in combination under number [323]. 
5.4.1 Harmful acts
5.4.1.1 Persecution 
Persecution in the Refugee Convention
[288] The Refugee Convention speaks of “being persecuted”, but does not
define what kind of acts amount to “persecution”. Nor does any other instru-
ment of international law provide for an authoritative interpretation.50 Some
guidance on the meaning of the term is offered by Article 33(1) RC, that pro-
hibits expulsion of a refugee to a country where “his life or freedom would be
threatened” on account of one of the persecution reasons. As the purpose of
this provision is to prevent exposure of a refugee to persecution, a threat to life
or freedom amounts to well-founded fear of persecution.51 State practice, the
UNHCR Handbook as well as most commentators support the view that cer-
tain other acts or measures may also constitute persecution acts. 52 Often, “per-
secution” is interpreted by reference to human rights treaties. It is generally
accepted that a violation of human rights must attain a certain level of serious-
ness in order to constitute persecution,53 but there is uncertainty both as to the
minimum level of seriousness of the violation, as well as to the scope of
human rights whose violation may give rise to persecution. 
[289] Hathaway proposes to interpret the term persecution by reference to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), to which the Refugee
Convention explicitly refers,54 the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR),55 because these instruments codify the rights set
out in the Universal Declaration, and because of their almost universal acces-
sion.56 On the basis of these instruments, three categories of obligations rele-
vant for the reading of the term persecution can be identified.57 First, rights
stated in both the UDHR and the CCPR, from which the latter allows no dero-
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gation, such as the prohibition on torture and inhuman or degrading treatment
and punishment, the right to life, and the prohibition on slavery.58 Second,
rights stated in both the UDHR and the CCPR, from which states may dero-
gate in certain circumstances, such as freedom of thought and other “political”
rights. The third category concerns rights stated in the UDHR and laid down
in the ICESCR, or not codified in either the CCPR or the ICESCR – econo-
mic and cultural rights. 
Most commentators hold that failure to protect from breaches of the rights
in the first category will under any circumstances amount to persecution, and
failure to ensure those in the second category will do so generally.59 A reading
in conjunction with Article 33 RC supports this view as to the first and, par-
tially, the second category. It appears that infringements on the remaining
rights of the second and those of the third category, such as deprivation of
means of existence, would in themselves not constitute persecution, but seri-
ous violations may do so, in combination with other measures.60 According to
Vanheule, support for this approach can be found in state practice.61
Persecution in the Qualification Directive
[290] According to Article 9(1) and (2) QD, 
“1. Acts of persecution […] must:
(a) be sufficiently serious by their nature or repetition as to constitute a
severe violation of basic human rights, in particular the rights from
which derogation cannot be made under Article 15(2) of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms; or 
(b) be an accumulation of various measures, including violations of
human rights which is sufficiently severe as to affect an individual
in a similar manner as mentioned in (a). 
2. Acts of persecution as qualified in paragraph 1, can inter alia take the
form of: 
(a) acts of physical or mental violence, including acts of sexual violence;
(b) legal, administrative, police, and/or judicial measures which are in
themselves discriminatory or which are implemented in a discrimi-
natory manner;
(c) prosecution or punishment, which is disproportionate or discrimina-
tory;
(d) denial of judicial redress resulting in a disproportionate or discri-
minatory punishment;
(e) prosecution or punishment for refusal to perform military service in
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a conflict, where performing military service would include crimes
or acts falling under the exclusion clauses as set out in Article 12(2);
(f) acts of a gender-specific or child-specific nature.”
Persecution acts are defined as acts that affect the individual in a sufficiently
serious (or severe) 62 way. The required level of seriousness is defined in
Article 9(1)(a) by means of reference to “basic human rights”. Thus, serious
violations of basic human rights are persecution acts. Article 9(1)(b) explicit-
ly accepts persecution on cumulative grounds: acts or measures that taken
alone do not constitute persecution may do so in combination. All this seems
well in line with state practice and academic writing as discussed above.63
[291] An aspect that deserves closer attention is the distinction between
“basic” and other human rights. The distinction has significant legal conse-
quences, as it follows from Article 9(1) that violation of other human rights
than “basic” ones could amount to persecution only in combination with
“other measures”. Article 9(1)(a) specifies that “basic human rights” are “in
particular the rights from which derogation cannot be made under Article
15(2)” ECHR – that is, the right to life, freedom from ill-treatment, slavery
and servitude, and from retroactive criminal liability.64 From a methodological
point of view, interpretation of the term “persecution” by reference to the
European Convention of Human Rights is flawed. The interpretation of the
Refugee Convention by Article 9 QD addresses obligations under general, not
regional international law, binding many states not party to the European
Convention of Human Rights. Interpretation by reference to the Covenant
would have been a more obvious choice. 
For practical purposes, we should observe that the specification suggests
that violations of derogable rights (the second category identified above), such
as the freedom of expression and freedom from arbitrary detention could,
taken separately, not be persecution acts. This would run counter to state prac-
tice. Further, it would be at odds with the context of Article 1 RC, Articles
31(1) and 33(1) RC. For example, well-founded fear of arbitrary detention
would, arguably, constitute a “threat to freedom” as meant in those provisions,
and hence fear of persecution. We may further observe that in contrast to
Article 15(2) ECHR, Article 4 CCPR marks the right to recognition as a per-
son before the law and the freedom of thought, conscience and religion as non-
derogable.65 Hence, not even the full range of rights of the first category iden-
tified above would be “basic” for the purposes of Article 9(1) QD. 
So it seems that Article 9(1)(a) suggests an overly restrictive scope of
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human rights whose violation could, taken separately, amount to persecution.
But by virtue of the term “in particular” the Directive does not impose such a
restriction. We should further observe that instances of persecution acts listed
under Article 9(2), for example, discriminatory legal or administrative mea-
sures (Article 9(2)(b)), do not imply a restriction to the rights mentioned in
Article 15(2) ECHR, or to non-derogable rights. It appears that the reference
to non-derogable rights serves to place beyond doubt that severe violations of
those rights constitute persecution, but does not restrict the scope of “basic
human rights”. 
[292] Among the instances of persecution acts listed in paragraph 9(2), Article
9(2)(e), on persecution by prosecution of draft evaders, is of particular interest,
as state practice varies among Member States.66 According to the UNHCR
Handbook, such prosecution amounts to persecution if the deserter or draft
evader faces disproportionately severe or discriminatory punishment67, if mili-
tary service would require participation in military action contrary to the appli-
cant’s genuine political, religious, moral or conscientious objections.68
Article 9(2)(e) is considerably more restrictive in scope than both the
UNHCR Handbook as well as the practice of some Member States: it addres-
ses only the situation that “performing military service would include crimes
or acts falling under the exclusion clauses”, that is, crimes or acts against
humanity and the like as meant in Article 1F RC.69
In summary, Article 9 QD defines persecution acts as acts that attain a
minimum level of severity. Severe violations of “basic” human rights do so,
violations of other human rights only in combination with other measures. The
category of “basic” human rights encompasses non-derogable rights meant in
Article 15(2) ECHR, but is not restricted to them. The Directive acknowledges
that prosecution of conscientious objectors to military service may constitute
persecution. 
5.4.1.2 Serious harm
[293] The counterpart to “persecution” in the definition of persons eligible for
subsidiary protection is “serious harm as defined in Article 15” of the
Qualification Directive. This provision runs as follows: 
“Serious harm consists of: 
(a) death penalty or execution; or 
(b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an appli-
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cant in his or her country of origin, or in the case of a stateless person,
his or her country of former habitual residence; or 
(c) serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of
indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed
conflict.”
I will subsequently discus all three types.
Article 15(a) QD
[294] It follows from the Preamble to the Qualification Directive that the cri-
teria for recognition of persons as eligible for subsidiary protection “should be
drawn from international obligations drawn from human rights instruments
and practices in Member States”.70 No instrument of international law binding
the Member States explicitly prohibits expulsion in the event of imminent
death penalty or execution, but it may be implicit in Article 1 of the Sixth
Protocol to the ECHR.71 And Article 19(1) Charter prohibits expulsion of a
person to a state where he “would be subjected to the death penalty […]”.72
Article 15(b) QD
[295] The first part of Article 15(b) (“torture or inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment”) is identical to Article 3 ECHR.73 The provision may also
cover “torture” as relevant for the prohibition on expulsion ex Article 3 CAT.
Article 7 CCPR defines ill-treatment in slightly different terms, as it speaks of
subjection to “torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment [emphasis added, HB].”74 If we assume that the provision lists ill treat-
ment in a falling scale of seriousness, acts that qualify as “cruel” treatment or
punishment would also qualify as “inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment.” We may further observe that according to Article 27(1)(c) PD, the safe
third country exception may be applied only when in the third country “the
prohibition on removal in breach of the right to freedom from torture and
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as laid down in international law is
respected [emphasis added, HB]”. This provision acknowledges that imminent
“cruel” treatment may bar expulsion. Hence, Article 15(b) could cover all acts
of harm meant in Article 7 CCPR. 
[296] The second part of Article 15(b) restricts the scope to ill treatment “of
an applicant in his or her country of origin” (emphasis added). Article 2(e) QD
limits the scope to persons running a real risk of serious harm “if returned to
his or her country of origin.” Noll points out that cases where serious harm is
feared after chain expulsion by the country of origin to a third country would
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fall within the scope of Article 2(e), but out of the scope of Article 15(b); as
Article 15(a) nor 15(c) contains a similar geographical limitation, an odd dis-
tinction between these provisions and Article 15(b) results.75
But arguably, the words “in his country of origin” in Article 15(b) do not
serve to restrict the geographical scope, but the substantive scope of the pro-
vision. For present purposes, we should distinguish between two types of cases
where expulsion would be in breach of the prohibitions of refoulement. First,
‘classic’ asylum cases wherein the alien fears torture or inhuman treatment
upon arrival in the country of destination, inflicted by the state or by some
third party. In this type of case, the ill-treatment is the foreseeable conse-
quence of the expulsion, and therefore prohibited,76 but the expulsion itself
does not constitute or attribute to the ill-treatment. Second, “humanitarian
cases” where the act of expulsion does attribute to the liability under Article 3
ECHR, as addressed by the European Court of Human Rights in D v UK.
This judgement concerned expulsion of a convicted drug trafficker to St
Kitts and Nevis, who suffered from AIDS in an advanced stage. Whereas D
received “sophisticated treatment and medication in the United Kingdom, and
the care and kindness of a charitable organisation”, he could not expect due
medical care or “moral or social support” in St Kitts and Nevis.77 According
to the summary of D v UK by the European Court of Human Rights in Henao,
“[a]n abrupt withdrawal of the care facilities provided in the respondent
State together with the predictable lack of adequate facilities as well as of
any form of moral or social support in the receiving country would hasten
the applicant’s death and subject him to acute mental and physical suffering.
In view of those very exceptional circumstances, bearing in mind the criti-
cal stage which the applicant’s fatal illness had reached and given the com-
pelling humanitarian considerations at stake, the implementation of the
decision to remove him to St. Kitts would amount to inhuman treatment by
the respondent State in violation of Article 3.”78
So, the expulsion amounted to “inhuman treatment” because of the combined
effect of the circumstances awaiting the alien in the country of origin and the
“withdrawal” of medical and mental care.
[297] Hence, Article 3 ECHR prohibits expulsion not only in the case that the
alien runs a real risk of being subjected to ill-treatment upon expulsion in the
receiving country, but also in case the combined effect of exposure to suffering
in the receiving state and withdrawal of care by the act of expulsion amounts
to ill-treatment. Article 2(e) QD might encompass both types of prohibited
expulsion. The requirement in Article 15(b) QD that the ill-treatment occur
236 Chapter 5
“in” the country of origin however excludes “humanitarian grounds” cases
from the scope of subsidiary protection. It appears from the legislative histo-
ry of the Qualification Directive that exclusion of those cases was indeed the
purpose of the second part of Article 15(b),79 and that Preamble (9) QD origi-
nally had the purpose to sustain this reading: 
“[…] third country nationals or stateless persons, who are allowed to
remain in the territories of the Member States for reasons not due to a need
for international protection but on a discretionary basis on compassionate
or humanitarian grounds, fall outside the scope of this Directive”.80
Thus, Article 15(b) addresses harm as meant in Articles 3 CAT, 7 CCPR and
3 ECHR, with the exception of harm in “humanitarian” cases like D v UK.
This still leaves the matter of the geographical scope of Article 15(b) to
decide. As stated above, the terms “in the country of origin” (or former habi-
tual residence) serve to exclude “compassionate grounds” cases, not to restrict
the geographical scope as defined in Article 2(e) QD. This explains why nei-
ther Article 15(a) nor Article 15(c) contains a similar clause. The imposition
of the death penalty (Article 15(a)), or the exposure to a threat to indiscrimi-
nate violence (Article 15(c)) can occur only within the receiving state, and
Member States cannot incur on such grounds the type of liability accepted in
D v UK. Consequently, the geographical scope as defined in Article 2(e)
applies to all sub-paragraphs of Article 15, hence cases where ill-treatment
would be faced after expulsion from the country of origin are covered by
Article 15(b) QD as well. We may read the term “in the country of origin” in
Article 15(b) as “by an actor in the territories of a receiving state upon expul-
sion to the country of origin”.
Article 15(c) QD
[298] The third type of serious harm is “serious and individual threat to a civi-
lian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of inter-
national or internal armed conflict.” In order to have any meaning next to
Article 15(a) and (b), it must have a different scope. What scope exactly, is not
clear at first sight. Below, I will first argue that Article 15(c) does not address
other types of harm than Article 15(a) or (b) QD. Then, I will argue that the pro-
vision in fact modifies the risk criterion applicable in the situation it addresses. 
Article 15(c): type of harm
[299] The scopes of Article 15(a) and (b) differ as to the nature of the harm
addressed (death penalty and execution in the first, and torture or inhuman
treatment or punishment in the second provision). Article 15(c) addresses
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“threat to life or person”. “Life” is pretty much covered by Article 15(a),
though there is room to argue that expulsion cases engaging the Member
States’ responsibility under Article 2 ECHR could cover issues outside the
scope of Article 15(a), in case the threat to life is not due to execution or death
penalty, but stems from a government controlled death squad or from a third
party. But the practical meaning of Article 2 next to Article 3 ECHR is negli-
gible. In all expulsion cases wherein Article 2 was invoked, the European
Court of Human Rights ruled that responsibility under the provision raised no
separate issue next to Article 3 ECHR. 
That leaves us the “threat to person”, a somewhat imprecise term. If we
understand “person” as physical integrity, this element is covered by Article
15(b) to a large extent. If “person” should be attributed the meaning of “perso-
nal” (as opposed to physical) integrity, Article 15(c) would potentially cover
any violation of any human right, which would be an unreasonable interpreta-
tion. 
[300] Relevant rules of international law may shed more light on the issue. The
phrase “violence to life or person” occurs in Common Article 3 of the 1949
Conventions. It has indeed been argued in scholarly literature that these instru-
ments implicitly prohibit refoulement, but this view is not generally accepted.81
Still, it might be relevant for interpretation of Article 15(c);82 one of the draft
versions explicitly referred to the instrument.83 Common Article 3 concerns
situations of “armed conflict not of an international character”. As to
“[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities”, 
“the following acts are and shall remain prohibited […]: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without pre-
vious judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court […]”.
The provision hence addresses situations in the receiving state not dissimilar
to those envisaged by Article 15(c): civilians caught in armed conflict, fearing
attacks on “life and person”. But if anything, Common Article 3 of the 1949
Conventions suggests that “life and person” have a considerably narrower
scope than Article 15(a) and (b), as “humiliating and degrading treatment”
appears not to be covered by “life and person” in Common Article 3 (as it is
separately mentioned under c). In sum, a reading in the light of Common
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Article 3 does not yield a scope of Article 15(c) QD that does not fall within
those of Articles 15(a) and (b). 
[301] The Explanations to the draft of Article 15(c) as it was ultimately adop-
ted offer yet another explanation for the added value of Article 15(c) next to
paragraphs (b) and (c). They state that situations of indiscriminate violence
and systematic human rights violations cannot count as “treatment” in the
sense of Article 15(b) (or death penalty or execution in the sense of Article
15(a)).84 Hence, Article 15(c) would differ from (b) as to the nature of the
harmful act. However, there is no reason to assume that Article 3 ECHR
(whereon Article 15(b) is based, as we saw above) does not cover violence of
indiscriminate nature. It is true that according to the case law of the European
Court of Human Rights, only intentionally inflicted harm may amount to
degrading or inhuman treatment or torture.85 This “intention” serves to distin-
guish ill-treatment from, say, ecological disasters (that cause the same degree
of suffering as implied by ill-treatment). But the term “treatment” does not
imply any degree of individualisation. If a state party to the European
Convention engages in the random bombing of its citizens, it would surely be
liable for ill-treating them. Obviously, systematic human rights violations or
indiscriminate violence in armed conflicts abroad are in themselves not
enough to bar expulsion, but the reason is not that it concerns types of harm
outside the scope of the treatment. Rather, this is due to the real risk criterion,
applicable in expulsion cases.86 Hence, the intentional nature of “ill-treatment”
does not explain the additional value of Article 15(c) next to Article 15(b) QD. 
Article 15(c) QD: “serious and individual threat”
[302] The emphasis in the Explanations placed on the indiscriminate nature of
the harm offers a clue: it indicates that Article 15(c) in fact modifies the appli-
cable risk criterion. This reading is strongly endorsed by the words “serious
and individual threat” in Article 15(c), which address the assessment of risk.
Read in conjunction with the definition of persons eligible for subsidiary pro-
tection (Article 2(e) QD, quoted under number [275]), Article 15(c) provides
that a third country national qualifies for subsidiary protection if there are sub-
stantial grounds for believing that upon return, that person would face a real
risk of a serious and individual threat to life or person. The difference between
this criterion and the “real risk” standard applicable to Article 15(a) and (b)
QD would then be that the former demands not a real risk of ill-treatment, but
a real risk of a threat of ill-treatment – provided that the risk is the result of
indiscriminate violence.87 Arguably, then, in case of indiscriminate violence a
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lesser degree of individualised risk is required in order to qualify for protec-
tion, than in case of death penalty or ill-treatment. 
[303] An argument against this reading of Article 15(c) is the heading to the
provision: “serious harm”, not “risk”. However, provisions that elaborate on
the requirements for qualification for subsidiary protection do not neatly dis-
tinguish between the elements of the definition of persons eligible for sub-
sidiary protection. For example, Article 6 QD defines actors of harm, i.e. the
second element, partially by reference to Article 7 QD, on the actors of pro-
tection, the fourth element of the definition (see par. 5.4.3 below). According
to Preamble recital (26), 
“[r]isks to which a population of a country or a section of the population is
generally exposed do normally not create in themselves an individual
threat which would qualify as serious harm.”
So certain “risks” do “normally not create” (but, it appears, exceptionally might)
a “threat” that is “harm” – a somewhat confused statement, that if anything gives
further evidence of just how much risk and harm are conflated in Article 15(c).
Moreover, it is hard to see what meaning the terms “serious and individual
threat” could possibly have, other than a specification of the risk standard. 
Obviously, the proposed reading also puts some strain on the definition of
the term “individual” as employed in Article 15(c), which strain is repeated by
the quoted Preamble recital. This strain is however inherent in the provision,
juxtaposing the “individual” character of the threat and the “indiscriminate”
nature of the harm. Hence, any reading of the provision would be at odds with
one of both elements. The one proposed here has the advantage that it gives
Article 15(c) substantial meaning next to Article 15(a) and (b) – which result
could not be achieved if the usual risk criterion applied, thus the “individual”
character were stressed.
[304] Another objection might be that the proposed reading stretches the
scope of persons protected under Article 15 beyond the scope of persons that
fall under Article 3 ECHR and the other prohibitions of refoulement. But there
is no reason to assume that Qualification Directive rules are necessarily
restricted to approximation of domestic law within the ambit of the Member
States’ international obligations. The legal basis for Community rules on qual-
ification for subsidiary protection, Article 63(2)(a) TEC, does not imply so
(see number [195]). It is true that Preamble recital (9) states that 
“third country nationals or stateless persons, who are allowed to remain in
the territories of the Member States for reasons not due to a need for inter-
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national protection but on a discretionary basis on compassionate or
humanitarian grounds, fall outside the scope of this Directive.”88
But we should observe that this statement does not address all forms of pro-
tection granted on a discretionary basis – only protection “on compassionate
or humanitarian grounds”. This subject matter is addressed specifically in
Article 15(b) QD (see number [297]). Confirmation of the view that the per-
sonal scope of subsidiary protection may exceed the scope delimited by inter-
national law comes from Preamble recital (25) QD, which states that 
“criteria on the basis of which applicants for international protection are to
be recognised as eligible for subsidiary protection […] should be drawn
from international obligations under human rights instruments and prac-
tices existing in Member States [emphasis added, HB].” 
And it appears that most Member States do grant some form of protection to
victims of generalised violence.89
Serious harm: assessment
[305] If all this is correct, Article 15 QD amounts to the following. Article
15(a) prohibits expulsion in case of a real risk of death penalty or execution.
The real risk criterion can and does apply; the death penalty presupposes that
the victim has been identified, hence the required degree of individualisation
is by definition met. Article 15(b) addresses cases of real risk of harm to
physical integrity upon expulsion. The real risk criterion in effect entails a cer-
tain degree of individualisation. Only if the risk of harm to life or person is
due to “indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed
conflicts”, does the criterion of a “real risk of a serious and individual threat”
apply, as in such situations the real risk criterion cannot be possibly met
(Article 15(c) QD). This lowered risk standard does not altogether do away
with the requirement of individualisation. This follows from the term “indivi-
dual threat”. We saw that according to Preamble recital (26), risks to which the
population at large is “generally exposed” do not “normally”, “in themselves”
create an individual threat for the purposes of Article 15(c). A certain degree
of individualisation is therefore required under Article 15(c), that is, “normal-
ly”- which implies that in exceptional circumstances, a serious threat to life or
person for reason of indiscriminate violence would do. 
5.4.1.3 Temporary protection
[306] Article 2(c) of the Temporary Protection Directive specifies two types of
241Qualification 
harm: (i) “armed conflict or endemic violence” and (ii) persons “at serious
risk or who have been the victims of systematic or generalised violations of
human rights”. As the occurrence of a mass influx of displaced persons is
established by Council decision, it is up to the Council to decide whether the
situation in a certain region or for a certain group of person amounts to these
types of harm. 
The Temporary protection Directive does not oblige the Council to specify
which of the grounds mentioned in Article 2(c) applies.90 Such an indication
however would be relevant for applications for subsidiary protection on the
ground of Article 15(c) QD by (former) temporary protection beneficiaries. If
the temporary protection was introduced on the second ground, it has been
established by the concerned Council decision that the (former) temporary
protection beneficiaries run a “serious risk” of those violations. If those vio-
lations occurred in situations of armed conflict (as usually will be the situa-
tion), the threat will concern life or person. Hence, the concerned persons
would only have to prove that the (already established) “serious risk” (cf.
Article 2(c)(ii) TPD) amounts to a “serious and individual threat” in order to
fulfil the requirements of Article 15(c) QD. If on the other hand the temporary
protection was introduced on the first ground, the Council decision contributes
little to proving the “serious and individual threat to life or person”. 
5.4.1.4 Comparison
[307] When comparing the definitions of harmful acts that may give rise to
refugee, subsidiary or temporary protection, we may observe that latter cate-
gory is the broadest: all violations of human rights may give rise to the tem-
porary protection regime. On the other hand, only “sufficiently serious”
infringements on human rights are “persecution acts”. The range of acts that
may qualify as “serious harm” for the purposes of subsidiary protection
appears even smaller. In this respect, the scope of subsidiary protection is
hence smaller than the scope of refugee protection under the CEAS.
Arguably, Article 15(c) QD addresses not only the nature of the harm, but
the applicable risk criterion as well – under the provision, a “serious threat” is
required. As argued above, this criterion is more lenient than the “real risk”
criterion. As far as Article 4 QD states identical rules on the “well-founded
fear” and “real risk criterion”, these are identical. It would therefore seem that
the “serious threat” criterion is more lenient than the “well-founded fear” cri-
terion as well. But as the Qualification Directive does not elaborate upon the
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level of risk required on the latter standard, no definite conclusion can be
drawn. 
5.4.2 Actors of harm 
[308] Article 6 QD addresses the issue of agents of persecution or serious
harm for both refugee and subsidiary protection. The matter is of great impor-
tance, as state practice in the European Union on this point diverges, with sig-
nificant consequences for numbers of recognised refugees and persons other-
wise in need of protection. I will first discuss relevant international law, and
then address the rules laid down in Article 6 QD. Temporary protection will be
briefly addressed under number [323].
Actors of persecution or serious harm: international law
[309] On the matter of agents of persecution, two views can be distinguished.
According to the “accountability view”, only actions for which the state can
be held accountable can be harmful acts. According to another view, the ques-
tion of whether or not the action can be accounted to the state is immaterial;
the relevant question is whether the persons involved are effectively protected
against human right violations (the “protection view”). In both views, actions
(1) committed or (2) condoned by state organs or (3) by a de facto authority
may be harm, but actions committed by a third party (which is not a de facto
authority) where (4) the state (or the de facto authority) is unable to offer pro-
tection or (5) there is no state (or de facto authority), can constitute serious and
unjustified harm according to the protection view, but not so according to the
accountability view.91
[310] The protection view fits in with Article 1A(2) RC far better than the
accountability view. The provision speaks of an individual who “is unable or,
owing to such [well-founded] fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection
of that country” (i.e. the country of origin, or of former habitual residence).
Noll observes that Article 1A(2) RC distinguishes two categories of refugees,
as far as protection is concerned, namely the refugee “unable […] to avail him-
self of the protection of that country” (i.e. the country of origin), and the
refugee “owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself ” of that protection.92
The distinction makes sense if the second category concerns those persecuted
by the country: they are able to get protection but unwilling, as the protector
is also the persecutor. The first category then concerns the situation where no
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protection is available – either because the country is not able to afford it, or
because no state exists. 
Hence, all five situations identified above seem to be covered by the pro-
vision. This reading is reinforced by Article 31(1) RC, which speaks of
refugees coming “from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened
in the sense of Article 1” (emphasis added), hence refugees fleeing a territo-
ry, not a country.93 Further, Noll observes that in the Refugee Convention,
limitations to the protective scope are made in an explicit manner; hence, the
absence of an explicit restriction of persecution acts to state acts warrants the
extensive reading. Finally, the purpose of the instrument endorses an extensive
reading.94
[311] As to the prohibitions of refoulement, for the purposes of Article 3
ECHR, the identity of the agent of harm is immaterial, as the provision pro-
hibits any action which has as a direct and foreseeable consequence that the
individual will be subjected to ill-treatment.95 In expulsion cases, the European
Court of Human Rights indeed consistently speaks of the risk of being sub-
jected to ill treatment “in the receiving country” (emphasis added),96 not “by”
that country. In D v UK, the Court stated that the prohibition on expulsion
applies both when the ill-treatment “emanates from […] acts from the public
authorities in the receiving country”, as well as when it emanates “from non
state-bodies in that country when the authorities are unable to afford appropri-
ate protection.”97 The latter holds true both when there is a state willing to pro-
tect, but unable to control the non-state actor,98 as well as when there is no
state.99 Thus, all five situations identified above fall within the ambit of the
prohibition.
Article 3 CAT cannot address harm inflicted by non-state agents, as Article
1 of the Convention Against Torture defines “torture” as a type of harm
“inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” Accordingly, the
Committee against Torture has stated that
“the issue of whether the State party has an obligation to refrain from
expelling a person who might risk pain or suffering inflicted by a non-
governmental entity, without the consent or acquiescence of the
Government, falls outside the scope of Article 3 of the Convention.”100
Thus, only situations (1) and (2) fall within the scope of Article 3 CAT. 
As far as I know the Human Rights Committee has never addressed the
issue. Arguably, the reasoning on Article 3 ECHR would apply to Article 7
CCPR as well.
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[312] Hence, all five situations mentioned under number [309] are covered by
both the Refugee Convention and the prohibition on exposure to ill-treatment
ex Article 3 ECHR; the first and second situations may also fall within the
scope of Article 3 CAT. 
It was already noted that state practice on the matter of agents of persecu-
tion and harm diverges among the Member States. As far as the application of
the Refugee Convention is concerned, seven Member States (Austria, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) hold the accountability view. The
protection view is held by eight States (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom).101 In
Germany, the interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights is not fol-
lowed on this point.102
Actors of harm: the Directive
[313] According to Article 6 QD,
“Actors of persecution or serious harm include:
(a) the State; 
(b) parties or organisations controlling the State or a substantial part of the
territory of the State;
(c) non-State actors, if it can be demonstrated that the actors mentioned
under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), including international organisa-
tions, are unable or unwilling to provide protection as defined in article
7 against persecution or serious harm”. 
The provision covers actions committed (Article 6(a)) or condoned by the
state (Article 6(c)), or committed (Article 6(b)) or condoned (Article 6(c)) by
a de facto authority as well as the situation that the acts are committed by a
third party (which is not a de facto authority) where the state is unable to offer
protection (Article 6(c)). Hence, the provision covers the first four situations
mentioned under number [309],103 but it is unclear from the text of Article 6
QD whether the fifth situation, harm by a third party in a situation of total
chaos, is also addressed. Article 6(c) can be read as presupposing the presence
of a state or a de facto state as defined under (b), but one can also say that only
a demonstration of inability to afford protection is required, which is esta-
blished also if there is no agent of protection. 
We should observe, however, that Article 2(c) QD (the Directive refugee
definition) faithfully reproduces (as far as is relevant here) the text of Article
1A(2) RC. The reasoning on the relevant phrase in Article 1A(2) RC applies
by analogy; and this reasoning favours the second reading. Article 2(e) QD
speaks of a person who, “if returned to his country of origin […] would face
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a real risk of suffering serious harm as defined in Article 15”, which provision
defines such harm, as far as is relevant for present purposes, as ill-treatment
“in the country of origin”. A reading in accordance with Article 3 ECHR
implies that in all five situations a person could qualify for subsidiary protec-
tion. 
Incidentally, even if the narrow reading should prevail, the provision does
not exclude that persecution acts may be committed in a situation of total
chaos: according to the first clause of Article 6, the actors of harm “include”
the listed entities.104
Hence, Article 6 QD reflects the “protection view”, in accordance with the
Refugee Convention and Article 3 ECHR. The arrangement is important for
approximation of asylum practices in the Member States. Still, the arrange-
ment is unsatisfactory from the point of view of international law, as the refe-
rence to Article 7 transposes the flaws of the latter provision to the issue of
agents of persecution or serious harm, to which I will now turn.
5.4.3 Protection and actors of protection
For both refugee as well as subsidiary protection, Article 7(2) QD addresses
the concept of protection, Article 7(1) actors of protection, and Article 8 QD
internal protection (protection within the country of origin) specifically. I will
address these three issues below. 
Protection
[314] According to Article 7(2) QD,
“Protection is generally provided when the actors mentioned in paragraph
1 take reasonable steps to prevent the persecution or suffering of serious
harm inter alia by operating an effective legal system for the detection,
prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution or serious
harm, and the applicant has access to such protection.” 
It follows from Article 7(2) that protection is “generally” provided for if two
conditions are met: (1) the actors of protection take “reasonable steps” to pre-
vent the harm from occurring, “inter alia by operating an effective legal sys-
tem” addressing the harmful acts, and (2) the applicant has access to this pro-
tection. In this context, Annex II to the Procedures Directive is relevant. This
Annex addresses the “safety” and hence presence of protection in the context
of the “safe third country of origin concept” (see further paragraph 6.4.5). It
states that relevant factors for determining whether or not a country of origin
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is “safe”, are the “laws and regulations of the country of origin and the man-
ner in which they are applied”, and whether “provision for a system of effec-
tive remedies against violations of ” the rights and freedoms set out in the
ECHR, “and/or” the CCPR “and/or” the CAT – “in particular”, Article 15(2)
ECHR is made.
[315] The term “reasonable steps” in Article 7(2) QD is troublesome, as it
seems to focus on the willingness rather than the ability to offer protection,
implying that there is “protection” if the actor of protection is willing, though
not (fully) able to afford it.105 Moreover, the term “reasonable” suggests an
amount of discretion on behalf of the examiner that is at odds with the
Refugee Convention as well as with the prohibitions of refoulement. But the
only possible standard for “protection” is that it reduces the risk below the
level of well-founded fear or real risk - 106 either protection is available, or it is
not. 
But on closer look, the arrangement seems to be in accordance with rele-
vant international law. Article 7(2) states that one of the “reasonable steps”
that the actor must (“inter alia”) take, is the operating of an “effective legal
system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts” (emphasis
added) of persecution or serious harm. Arguably, it follows from the effective-
ness requirement that not (merely) willingness, but also ability to afford pro-
tection is necessary to qualify as an actor of protection. And according to
Article 8(1) QD, internal “protection” is provided for only when “there is no
well-founded fear of being persecuted or no real risk of suffering serious
harm” (see further number [321] below). Arguably, it follows that the Member
States may assume that an actor provides for “protection” only when this pro-
tection is effective to the extent that it precludes the fear or risk from being
well-founded or real. Importantly, the term “generally” indicates that the
assumption that protection is provided for by some actor of protection (which
assumption may be based on the law and regulations of the country, and so
on), is open to rebuttal. As to the access to protection, the Directive requires
that the applicant “has” access (Article 7(2) QD), not, that he previously has
had an opportunity to get access to it. This is in line with the forward-looking
nature of recognition as a refugee. 
Agents of protection
[316] According to Article 7(1) QD, not only states, but also “parties or
organisations, including international organisations, controlling the State or a
substantial part of the territory of the State” may offer “protection”. The latter
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category qualifies as an actor of protection if it “controls” the state or “a sub-
stantial part” of its territory. It follows from the Preamble that “a substantial
part” should be read as “a region or a larger area within the territory of the
state”.107 Further “guidance” on the assessment of “whether an international
organisation controls a State or a substantial part of its territory and provides
protection” can be provided in Council acts that the Member States “shall”
(not may) “take into account”.108 Could such alternative sources provide for
protection as required by international asylum law?
Articles 2(c) and 2(e) QD speak of “protection by that country” (i.e. the
country of origin), following Article 1A(2) RC that speaks of “protection of
that country”. Hathaway suggests that “country” means “state”, pointing to the
nature of Convention protection as a substitute for protection by the state of
nationality (or former habitual residence).109 But one could argue that the same
purpose is met if the protection is effective, no matter the identity of the entity
affording it. It follows from Article 1D RC that the United Nations are a viable
source of “protection or assistance” for the purposes of Article 1 RC (see num-
ber [344]). On the other hand, one may doubt whether protection by an inter-
national organisation could ever be sufficiently comprehensive and enduring
for the purposes of Article 1A(2) RC, as defined in Article 7(2) QD. Moreover,
such a reading renders the element “of that country” in Article 1A(2) RC
redundant – an unreasonable interpretation.110
Thus, the actor of protection must qualify as “country” for the purposes of
Article 1A(2) RC. According to its ordinary meaning, “country” does not or
not necessarily mean “state”.111 But the language “country of his nationality”
employed in the same provision strongly implies that “country” simply means
“state”. That Article 1A(2) does not apply the term “state” is in itself no indi-
cation.112 But importantly, the Refugee Convention employs the term “territo-
ry” where a geographical designation in contrast to the institutional entity
“country” is meant.113 If the effective protection approach as sketched above
were intended, the term “protection within the territory of that country” would
arguably have been used. Hence, “country” in Article 1A(2) RC means
“state”. “Parties” cannot qualify as such - let alone “international organisa-
tions”. 
Could parties or international organisations provide for protection from
torture or ill-treatment for the purposes of the prohibition of refoulement ex
Article 3 ECHR? In the judgement H.L.R. v France, the European Court of
Human Rights ruled that Article 3 ECHR prohibits expulsion in case of real
risk of ill-treatment by third parties if it has been shown “that the authorities
of the receiving State are not able to obviate the risk by providing appropriate
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protection”.114 Arguably, it follows that only “the authorities of the Receiving
State” can offer “appropriate protection”. The Court touched upon the issue
sideways again in the admissibility decision Muratovic, wherein the applicant
alleged that the UN agency UNMIK was not “able to provide for minority
groups the protection required”.115 The Court did not state that UNMIK’s role
could not be relevant for the purposes of Article 3 ECHR. It declared the
appeal inadmissible when it found that UNMIK would object to the return
after an “individualised screening process”, that apparently addressed at any
rate “violence and crimes against minorities”. It would follow that if UNMIK
considers itself incapable of offering protection from such violence, there
would not be protection relevant for the purposes of Article 3 ECHR. But it
does not necessarily follow that the European Court deemed UNMIK capable
of offering protection from ill-treatment, as it concerned a “humanitarian
case”,116 and hence not a risk of ill-treatment by some party in Kosovo. As
Muratovic therefore does not allow for any definite conclusions, we may cau-
tiously assume on the basis of H.L.R. that only authorities of the receiving
state are capable of offering protection from ill-treatment by third parties for
the purposes of Article 3 ECHR. Application of Article 7(1) first clause and
(b) QD would therefore be at variance with the Refugee Convention as well as
the European Convention of Human Rights. 
The internal protection alternative: international law
[317] Article 8 QD addresses the assessment of the “internal protection” alter-
native for both refugee and subsidiary protection status. I will first discuss
relevant international law, and than the Directive provision.
According to Article 1A(2) RC, only persons who are unable or owing to
well-founded fear unwilling to avail themselves of “protection” by the country
origin can qualify for refugee status. Thus, if protection by that country is avai-
lable, albeit only in part of that territory, the definition is not fulfilled. Hence,
the internal protection alternative finds a basis in the “protection” element of
the refugee definition.117 Importantly, this particular basis does affect the
assessment of the internal protection: once an applicant has established that he
has well-founded fear of persecution and protection from the country is not
available in one area, this fear is not removed or otherwise affected by the fin-
ding that protection is available for him elsewhere in that country. Thus, the
assessment of the internal protection alternative takes place against the back-
ground of established well-founded fear of being persecuted in one part of the
country of origin118 (or, arguably, if such fear is assumed to be well-founded). 
Hathaway and Forster identify four conditions that the alternative should
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meet.119 First, the relevant area must be accessible for the applicant; otherwise,
protection is not “available”, as required by Article 1A(2) RC. Second, “there
must be reason to believe that the reach of the agent of persecution is likely to
remain outside” the relevant area.120 Thus, if the applicant fled a persecutor in
one part of the country and has well-founded fear of being persecuted by the
same agent in the “internal protection” area, “protection” is not available.
Third, there must be no new risk of persecution, of persecution by another
agent than the one the applicant had fled. All three requirements follow direct-
ly from Article 1A(2) RC.
[318] Fourthly, so Hathaway and Foster state, the alternative “protection”
should exceed protection from persecution. The “notion of ‘protection’ clear-
ly implies some affirmative defence or safeguard”, they argue, and this also
follows from the Preamble, which states as one of the aims of the Convention
“to revise and consolidate previous international agreements relating to the
status of refugees and to extend the scope of and protection accorded by such
instruments by means of a new agreement”, that protection “includes the legal
rights of the kind stipulated in the Convention itself ”.121 As a consequence,
“protection” is not available if the Convention benefits are not safeguarded in
the internal protection alternative. 
But why would “protection” in Article 1A(2) RC, understood as “an affir-
mative defence or safeguard”, address benefits like those laid down in Article
2-34 RC? In other contexts than the assessment of the internal protection alter-
native, “protection” means “protection from persecution”, that is, from serious
violations of basic human rights. Most Refugee Convention benefits are eco-
nomic and cultural rights, whose violation in principle does not constitute a
persecution act for the purposes of Article 1A(2) RC (see number [289]). The
assumption that in the context of assessment of the internal protection alterna-
tive “protection” includes safeguarding Convention benefits entails that the
term has two meanings – prima facie, an unreasonable result. And why would
the ‘broad’ reading of “protection” apply only to the internal protection issue?
We may further observe that the Preamble recital (quoted above) refers to
“protection” offered by host states, hence (a sort of) asylum, not to “protec-
tion” in Article 1A(2) RC. Application of its meaning to Article 1A(2) RC
would run counter to its object and purpose. For these reasons, I think that the
Refugee Convention does not require that the alternative protection should
safeguard the benefits laid down in Articles 2-34 RC. In the context of the
internal protection alternative, as in any other context, “protection” means
protection from being persecuted. 
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[319] The approach to the “internal protection” alternative by the European
Court of Human Rights appears to be in line with the one advocated by
Hathaway and Foster to a fair extent. In Hilal, it considered whether (main-
land) Tanzania constituted a “reliable guarantee against ill-treatment” that
Hilal feared from actors of harm from Zanzibar, an autonomous part of the
United Republic of Tanzania: 
“[…] the situation in mainland Tanzania is far from satisfactory and dis-
closes a long-term, endemic situation of human rights problems. Reports
refer in general terms to police in Tanzania ill-treating and beating
detainees […] and to members of the Zanzibari CCM [the agent of serious
harm in Hilal’s case, HB] visiting the mainland to harass CUF supporters
[like Hilal, HB] sheltering there […]. Conditions in the prisons on the
mainland are described as inhuman and degrading, with inadequate food
and medical treatment leading to life-threatening conditions […]. The
police in mainland Tanzania may be regarded as linked institutionally to the
police in Zanzibar as part of the Union and cannot be relied on as a safe-
guard against arbitrary action […]. There is also the possibility of extra-
dition between Tanzania and Zanzibar […]”.122
Both the second as well as the third condition identified by Hathaway and
Foster figure in this consideration: the possibility that the agents of harm from
Zanzibar could track Hilal, and the chance of ill treatment by mainland
Tanzanian authorities. In Chahal, the Court applied the same approach.123
There is no reason to assume that the reference to “human right problems” (in
the first clause of the quotation above) implies that violations of human rights
other than ill-treatment are relevant for assessing the safety of the protection
alternative: the Court explicitly focuses on “torture” and “inhuman and
degrading treatment”.124 The first condition that Hathaway and Foster mention,
access, is not addressed in either judgement, but neither Hilal nor Chahal had
brought up the matter. Arguably, protection by an internal alternative is not
“effective” for the purposes of the prohibition on refoulement ex Article 3
ECHR if access is not secured. 
In summary, the Refugee Convention as well as Article 3 ECHR allows for
application of the internal protection alternative, provided that three condi-
tions are met. First, the alternative must be accessible. Second, the applicant
should be safe there from well-founded fear of persecution and real risk of
serious harm from the agent of persecution or serious harm who threatens him
elsewhere in the country. Third, there must be no well-founded fear of perse-
cution or real risk of serious harm from another agent.125
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Internal protection: the Qualification Directive
[320] According to it’s heading, Article 8 QD specifically addresses “internal
protection”. We may assume that the rules on protection at large laid down in
Article 7 QD also apply. Article 8 QD hence serves to state that Member
States “may” (not must) examine the availability of an internal protection
alternative as part of the examination of the need for refugee or subsidiary pro-
tection status, and further lays down some special rules on this examination,
which must be read in conjunction with Article 7 QD. For the purposes of the
Directive, internal protection may be offered not only by the state but also by
parties, organisations and international organisations “controlling a substan-
tial part of the territory of the state” (cf. Article 7(1) QD). It was observed that
this regulation runs counter to both the Refugee Convention as well as to
Article 3 ECHR (in number [316]).
[321] As to the content of internal protection, Article 8(1) QD126 states two
conditions: (1) in a part of the country there is no well-founded fear of perse-
cution or no real risk of suffering serious harm and (2), the applicant can be
“reasonably expected to stay” there. Read in conjunction with Article 7(2) QD,
the latter requirement is met only if an effective legal system as meant in that
provision is in force. The first requirement effectively renders both the second
as well as the third condition flowing from international law – safety from the
agent of harm previously fled, and no alternative source of well-founded fear
or real risk. As to the first requirement from international law, “access”,
Article 7(2) QD requires that the applicant “has access”. However, it follows
from Article 8(3) QD that the request for refugee or subsidiary protection
“may” (not must) be turned down because availability of an internal protection
alternative applies “notwithstanding technical obstacles to returning to the
country of origin”. If there are technical obstacles to returning, the individual
is unable to avail himself of the internal protection. Turning down the request
on this ground is therefore at odds with Article 1A(2) RC, 127 and inconsistent
with Articles 2(c) and (e) QD. 
[322] As to the procedural aspects, we may observe that Article 8 QD does not
require that the availability of internal protection is addressed until after
assessment of the well-founded fear or real risk of the harm the individual fled
from. But the requirement that the individual should be out of reach of the
actor of that harm means that no meaningful assessment of the internal pro-
tection can be made without previous assessment of that well-founded fear or
real risk. Further, Article 8(2) states that 
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“In examining whether a part of the country of origin is in accordance with
paragraph 1, Member States shall at the time of taking the decision on the
application have regard to the general circumstances prevailing in that part
of the country and to the personal circumstances of the applicant.”
This paragraph makes explicit that two rules laid down in Article 4(3)(a) and
(c) QD (cf. number [282] above) also apply as to the assessment of the inter-
national protection alternative. First, the relevant moment of assessment is the
present. It is therefore irrelevant whether the individual could have acquired
access to the internal protection area before his entry into the European Union.
Second, safety in general in some area is not enough for application of the pro-
vision; the individual’s circumstances must be taken into account to assess
whether he has well-founded fear of being persecuted or runs a real risk of
serious harm (cf. Article 8(1) QD). Both rules are in line with international
law.128
Temporary protection
[323] The Temporary Protection Directive does not contain any restriction as
to the identity of the actor of harm. Article 2(c) of the Temporary Protection
Directive gives a material definition of protection, speaking of the inability of
displaced persons “to return in safe and durable conditions because of the situ-
ation prevailing in that country.” This open definition allows the Council to
install temporary protection regardless of the identity of the agent of harm or
protection. 
The Council decision installing temporary protection necessarily addresses
the internal protection alternative, as this protection applies to displaced per-
sons “who come from a specific country or geographical area”.129 If the pro-
tection applies to a group of persons “from a specific country”, no internal
protection alternative is (apparently) available; if it applies to a group of per-
sons from a specific area, other areas of the country are by implication an
internal protection alternative. 
Conclusions
[324] It follows from Article 7(2) QD that “protection” is afforded only when
it is effective to the extent that it precludes the fear or risk from being well-
founded or real, and that the applicant must still have access to this protection.
This is in accordance with relevant international law.
According to Article 7 QD, protection can be offered by states, by “parties”
and by “international organisations”. For the purposes of Article 1A(2) RC,
only states can offer protection; the same holds true for Article 3 ECHR. The
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latter view is reflected in the definitions of both refugees and of persons eli-
gible for subsidiary protection – both speak of protection “by that country”.
Hence, the overly wide definition of agents of protection in Article 7 is at odds
with international law, and with Article 2(c) and (e) QD too. 
The Refugee Convention and Article 3 ECHR set three conditions on the
application of the internal protection alternative: the individual should have
access to the relevant area, he should be safe there from the agent of persecu-
tion or serious harm he fled, and there should be no new source of persecution
or serious harm. The rules in Article 8 read in conjunction with7 QD are in
accordance with the second and third conditions, but Article 8(3) QD is at
variance with the first one. Article 8 QD further confirms that a general
assumption is not enough – the personal circumstances should be taken into
account, as they are at the time of making the decision. Application of the
internal protection alternative concept is not obligatory.
5.4.4 The Convention grounds
Element [2c], the Convention grounds, appears in the refugee definition only.
Here, two issues will be addressed. First, the grounds themselves, addressed
in Article 10 QD. The discussion below is largely focused on one reason whose
elaboration in the Qualification Directive raises most interest, “membership of
a particular social group”. Second, I address the “causal link”. Article 9(3) QD
requires that the persecution act be committed for the reasons set out in the
refugee definition, thus denying the relevance of those reasons for the absence
of protection. 
The grounds
[325] Article 10 addresses the “reasons of persecution” that figure in the
refugee definition - “race, religion, nationality, political opinion or member-
ship of a particular social group” (cf. Article 2(c) QD). The provision gives no
exhaustive regulation, but lists “elements” that the Member States “shall take
into account when assessing the reasons for persecution” (Article 10(1)).
According to Article 10(2): 
“When assessing if an applicant has a well-founded fear of being persecu-
ted it is immaterial whether the applicant actually possesses the racial, reli-
gious, national, social or political characteristic which attracts the persecu-
tion, provided that such a characteristic is attributed to the applicant by the
actor of persecution”. 130
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Thus, it is immaterial whether the applicant actually holds the opinion or not,
if the opinion is imputed to him. Nor does the Directive require a form of
intent on behalf of the persecutor, which is in line with the Refugee
Convention.131
On whom lies the burden of substantiating that a Convention ground
applies? According to the UNHCR Handbook, 
“it is for the examiner […] to ascertain the reason or reasons for the perse-
cution feared and to decide whether the definition in the [Refugee
Convention] is met with in this respect.”132
The Directive does not explicitly address the matter. But we may observe that
Article 4(1) and (2) QD distinguish between the applicant’s duty to submit rele-
vant elements, including “the reasons for applying”, and the Member State’s
duty to assess these elements, in “cooperation with the applicant”. The
Convention grounds are not among the reasons for applying – an applicant
seeks protection because of fear of being persecuted, irrespective of the reasons
or the predicament. Rather, identification of Convention grounds is upon the
Member States. Article 10(1) confirms that Member States must take the ele-
ments listed therein into account “when assessing” the reasons for persecution. 
The elaboration on the persecution grounds “race”,133 “religion”134 and
“nationality”135 raise no particular issues;136 “political opinion” will briefly be
addressed below. Special interest justifies quite extensive elaboration on the
reason of “membership of a particular social group”,137 as state practice on its
interpretation diverges significantly. Moreover, scope and meaning of this rea-
son has received particular interest and debate as to its relevance for sex and
age specific grounds. 
[326] According to Article 10(1)(d),
“a group shall be considered to form a particular social group where in par-
ticular:
- members of that group share an innate characteristic, or a common
background that cannot be changed, or share a characteristic or belief
that is so fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not
be forced to renounce it; and 
- that group has a distinct identity in the relevant country, because it is
perceived as being different by the surrounding society.”
The provision appears to combine two criteria for identification of special
social groups. The first indent states the ‘protected characteristics’ test. Under
the ‘protected characteristics’ test as applied by several States party to the
Refugee Convention, the criterion is some personal characteristic of individu-
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als that deserves protection. Persons belong to a “particular social group” in
the sense of Article 1A(2) RC when they share some characteristic they can-
not possibly give up, or cannot be expected to give up.138
The Directive acknowledges two kinds of protected properties. First,
“characteristics” or “a common background” that cannot possibly be changed
(for example sex or descent). Second, a “characteristic or belief ” which the
alien “should not be required to renounce” – for example, homosexuality.139
The Directive does not require any degree of cohesiveness of the group in
order to classify as a particular social group, nor is it required that all mem-
bers of the group be persecuted.140
The second indent of Article 10(1)(d) QD reflects part of the ‘social per-
ception’ test. Under this test, a group must share some common attribute that
makes them cognisable as a group in society. It appears that the ‘social per-
ception’ test is applied in France and the United Kingdom.141 The second
clause of Article 10(1)(d) QD addresses the second limb of the social percep-
tion test: only groups “perceived as different by surrounding society” could be
particular social groups. This requirement applies cumulatively to the ‘protec-
ted characteristics’ test.142
[327] Whereas Contracting states tend to apply either the protected characte-
ristics or the social perception test, the Directive requires that both tests be
satisfied.143 Does it follow that the interpretation of “particular social group”
that Article 10(1)(d) QD proposes is overly restrictive? Aleinikoff observes
that in fact, virtually all groups that share ‘protected characteristics’ will also
be socially cognisable because of those characteristics, and hence satisfy the
social perception test as well.144 Hence, the result of cumulatively applying
both tests is, arguably, identification of the groups that meet the protected
characteristics test. 
Hathaway observes, however, that as a result of the ‘social perception’
requirement in Article 10(1)(d), groups like homosexuals or women are not
recognised as “clear examples” of particular social groups (as they allegedly
would have been if only the protected characteristics test applied).145 The
requirement would hence restrict the scope of persons identified by the pro-
tected characteristics test. It is true that according to Article 10(1)(d), it can-
not be stated in the abstract that homosexuals or women constitute a particu-
lar social group, but arguably, such a statement can never be made in the
abstract. For example, former landowners might have constituted a particular
social group in Eastern Europe in the Communist era, but not so any more and
never so in the West. The same reasoning applies to women and homosexuals.
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Arguably, the social perception requirement in the second clause of Article
10(1)(d) QD refines the “protected characteristics test”, but does not set undue
restrictions on its application. 
[328] How about the reverse situation: could Article 10(1)(d) QD result in
exclusion of groups that meet the social perception test, but not the protected
characteristics test? Aleinikoff suggests that the social perception test may
identify groups that could not meet the protected characteristics test, as social
perception may identify groups by a common characteristic that is not innate
or otherwise deserve protection.146 Arguably, no confirmation for this con-
tention can be found in state practice. At least the social perception test as
applied by the House of Lords and the French Conseil d’État does not confirm
this view. The fact that these courts did not specify the relevant characteristics
as deserving protection does not mean that any common characteristic would
suffice for identifying a “particular social group”, nor does this follow from
the cases involved. 
Besides, it may in practice be hard if not impossible to identify a group
whose members share some characteristic that is not innate or deserves pro-
tection for another reason, otherwise than by the persecution of its members.
But a particular social group should be identifiable apart from its members
being targeted for persecution. Otherwise, the persecution and the persecution
ground would coincide, which would be at odds with both wording and pur-
pose of Article 1 RC.147
There is, therefore, no reason to suppose that groups whose members share
some characteristic that does not merit protection under the protected charac-
teristic test should qualify as “particular social group” in the sense of Article
1A(2) RC. Consequently, the exclusion of such groups by Article 10(1)(d) QD
is not at variance with the Refugee Convention. 
[329] The provision further specifically addresses the definition of “particular
social group” as to claims related to sexual orientation and gender.148 As
Article 10(1)(d) states that 
“Depending on the circumstances in the country of origin, a particular
social group might include a group based on a common characteristic of
sexual orientation.”
The proviso “[d]epending on the circumstances in the country of origin”,
arguably, spells out the consequence of application of the social perception
test. Hence, the effect of the provision is explicit acknowledgement that sexu-
al orientation may satisfy the first requirement: it is a shared characteristic that
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is so fundamental to identity that a person should not be required to denounce
it. However, “[s]exual orientation cannot be understood to include acts consi-
dered to be criminal in accordance with national law of the Member States.”
Arguably, the provision prescribes that prohibited conduct prompted by sexu-
al orientation may not be considered as a property the person cannot be
required to renounce. Finally, Article 10(1)(d) states that “[g]ender related
aspects might be considered, without by themselves alone creating a presump-
tion for the applicability of this Article”. Consequently, “women” do “by
themselves alone” not constitute a particular social group. But, arguably,
“Pakistani women” might, if Pakistani society assigns them a distinct position.
In effect, the clause seems to leave the matter to the Member States. 
The causal link
[330] Article 2(c) QD requires, as Article 1A(2) RC does, that the fear of
“being persecuted” is “for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opi-
nion or membership of a particular social group”. Article 9(3) QD states that 
“In accordance with Article 2 (c) [the definition of “refugee”, HB], there
must be a connection between the reasons mentioned in Article 10 and the
acts of persecution as qualified in [Article 9(1)]”. 
The provision rules out the possibility that the definition requirement “for rea-
sons of ” a Convention ground could be satisfied in case of a causal link
between a Convention ground and the failure to offer protection. Article
10(1)(e) and (2) QD express the same view on the causal link, as they both
require a nexus between the Convention ground “political opinion” and the
persecutor.149
In many cases, the persecution act will indeed be inflicted upon the indi-
vidual for reasons of a Convention ground. Then, the requirement of a connec-
tion with a Convention ground is obviously satisfied. However, in other cases
such a link may be absent, whereas the failure of the state to protect the indi-
vidual from a non-state persecutor may be “for reasons of ” a Convention
ground. Does it follow from the Refugee Convention that in such cases well
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of a Convention cannot be esta-
blished? 
[331] Article 1A(2) RC speaks of the “well-founded fear of being persecuted”
of a person who is “owing to such fear unable or unwilling to avail himself of
the protection of ” his country of origin. Thus, the fear is the result of two fac-
tors: persecution and absence of protection.150 And there are two good reasons
to assume that the causal link with the Convention ground concerns this
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predicament, and not the persecution act (or actor) in particular.151 First, the
passive voice applied in the phrase “being persecuted” (instead of for exam-
ple “persecution for reasons of ” a Convention ground). Second, the
Convention’s fundamental purpose of defining the circumstances in which
international protection, surrogate to protection by the refugee’s country of
origin, is warranted. Hence, Article 1A(2) RC requires that the dire position
of the individual, the result of the persecution and the absence of protection,
be for reasons of a Convention ground. And this is so both if the absence of
protection as well as when the infliction of the persecution act (or the threat
thereto) is for reasons of a persecution ground. This view is broadly advoca-
ted in academic writing; moreover, supreme courts in several jurisdictions
have explicitly accepted it.152
[332] It appears, however, that this view is not generally shared. According to
the Dutch Council of State, presently the highest court on asylum claims in the
Netherlands,
“There is well-founded fear of persecution only when the persecution is
based on one or more of the persecution grounds mentioned in [Article 1A
(2) RC]. That assessment precedes the question of whether the authorities
can offer protection from the alleged facts. [….; T]he lack of protection can
come up only if the alleged threat can be reduced to one of the Convention
grounds”.153
Hence, only if the “alleged threat” (i.e. the alleged persecution act)154 is inflic-
ted for reasons of a Convention ground can a person qualify for refugee sta-
tus, the reasons for failure to protect are immaterial. The only ground adduced
for stating so is the order of assessment – first persecution for reasons of a
Convention ground, then protection. The Council of State gives no grounds
why this order of assessment applies.155 The mere word order of Article 1A(2)
RC cannot defeat the arguments based on both text and object and purpose
mentioned above. 
[333] Perhaps the Community legislator expresses the same view as the Dutch
Council of State where it states in Article 9(3) QD that “in accordance with
Article 2(c) [QD], there must be a connection between the reasons mentioned
in Article 10 and the acts of persecution as qualified in paragraph 1” (empha-
sis added). At any rate, this statement expresses the view that the restrictive
reading follows from the text of the refugee definition. 
But the Community legislator is not consistent in this matter. We saw above
that Article 6(c) defines actors of “harm” by reference to actors of “protec-
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tion”. And Annex II to the Procedures Directive, that addresses the safety “in
general” of countries of origin for the purposes of the “safe third country of
origin concept” (see paragraph 6.4.5.2), states that “in making this assess-
ment”, namely, whether “there is […] no persecution as defined in Article 9
[QD]”, “account shall be taken inter alia of the extent to which protection is
provided against persecution […]”. In both instances, it is acknowledged that
occurrence of persecution cannot be established separately from the provision
of protection. If, then, persecution and protection can not be addressed sepa-
rately, there are no grounds for the view that the Convention grounds address
one of the facets of the refugee’s predicament in particular. 
In summary, it follows from the text and purpose of Article 1A(2) RC that the
causal link with a Convention ground is established not only when the inflic-
tion of the persecution act (or the threat thereof), but also when protection is
withheld for reasons of such a ground. As Article 9(3), Article 10(1)(e) and
10(2) QD require a link with a persecution act or the persecutor, they exclude
the second possibility. In so far, these standards are overly restrictive interpre-
tations of the Refugee Convention, in accordance with this instrument. 
5.4.5 Concluding remarks
[334] The findings on the compatibility of the elaboration in the Qualification
and Temporary Protection Directive on the several aspects of the element
“harm” were summarised in the concluding paragraphs above. We saw that the
definition of actors of harm in Article 6 QD is satisfactory from the point of
view of international asylum law, and an important contribution to the har-
monisation of asylum law in the Member States. However, this appraisal is
affected by the overly wide definitions of agents of protection and the internal
protection alternative in Articles 7 and 8 QD. Maybe superfluously, we should
observe that acknowledging that persecution or serious harm may be inflicted
by non state agents does not justify the view that protection could also be
afforded by non-state agents. A person is in need of “international protection”,
protection by another state than the one of origin, if he fears persecution or
serious harm and “national protection”, protection by the country of origin, is
not available. 
The scope of protection afforded by Article 6 QD is also affected by the
requirement in Article 9(3) QD, that there be a causal link between the perse-
cution act and the persecution ground. If the state commits the persecutory act,
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the actor of persecution and of protection is the same, so the causal link
addresses the same entity. But this is different where the agents of persecution
and of protection are not identical – that is, when a non-state agent commits
the persecutory act. Thus, the overly restrictive reading by Article 9 QD affects
in particular victims of persecution by non-state agents.
5.5 Alienage
[335] Element [3] of the definitions of directive refugees, of persons eligible
for subsidiary, and of those eligible for temporary protection requires that the
third country national is outside his country of origin.156 A well-founded fear
of persecution and real risk of serious harm will usually be based on experi-
ences or events that occurred to the third country national in the country of
origin. But exceptionally, the fear of being persecuted (or risk of being sub-
jected to ill-treatment) may arise “sur place”: in another state, after departure
from the country of origin. Article 5(2) QD states that a well-founded fear or
real risk in such circumstances exists 
“in particular where it is established that the activities relied upon consti-
tute the expression and continuation of convictions or orientations held in
the country of origin.”
This comes close to stating the “continuation of convictions” as a condition
for well-founded fear or real risk. Continuation of convictions is sufficient, but
not necessarily required for recognition of a claim under the Refugee
Convention.157 As to Articles 3 ECHR, 3 CAT and 7 CCPR, the intentions or
purposes of a third country national are immaterial for state responsibility in
expulsion cases. If for example a person converts abroad to some religion
whose followers are persecuted or subject to ill-treatment in his country of ori-
gin, he has fear of being persecuted or runs a risk of being subjected to ill-
treatment for the purposes of relevant international law. But according to
Article 4(3)(d) QD, Member States must assess 
“whether the applicant’s activities since he left his or her country of origin
were engaged in for the sole or main purpose of creating the necessary con-
ditions for making an application for international protection, so as to
assess whether these activities will expose the concerned person to perse-
cution or serious harm if returned to that country”. 
According to the latter provision, scrutiny of the applicant’s motivation for
engaging in those activities apparently merely serves to apply the usual stan-
dard of well-founded fear or real risk of persecution or harm.158 This reading
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is endorsed by Article 20(6) and (7) QD, which states that Member States
“may reduce” residence conditions to Directive refugees and subsidiary pro-
tection beneficiaries who obtained their status “on the basis of activities
engaged in for the sole or main purpose of creating the necessary conditions
for being recognised”. It follows that engagement in activities for the purpose
of acquiring refugee or subsidiary protection status does not impede the grant
of that status (whether Articles 20(6) and (7) themselves are compatible with
the Refugee Convention is another matter that will be discussed under num-
ber [590]). 
[336] Temporary protection applies to persons who “have had to leave their
country or region of origin, or have been evacuated”.159 The quoted definition
excludes application of temporary protection to persons from the same coun-
try or region for whom the threat arrives sur place. But Member States could
solve the need for protection by extending the temporary protection to the con-
cerned individuals pursuant to Article 7(1) TPD.160
5.6 Grounds for refusal
An alien does not qualify for refugee status if Article 12 QD applies, and not
for subsidiary protection status when Article 17(1) or (2) QD applies (element
[4] in Articles 2(c) and (e) QD, see numbers [274] and [275] above). Article
14(5) read in conjunction with 14(4) and 17(3) QD set in addition facultative
grounds for refusal of refugee and subsidiary protection status; Article 28 TPD
does the same for temporary protection. I address here the obligatory and fa-
cultative grounds for refusal of the various statuses together. 
The grounds for refusal may be divided into three groups. The first is based
on Article 1F RC, the second on Article 33(2) RC and the third one on Article
1D and 1E RC. 
5.6.1 Article 1F RC 
Refugee status
[337] Article 12(2) QD states rules on exclusion which are close, but not iden-
tical to those laid down in Article 1F RC. According to Article 12(2) first
clause, a third country national “is excluded from being a refugee when there
are serious reasons for considering that” one of the exclusion grounds applies.
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Exclusion is hence obligatory. It follows from the wording “excluded from
being a refugee” that the individuals concerned are not merely excluded from
the grant of refugee status as meant in Article 13 QD, but cannot qualify as a
refugee.161
Article 12(2)(a) – (c) QD list the exclusion grounds of Article 1F RC,162 but
is in one respect more precise. Article 12(2)(c) limits the “acts contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United Nations”, mentioned in Article 1F(c)
RC, to acts contrary to the purposes and principles “set out in the Preamble
and Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United Nations”.163 The 1996 Joint
Position likewise identified the Charter as the document where those “princi-
ples” were to be found;164 UNHCR also identified Articles 1 and 2 Charter as
the provisions relevant for the purposes of Article 1F(c) RC.165
[338] Article 12 QD offers guidance for the application of Article 1F RC on
three issues. First, these exclusions grounds apply not only to persons who
physically committed those acts, but also to persons who “instigate or otherwise
participate in the commission” of those acts.166 According to the UNHCR, it fol-
lows from relevant rules of international law and case-law of the International
Criminal Tribunals on Rwanda and Yugoslavia that individual criminal respon-
sibility for the purposes of Article 1F RC may indeed arise from instigation and
some other forms of contribution to the commission of a crime.167
Second, according to Article 12(2)(b) the commission of non-political
crimes prior to “admission as a refugee” (as the text of Article 1F(b) RC runs)
“means [prior to] the time of issuing a residence permit based on the granting
of refugee status”. This reading accommodates application of the provision to
sur place claims for refugee recognition.168
Third, the provision offers guidance on the qualification of crimes as “non-
political”. Article 1F(b) RC applies only to non-political crimes. For present pur-
poses, we may distinguish between three categories of crimes.169 First, purely
political crime, such as high treason or electoral fraud. As these crimes cannot
qualify as “non-political”, persons who committed these crimes cannot therefore
be excluded from refugee status.170 Second, crimes that are defined as non-politi-
cal in treaty law, such as terrorism: these crimes fall by definition within the
scope of Article 1F(b) RC.171 Third, an intermediate category of civil offences
that are committed with a political objective. It is well-established state practice
under the Refugee Convention that the assessment of the political nature of
crimes meant in Article 1F(b) RC involves balancing of (inter alia) the serious-
ness of the crime and the motives of the individual who committed them.172
Article 12(2)(b) QD states that “particularly cruel actions, even if commit-
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ted with an allegedly political objective, may be classified as serious non-
political crimes.”173 It would appear that the provision only addresses the 
second category, the purely non-political crimes. But we should observe that
this phrase is the partial incorporation of Article 5.3 of the 1996 Joint Position
that read: 
“The severity of the expected persecution is to be weighed against the
nature of the criminal offence of which the person concerned is suspected.
Particularly cruel actions, even if committed with an allegedly political
objective, may be classified as serious non-political crimes. This applies
both to the participants in the crime and to its instigators.” 
The first part of this Article addresses the third, intermediate category of
crimes, the second clause exempts the (second) category of purely non-politi-
cal crimes from balancing. The occurrence of the second clause in Article
12(2)(b) QD reveals the implicit acknowledgement that balancing is inherent
to Article 1F(b) RC – otherwise the phrase would have no meaning. 
Subsidiary protection
[339] The arrangement in Article 17(1)(a)-(c) and (2) QD for exclusion from
being a person eligible for subsidiary protection174 is identical to the one in
Article 12 QD, except for one important aspect. Article 17(1)(b) stretches the
ground of Article 1F(b) RC considerably, as it stipulates exclusion of any per-
son who “has committed a serious crime”, i.e. either political or non-political,
and apparently, either before or after the grant of subsidiary protection status
(cf. Article 12(2)(b) QD). Further, Member States “may” (not must) exclude a
person who prior to his admission committed some other crime “which would
be punishable by imprisonment, had they been committed in the Member State
concerned” and if the person left his country “solely” in order to avoid sanc-
tions “resulting from those crimes”.175 The open definition leaves space for
disharmony between the Member States, as penalisation by imprisonment has
not yet been harmonised.
Temporary protection
[340] Article 28(1) TPD allows for, but does not require exclusion from protec-
tion on the grounds meant in Article 1F RC. Article 28(2) TPD offers two rules
for application of this exclusion ground, that do not appear in the Qualification
Directive. First, exclusion “shall be based solely on the personal conduct of the
person concerned”. Are we to understand that the person concerned should be
personally involved in the commission of the act giving rise to application of
the exclusion grounds? It follows from relevant rules of international law and
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from state practice that the fact that an individual is a member of a certain
government branch or an organisation involved in unlawful violence may give
rise to the presumption that Article 1F RC applies.176 If the individual could not
rebut the presumption, Article 1F RC would apply although his “personal con-
duct” would arguably not be involved. Second, Article 28(2) TPD provides that
“[e]xclusion decisions or measures shall be based on the principle of propor-
tionality”. UNHCR labels the proportionality requirement as “a useful tool” for
application of Article 1F RC, but considers that state practice is insufficiently
settled to conclude that Article 1F RC requires it.177
5.6.2 Article 33(2) RC
[341] Pursuant to Article 14 QD, Member States “may”, not must, “decide not
to grant” refugee status “to a refugee” when “there are reasonable grounds for
regarding him or her as a danger to the security of the EU Member State”
where he or she is, or if he or she, “having been convicted by a final judge-
ment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of
that Member State”178 - the grounds mentioned in Article 33(2) RC.179 The pro-
vision does not further address in which cases it may apply, but according to
the Preamble, 
“The notion of national security and public order also covers cases in
which a third country national belongs to an association which supports
international terrorism or supports such an association”.180
[342] Article 14(6) QD elaborates on the treatment of refugees to whom no
status is granted, or whose status was revoked, ended or not renewed on the
same grounds: 
“Persons to whom paragraphs 4 or 5 apply are entitled to rights set out in
or similar to those set out in Articles 3, 4, 16, 22, 31 and 32 and 33 of the
Geneva Convention in so far as they are present in the Member State”. 
Hence, pursuant to Article 14(6) such “persons” (refugees in the sense of
Article 1 RC and of Article 2(c) QD) enjoy a sort of status (in the sense of a
legally defined position) under the Common European Asylum System as they
are entitled to the mentioned Convention rights. This “status” is not further
elaborated upon. We may observe that Article 14(6) QD supposes “recogni-
tion” of these refugees, i.e. determination that the requirements of Article 2(c)
QD are fulfilled, distinct from the “recognition of refugee status” as meant in
Article 13 read in conjunction with2(c) QD (see further paragraph 8.5). 
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[343] According to Article 17(1)(d) QD, the Member States must (not: may)
exclude from subsidiary protection status any person who “constitutes a danger
to the community or to the security of the country in which he or she is”.181 The
provision is obviously moulded to Article 33(2) RC, but neither the standard of
“reasonable grounds” nor the requirement of a final judicial conviction of a
particularly serious crime applies. Hence, Member States have a great deal of
discretion when they apply the provision - suspicion of criminal behaviour
might be enough, and persons may constitute a danger because of petty crimes.
Article 28(1) TPD allows for exclusion from temporary protection any per-
son to whom the grounds mentioned in Article 33(2) RC apply. Exclusion on
these grounds is subject to the same rules on application as exclusion on the
grounds meant in Article 1 F RC, discussed under number [340]. 
5.6.3 Article 1D and 1E RC
[344] Article 12(1) QD reproduces182 Article 1D and 1E Refugee Convention
and hence excludes persons who are protected by UNWRA (i.e. Palestinians),
and persons who acquired de facto citizenship in another state. There are no
similar exclusion grounds for subsidiary and temporary protection.
Surprisingly, then, the scope of subsidiary protection is broader in this respect.
A partial explanation for this asymmetry may be that in practice, one of the
safe third country exceptions may apply. In particular, the application by a per-
son who acquired de facto citizenship in another state would be inadmissible
pursuant to Article 26 first clause and under b PD (the “country of first asy-
lum” exception, see paragraph 7.5.3). Whether the claim for refugee protec-
tion is well-founded, including application of Article 1E, will then not be con-
sidered (see further under number [427]). Moreover, Article 4(3)(e) QD states
that when assessing applications for Directive refugee protection or subsidiary
protection, Member States should take into account inter alia “whether the
applicant could reasonably be expected to avail himself of the protection of
another country where he could assert citizenship.” This provision may in fact
function as the counterpart of Article 12(1) QD for subsidiary protection. As
to refugee protection, Article 4(3)(e) QD can not apply in case Article 1E RC
does not apply – for the latter provision defines when a person cannot qualify
for refugee status on account of protection from another state than the one of
his nationality (or habitual residence).183
As to Article 1D RC, Hathaway observes that the “wholesale exclusion [of
Palestinian refugees] is inconsistent with a commitment to a truly universal
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protection system”, 184 and hence to object and purpose of the Refugee
Convention. It appears indeed that several Contracting states to the Refugee
Convention do not apply Article 1D RC for these, or similar reasons.185 Maybe
we should assume that the drafters of the Qualification Directive felt the same
and, while unwilling to depart from the explicit Refugee Convention provision
on Palestinians, therefore did not exclude them from subsidiary protection.
5.6.4 Conclusion
[345] The grounds for exclusion from Directive refugee as well as subsidiary
and temporary protection are inspired by the Refugee Convention. Whereas
the grounds for exclusion from refugee and temporary protection quite nar-
rowly follow the Refugee Convention, those for subsidiary protection are far
broader. But not in every respect, for the Qualification Directive does not con-
tain exclusion grounds equivalent to Article 1D and 1E RC for subsidiary pro-
tection. That a similar exclusion ground is absent from the Temporary
Protection Directive does not come as a surprise: application requires exami-
nation of individual circumstances, which temporary protection envisages
postponing. 
The Qualification and Temporary Protection Directives hardly offer gui-
dance for interpretation or application of the Refugee Convention provisions
on exclusion, but where they do, they diverge. Important, finally, is the distinc-
tion between obligation and competence to exclude. Most notably, when the
grounds meant in Article 1F RC apply to a person, the Member States must
exclude that person from both refugee and subsidiary protection status. When
the grounds meant in Article 33(2) RC apply to a person, the Member States
must exclude him from subsidiary protection, and may exclude him from
refugee protection. There is no obligation to exclude persons to whom Article
1F or 33(2) RC applies from temporary protection. 
5.7 Cessation and withdrawal 
[346] The Qualification Directive lists three types of grounds for termination
(“revocation”, “ending” or “refusal to renewal”)186 of Directive refugee status
or subsidiary protection status: exclusion, cessation and fraud. The first type,
exclusion grounds, has been discussed in the preceding paragraph.187
As to the second type, the Directive draws a remarkable distinction
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between cessation of refugee and of subsidiary protection status. According to
Article 11(1)(a-f) QD, a person “shall cease to be a refugee” if one of the
grounds mentioned in Article 1C(1-6) RC applies.188 For subsidiary protection,
the Directive gives only one cessation ground, Article 16(1) QD: a person 
“shall cease to be a person eligible for subsidiary protection when the cir-
cumstances, which led to the granting of subsidiary protection status have
ceased to exist or have changed to such a degree that protection is no
longer required”.189
This cessation ground combines Article 1C(5) and (6) RC (Article 11(1)(e)
and (f) QD). Should we infer that the Directive does not allow for cessation of
subsidiary protection in cases where the beneficiary availed himself of the
protection of his country of origin or a new country as required by Article
11(1)(a-d) QD and Article 1C(1-4) RC for Directive refugee status?190 This is
hardly likely. Maybe the drafters felt that Article 16(1) QD encompasses the
last mentioned circumstances. But this renders an odd asymmetry: the terms
cessation or change of circumstances in Article 16(1) QD have a far wider
scope than identical or similar terms in Article 11 QD. 
Guidance on the application of the cessation clauses is offered by Article
11(2) and 16(2) QD. When considering cessation on the grounds mentioned in
Article 11(1)(e) or (f) QD (Article 1C(5) or (6) of the Refugee Convention), 
“Member States shall have regard to whether the change of circumstances
are of such a profound and durable nature that it eliminates the refugee’s
well-founded fear of being persecuted”. 
This clause seems to incorporate paragraphs 135 and 136 of the UNHCR
Handbook.
[347] Thirdly, Member States must terminate Directive refugee or subsidiary
protection status if “misrepresentation or omission of facts […] were decisive
for the granting of the status”.191 This ground, though not explicitly mentioned
in the Refugee Convention, is quite compatible with it: if a person was recog-
nised on the basis of false evidence, he never was a Convention refugee. 
Finally, the Qualification Directive contains a rule on the burden of proof
in case of withdrawal of status. According to Article 19(4) QD, the state has to
“demonstrate” whether any of the termination grounds applies to the sub-
sidiary protection beneficiary. Article 14(2) QD also shifts the burden of proof
to the state, but only as far as cessation of refugee status in accordance with
Article 11 is concerned. Apparently, as far as termination of refugee status in
connection with the exclusion grounds or fraud is concerned, the “normal”
burden of proof of Article 4(1) QD applies.192 The odd consequence of this is
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that subsidiary protection beneficiaries suspected of fraud or commission of a
crime have a better position than recognised Directive refugees do. 
[348] Temporary protection “shall come to an end” either when the maximum
duration has been reached, or before that moment, when the Council decides
so.193 The Temporary protection Directive does not address cessation of the
protection in individual cases. But obviously, a Member State may terminate
temporary protection if it is established that the person concerned does not
belong to the protected group, i.e. in case of fraud. 
5.8 The relation between the CEAS protection statuses 
[349] In the previous paragraphs, I analysed the definitions of persons eligi-
ble for refugee, subsidiary and temporary protection status in some detail. On
the basis of this analysis, we can now turn to the relation between these statuses.
This relation begs two questions. 
First, the differences in the personal scope of these three statuses.
Subsidiary protection is “subsidiary”, that is, secondary or complementary to
refugee status: according to element [5] of the definition of persons eligible
for subsidiary protection, it applies only to persons who do not qualify as
refugees (see number [274]). This complementary nature presupposes that its
personal scope is, at least in certain respects, wider than the scope of Directive
refugee status – if not, this status would never apply. Temporary protection
applies in cases of mass influx, “in particular if there is also a risk that the asy-
lum system will be unable to process this influx without adverse effects for its
efficient operation”.194 This status hence serves “in particular” to postpone the
examination of applications for refugee and subsidiary protection. It can ful-
fil this objective only if its personal scope is wider than the scope of persons
entitled to refugee status and subsidiary protection – otherwise, the Member
States would have to examine the claims for these statuses of persons who do
not qualify for temporary protection. In paragraph 5.8.1 I address the question
of whether the definitions of subsidiary and temporary protection beneficia-
ries do indeed secure that these statuses serve this purpose. 
Second, the hierarchy among CEAS statuses. European asylum law makes the
hierarchy among the statuses only partially explicit; in some instances, persons
may enjoy different statuses at the same time. Hierarchy and concurrence of the
statuses is relevant because the sets of secondary rights that are attached to
them differ (see Chapter 8). Whether and if so, to what extent the requirements
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for qualification for the various CEAS protection statuses establish a hierarchy
and allow for concurrence will be discussed in paragraph 5.8.2.
5.8.1 The complementary character of subsidiary and temporary
protection 
[350] The definitions of “refugees”, of “persons eligible for subsidiary protec-
tion” and of persons eligible for “temporary protection” have more in common
than appears from their wording. This holds true most obviously for the defi-
nitions of refugees and of persons eligible for subsidiary protection. In Article
2(c) and 2(e) QD, only one element is phrased in identical terms, “protection”
(element [2b] in the definitions, see paragraph 5.2 and 5.4.3 above). The pro-
visions elaborating this element, Articles 7 and 8 QD, apply to both forms of
protection. Although the element alienage (number [3]) is phrased in different
terms the two definitions, there is no difference in its application (Articles
4(3)(d), 5 and 20(6) and (7) QD). Likewise, the regulation on agents of harm
and agents of protection is identical (Articles 6 and 7 QD). As far as these ele-
ments are concerned, the personal scope of refugee and subsidiary protection
as defined by European asylum law is identical.
[351] The definitions for Directive refugees and persons eligible for sub-
sidiary protection differ as regards the three elements of risk [1], harmful acts
[2a], persecution grounds [2c], and exclusion [4]. As to the element risk, to
subsidiary protection the “real risk” criterion applies; to refugee status, “well-
founded fear”. The rules for risk assessment in Article 4 QD apply to both
categories, and hence will level down differences the two standards. Article
15(c) QD provides for a major complication, as it modifies the risk criterion:
for the specific type of harm it defines, not real risk but merely a “serious and
individual threat” must be shown (number [305]). But as the Directive does
not elaborate on the level of risk required by the well-founded fear criterion,
it is hard to say whether the definition of subsidiary protection is more restric-
tive in this respect than the one for refugee protection, or vice versa.
The element of harmful acts (number [2a] in the definitions) brings about
an important distinction between Directive refugees on one and persons eligi-
ble for subsidiary on the other hand. Serious harm in the latter definition con-
cerns only the right to life or person. “Persecution” on the other hand can con-
cern also other human rights. 
The regulation of exclusion and cessation, finally, is somewhat confused.
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Grounds for exclusion and cessation from refugee status are identical to those
set out in Articles1C – 1F and 33(2) RC. As to subsidiary protection status, the
grounds for exclusion are wider, but the grounds for cessation are more strin-
gent than the grounds that apply to refugee status: counterparts of Article
1C(1)-(4), 1D and 1E RC for cessation of subsidiary protection status are
absent. Cessation of subsidiary protection status on similar grounds may how-
ever be possible on other bases (see number [346]). 
[352] In which respects, then, is the scope of subsidiary protection wider than
the scope of refugee protection, and does it indeed cater for complementary
protection? First, no nexus with a persecution ground is required for qualifi-
cation for subsidiary protection status. We should observe that the more
restrictively the requirements on this nexus are applied, the greater the relative
importance of subsidiary protection will be. Secondly, the ambiguous provi-
sion Article 15(c) QD may require subsidiary protection of persons who fulfil
all requirements of the refugee definition, but fail to substantiate well-founded
fear. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, we may note that the definition of
subsidiary protection status is moulded to a considerable extent by the prohi-
bition of refoulement ex Article 3 ECHR. This makes subsidiary protection
subject to the dynamics of the interpretation of the latter provision by the
European Court of Human Rights. 
[353] How does temporary protection relate to refugee and subsidiary protec-
tion? As far as the Temporary Protection Directive elaborates on the matter, its
definition of “harmful act” and of “protection” (elements [2a] and [2b]) are
broader than those applicable to refugee and subsidiary protection. The same
holds true for the risk criterion (element [1]) in Article 2(c)(ii) TPD, “serious
risk”. It was observed that this criterion comes close to the criterion applied under
Article 15(c) QD, which similarity may play a role for temporary protection bene-
ficiaries applying for subsidiary protection (number [306]). The grounds for
exclusion and cessation are more stringent. Only for risk of harm arising sur
place does the Temporary Protection Directive seem to offer less protection, as
we saw. Hence, apart from the latter issue, temporary protection is capable of
encompassing the full scopes of both subsidiary and refugee protection. 
5.8.2 Hierarchy and concurrence
[354] According to the Preamble to the Qualification Directive, 
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“The Geneva Convention and Protocol provide the cornerstone of the inter-
national legal regime for the protection of refugees”;
accordingly, 
“[s]ubsidiary protection should be complementary and additional to the
refugee protection enshrined in the [Refugee] Convention.”195
Consequently, Article 2(e) QD states that one can qualify for subsidiary pro-
tection only when one “does not qualify as a refugee” (element [5] of the defi-
nition, see number [275] above). Concurrence of Directive refugee and sub-
sidiary protection is therefore excluded. It follows from the quoted Preamble
recital that “qualification as a refugee” means here qualification as a refugee
in the sense of Article 2(c) QD or 1 RC, not qualification as a refugee “in
accordance with Chapters II and III” QD as meant in Article 13 QD. The for-
mer group of refugees is larger than the second one to the extent, that the
Qualification Directive does not harmonise qualification for refugee status to
the standards of Article 1 RC. 
[355] But do the rules on qualification indeed secure the primary position of
refugee status? We saw that the Qualification Directive rules on the nexus
with Convention grounds are overly restrictive, and that acknowledgement
of the (eventual) existence of group persecution is absent. A nexus with
Convention grounds is not required for subsidiary protection, and Article
15(c) QD addresses a form subsidiary protection where, arguably, only a
limited degree of individualisation is required. In both instances, the grant
of subsidiary protection as required by the Qualification Directive may
result in unwillingness of Member States to extend the scope of refugee pro-
tection beyond the obligations set out in the Directive, but in accordance
with their obligations under the Refugee Convention.196 We will see in the
next Chapter that if domestic law entitles subsidiary protection beneficiaries
to the same secondary rights as Directive refugee status, the applications for
refugee status by those beneficiaries (or their appeals against refusal of
refugee status) may be declared inadmissible for lack of interest (see num-
ber [428] and [422] below). Thus, the grant of subsidiary protection status
may bar examination of the application for refugee status. Hence, under the
CEAS, subsidiary protection may take the place of refugee protection for
Convention refugees; the primary position of refugee status is only partially
secured. 
[356] As to concurrence of applicant status with refugee and subsidiary pro-
tection status, the former ends when refugee status is granted (cf. par. 4.7).
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During the examination of their request for protection, persons eligible for
subsidiary protection are entitled to applicant status, as we saw above. This
means that persons can be both applicants and subsidiary protection benefici-
aries. This will occur when upon a request for refugee protection, subsidiary
protection has been granted. When appealing against the decision to refuse the
grant of refugee status, the third country national enjoys both applicant as well
as subsidiary protection status. 
Temporary protection may concur with both refugee and with subsidiary
protection. For during temporary protection the Member States may process
requests for both forms of protection, but the grant of one of these statuses
does not end the temporary protection (see number [348] on cessation of tem-
porary protection). 
[357] The relation between temporary protection status and applicant status is
only very partially elaborated in the CEAS. Beneficiaries of temporary protec-
tion must have the opportunity to lodge an application for asylum.197 This pro-
vision apparently presupposes that temporary protection beneficiaries may not
yet have lodged a request for asylum. But these persons necessarily lodged
some kind of request for protection. For the Council decision installing tem-
porary protection does not name the individual beneficiaries, 198 and it is
unlikely the Member States will grant the status without some sort of request. 
This begs the question of how the request for temporary protection must be
qualified. As we saw above, any request for protection has to be treated as a
request for protection as a refugee, unless the requested state runs a specific
procedure for other forms of protection and the individual explicitly requests
such alternative protection (number [264]). Hence, in principle199 any tempo-
rary protection beneficiary is an applicant for asylum for the purposes of the
Dublin Regulation and the Procedures Directive. The temporary protection
beneficiary who enjoys applicant status cannot claim Reception Standards
Directive benefits, as that instrument “shall not apply when the provisions of
the [Temporary Protection Directive] are applied”.200
We may finally observe that temporary protection status has a declaratory
nature – displaced persons to whom it applies are entitled to the benefits laid
down in the Temporary Protection Directive from the moment temporary pro-
tection is introduced, because they fall within its scope. This means that when
temporary protection is introduced, all applicants who claim that they fall
within its scope must be treated in accordance with Temporary Protection
Directive standards (obviously, until it has been ascertained they do not fall
within the scope of the temporary protection). 
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For the sake of completeness, we should finally address the exceptional status
for persons who qualify for refugee status for the purposes of Article 2(c) QD,
but to whom Directive refugee status can be denied because an exception to
the prohibition of refoulement meant in Article 33(2) RC applies (Article
14(6) QD; see number [342] above). It follows from Article 14(4) and (5) QD
that this status cannot concur with refugee status granted pursuant to Article
13 QD. The persons concerned are obligatorily excluded from grant or renewal
of subsidiary protection pursuant to Articles 17(1)(d) and 19(3)(a) QD, and
may be excluded from temporary protection pursuant to Article 28(1) TPD.
This status can therefore concur only with applicant status: during appeal
against the negative decision on the request for Directive refugee status. 
[358] In sum, Directive refugee status may concur only with temporary pro-
tection status. Subsidiary protection may concur with both applicant and with
temporary protection status. Concurrence with temporary protection status
may raise issues in so far as the latter status offers more favourable secondary
rights than subsidiary protection. European asylum law does not acknowledge
that, in most cases, temporary protection beneficiaries will by virtue of their
request for temporary protection also be applicants. But it is to be doubted that
this will raise practical problems, as temporary protection beneficiaries are
explicitly excluded from the scope of the Residence Standards Directive.
5.9 Concluding remarks
[359] In the preceding paragraphs, I analysed the rules on qualification for
refugee, subsidiary protection and temporary protection status, and to what
extent they are in accordance with international asylum law. Findings on the
various definition elements were summarised in concluding paragraphs. Can
we draw general conclusions on the impact of this legislation on the legal posi-
tion of persons in need of international protection? Three categories of issues
can be distinguished.
First, a number of rules set standards that are compatible with internatio-
nal asylum law – for example Articles 6 QD (on agents of harm) and Article
10(2) QD (on the Convention ground “particular social group”). Article 15(c)
QD, arguably, extends the scope of protection beyond the standards set by
international asylum law. In this, the position of persons in need of protection
is strengthened. 
Second, a number of issues are not addressed, such as the risk standard of
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“well-founded fear” and “compassionate grounds” cases under Article 3
ECHR. Provisions on other issues state no or hardly any rules that provide for
meaningful protection, such as those on cessation and exclusion from refugee
protection (Articles 11 and 12 QD). In this, the position of persons in need of
protection remains unaffected.
Third, a number of provisions state or suggest standards that fall short of
the level of protection required by international asylum law. Article 7(2) QD
suggests an overly wide scope of agents of protection, Article 8(3) QD propo-
ses an overly wide application of the internal protection alternative), and arti-
cle 9(3) states overly restrictive rules on the causal nexus with the Convention
grounds. 
For a number of provisions, it is not clear at first sight whether they belong
to the third or to the second category - the concept of group persecution, the
risk standards set by Article 3 CAT and the definition of persecution acts in
Article 9(1). This matter will be addressed in Chapter 9. Therein I will further
address the questions of whether these provisions sort direct effect (and hence
may be relied upon by individuals in court), whether the European Court of
Justice can rule on the compatibility of the above-mentioned rules with inter-
national law and finally, whether rules that are not in accordance with interna-
tional law affect the validity of the relevant legislation.
[360] Finally, it was further observed that European asylum law grants refugee
status a primary position to the other statuses, but secures it only partially.
Because of its secondary position next to refugee status, the practical meaning
of subsidiary protection may be modest. Pursuant to Community legislation,
its personal scope exceeds the scope of refugee protection, as no nexus with
some Convention ground is required. And arguably, its scope may be wider
because of the lenient risk standard that applies to persons who fled “indis-
criminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict”
(Article 15(c) QD). 
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1 Preamble recitals (2), (8), (15) and (17), and Articles 9(1) and 14(6) QD. Even more expli-
cit is the definition of “refugee” in Article 2(f) of the Procedures Directive: “”Refugee”
means a third country national or a stateless person who fulfils the requirements of Article
1 of the Geneva Convention as set out in Council Directive 2004/83/EC”, i.e. the
Qualification Directive. 
2 Preamble recital (6) QD.
3 Article 63(2)(a) TEC, see number [195]; cf. Preamble recital (8) QD. 
4 Preamble recital (9) QD. 
5 Cf. number [297].
6 Explanatory memorandum to QD Proposal, p. 5.
7 Preamble recital (10) TPD. 
8 Preamble recital (10) QD. 
9 Cf. Preamble recital (22) TPD.
10 The [deleted] part states the same requirements for stateless persons: “[…] and a stateless
person, who, being outside of the country of former habitual residence for the same reasons
as mentioned above, is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it […]”.
11 Apart from, obviously, the limitation to non-EU citizens, addressed above under numbers
[184] and [261]. 
12 Article 2(a) TPD.
13 Article 2(c) TPD. 
14 Article 5(1) and (2) TPD.
15 Article 6(1) TPD. 
16 Article 2(e) QD, see par. 4.1 above.
17 Article 7(b) of the QD Proposal prescribed the “reasonable probability” test, apparently
informed by relevant UK and USA case-law, cf. Battjes 2002, p. 163 and Hathaway 2003,
p. 14. 
18 Carlier 2005, under 1. B. 2) “Risque”. 
19 See Carlier 2005, text accompanying footnote 34; Piotrowicz &Van Eck 2004, p. 113;
Battjes 2002, p. 164. 
20 Cf. QD Proposal, Article 5(2): “subsidiary protection shall be granted to any third country
national […] who, owing to a well-founded fear of suffering serious and unjustified harm
set out in article 15 […].” 
21 Carlier 2005, under 1. B. 2) “Risque”.
22 HRC 30 July 1993, No. 470/1991 (Kindler v. Canada), par. 6.2. 
23 Steenbergen et al. 1999, pp. 175-6. Under Article 3 ECHR, unqualified “foreseeability”
suffices, the Strasbourg case-law does not require that the consequence is “necessary” as
well. 
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24 Article 4(1) and (2) QD. 
25 Article 2(e) QD, cf. number [275] above.
26 Article 3(1) CAT prohibits refoulement “where there are grounds” to believe that torture
will ensue. 
27 Cf. Articles 4(2) QD, 4(3)(b) QD and 9A PD. The term “may” in Article 4(1) might seem
to suggest otherwise, but see below in the main text. 
28 The provision seems to be inspired by pars 195-196 Handbook. The Comments on this pro-
vision in the QD Proposal does indeed refer to the UNHCR as a source of reference. 
29 But Articles 33A and 23(4)(i) PD in fact sanction belated applications, see numbers [429]
and [431] below.
30 Article 2(e) QD. 
31 See number [15] above.
32 Cf. footnote 26 above. 
33 Article 30B(2) read in conjunction with 30B(1) and 30(1) PD. 
34 Article 4(1) QD.
35 In the present paragraph I discuss the elements mentioned under Article 4(3)(a), (b) and (c)
QD; those mentioned under Article 4(3)(d) and (e) will be addressed under numbers [335]. 
36 Article 4(3)(b) and (c) QD; cf. UNHCR Handbook 1992, pars. 42 and 43.  
37 Cf UNHCR Handbook 1992, par. 45. 
38 Preamble Recital (12) QD.
39 The Comment on Articles in the QD Proposal observes that “in assessing an application for
international protection Member States should take into consideration: (a) the fact that the
age and maturity of the child and his or her stage of development form part of the factual
context of the application (b) the fact that children may manifest their fears differently from
adults (c) the fact that children are likely to have limited knowledge of conditions in their
country of origin (d) the existence of child specific forms of persecution, such as recruit-
ment of children into armies, trafficking for sex work, and forced labour” (QD Proposal,
Comment on Articles ad 7(d) (old, now Article 4(3)(c) QD), p. 15).
40 Joint Position of 4 March 1996 defined by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the
Treaty on European Union on the harmonized application of the definition of the term
‘refugee’ in Article 1 of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to the status of
refugees, OJ [1996] L63/2 (cf. number [45]), Article 2: “In practice it may be that a whole
group of people are exposed to persecution. In such cases, too, applications will be exami-
ned individually, although in specific cases this examination may be limited to determining
whether the individual belongs to the group in question.” Cf. Hathaway 2003, p. 14. See for
an argument that Article 1A(2) RC is not only capable of addressing group persecution but
rather meant to do so Spijkerboer 2002, pp. 25-29. See in this context also UNHCR 2005,
Comments on Article 15. 
41 Cf. UNHCR Handbook 1992, pars. 193f.
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44 Cf. UNHCR Handbook 1992, par. 196; Carlier 2005, under 1. B. 3) “Preuve”. 
45 Carlier 2005, under 1. B. 2) “Risque”; Gorlick 2003; cf. Goodwin-Gill 1996, pp. 34f. 
46 Article 5 TPD.
47 Article 2(c)(i) TPD. The Dutch language version speaks of persons who “hebben moeten
vluchten”, i.e. who had to flee. This implies a certain risk criterion. As the French, German
and Italian language versions corroborate the English version, the Dutch version apparently
contains a translation error – maybe due to contamination with the first part of Article 2(c)
TPD that speaks of displaced persons as persons “who have had to leave” their country. 
48 Article 2(c)(ii) TP
49 Cf. Article 4(4) QD, number [282]. 
50 Cf. UNHCR Handbook 1992, par. 51; 1996 Joint Position point 4.
51 Spijkerboer &Vermeulen 1995, p. 108; Article 31(1) RC, prohibiting penal sanctions for
refugees who came directly from a place where “their life or freedom were threatened” rein-
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52 As to state practice, see Vanheule 1997, pp. 98-102; UNHCR Handbook 1992, par. 51;
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authors. 
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54 Cf. the first recital of the Preamble, quoted under number [558]. 
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in the UDHR, but laid down in neither of the mentioned Covenants; for present purposes, the
tripartition as set out (merging Hathaway’s third and fourth category) will suffice.
Spijkerboer and Vermeulen classify human rights not on a formal, but on a thematic basis,
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arguably qualify as a violation of the human right laid down in Article 26 CCPR. Article
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2002, p. 5).
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ECHR” (Council doc. nr. 12148/02, Asile 2002/43, Brussels 20 September 2002, p. 5). 
74 According to Piotrowicz & Van Eck 2004, p. 121 however it would have been desirable to
add the term “cruel” to Article 15(b). 
75 Noll 2002, p. 187.
76 Cf. ECtHR 7 July 1989, Ser. A vol. 161 (Soering v. United Kingdom), par. 91, confirmed in
ECtHR 21 November 2001, Rep. 2001-XI (Al-Adsani v. UK), par. 39 and ECtHR (Grand
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recital, and renders the recital irrelevant for assessing the relation between Article 3 ECHR
and Article 15 QD. 
81 See Noll 2000, pp. 372-377 for a discussion.
82 Piotrowicz & Van Eck 2004, p. 134 advocate that the scope of subsidiary protection should
be inspired by Common Article 3 – but as it appears, by its full range, not merely by its
stipulation concerning “life and person”. 
83 The Draft version of Article 15(c) in doc. nr. 13354/02, Asile 2002/55, 23 October 2002 run
as follows: “in accordance with the 1949 Convention relating to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in time of War, serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason
of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict”. 
84 “[Article 15(a) and (b)] would in all cases appear to cover applicants facing a serious
threat to life or physical integrity. However, threats arising in situations of indiscriminate
violence, would not be covered since such situations can not be described as treatment or
punishment or suffering the death penalty. Hence, a separate subparagraph has been draf-
ted in order to include this situation” (Council doc. nr. 12148/02, pp. 6-7). The Explanations
continue as follows: “This would simultaneously be in line with the jurisprudence of the
ECHR relating to Article 3 ECHR, namely as was indicated in [Vilvarajah], that an expul-
sion as such to a situation with a high level of danger and insecurity/indiscriminate violence
could be considered an inhuman or degrading treatment. [Footnote:] In [Vilvarajah] the
Court stated that it would not exclude the possibility of applying the principle of non-
refoulement in a situation where a country would seek to expel an individual to a country
where a high level of insecurity prevailed” [emphasis added, HB; ibid., p. 7]. So it appears
that according to the drafters, indiscriminate violence could after fall within the scope of
Article 3 ECHR – in contradiction to the former statement. We may further observe that in
the Vilvarajah judgement (ECtHR 30 October 1991, Ser. A vol. 215), the Court addressed
the risk of ill treatment upon return to Sri Lanka, not the “expulsion as such”. Moreover, in
Vilvarajah the Court did (and could) obviously not “exclude the possibility” of a risk of ill-
treatment in a country where “high level of insecurity prevailed”. But the very gist of that
judgement is that this high level of insecurity is not enough for considering the risk of ill-
treatment as “real”. Rather, the European Court of Human Rights required a quite strict
degree of individualisation of the risk of ill-treatment: the applicants should have showed
“special distinguishing features in their cases that could […] have enabled” the authorities
of the expelling state to foresee that they would be ill-treated. (Vilvarajah, par. 112). As the
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purport of this statement in the Council document is hence utterly unclear if correct at all,
I leave it further out of account. 
85 In D v. UK, par. 49, the Court observed that ill-treatment in the receiving country may stem
“from factors which […] engage either directly or indirectly the responsibility of the public
authorities of that country”, and this direct responsibility is engaged in case of “intentio-
nally inflicted acts of the public authorities” (emphasis added, HB). 
86 UNHCR points out in its Comments to the provision that persons who have fled situations
of indiscriminate violence likewise might qualify for refugee status (Comments to Article
15 and to Preamble recital (26) QD, cf. number [303] below). 
87 If I see it correctly, Carlier comes to the same conclusion, though on different grounds
(Carlier 2005, under I.B.1.a) 1) atteintes graves). The French asylum appeals body
Commission des Recours des Réfugiés however has held that Article 15(c) Qualification
Directive only applies when an expulsion would be contrary to Article 3 ECHR, thus imply-
ing that Article 15(c) has no added value compared to Article 15(b); CRR 25 June 2004,
(Mme Koffi Amani), Contentieux des réfugiés 2-2004, p. 24-25.
88 Cf. Noll 2002, pp. 184f states that the Community is not competent to legislate on protec-
tion outside the scope of international law.
89 Spijkerboer 2002, pp. 31-2.
90 Cf. Article 5(3) TPD. 
91 Vermeulen et al. 1998, p. 7f.
92 Noll 2000, pp. 515-521; Vermeulen et al. 1998, pp. 7f.
93 The same follows from Article 33(1) RC – Noll 2000, p. 515. 
94 Noll 2000, pp. 519-520, with references to case law.
95 ECtHR 7 July 1989, Ser. A vol. 161 (Soering v. United Kingdom), par. 91, confirmed in
ECtHR 20 March 1991, Ser. A vol. 201 (Cruz Varas), par. 69, ECtHR 30 October 1991, Ser.
A vol. 215 (Vilvarajah), par. 107 and ECtHR 21 November 2001, Rep. 2001-XI (Al-
Adsani), par. 39.
96 Cf. Soering, par 91; Vilvarajah, par. 103. 
97 ECtHR 2 May 1997, Rep. 1997-III (D v. UK), par. 49. 
98 Cf. ECtHR 15 November 1996, Rep. 1996-V (Chahal), par. 105; ECtHR 29 April 1997,
Rep. 1997-III (H.L.R.), par. 40. 
99 ECtHR 17 December 1996, Rep. 1996-VI (Ahmed), pars. 35 and 47. 
100 CaT 15 May 2001, CAT/C/22/D/49/1996 (S.V. v. Canada), par. 9.5. It appears that in this view the
Committee silently retracts from its earlier statement in Elmi v. Australia, where it considered as
follows: “for a number of years Somalia has been without a central government […] some of the
factions operating in Mogadishu have set up quasi-governmental institutions and are negotiating
the establishment of a common administration. It follows then that, de facto, those factions exer-
cise certain prerogatives that are comparable to those normally exercised by legitimate govern-
ments. Accordingly, the members of those factions can fall, for the purposes of the application of
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the Convention, within the phrase “public officials or other persons acting in an official capaci-
ty” contained in article 1” (CaT 14 May 1999, CAT/C/22/D/120/1998, par. 6.5).
101 See Spijkerboer, ibid. I have no information on the ten Member States that acceded on 
1 May 2004. 
102 Spijkerboer 2002, pp. 32-33, Bouteillet-Pacquet 2002, pp. 233-236. 
103 Article 6 QD is therefore more inclusive than the 1996 Joint Position, which addressed only
situations (1), (2) and (3): “Persecution by third parties will be considered to fall within the
scope of the Geneva Convention where it is based on one of the grounds in Article 1A of that
Convention, is individual in nature and is encouraged or permitted by the authorities.
Where the official authorities fail to act, such persecution should give rise to individual
examination of each application for refugee status, in accordance with national judicial
practice, in the light in particular of whether or not the failure to act was deliberate. The
persons concerned may be eligible in any event for appropriate forms of protection under
national law”. The QD Proposal stated in Article 12(2)(a) QD that “it is immaterial whether
the persecution stems from the State, parties or organisations controlling the State, or non-
state actors where the State is unable or unwilling to provide effective protection”. 
104 Spijkerboer 2004, p. 179. 
105 In the same vein UNHCR 2005, Comments on Article 7(2). 
106 Cf. Hathaway 2003, p. 15. 
107 Preamble recital (19) QD. 
108 Article 7(3) QD; cf. the statement in the Minutes of the 2579th meeting of the Council of the
European Union at 29 and 30 April 2004, Council doc. nr. 8990/04 ADD 1 REV 1, p. 9.
109 Hathaway 2003, pp. 15-16, with references to relevant case law to this extent from Canada
and the United Kingdom.
110 Not only for the purposes of Article 1A(2) RC, but also for those of Article 7 QD, as this
provision treats “protection” and “actors of protection” as separate issues. 
111 Cf. Oxford English Dictionary, mentioning “The territory or land of a nation; usually an
independent state” under 3. after a.o. “A tract or expanse of land of undefined extent”. The
same holds true for the French language version “pays” as opposed to “état”, and the Dutch
“land” as opposed to “staat”. 
112 The Refugee Convention employs the term “state” exclusively for Contracting states – with
one exception: Article 8 prohibits exceptional measures to be taken against the refugee who
“is a national of [a foreign] State”, that is, his “the country of his nationality”. Elsewhere, the
Refugee Convention the term “countries” where not or not exclusively the Contracting states
are meant, but occasionally, the instrument refers to the Contracting states as “countries”,
where it speaks of “country of residence” (for example Articles 14 first clause and 17(2) RC).
113 Cf. Articles 31 and 33 RC. 
114 ECtHR 29 April 1997, Rep. 1997-III (H.L.R. v. France), par. 40, repeated in ECtHR 22
October 2002, Appl. No. 60959/00 (Ammari v. Sweden), under “The Law. B”. 
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115 ECtHR 19 February 2004, Appl. No. 14513/03 (Sadeta Muratovic v. Denmark), under “The
Law”. 
116 Muratovic, under “A. The circumstances of the case”. 
117 Hathaway & Foster 2003, pp. 365-381. They also discuss alternative readings of the term
“protection”, as well as the alternative basis for internal protection assessment in Article
1A(2) RC, “well founded fear”. 
118 Hathaway & Foster 2003, pp. 367-370, and cf. UNHCR 2005, Comments on Article 8.
119 Hathaway & Foster 2003, pp. 389-411.
120 Hathaway & Foster 2003, p. 392. 
121 Hathaway & Foster 2003, p. 405. As to their argument based on ECtHR 15 November 1996,
Rep. 1996-V (Chahal v. UK), see footnote 124 below. 
122 ECtHR 6 March 2001, Rep. 2001-II (Hilal), par. 67. 
123 Chahal, pars. 99 and 104. 
124 The same holds true for Chahal, par. 103. 
125 Incidentally, these requirements are quite similar to those that apply to the safe third coun-
try exception - see number [519]. 
126 Article 8(1) QD: “As part of the assessment of the application for international protection,
Member States may determine that an applicant is not in need of international protection if
in a part of the country of origin there is no well-founded fear of being persecuted or no
real risk of suffering serious harm and the applicant can reasonably be expected to stay in
that part of the country.”
127 Cf. Hathaway & Foster 2003, pp. 390-392; cf. Hathaway 2003, p. 16; UNHCR 2005,
Comments on Article 8. 
128 Cf. Hathaway & Foster 2003, pp. 411-415.
129 Article 2(d) TPD; cf. Article 2(c)(i) TPD. 
130 Cf. 1996 Joint Position pars. 7.1, 7.4 and 7.5. - Article 10(1)(e) QD states the same as to
“political opinions” in particular: “[…] the concept of political opinion shall in particu-
lar include the holding of an opinion, thought or belief on a matter related to the poten-
tial actors of persecution mentioned in Article 6 and to their policies or methods,
whether or not that opinion, thought or belief has been acted upon by the applicant”
[emphasis added, HB].
131 See Goodwin-Gill 1996, pp. 50-52, referring to the language employed in Article 1A(2) RC
(“for reasons of” in stead of “on account of”), and to the preparatory works. 
132 UNHCR Handbook 1992, par. 67.
133 Article 10(1)(a) QD: “[…] the concept of race shall in particular include considerations of
colour, descent, or membership of a particular ethnic group […]”. 
134 Article 10(1)(b) QD: “[…] the concept of religion shall in particular include the holding of
theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, the participation in, or abstention from, formal
worship in private or in public, either alone or in community with others, other religious
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acts or expressions of view, or forms of personal or communal conduct based on or man-
dated by any religious belief […]”.
135 Article 10(1)(c) QD: “[…] the concept of nationality shall not be confined to citizenship or
lack thereof but shall in particular include membership of a group determined by its cultu-
ral, ethnic, or linguistic identity, common geographical or political origins or its relation-
ship with the population of another State […]”.
136 Cf. Comment on Articles to the QD Proposal: “Article [7, HB] owes much to the Geneva
Convention and the Joint Position and does not seek to create any new reasons not expli-
citly or implicitly recognised by these instruments” (Comment at Article 11, p. 21). The
wording of Article 10(1)(c) QD is even identical to Article 7.3 of the 1996 Joint Position.
Article 10(1)(a), (b) and (c) QD belong to the few proposed provisions that reached the
adopted version unaltered. 
137 The Preamble remarks that “it is […] necessary to introduce a common concept of the per-
secution ground “membership of a particular social group” (recital 21), after having
observed that “it is necessary to introduce common concepts of […] persecution, including
the reasons for persecution” (recital 18). 
138 Aleinikoff 2003, pp. 268-271, 275-280 and 294f. The test is advocated in academic litera-
ture by especially Hathaway (Hathaway 1991, pp. 157f). 
139 That homosexuality is indeed a property that a person cannot be expected to renounce rather than
an innate characteristic for the purposes of Article 10 QD follows from the other part of Article
10(1)(d) QD; see number [329] below. - In the QD Proposal, the “common background” was
mentioned among the properties that a person couldn’t be required to denounce (Article 12(d)). 
140 Cf. Aleinikoff 2003, pp. 277f. 
141 The French Conceil d’État ruled that a particular social group exists “en raison des carac-
téristiques communes qui les définissent aux yeux des autorités et de la société” (23 June
1997, Decision No. 171858 (Ourbih), quoted in Aleinikoff 2003, p. 281); in Islam and Shah
Lord Hope of Craighead stated that “a social group may be said to exist when a group of
people with a particular characteristic is recognised as a distinct group by society” (reprin-
ted in IJRL 1999, p 518). Goodwin-Gill appears to be supportive of the approach
(Goodwin-Gill 1996, p. 46f). 
142 It appears that the conjunction “and” does not appear between both indents of Article
10(1)(d) QD in the Swedish language version, but it does appear in the Dutch, English,
French, German and Italian versions. 
143 Hathaway 2003, p. 17.
144 Aleinikoff 2003, p. 300. If the characteristic is cognisable to the persecutor only, the deter-
mination of the particular social group and the persecution act tend to coincide which
deprives the Convention ground of its meaning – an unreasonable result (cf. number [328]). 
145 Hathaway 2003, l.c..
146 Aleinikoff 2003, pp. 297-300.
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147 Cf. Hathaway 1991, p. 159, Aleinikoff 2003, pp. 285-6. 
148 The relevant statements are the result of a compromise. Article 12(d) QD Proposal defined
“particular social group” as “a group which may be defined in terms of certain fundamen-
tal characteristics, such as sexual orientation, age and gender […]”. In Council negotia-
tions during the adoption, it appeared that some Member States wanted to delete these refe-
rences to sexual orientation, age and gender, whereas other ones wanted to maintain them
in the definition (cf. Council doc 121999/02, p. 15n).
149 Article 10(1) “ Member States shall take the following elements into account when asses-
sing the reasons for persecution: […] (e) the concept of political opinion shall in particu-
lar include the holding of an opinion, thought or belief on a matter related to the potential
actors of persecution mentioned in Article 6 and to their policies or methods, whether or
not that opinion, thought or belief has been acted upon by the applicant. 2. When assessing
if an applicant has a well-founded fear of being persecuted it is immaterial whether the
applicant actually possesses the racial, religious, national, social or political characteris-
tic which attracts the persecution, provided that such a characteristic is attributed to the
applicant by the actor of persecution.”
150 See Hathaway 1991, pp. 104-5 and 112; cf. Haines 2003, pp. 327-330 and Aleinikoff 2003,
pp. 302-3. This view has explicitly been accepted by courts of the jurisdictions mentioned
below. 
151 Hathaway et al. 2004, under 6. UNHCR remarkably did not comment on Article 9(3) QD
in UNHCR 2005. 
152 See Aleinikoff 2003, pp. 302-3 and Haines 2003, p. 327n for references. 
153 Council of State 20 January 2004, JV 2004/98, par. 2.2.2; translation HB. 
154 The phrasing of the Council at times markedly deviates from the terms of the Refugee
Convention (“based on” and “reduced” instead of “for reasons of”; cf. footnote 131), but
the use of the term “persecution” (“vervolging”) instead of “being persecuted” does pro-
bably not render the Council’s particular view on the reading of Article 1A(2) RC, but mere-
ly repeats the official (but unauthentic) Dutch translation of the Refugee Convention (cf.
Tractatenblad 1954, 88).
155 Nor did it do so in any other judgement – cf. T.P. Spijkerboer in his annotation to the quo-
ted judgement in JV 2004/98.
156 Cf. Article 2(c) and (e) QD. 
157 See Hathaway 2003, pp. 14-15. 
158 Cf. Hathaway 2003, p. 14n.
159 Article 2(c) TPD.
160 Article7(1) TP Directive: “Member States may extend temporary protection as provided for
in this Directive to additional categories of displaced persons over and above those to
whom the Council Decision provided for in Article 5 applies, where they are displaced for
the same reasons and from the same country or region of origin.”
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161 The wording “excluded from being a refugee” may seem somewhat odd. Article 14(1)
Proposal QD read “exclude from refugee status”. As “refugee status” is “recognition as
refugee” (Article 2(c)), and as this recognition is a “declaratory act” (Preamble recital (14)
QD), unrecognised refugees fell outside the scope of Article 14(1) QD Proposal. - Another
difference in wording is the substitution of “[…] excluded from being a refugee with respect
to whom there are serious grounds [….]”, as Article 1F RC reads, by “[…] excluded from
being a refugee where there are serious grounds [….]” in Article 12 QD (emphasis added,
HB). But arguably, this difference in wording does not bring about a difference in meaning.
162 Article 12(2) QD: “A third country national or a stateless person is excluded from being a
refugee where there are serious reasons for considering that: (a) he or she has committed
a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the interna-
tional instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes; (b) he or she has
committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his or her
admission as a refugee; which means the time of issuing a residence permit based on the
granting of refugee status; particularly cruel actions, even if committed with an allegedly
political objective, may be classified as serious non-political crimes; (c) he or she has been
guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations as set out in the
Preamble and Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United Nations.” 
163 The specification was initiated by France (cf. Council doc. 9038/02 Asile 2002/25 of 17
June 2002, p 20n), not surprisingly, as among the Member States, France appears to be the
only Contracting state that applies Article 1F(c) on a more or less regular basis (cf. Kwakwa
2000, pp. 87 and 89-90).
164 Cf. Article 5.4 1996 Joint Position: “The purposes and principles referred to in Article 1F
(c) are in the first instance those laid down in the Charter of the United Nations”. 
165 UNHCR 2003, par. 17, UNHCR 2003a, par. 46; cf. Kwakwa 2000, p. 83. 
166 Article 12(3) QD.
167 UNHCR 2003a, pars. 52-53, mentioning next to instigation “aiding or abetting”, cf. Article
25 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted July, 17, 1998, UN
Doc. A/CONF.183/9*, corrected Nov. 10, 1998 and July 12, 1998). 
168 Cf. UNHCR 2003a, par. 12. 
169 See Spijkerboer & Vermeulen 2005, pp. 99-100.
170 Kälin 1982, p. 212. 
171 Kälin & Künzli 2000, pp. 67-8 and UNHCR 2003a, pars. 81-82.
172 See UNHCR 2003a, pars. 41 and 81f with references to relevant case law, and Kälin &
Künzli 2000, pp. 67-8.
173 Article 12(2)(b) QD.
174 Article 17(1) QD “A third country national or a stateless person is excluded from being eli-
gible for subsidiary protection where there are serious reasons for considering that: (a) he
or she has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as
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defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such
crimes; (b) he or she has committed a serious crime; (c) he or she has been guilty of acts
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations as set out in the Preamble
and Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United Nations; (d) he or she constitutes a dan-
ger to the community or to the security of the Member State in which he or she is present.
2. Paragraph 1 applies to persons who instigate or otherwise participate in the commission
of the crimes or acts mentioned therein […].”
175 Article 17(3) QD. 
176 Cf. UNHCR 2003, par. 19, UNHCR 2003a, pars. 57f with references to relevant treaties and
case law.
177 UNHCR 2003, par. 24, UNHCR 2003a, pars. 76f with references to relevant treaties and
case law.
178 Article 14(5) read in conjunction with 14(4) QD. 
179 Article 21 QD, on “Protection from refoulement”, contains an identical arrangement; see
number [576]. 
180 Preamble recital (28) QD – criticised in UNHCR 2005 as too broad. 
181 Article 17(1)(d) QD.
182 Oddly, Article 12(1)(a) QD refers explicitly to Article 1D, whereas neither Article 12(1)(b)
nor 12(2) QD refers to Article 1E or 1F RC. 
183 Likewise UNHCR 2005, Comments on Article 4(3). 
184 Hathaway 1991, p. 209.
185 Cf. Takkenberg 1997, pp. 153f.
186 Cf. Article 14 and 19 QD. 
187 Articles 14(3)(a) and (4), and 19(2) and (3)(a) QD. The grounds for ending statuses are
obligatory or facultative on the same footing as the grounds for exclusion. Thus, termina-
tion on grounds inspired by Article 1F RC is obligatory (Article 14(3)(a), 19(3)(a)), on
grounds inspired by Article 33(2) RC is facultative where Directive refugee status is con-
cerned (Article 14(4)) but obligatory as to subsidiary protection (Article 19(3)(a)), and ter-
mination because of applicability of the grounds mentioned in Article 17(3) is facultative
(Article 19(2) QD). 
188 Article 11(1) and Article 14(1) QD. 
189 Article 16(1) and 19(1) QD. 
190 According to Article 1C(1)- (4) RC a person ceases to be a refugee if “(1) He has volunta-
rily re-availed himself of the protection of the country of his nationality; or (2) Having lost
his nationality, he has voluntarily re-acquired it, or (3) He has acquired a new nationality,
and enjoys the protection of the country of his new nationality; or (4) He has voluntarily 
re-established himself in the country which he left or outside which he remained owing to
fear of persecution, or (5) He can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with
which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail
287Qualification 
himself of the protection of the country of his nationality; […] (6) Being a person who has
no nationality he is, because the circumstances in connection with which he has been recog-
nised as a refugee have ceased to exist, able to return to the country of his former habitual
residence.”
191 Article 14(3)(b) and 19(3)(b) QD.
192 As far as it is compatible with Article 1F RC, of which the terms “when there are serious
reasons for considering that” unequivocally places the burden on the state (cf. Article 14(2)
and 17(1) QD). 
193 Article 6(1) TPD.
194 Article 2(a) TPD. 
195 Preamble recitals (3) and (24) QD. 
196 Likewise UNHCR 2005, Comments on Article 15. 
197 Article 17(1) TPD.
198 Article 5(3)(a) TPD speaks of a description of the “specific groups of persons” to whom the
protection applies. 
199 In principle, for if the third country national explicitly requests for alternative forms of pro-
tection, and the requested Member State operates a separate system for them, the request
for temporary protection is not an application for asylum. 
200 Article 3(3) RSD. Oddly, its counterpart in the Temporary Protection Directive states that
Member States “may provide that temporary protection may not be enjoyed concurrently





In this chapter, I discuss rules of European asylum law on procedures on the
granting and withdrawal of protection. Most rules on asylum procedures are
laid down in the Procedures Directive, a few in the Dublin Regulation and the
Temporary Protection Directive. Rules on withdrawal of secondary rights laid
down in the Reception Standards Directive and rules on examination of
requests for family reunification in the Family Reunification Directive will
not be discussed here, but in connection with those secondary rights in
Chapter 8.
In paragraph 6.2, I address the asylum procedures in first instance. Rules
on appeal proceedings are discussed in paragraph 6.3; grounds for refusal in
paragraph 6.4, and rules on procedures on withdrawal or termination of pro-
tection statuses in paragraph 6.5. In paragraph 6.1, I address some peculiari-
ties of the scope of the Procedures Directive and its relation to other instru-
ments that are relevant for asylum procedures. 
6.1 Introduction
[361] At the outset, it should be observed that the reading of the Procedures
Directive is complicated because of a number of incongruities that are due to
the troublesome legislative history of that instrument. The original
Commission Proposal presented on 24 October 20001 met so much opposition
in the Council that the Commission was asked to redraft it.2 The Amended
Proposal, presented on 18 June 2002,3 was subject to further extensive debates
in the Council; the initiative of Austria for a Council Regulation on the quali-
fication of safe third countries,4 a matter also addressed by the Procedures
Directive, may have complicated matters further. As a result, the Directive suf-
fers from a number of inconsistencies that must be addressed in order to sort
out the scope and content of this instrument.
[362] According to Article 1 PD, the purpose of the Procedures Directive is
“to establish minimum standards on procedures in the Member States for
granting or withdrawing refugee status.” Its rules apply to “applications for
asylum”.5 Pursuant to this definition the personal scope may differ among the
Member States (see number [263]). In Member States that run separate proce-
dures for refugee protection and for other forms of protection, the Directive
applies only to the processing of the application for refugee protection,6 but in
States that have a single procedure for refugee and subsidiary protection, the
Procedures Directive also applies to requests for the latter form of protection. 
Although the Procedures Directive does apply in some Member States to
requests for subsidiary protection, several provisions such as the definition of
the purpose of the instrument, refer to examination of the “qualification as a
refugee” only.7 Should we assume that such provisions do not address the
qualification of a person as eligible for subsidiary protection? The Directive
explicitly addresses protection under instruments of international asylum law
other than the Refugee Convention.8 And it would be unreasonable to assume
that application of the Directive’s rules to requests for subsidiary protection
serve, in the terms of Article 1 PD, only the purpose of setting standards on
procedures for granting refugee protection. We must therefore assume that
Procedures Directive provisions that refer to “qualification as a refugee by
virtue of the Qualification Directive” only, may be equally applicable to
“qualification as a person eligible for subsidiary protection status” in those
Member States where the instrument also applies to procedures for the gran-
ting of subsidiary protection. This extensive reading accommodates both
objectives of the Directive - observance of human rights, and preclusion of
secondary movements (see paragraph 4.6). 
[363] The Dublin Regulation and the Temporary Protection Directive also set
some rules on procedures concerning the granting of international protection.
How do these rules relate to the rules on procedures in the Procedures
Directive? 
Pursuant to the Dublin Regulation, the Member State where an applica-
tion was lodged may decide that it will not “examine” the application when
another state is “responsible” (see paragraph 7.2.1). This decision not to
examine the claim is subject to some procedural rules in the Dublin
Regulation.9 As a decision on an “application for asylum”, it also falls with-
in the scope of the Procedures Directive.10 It would follow that all relevant
Procedures Directive provisions apply to decisions to transfer the applicant
pursuant to the Dublin Regulation (and hence not to examine the merits of the
claim). However, the Preamble to the Procedures Directive states that “[t]his
Directive does not deal with procedures governed by [the Dublin
Regulation]”.11 The Dublin Regulation makes a similar distinction in its defi-
nition of “examination”:
“‘examination of an asylum application’ means any examination of […] an
application for asylum by the competent authorities in accordance with
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national law except for procedures for determining the Member State
responsible in accordance with this Regulation”.12
So we must distinguish between two forms of examination. First, “examination”
in the sense of “procedures for determining the Member State responsible in
accordance with this regulation”, or allocation procedures. Second, “examina-
tion” in the sense of any other decision or ruling on the application (such as
whether the claim is well-founded or not). Examination in the sense of alloca-
tion procedures is subject to the Dublin Regulation, the latter to “national law”. 
Does it follow that procedures on application of the Dublin Regulation (the
first type) fall outside the scope of the Procedures Directive? The Dublin
Regulation “governs” these procedures only very partially. It does not address
many issues that are regulated by the Procedures Directive, such as most of the
procedural guarantees laid down in Chapter II PD (see paragraph 6.2.4). These
matters are apparently left to the domestic law of the Member States, which in
its turn is subject to relevant Procedures Directive rules.13 Hence, the
Procedures Directive deals with transfer decisions according to the Dublin
Regulation only as far as they are governed by the Dublin Regulation. Where
the Dublin Regulation does not state rules, the Procedures Directive applies.
The rules on procedures laid down in the Dublin Regulation will therefore be
discussed in conjunction with those set out in the Procedures Directive (see
numbers [371] and [425]). 
[364] The Temporary Protection Directive states only a few procedural rules,
which concern appeal against the denial of temporary protection (discussed
under number [471]). A person within the scope of a decision establishing
temporary protection will be an “applicant” for the purpose of the Procedures
Directive, unless Member States establish a special procedure for processing
claims for temporary protection and the alien explicitly applies for it (number
[263]). In one instance, the Procedures Directive explicitly addresses situa-
tions of mass influxes.14
6.2 Asylum procedures at first instance
In this paragraph, I address rules on procedures for the examination of
requests for protection at first instance. I will first discuss relevant rules of
international law (paragraph 6.2.1). Then I address the general set-up of pro-
cedures at first instances (paragraph 6.2.2), and discuss two aspects in some
detail: the rules on organisation of the various types of asylum procedures at
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first instance that the Procedures Directive establishes, and the safeguards that
apply in these procedures (paragraphs 6.2.3 and 6.2.4).
6.2.1 International law
The effectiveness principle
[365] Neither the Refugee Convention nor other instruments of international
law establish systems for the processing of claims for protection. Still, inter-
national asylum law does set conditions on procedures for the granting of pro-
tection. For in order to comply with international asylum law, states must
implement and apply it in an effective way.15 The relevance of the “effective-
ness” requirement for procedures can be traced in the rulings of several courts.
The International Court of Justice asserted in its judgement LaGrand that
the requirement that states give “full effect” to a treaty provision can have
implications for application of domestic procedural rules.16 The case con-
cerned two German brothers who had been sentenced to death in the United
States of America. The United States authorities had not informed the German
consul, as they should have done according to Article 36(1) of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR).17 The LaGrand brothers learnt of
their rights under this Convention only after their conviction and launched
proceedings against their death sentences, inter alia on the ground that the
United States had failed to notify the German consul. The United States courts
rejected their claim on the basis of the domestic “procedural default” rule:
they should have raised the claim earlier, before a state court. Pursuant to
Article 36(2) VCCR, domestic rules indeed do apply to claims under Article
36(1) VCCR. But the International Court of Justice ruled that the application
of this domestic doctrine of “procedural default” in this case violated Article
36 VCCR, because domestic procedural rules “must enable full effect to be
given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this article are
intended.”18
Likewise, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights
held in its judgement Mamatkulov II that
“treaties must be interpreted in good faith in the light of the object and pur-
pose […] and also in accordance with the principle of effectiveness.”19
As to the Refugee Convention, Legomsky argues that 
“[t]he Convention does not expressly prohibit […] any specific procedure,
but [if a] procedure is so unfair and unreliable, the act of establishing it
assures that an unacceptably high number of refugees will be returned
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erroneously to their persecutors. Thus, it is submitted, the establishment of
an unfair refugee status determination procedure is itself a violation of
Article 33 [RC].”20
The Appeals Court of The Hague (the Netherlands) reasons along the same
lines, in its judgement on the compatibility of the Dutch fast track procedure
with Article 33 RC: 
“[t]he Refugee Convention itself contains no provisions on the procedure
that the Contracting states should follow in order to determine who is a
refugee in the sense of the Convention. But the prohibition on refoulement
of Article 33 Refugee Convention does entail, that a Contracting state must
not establish this procedure in such a way, that an asylum seeker has insuf-
ficient opportunity to show that he or she is a Convention refugee, with the
result that refugees in the sense of the Convention run a disproportionate
risk on refoulement [my translation, HB].”21
The UNHCR Handbook states that in view of the (usually) “particularly vul-
nerable situation” of asylum seekers, their claims should be dealt with in “spe-
cially established procedures” that should meet some basic requirements.22
Thus, as international law does not establish procedures for the processing
of claims for international protection, states may apply domestic procedural
rules. But domestic rules may not prohibit ‘full effect’ being given to interna-
tional asylum law. This requirement applies to both procedures at first instance
as well as to appeal procedures. Below, I address the implications of the pro-
hibitions of refoulement for procedures at first instance (rules of international
law on appeal procedures are addressed in paragraph 6.3.1). 
Article 33 RC
[366] The UNHCR Handbook elaborates on the “basic requirements, which
reflect the special situation of the applicant” that procedures should meet.23
These basic requirements were “recommended” by ExCom.24 Their obser-
vance is therefore in itself not an obligation under international law (see num-
ber [32]), but asylum procedures that do not meet these requirements are par-
ticularly susceptible to not giving the asylum seeker ‘sufficient opportunity’ to
show that he is a refugee. The requirements suggested in the UNHCR
Handbook will be addressed in the discussion of the Community provisions on
asylum procedures in the following paragraphs. 
Article 3 CAT
[367] According to Article 3(2) of the Convention Against Torture,
“[f]or the purpose of determining whether there are [substantial grounds
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for believing that the alien would be in danger of being subjected to tor-
ture], the competent authorities shall take into account all relevant consi-
derations including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned
of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human
rights.” 
Boeles observes that Article 3(2) bears witness to the applicability of the effec-
tiveness principle to Article 3(1) CAT: the Contracting states must operate pro-
cedures that guarantee that the risk of expulsion to a country where the appli-
cant is threatened with torture is as low as possible.25 But specific requirements
for the powers of the “competent authorities” and the layout of procedures
before them cannot be based on this provision. For according to Article 12 CAT,
“Each State Party shall ensure that its competent authorities proceed to a
prompt and impartial investigation, wherever there are reasonable grounds
to believe that an act of torture has been committed in any territory under
its jurisdiction”. 
The Convention does not prescribe the conduct of a “prompt and impartial
investigation” in cases where the alleged torture took place outside the
Contracting state’s territories. Hence, the Convention left the issue to the dis-
cretion of the contracting states. Absence of specific procedural guarantees as
such is not in violation of Article 3 CAT. 
Article 3 ECHR
[368] Article 3 ECHR, like Article 33 RC, implicitly conditions the applica-
tion of procedural rules. Already in Vilvarajah the European Court of Human
Rights has stated that 
“[t]he Court’s examination of the existence of a risk of ill treatment in
breach of Article 3 at the relevant time must necessarily be a rigorous one
in view of the absolute character of this provision and the fact that it
enshrines one of the fundamental values of the democratic societies making
up the Council of Europe”.26
Here, the requirement of a rigorous scrutiny concerned the Court’s own exami-
nation of the case, but in Jabari it stated on the same grounds that 
“a rigorous scrutiny must necessarily be conducted of an individual’s claim
that his or her deportation to a third country will expose that individual to
treatment prohibited by Article 3”, 
apparently applying the obligation to the state, and continued that in the present
case 
“[t]he Court is not persuaded that the authorities of the responding claim
conducted any meaningful assessment of the applicant’s claim […].”27
294 Chapter 6
So, the state addressed by the alien must perform a “rigorous scrutiny” of the
claim, which entails that its authorities must conduct “a meaningful assess-
ment” of it. In the case of Jabari, the European Court of Human Rights con-
cluded that the automatic and mechanical application of a too short time limit
(five days) for submitting an asylum application was “at variance with”
Article 3 ECHR.28
[369] The European Court of Human Rights addressed the obligation not to
apply procedural rules that bar full effect of the prohibition of refoulement in
an oblique way in the Bahaddar case.29 The legal question was whether or not
Bahaddar, a failed asylum seeker, had exhausted the domestic remedies, for
appeal to the European Court of Human Rights is not admissible if the appli-
cant has not first taken recourse to all “accessible” and “effective” domestic
remedies in order to prevent violation of his Convention rights.30
The Court ruled that “even in cases of expulsion” where there is an alleged
risk of ill treatment, “the formal requirements and time-limits laid down in
domestic law should normally be complied with”, but “special circumstances
which absolve an applicant from the obligation to comply with such rules” can
occur, depending on the facts of each case, and added:
“in applications for recognition of refugee status it may be difficult, if not
impossible, for the person concerned to supply evidence within a short
time, especially if – as in the present case – such evidence must be obtained
from the country from which he or she claims to have fled. Accordingly,
time-limits should not be so short, or applied so inflexibly, as to deny an
applicant for recognition of refugee status a realistic opportunity to prove
his or her claim”.31
In this case, the Court found no “special circumstances” absolving Bahaddar
from compliance with formal requirements. It considered that Bahaddar could
have asked the domestic court to extend the period for submitting evidence.
Further, Bahaddar had had the opportunity to lodge a new application. And 
“[f]inally, it would be open to the applicant even now to lodge a further
such application, and if necessary to apply for an interim measure restrai-
ning the respondent Government from expelling him pending the outcome
of the ensuing proceedings (see paragraph 34 above). It has not been
argued that such a remedy would necessarily be ineffective”.32
So, it appears that in principle domestic law can be applied to asylum proce-
dures. This is different when application of domestic procedural law (for
instance, fatal time-limits) bars “a realistic opportunity to prove” the claim,
that is, make the safeguard of Article 3 ineffective. The possibility of Bahaddar
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lodging a fresh claim at any time during the procedure was also a decisive fac-
tor.33
Conclusions
[370] International asylum law does not specifically regulate procedures for the
granting of protection, but the obligation to give full effect to the prohibitions
of refoulement has implications for such procedures. Article 33 RC requires
that these procedures offer the applicant “sufficient opportunity” to establish
his case. Article 3 ECHR requires that domestic authorities perform a “rigorous
scrutiny”, that is, a “meaningful assessment” of the claim that expulsion would
result in ill-treatment, and therefore offer the applicant a “realistic opportuni-
ty” to prove his claim. Domestic procedural law may be applied in asylum pro-
ceedings, unless they bar such an assessment or opportunity.
6.2.2 The set-up
[371] The basic principle for Community asylum procedures is to be found in
the Dublin Regulation: Article (3)(1) states that the “Member States shall
examine the application of any third country national who applies at the bor-
der or in their territory to any one of them for asylum”. The Procedures
Directive establishes a two tier system for this decision making: “procedures
at first instance”, addressed in Chapter III PD, and “appeal procedures”,
addressed in Chapter V. Chapter II PD contains “basic principles and safe-
guards” that may apply to procedures at both instances (see paragraph
6.2.4.1). 
The main rules for procedures at first instance are laid down in Article
23(1) read in conjunction with 29(1) PD. According to Article 23(1) PD,
“Member States shall process applications for asylum in an examination
procedure in accordance with the basic principles and guarantees of
Chapter II.”
According to Article 29(1) PD,
“[…] Member States may only consider an application for asylum as
unfounded if the determining authority has established that the applicant
does not qualify for refugee status pursuant to [the Qualification
Directive]”. 
Together, these provisions state three obligations. First, the Member States
must process applications in an “examination procedure”; second, the proce-
dure must be in accordance with the procedural safeguards in Chapter II;34
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third, Member States must consider whether the applicant qualifies for a sta-
tus pursuant to the Qualification Directive. 
[372] All three rules are subject to a limited35 number of exceptions. Both the
obligation to process the claim and the obligation to do so in accordance with
the procedural safeguards ex Chapter II (the first and second rule) suffer
exception pursuant to Article 24 PD: 
“1.Member States may moreover36 provide for the following specific pro-
cedures derogating from the basic principles and guarantees of Chap-
ter II:
(a) a preliminary examination for the purpose of processing cases con-
sidered within the framework of the provisions set out in Section IV;
(b) procedures for the purpose of processing cases considered within
the framework set out in Section V.
2. Member States may also provide a derogation in respect of Section VI.”
Thus, Member State may provide for “specific procedures” as addressed in
Sections IV and V of Chapter III that derogate from the second obligation, that
is, wherein the “basic principles and guarantees” do not apply.37 Furthermore,
it follows from Article 24(2) that “in respect of Section VI” the Member States
may derogate both from the obligation to process applications as well as from
the duty to do so in accordance with Chapter II: no examination has to take
place if the third country exception set out in that Section (Article 35A)
applies.38
In summary, the Procedures Directive provides for five procedures at first
instance for the handling of applications for asylum (the designations are
mine, HB):
(1) the ‘normal procedure’ pursuant to Article 23(1); 
(2) the ‘preliminary procedure’ for the processing of subsequent applica-
tions, set out in Section IV , Articles 33 – 34 PD; 
(3) the ‘normal border procedure’ pursuant to Article 35(1) PD in Section V;
(4) the ‘special borders procedure’ pursuant to Article 35(2) PD, also in
Section V;
(5) the ‘safe neighbouring third country procedure’ set out in Section VI,
i.e. Article 35A PD.
Each of these procedures has its own set of “basic principles safeguards”. 
[373] The third rule, the obligation to determine whether or not the applicant
qualifies for refugee or subsidiary protection, is subject to five exceptions.
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First, no examination to the merits has to take place when another state is
“responsible” for it according to the Dublin Regulation.39 Second, “Member
States are not required to examine whether the applicant qualifies as a refugee
in accordance with” [the Qualification Directive] where an application is inad-
missible.40 Third, the obligation to address the foundedness is “without preju-
dice” to rejection or discontinuation of the examination after withdrawal.41
Fourth, if the ‘preliminary procedure’ applies, the obligation to establish
whether the applicant qualifies for protection is limited to establishing
whether the subsequent application merits full examination in the normal
examination or normal border procedure.42 If not, the authority may reject the
claim. Fifth, no examination has to take place in case the ‘safe neighbouring
third country’ exception applies.43 If none of these exceptions applies, the
authority must address the merits of the claim for protection, and decide
whether it is “unfounded” (Article 29(1) PD), “manifestly unfounded”
(Article 29(2) PD) or well-founded. 
[374] In summary, Article 3(1) DR read in conjunction with 23(1) read in con-
junction with 29(1) PD requires that (1) each application is examined (2) in
accordance with the basic principles and safeguards of Chapter II (3) as to
qualification for refugee or subsidiary protection status. The first obligation
suffers exception when the ‘safe third neighbouring country procedure’
applies (Article 24(2) PD), the second, when one of the ‘special procedures’
applies (Article 24(1) PD), and the third obligation suffers exception when the
Dublin Regulation applies, when the application is inadmissible (Article 25
PD), when it is withdrawn (as set out in Articles 19 and 20 PD), when it con-
cerns a subsequent application (Articles 33 and 34 PD) and when the ‘safe
third neighbouring country’ exception applies (Article 24(2) PD). 
The rules on organisation of the five procedures are discussed in paragraph
6.2.3, the procedural safeguards under 6.2.4. The exceptions to the obligation
to consider whether claims are well-founded are addressed in the context of
the grounds for refusal, in paragraph 6.4. 
6.2.3 The organisation
[375] According to the Preamble to the Procedures Directive, 
“The organisation of the processing of applications for asylum is left to the
discretion of Member States”.44
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Indeed the Directive states few rules on the organisation of procedures for
granting protection. Most of the discussion below addresses the distinction
between the five procedures established by Article 23 read in conjunction
with24 PD – the ‘normal’, the ‘normal border’, the ‘special border’, the ‘pre-
liminary’ and the ‘safe third neighbouring country’ procedures.
The ‘normal procedure’
[376] The ‘normal procedure’ is the procedure that obligatorily applies to the
processing of applications if no special procedure applies.45 It can have two
shapes: the “normal” and the “accelerated” or “prioritised” examination.46
The Procedures Directive does not provide for a special time frame for
accelerated examination. Both an accelerated and a “normal” examination
procedure must be “concluded as soon as possible”; if no decision can be
taken within six months, the applicant shall either be informed of the delay or,
upon his request, receive “information on the time-frame” when a decision
may be expected – which does not bind the Member State to comply with that
“time-frame”.47 In Article 11(2) RSD, it is assumed that it may take over a year
before a first decision on the application is taken.48
In which types of cases may the examination be accelerated? According to
Article 23(3) PD, 
“Member States may prioritise or accelerate any examination […] inclu-
ding where the application is likely to be well-founded or where the appli-
cant has special needs”. 
Hence, any case may be “accelerated” or “prioritised”.49 Article 23(4) further
provides that “Member States may lay down that an examination procedure in
accordance with the basic principles and guarantees of Chapter II be prioritised
or accelerated if ” one of the no less than fifteen grounds that follow apply. But
as any case may be prioritised pursuant to Article 23(3) PD, the list of Article
23(4) has no consequences in this respect. The Directive does not establish any
(further) rules that apply specifically to accelerated examination in general, or
to the list of Article 23(4) PD in particular. The occurrence of this list can only
be explained by reference to the drafting history of the Procedures Directive: in
draft versions, examination in the accelerated procedure on the grounds listed
in Article 23(4) did have legal consequences for the right to remain during
appeal proceedings. Since the relevant draft provisions were dropped, Article
23(4) PD remained unaltered, now serving only as a catalogue of examples of
negative decisions (see further numbers [430] and [431]).
[377] In the ‘normal procedure’, applications must be processed in accordance
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with all the “basic guarantees” laid down in Chapter II PD.50 The examination
is in principle performed by the “determining authority” – a specialised asy-
lum service of sorts (see number [390]).51 The personnel of this authority must
be capable of conducting an “appropriate examination”,52 and be properly
trained.53 Another authority than this specialised agency (for example, border
guards) may be responsible for processing claims where transfer pursuant to
the Dublin Regulation is being considered,54 and when the decision upon the
application “in the light of national security provisions, provided a determining
authority is consulted prior to this decision as to whether the applicant quali-
fies as a refugee by virtue of [the Qualification Directive]”.55 Meaning and
consequences of the distinction between the “determining” authority and the
other authority is relevant for applicability of “basic guarantees and princi-
ples”, and will be discussed in that context (paragraph 6.2.4.1). 
As to other aspects of the organisation of the ‘normal procedure’, Member
States 
“may impose upon applicants for asylum obligations to cooperate with the
competent authorities insofar as these obligations are necessary for the
processing of the application”.56
The applicant should in principle be offered the opportunity of a “personal
interview”.57 Prior to this interview, a meeting “with the applicant for the pur-
pose of assisting him/her with filling in his/her application and submitting the
essential information regarding the application” may take place,58 but this
interview is not obligatory. Rules on this interview and other “basic principles
and guarantees” are further discussed in paragraph 6.2.4. 
[378] The examination in the ‘normal procedure’ may result in five types of deci-
sions: inadmissible,59 manifestly unfounded, unfounded, or founded60 of the appli-
cation, or the decision not to continue the examination.61 The Procedures Directive
does not impose or imply an obligation to introduce in domestic law one of these
categories of negative decisions.62 Except for the exception of the safe third coun-
try of origin (see par. 6.4.5), all grounds for refusal are facultative. The Directive
therefore allows the Member States to grant refugee or subsidiary protection sta-
tus to applicants although these grounds for refusal apply. Moreover, pursuant to
the Procedures Directive, different labels may be attached to the same ground of
refusal. Thus, the exception of the safe third country may be a ground for inadmis-
sibility63 as well as for unfoundedness;64 and all specifically mentioned grounds for
unfoundedness may also be labelled as a ground for manifest unfoundedness.65
The Procedures Directive does therefore not impose the obligation to introduce the
categories of “inadmissibility” or “manifest unfoundedness”.66
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The preliminary examination procedure
[379] Member States “may” (not must) apply a specific ‘preliminary exami-
nation procedure’ to four “cases of subsequent applications”.67 First, the alien
explicitly or implicitly withdrew the previous application.68 Second, there is a
“decision” (at first instance) or “final decision” (a decision no longer subject
to a appeal)69 on a previous application.70 Third, a dependant (a person who
previously consented to have his case be part of another application made on
his behalf, see number [394]) lodges an application of his own.71 Fourth, the
application is “filed at a later date” and the applicant “either intentionally or
owing to gross negligence fails to go to a reception centre or to appear before
the competent authorities at a specified time.”72 Arguably, this ground is a vari-
ant of the first category: the applicant did not comply with the requirement to
file the application “as soon as possible”,73 and implicitly withdrew it by fai-
ling to appear in due time.74
[380] In the ‘preliminary examination’ procedure, examination is limited to
the question of whether the subsequent application merits being “further
examined in conformity with Chapter II” (that is, in the ‘normal examination’
or the ‘normal border procedure’, see number [403]).75 When such further
examination is required will be discussed in paragraph 6.4.4, on subsequent
applications. 
The preliminary examination procedure is subject to far fewer procedural
safeguards than the ‘normal procedure’ (see paragraph 6.2.4.3). Another
authority than the (specialised) determining authority may conduct the
preliminary examination, provided that “this authority has access to the appli-
cant’s file regarding the previous application”.76 Moreover, Article 34(2) PD
states some special rules on the burden of proof that applicants should meet in
the preliminary procedure, to be discussed in paragraph 6.4.4.
Normal border procedures
[381] According to Article 35(1) PD, Member States “may provide for” pro-
cedures for deciding on applications made “at the border or transit zones”.77 In
cases of mass influxes, the procedure may also apply “where and for as long
as these third country nationals or stateless persons are accommodated nor-
mally at locations in proximity to the border or transit zone”.78 The Procedures
Directive does not address the kind of decisions that may be taken in this pro-
cedure; arguably, these are the same as those taken in the ‘normal procedure’
(see number [378]). All basic principles and safeguards of Chapter II apply to
this procedure.79 It therefore differs in only one respect from the ‘normal pro-
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cedure’: the “responsible authority” is not necessarily the “determining
authority” as defined in Article 3A(1) - for practical purposes, in this proce-
dure for example border guards may consider applications.80 The legal conse-
quences of the distinction between the “determining” and other authorities are
addressed in paragraph 6.2.4.1.
Special border procedures
[382] A second type of border procedures concerns decisions 
“at the border or in transit zones on the permission to enter their territory
of applicants for asylum who have arrived and made an application for asy-
lum at such locations”.81
Hence, the ‘special border procedure’ applies to applicants who have no per-
mission to enter. Consequently, it does not apply to applicants in possession of
a visa or otherwise authorised to enter.82 This procedure is subject to a stand-
still clause.83
The authority that examines applications in this procedure may be another
one than the “determining authority” (the specialised asylum agency, cf.
number [394]).84 Decisions shall be taken “as soon as possible”; if not with-
in four weeks, the applicant has “entry to the territory of the Member State
in order for his/her application to be processed in accordance with the other
provisions of ” the Procedures Directive – that is, in fact, in the ‘normal pro-
cedure’.85 Examination may take longer in case of mass influxes in accommo-
dations in the proximity of the border or transit zones.86 A “refusal to enter”
amounts to a negative decision on an application for asylum,87 but “permis-
sion to enter” does not (or not necessarily) imply a positive decision on the
application.88 No further rules are stated for the organisation of this proce-
dure, except for application of some “basic principles and safeguards” (see
paragraph 6.2.4.3). 
The safe third neighbouring country procedure
[383] According to Article 35A(1),
“Member States may provide that no, or no full, examination of the asylum
application and of the safety of the applicant in his/her particular circum-
stances as described in Chapter II takes place in cases where a competent
authority has established, on the basis of the facts, that the applicant for
asylum is seeking to enter or has entered illegally into its territory from a
safe third country according to paragraph 2”. 
Thus, “examination” may be done without altogether in case of illegal entry
from certain safe third countries. This procedure applies if two conditions are
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met: the alien enters or has entered “illegally”, and did so “from a safe third
country according to” Article 35A(2). Requirements and rules on designation of
this particular type of safe third countries will be addressed in paragraph 7.5.5.
Arguably, the provision applies only in Member States that border those
safe third countries, although the provision does not explicitly state so. It
applies in case of entry “into [a Member State] from a safe third country”.
When the alien illegally enters a border Member State and then travels through
to another Member State, he enters the last state “from” a Member State, not
from the third country. The same holds true for aliens who came by plane from
the safe third country. It follows from Article 3(1) PD that for the purposes of
the Procedures Directive, transit zones do not make part of the territory of the
Member States.89 Illegal entry “into the territory” of a Member State after a
flight from the safe third country would be entry from the transit zone, not
“from a safe third country”. Hence, Article 35A addresses only aliens who are
caught in the act of illegally entering, or caught just after having illegally
entered a Member State over the land border with a safe third country accor-
ding to Article 35A(2). 
[384] There is no obligation to conduct an “examination” in case of illegal
entry from certain safe third countries. But it follows from Article 35A that
“establishing” whether or not the requirements are met is obligatory. The
“competent authority” responsible for deciding in this procedure may, obvi-
ously, be another one than the “determining authority” meant in Article 3A(1)
PD.90 Application of the provision yields a “decision”.91 If the decision cannot
be implemented because the third country does not readmit the applicant (see
number [532]), his case must be examined “in accordance with the basic prin-
ciples and guarantees described in Chapter II”,92 that is in fact in the normal
procedure or in the normal border procedure. Obviously, the basic principles
and guarantees of Chapter II do not apply.93
Concluding remarks
[385] The five procedures established by the Procedures Directive differ from
each other mainly in two respects: the type of applications that may be
processed, and the basic principles and safeguards that apply. Most extensive
is the scope of the ‘normal procedure’ – it may apply to any application by any
applicant on the territory or at the border. The ‘normal border procedure’
applies to any type of application, lodged at the border or in transit zones.
Decision making in both procedures is subject to the basic principles and
guarantees of Chapter II. 
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The ‘special border procedure’ is a transitional arrangement for Member
States that run border procedures that are not up to those standards. If in force
at the time of adoption of the Procedures Directive, those states are not
required to apply certain principles and guarantees when examining applica-
tions lodged at the border by applicants who have no permission to enter. The
preliminary procedure applies to “subsequent applications” only; the main dif-
ference with normal procedure is the absence of most guarantees. The ‘safe
third neighbouring country procedure’, finally, may apply only at or close to
the border with non-Member States. Its special distinguishing feature is the
absence of an obligation to examine applications and of procedural safe-
guards. 
[386] The Procedures Directive sets very few rules on the organisation of these
procedures. Most conspicuously, it only mentions the possibility to “accele-
rate” or “prioritise” claims, but gives no rules on even the time frame of fast-
track procedures. 
International law is neutral on the organisation of procedures, as long as
they do not affect the effectiveness of protection from refoulement and allow
for a meaningful and rigorous scrutiny of claims (cf. number [363]). Too short
time limits may bar the possibility to conduct a meaningful examination;
absence of such time limits is therefore regrettable. Most important for secu-
ring compliance with international law is the obligation to process all applica-
tions lodged in the territory or at the border of the Member States. Obviously,
the exception made in case of the ‘safe third neighbouring country procedure’
therefore raises questions as to their compatibility with international law.
These will be addressed in paragraph 7.5.5. 
6.2.4 Basic principles and guarantees
Chapter II addresses “basic principles and guarantees”. Most of these provi-
sions concern safeguards like the prohibition on expulsion, the right to a per-
sonal hearing, access to a legal counsellor and so on. We saw above that dif-
ferent sets of those “principles and guarantees” apply in the different proce-
dures. But on closer scrutiny, the scope of application of these “principles and
guarantees” raises some intricate questions that I will address under paragraph
6.2.4.1. Subsequently, the content of the safeguards that apply in the normal,
and of those that apply in the special procedures will be discussed (paragraphs
6.2.4.2 and 6.2.4.3). 
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6.2.4.1 Scope of application
[387] In Chapter II, “basic principles and guarantees” are laid down. On the
basis of their wording, most Chapter II provisions would apply to all proce-
dures at first instance: most of them address or may apply to applicants or
(decisions on) applications. We should observe that several Chapter II provi-
sions explicitly address appeal proceedings and thus apply to them, although
no reference to those principles and guarantees is made in Chapter V (cf. num-
bers [423] and [424]). Hence, Chapter II provisions may apply on their own
terms, and not because of reference to them in other provisions of the
Directive (as for example Article 23(1) PD).
Article 23 PD confirms that all relevant basic principles and guarantees do
apply to the ‘normal procedure’ (in its ‘normal’ shape as well as in the fast
track variant). But pursuant to Article 24 PD, derogation from the basic prin-
ciples and guarantees can be made in all ‘special procedures’. 
Still, all or most basic principles do apply in most special procedures, for
one of two reasons. First, because provisions that establish or address those
special procedures state so. According to Article 35(1), all safeguards set out
in Chapter II apply to the ‘normal border procedure’, and pursuant to
Articles 34 and 35(3) PD, a number of them apply to the ‘preliminary’ and
the ‘special border procedure’ as well. Second, some of the provisions of
Chapter II apply on their own terms to special procedures, notwithstanding
the derogation clause of Article 24 PD. Article 15(1) PD (guarantees for
unaccompanied minors) explicitly addresses “all procedures provided for in
this Directive”. Article 6 PD, on expulsion during asylum procedures at first
instance, necessarily applies to the ‘preliminary procedure’ although no
reference is made to the provision in Section IV (see number [401]). We
must assume that as leges speciales these provisions have precedence over
Article 24 PD. Other provisions on ‘basic principles and guarantees’ do not
contain similar indications.
[388] The scope of basic principles and guarantees that apply to (decisions by)
the “determining authority”, such as the prohibition on expulsion during
examination and the right to a hearing, is somewhat complicated.94 Other pro-
visions seem to have a broader scope as they speak of “competent authori-
ties”95 or “authorities”96 (or simply address the Member States, without making
mention of any specific authority).97 But Article 2(e) PD defines the “deter-
mining authority” as 
“any quasi-judicial or administrative body in a Member State responsible
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for examining applications for asylum and competent to take decisions at
first instance in such cases […]”.98
It follows that the authority that examines and decides on applications is a
“determining authority” in the sense of Article 2(e), and therefore in the sense
of the relevant basic principles and guarantees. 
[389] However, Article 3A(1) states that “Member States shall designate for
all procedures a determining authority which will be responsible for an
appropriate examination of the applications”, whereas according to Article
3A(2) “Member States may provide that another authority is responsible in
the following cases”. So next to the “determining authority” as defined in
Article 3A(1) there may be “another authority responsible”, if Article 3A(2)
allows for it. Article 3A(2)(c) quite explicitly opposes this other authority to
the determining one (cf. number [438]). Should we assume that the basic
principles and guarantees that address “(decisions by) the determining
authority”, such as the right to remain during examination and the right to a
hearing do not apply to those procedures where Member States have
appointed “another responsible authority” in accordance with Article 3A(2)
PD? 
This reading is unlikely for several reasons. If we assume that Article 3A
defines the term “determining authority” for the purposes of Chapter II, we
would have to disregard Article 2(e) completely. Neither text nor context pro-
vides for any indication that Article 3A serves the purpose of limiting the
scope of the provisions of Chapter II. Further, it would follow that the ‘normal
procedure’ would be subject to lower standards than the ‘special border proce-
dure’ – which is obviously contrary to the purpose of Article 35 PD (cf. num-
ber [404]).99 Consequently, “another responsible authority” as meant in Article
3A(2) is a “determining authority” for the purposes of the relevant Chapter II
provisions, in accordance with Article 2(e) PD. 
[390] This leaves two questions to answer. First, if the prohibition on expulsion,
the right to a hearing and the other provisions that refer to the “determining
authority” apply to examination by any authority, what does the distinction
between “determining” and other authorities made in Chapter II provisions
entail? The literal meanings of the terms “authorities” and “competent autho-
rity” have a wider scope than “determining authority”. They address next to the
determining authority the appeal authorities100 and other authorities that may be
involved in the processing of asylum applications. Their involvement concerns
other activities than examining or deciding on applications (which activities
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single out the “determining authority” as meant in Article 2(e) PD), dependent
on the subject matter addressed by the relevant Chapter II provision. 
Second, what does the distinction between the “determining” and the
“other responsible authority” made in Article 3A entail? Article 3A(1) PD,
arguably, serves the purpose of obliging the Member States to establish one
authority that both examines and decides on applications, a specialised asylum
agency that is responsible for procedures, in accordance with the UNHCR
Handbook.101 This agency must perform examination at first instance, unless
one of the exceptions of Article 3A(2) applies. Article 3A(1) requires that
examination by the “determining authority” complies with “in particular
Articles 7(2) and 8” PD, two of the “basic principles and guarantees” in
Chapter II. Article 7(2) requires an “appropriate” examination, and stipulates
that both examination and decision must be “individual”, “impartial” and
“objective”; the personnel that examine applications must be properly
trained.102 All these requirements are not stated for other authorities responsi-
ble pursuant to Article 3A(2); Article 3A(3) merely requires that the person-
nel of such other authorities be properly trained. Hence, the Procedures
Directive sets certain standards for examination by the “determining authori-
ty” pursuant to Article 3A(1), which do not apply to other “responsible author-
ities” appointed on the basis of Article 3A(2). 
For practical purposes, we can conclude that Articles 7(2) and 8 PD apply
in any procedure if examination is done by the “determining authority” as
meant in Article 3A(1) (thus irrespective of applicability of the ‘basic princi-
ples and guarantees’), as well as to examination by “another authority” if both
provisions apply by virtue of applicability of “the basic principles and guaran-
tees of Chapter II”, that is, in the ‘normal border procedure’. Article 3A(3)
therefore has practical meaning only when the examination is done by “anoth-
er authority” as meant in Article 3A(2), and the basic principles and guaran-
tees of Chapter II do not apply. 
[391] In summary, the scope of application of the “basic principles and safe-
guards” is defined as follows. All principles and safeguards of Chapter II
apply to the ‘normal’ and the ‘normal border procedures’; to the other special
procedures apply those safeguards that are mentioned in Articles 34 and 35(3)
PD, as well as Articles 6 and 15 PD. In Chapter II provisions that refer to the
“determining authority”, mean the “determining authority” as defined in
Article 2(e) PD. These provisions do not apply only to the specialised immi-
gration service meant in Article 3A(1), but also to any authority that is respon-
sible for examination and decision-making. 
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6.2.4.2 Standards on the ‘normal procedure’ and the ‘normal border
procedure’
Non-refoulement
[392] Article 6(1) PD states that
“[a]pplicants shall be allowed to remain in the Member State, for the sole
purpose of the procedure, until such time as the determining authority has
made a decision in accordance with the procedures at first instance […]. This
right to remain shall not constitute an entitlement to a residence permit.” 
The provision secures protection from refoulement during the examination at
first instance; protection from refoulement after the decision at first instance
has been taken is left to domestic law (see paragraph 6.3.2). At what moment
does the protection of Article 6(1) PD set in? According to Article 5(1) PD,
“Member States may require that applications for asylum be made in person
and/or at a designated place”.103 Hence, the protection afforded by Article 6(1)
PD does not necessarily stretch from the moment that the alien reaches the
border of the Member State, and expresses his wish to apply for asylum to an
authority. But according to Article 5(5),
“Member States shall ensure that authorities likely to be addressed by
someone who wishes to make an asylum application are able to advise that
person how and where he/she may make such an application and/or may
require these authorities to forward the application to the competent
authority”, 
in accordance with the UNHCR Handbook.104 It appears that a request for pro-
tection already counts as an “application” before it has reached the competent
authorities. Arguably, the protection from refoulement by Article 6(1) PD
therefore stretches from the moment that the alien addressed some “authori-
ty”, until a decision has been taken.
[393] The right to remain during the ‘examination procedure’ suffers excep-
tion (inter alia, see further number [401]) where the Member States 
“will surrender or extradite, as appropriate, a person either to another
Member State pursuant to obligations in accordance with a European
Arrest Warrant or otherwise, or to a third country, or to international crimi-
nal courts or tribunals”.105
As the “European Arrest Warrant” may be issued only for certain punishable
acts,106 Article 6(2) PD also addresses surrender to other Member States “other-
wise”. We may further observe that surrender to “international courts or tri-
bunals” also implies extradition or surrender to the Member State or the third
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country that hosts the court or tribunal.107 Obviously, extradition or surrender is
without prejudice to the Member States’ obligations under the prohibitions of
refoulement as the Soering case showed (and the Framework Decision on the
European Arrest Warrant explicitly recognises).108 The Procedures Directive
does not address this issue, nor does it explicitly address the consequences of
extradition or surrender for the examination of the application.
Could applicants who are not protected from expulsion by Article 6 PD
rely on Article 21(1) QD? According to this provision, 
“Member States shall respect the principle of non-refoulement in accor-
dance with their international obligations.” 
The second paragraph states that 
“Where not prohibited by the international obligations mentioned in para-
graph 1, Member States may refoule a refugee, whether formally recog-
nised or not” 
when the grounds mentioned in Article 33(2) RC apply. It would follow that
Article 21(1) QD applies to unrecognised refugees such as applicants (see par.
8.7.1), and to persons within the scope of Articles 3 ECHR, 3 CAT and 7
CCPR whose application has not yet been assessed. However, the provisions
of the Qualification Directive address the content of the protection granted to
persons who qualify for “refugee status” or “subsidiary protection status”.109
Article 21 QD can therefore be relied on only after status determination. The
reference to unrecognised refugees in Article 21(2) QD concerns persons who
qualify for refugee status in the sense of Article 2(d) (and 13) QD, but to
whom the benefits of the Qualification Directive may be denied because the
grounds for expulsion in Article 33(2) or 32(1) RC apply (see further par. 8.5). 
Access
[394] The requirement that applications be examined and decided upon “indi-
vidually” (Article 7(2) PD) is partially elaborated in Article 5 PD, on “access
to the procedure”. Each adult has the right to make an application on his own
behalf. Member States “may” provide that an applicant can make an applica-
tion “on behalf of his/her dependants”; consent of the dependant adult is
required. 
To a certain extent, the provision secures that individual assessment take
place. There is however one important caveat. The circumstances of the
request for “consent” by the dependant may hinder a free deliberation or con-
sultation, or later developments (for example, assessment of facts by the legal
counsellor) may result in the finding that the consent was misinformed. An
obvious example would be the consent given by a woman to have her applica-
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tion making part of her husband’s, while she is not willing (because of her hus-
band’s physical presence) or unable (for mental reasons) to state that fear or
risk of rape would warrant a separate application (or who became aware of the
relevance of that rape for the application only after legal counselling). In order
to prevent such incidents from happening, each application should be assessed
individually. 
But Member States do not have to give “dependants” the opportunity of a
personal interview; any request by the dependant to have the application con-
sidered separately may be treated as a “subsequent” application which entails
that facts and elements that could have been put forward before the “subse-
quent” request can be left out of account (see number [440]). Once given, the
consent may thus effectively block any assessment of facts or elements indi-
cating well-founded fear or real risk of harm. 
[395] Unaccompanied minors must, and dependant minors110 may be offered
the opportunity to lodge an application on their own behalf.111 As in the case
of “dependant” adults discussed above, minors need not be offered the oppor-
tunity of an individual interview, and a later application by the minor (whether
still under eighteen, or having become an adult) may be treated as a “subse-
quent” application.112
Safeguards on the assessment
[396] According to the Preamble to the Procedures Directive, the “necessary
safeguards” on asylum procedures 
“should require that […] every applicant is to have effective access to pro-
cedures, the opportunity to co-operate and properly communicate with the
competent authorities so as to present the relevant facts of his case and suf-
ficient procedural guarantees to pursue his case at and throughout all
stages of the procedure”,113
which is in accordance with the UNHCR Handbook.114 Offering the opportu-
nity to cooperate and properly communicate implies that the applicant is
informed on the course of the procedure;115 “whenever necessary”, the appli-
cant must receive the services of an interpreter (paid for out of public funds),
“at least” when the personal interview is held (see below).116 Member States
“may provide for rules concerning the translation of documents relevant for
the examination of applications”.117 Hence, translation is not obligatory. 
As to legal counselling, Member States must “allow” applicants to consult
lawyers at their own costs.118 Free legal assistance is required only in the event
of a negative decision, hence in appeal proceedings (see further par. 6.3).119
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Further, the Directive sets some basic guarantees on decisions. Decisions must
be in writing; negative ones must be motivated.120 Further, applicants must be
given notice in due time of the decision in a language they may reasonably be
supposed to understand, and be informed of the possibility to challenge the
decision.121
[397] Most important among the safeguards on the assessment is the right to
a personal interview. Article 4(1) of the Qualification Directive obliges the
Member States (in fact the determining authority) to “assess” the relevant ele-
ments of the application. This obligation encompasses the duty to take inter
alia the individual circumstances of the applicant into account, and assess-
ment of his credibility.122 The Comment on Articles to the Proposal Procedures
Directive observes that 
“[s]ince in most if not all asylum cases the determining authority must
assess the credibility of statements and/or of the applicant on the basis of
all available facts, it is imperative for a proper assessment that applicants
have, as much as possible, the opportunity to bring these forward in a per-
sonal manner, i.e. in an interview”.123
Accordingly, Article 10(1) PD requires that
“[b]efore a decision is taken by the determining authority, the applicant for
asylum shall be given the opportunity of a personal interview on his/her
application for asylum with a person competent under national law to con-
duct such an interview.” 
The Procedures Directive provides for some further safeguards for this
interview. A person “competent under national law” must conduct it, who
is at any rate “sufficiently competent to take account of the personal or
general circumstances surrounding the application, including the appli-
cant’s cultural origin or vulnerability, in so far as it is possible to do so”.124
An interpreter should be present.125 The conditions under which the inter-
view is held should “allow applicants to present the grounds for their
applications in a comprehensive manner”126 and in particular ensure
“appropriate confidentiality”.127 It is left to the Member States to provide
whether or not the applicant can bring with him his legal counsellor.128 A
written report should be made of every interview, containing “at least the
essential information regarding the application, as presented by the appli-
cant, in terms of Article 4(2) [QD].”129 Applicants may, but need not be
given the right to comment on this report of the interview; they must have
“timely access” to it, but that timely access may be granted only after a
negative decision.130
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[398] In which types of cases must the Member States offer the opportunity of
a personal interview – in particular, must they do so only when the founded-
ness of the claim is addressed? Article 10(1) PD applies to a “decision” on an
“application” by the determining authority. Article 2(d) defines a (final) “deci-
sion” as a “decision whether an [applicant] be granted refugee status by virtue
of [the Qualification Directive]” (and which is no longer subject to a remedy).
Article 29(1) PD states that “Member States may only consider an application
for asylum as unfounded if the determining authority has established that the
applicant does not qualify for refugee status pursuant to Council Directive
2004/83/EC”. Thus, we must distinguish the decision on the granting of
refugee status (Article 2(d)) from the decision on qualification as a refugee
(Article 29(1)). Arguably, the definition in Article 2(d) is, read in conjunction
with Article 29(1), sufficiently broad to encompass admissibility decisions:
when a Member State turns down an application because the applicant should
turn to safe third country, it decides not to grant refugee status, without
addressing the qualification as a refugee. We may further observe that Article
38(1)(a) PD labels decisions on admissibility as “decisions”, apparently in the
sense of Article 2(d) PD.131
Hence, the scope of Article 10 is not restricted on decisions on “qualifica-
tion” for refugee status pursuant to the Qualification Directive. Rejection of
an application because another Member State is responsible or on (other)
grounds for inadmissibility that are mentioned in Article 25 PD may hence
take place only after the opportunity to an interview was offered. 
[399] This obligation to offer the opportunity of a personal interview is sub-
ject to a number of exceptions. To begin with, only adult “applicants” must be
given the opportunity to have an interview; dependant adults who gave the
consent meant in Article 5(3) PD (cf. number [394] above) “may”, not must,
be given the opportunity.132 As to minors, “Member States may determine in
national legislation the cases in which a minor shall be given the opportunity
of a personal interview”.133 Further, Member States may “take into account the
fact that an applicant failed to appear for a personal interview, unless he or she
had good reasons for the failure to appear”.134 Failure to appear hence may be
deemed to negatively affect the credibility. But such failure may have far more
serious consequences: Member States may assume that the applicant “impli-
citly withdrew” his application if he did not appear for the interview, “unless
the applicant demonstrates within a reasonable time that his failure was due to
circumstances beyond his control”135 – a far more stringent criterion than
“good reasons”.136
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Article 10 provides for four further exceptions to the obligation to offer the
opportunity of having an interview. First, the authority may decide not to hold
the interview when “it is not reasonably practicable” because the applicant is
“unable or unfit to be interviewed owing to enduring circumstances beyond
his/her control.”137 Article 10(2) lists the other three exceptions:
“The personal interview may be omitted where: 
(a) the determining authority is able to take a positive decision on the basis
of evidence available; or 
(b) the competent authority has already had a meeting with the applicant
for the purpose of assisting him/her with filling his/her application and
submitting the essential information regarding the application, in terms
of Article 4(2) [QD]; or 
(c) the determining authority, on the basis of a complete examination of
information provided by the applicant, considers the application as
unfounded in the cases where the circumstances mentioned in Article
23(4)(a), (c), (g), (h) and (j) apply”.
Read in conjunction with the ground mentioned under (a), those addressed
under (b) and (c) concern negative decisions that may be taken without an
interview. 
It follows from Article 10(2)(b) that the authority may decide to have the
“meeting” take the place of the “interview”. Application of this exception
would detract from the procedural safeguards offered by Article 10. Although
most requirements on the personal interview are equally applicable to this
meeting,138 interview and meeting cannot be considered as equivalent. Whereas
the interview serves to “allow applicants to present the grounds for their appli-
cations in a comprehensive manner”,139 the meeting serves the purpose of
assisting the filling of the application form and submitting “essential informa-
tion” meant in Article 4(2) QD – first and foremost, travel and identity data and
further the “reasons” for applying (cf. Article 10(2)(b) PD). Therefore, the
meeting does not address assessment of, in particular, the applicant’s credibili-
ty, one of the purposes of the personal interview (cf. number [397]). Moreover,
the applicant may not have stated all relevant information because he expected
that he would be able to do so in the subsequent interview. 
According to the exception under (c), no interview has to be held when the
safe third country exception or the safe country of origin rule applies.140 The
arrangements on these matters in the Directive both explicitly allow for rebut-
tal of the assumption that the country of origin or the third country is safe (see
numbers [446] and [527]). Obviously, omission of a personal interview seri-
ously affects the possibility of effective rebuttal. The other grounds concern
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applications that are “clearly unconvincing” (or some variant thereof) and sub-
sequent applications.141
[400] Absence of an interview does not prevent the authority from taking a
negative decision.142 But according to Article 10(5) PD, “absence of a personal
interview pursuant to paragraph 2(b) and (c) and paragraph 3 shall not
adversely affect the decision of the determining authority.” Arguably, the
omission of the interview in case of a negative decision by definition adverse-
ly affects that decision. Maybe the provision purports that in case the deter-
mining authority has only the slightest doubt, it should not apply Article
10(2)(b) or (c), but hold the interview. 
6.2.4.3 Standards on the special procedures
The preliminary procedure
[401] Pursuant to Article 24(a) PD, the ‘preliminary examination’ procedure
may “derogate” from the basic principles and guarantees of Chapter II PD.
Article 34 PD, on “procedural rules” for this procedure, states that 
“Member States shall ensure that applicants for asylum whose application
is subject to a preliminary examination pursuant to Article 33 enjoy the
guarantees listed in Article 9(1)” 
- that is, they must be informed on the procedure, receive the services of an
interpreter, not be denied the opportunity to communicate with UNHCR and
be given notice in reasonable time of the decision on the application. Article
34(3)(a) PD states that if “the outcome” of the preliminary procedure is a
negative decision, the applicant should be “informed” and the decision should
be motivated - apparently not necessarily in writing, as Article 8 PD (that does
not apply in this procedure) explicitly requires (see number [396]). As to the
other basic principles and safeguards, Article 15(1) PD (guarantees for
minors) applies on its own terms (thus not through reference in Articles 33 –
34 PD, see number [387]). 
Arguably, the same holds true for Article 6(1), on the right to remain 
during the examination at first instance. Article 6(1) protects the applicant
from expulsion until a “decision in accordance with the procedures at first
instance set out in Chapter III” is reached, such as the ‘preliminary procedure’.
Article 6(2) allows for an exception “where in accordance with Articles 33 and
34, a subsequent application will not be further examined” (emphasis
added).143 The exception of Article 6(2) PD therefore only applies after the
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decision144 has been taken that no new facts merit further examination in a new
procedure. Until that decision is reached, the subsequent applicant has the
right to remain pursuant to Article 6(1) PD. This reading finds confirmation
in the Commentary on Article 6, stating that
“[t]he second paragraph refers to a new Article that allows Member States
to have a special procedure for subsequent applications (see Articles 33
and 34). A preliminary procedure would allow member States to examine
whether or not there is reasonable cause to “open a new asylum proce-
dure”. From the moment it is decided not to do so, Member States are free
to remove applicants from their territory on the basis of an earlier decision
[emphasis added, HB].”145
Object and purpose of Article 6 require that this protection from refoulement
for subsequent applicants during preliminary examination should not be dis-
regarded. The Preamble to the Procedures Directive mentions as an objective
ensuring observance of the prohibition of refoulement as worded in Article 33
RC146 and as a general principle of Community law, “in particular” as laid
down in Article 19 Charter.147
[402] In view of the few safeguards that apply in the preliminary procedure,
the level of protection it offers is very low. The general requirements of Article
7 on examination do not apply – examination needs not be “appropriate”, nor
is it to be conducted “individually, impartially and objectively”. Further, there
is no explicit right to individual access to the procedure,148 decisions need not
be in writing, there is no right to a personal interview or to legal assistance or
representation, the requirements on detention, on access of UNHCR and pru-
dence as to disclosure of information to persecutors all do not apply.
Safeguards on the normal border procedures
[403] According to Article 24(b) PD, states may derogate from Chapter II prin-
ciples and safeguards in ‘normal border procedures’, but Article 35(1) states
that
“Member States may provide for procedures, in accordance with the basic
principles and guarantees of Chapter II, in order to decide, at the border or tran-
sit zones of the Member State, on the applications made at such locations”.
The Member States may provide that “another authority” than the specialised
asylum agency (the “determining authority” as addressed in Article 3A(1) PD)
is responsible for processing claims in this procedure, so border guards may
examine and decide in this procedure. But as observed previously, this has no
consequences for the application of the “basic principles and guarantees” of
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Chapter II (see number [389]). So after all, there is no difference between the
‘normal examination’ and the ‘normal border procedure’ as to the require-
ments that apply to examination and decision-making. 
Special border procedures
[404] The special border procedures that can be maintained pursuant to Article
35(2) may derogate from Chapter II (Article 24(b) PD).149 Article 35(3) PD
states that these procedures
“shall ensure in particular that the persons concerned:
- shall be allowed to remain at the border or transit zones of the Member
State, without prejudice to Article 6;150 and
- must be immediately informed of their rights and obligations, as
described in Article 9 (1) (a); and
- have access, if necessary, to the services of an interpreter, as described
in Article 9 (1) (b); and
- are interviewed, before the competent authority takes a decision in such
procedures, in relation to their application for asylum by persons with
appropriate knowledge of the relevant standards applicable in the field
of asylum and refugee law, as described in Articles 10 to 12; and
- can consult a legal adviser or counsellor admitted or permitted as such
under national law, as described in Article 13 (1); and
- have a representative appointed in the case of unaccompanied minors,
as described in Article 15 (1), unless Article 15(2) or (3) applies. 
Moreover, in case permission to enter is refused by a competent authority,
this competent authority shall state the reasons in fact and in law why his/her
application for asylum is considered as unfounded or as inadmissible.”
Notably absent are the general requirements on the competent authority laid
down in Article 7 that stipulates that decisions are taken impartially and objec-
tively; and the right to individual access (Article 5). It is not required that a
negative decision is put down in writing; the requirement to give notice of a
decision “in reasonable time” does not apply, nor the right to be informed
about the result of the decision to challenge it before a court or tribunal; nor
has the failed applicant any right to free legal assistance in such circum-
stances.151 Further, the safeguards on the appropriate conduction of a personal
interview ex Article 11 do not apply,152 nor do the requirements on detention
or access by a legal counsellor in detention.153 Finally, it is not required that the
applicant in this procedure could communicate with UNHCR.154
316 Chapter 6
Safe third neighbouring country procedures
[405] According to Article 24(2) PD, in the safe neighbouring country proce-
dure (Article 35A PD) derogation may be made from any principle or guaran-
tee laid down in Chapter II PD. But pursuant to Article 35A PD, a few safe-
guards do nevertheless apply. It must be “established on the basis of the facts”
that this procedure applies.155 As the decision to apply the procedure is subject
to appeal,156 we may assume that some record of this decision and these facts
should be made, but the Directive does not explicitly state so. Further, when
“implementing” such a decision, that is, when expelling the alien without pre-
vious examination of his claim, the “authorities” must “inform” him thereof
and give a document for the authorities of the third state to inform them that
no examination of the substance of the claim has taken place.157
6.2.5 Conclusions
[406] The Procedures Directive secures only to a limited extent that a mea-
ningful and rigorous scrutiny is made of applications for protection, as
required by relevant international law (cf. number [370]). It states a number of
safeguards that, no doubt, importantly contribute to a meaningful examination
of the claim, such as the prohibition on expulsion during the examination, the
right of the applicant to be properly informed, the right to an interpreter and
the right to a personal interview (numbers [392], [396] and [397]). However,
the Procedures Directive allows for exceptions from these safeguards that, if
applied by the Member States, may seriously affect the effectiveness of the
protection. As far as the safeguards stated in Chapter II serve to secure com-
pliance with international law, making exception to them may lead to variance
with relevant international law standards.
The Procedures Directive allows for derogation from some or most safe-
guards in the ‘special border’, the ‘preliminary’ and the ‘safe neighbour coun-
try procedure’. For example, the prohibition of expulsion before examination
does not apply in the ‘safe third neighbouring country procedure’, and the
applicant has no right to a personal interview in the ‘preliminary procedure’
(numbers [405] and [402]). Processing applications in these special proce-
dures in the absence of these and other safeguards might result in refoulement.
Further, in all procedures certain exceptions to various safeguards are
allowed for. Thus, the right to a personal interview may suffer exception in all
procedures on grounds that find no justification in international law. The
denial of the opportunity to state grounds in a personal interview in case a
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third country or the country of origin is generally considered as safe affects
the possibility of rebuttal, required by international law (see number [399]). A
most serious flaw is finally the failure to secure that each application is con-
sidered individually (number [394]). The Procedures Directive allows Member
States to provide that applications may be made on behalf of dependant adults
and minors. Once these dependants have consented, they have forfeited the
right to a personal interview. Consequently, all procedures may result in nega-
tive decisions where no meaningful assessment of individual circumstances of
those dependants have taken place at all. 
6.3 Appeal procedures
6.3.1 Standards of international and Community law
[407] As observed under number [365], international law does not specifical-
ly regulate asylum procedures. But a number of provisions of international law
do address appeal proceedings in general and are or might be of consequence
for asylum proceedings. I will subsequently discuss rules of international law
on access to the court and the right to fair trial (Articles 14 CCPR, 16 RC and
6 ECHR), the right to an effective remedy from violations of the European
Convention and the Covenant (Articles 13 ECHR and 2(3) CCPR), the impli-
cations of Article 33 RC and, finally, relevant general principles of
Community law and Article 47 Charter, which are informed by relevant inter-
national law.
The right to access to the court and to fair trial
[408] According to Article 14 CCPR,
“All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determi-
nation of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations
in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.” 
The right to a (fair) trial is thus confined to “the determination of rights and
obligations in a suit at law”. May we assume that procedures on expulsion
decisions fall within the scope of the right to a fair trial?158 The term “suit at
law” in the English language version refers to civil proceedings; the same
holds true for the French and Russian language versions.159 The views of the
Human Rights Committee offer no clue for assuming that this restriction to the
scope of Article 14(1) no longer applies.160 Rather, the Committee holds the
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view that as Article 13 (discussed in number [467] below) “speaks directly”
on the right to a remedy in expulsion cases, and as it 
“incorporates notions of due process also reflected in Article 14 of the
Covenant, it would be inappropriate in terms of the scheme of the Covenant
to apply the broader and general provisions of Article 14 directly”.161
In summary, there are not sufficient grounds to assume that Article 14 CCPR
applies to asylum procedures. 
[409] According to Article 16 RC, 
1. A refugee shall have free access to the courts of law on the territory of
all Contracting States.
2. A refugee shall enjoy in the Contracting State in which he has his habi-
tual residence the same treatment as a national in matters pertaining to
access to the Courts, including legal assistance and exemption from
cautio judicatum solvi.
3. A refugee shall be accorded in the matters referred to in paragraph 2 in
countries other than that in which he has his habitual residence the treat-
ment granted to a national of the country of his habitual residence.”
Does Article 16 RC grant a right of appeal to a domestic court against deci-
sions on admission or the determination of refugee status?162 The provision
merely addresses the issue of access to the court, not the content of procee-
dings. In particular, the notion of equal treatment in Article 16(2) addresses
matters concerning access to the court, not what kind of subject matter should
be open to appeal before a court.163 Hence, Article 16 RC has no implications
for asylum procedures.
[410] Article 6(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights,164 the right
to a fair trial, implies a right to have a claim concerning one’s “determination
of civil rights and obligations” and “criminal charges” brought before a court
or tribunal.165 However, it does not apply to expulsion cases. In its judgement
Maaouia the European Court of Human Rights decided that decisions by the
states concerning entry, stay or deportation of aliens do not concern the deter-
mination of civil rights and obligations nor a criminal charge within the mea-
ning of Article 6(1) ECHR.166 The standards of Article 6(1) ECHR however do
apply as general principles of Community law (see below number [417]). 
Effective remedy from violations of Article 3 ECHR and 7 CCPR
[411] Article 13 ECHR provides, as far as relevant for present purposes, that 
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention
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are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority
[…]”.
Thus, the Contracting states must provide individuals, whose rights have been
violated, with an “effective remedy” before a “national authority”. According to
well-established case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the right to
an effective remedy applies not only when a violation has taken place, but also
in case of an “arguable claim” or “arguable complaint” of such a violation.167
When is a claim “arguable”? The European Court of Human Rights has never
given a definition,168 but its case law offers some guidelines. A remedy for
“unmeritorious” claims is not required.169 Further, “in principle” the same thres-
hold applies as to appeals to the Strasbourg organs.170 The European Court of
Human Rights declares appeals “inadmissible for manifest ill-foundedness” if
“there is not even a prima facie case against the respondent state”.171 Thus, in prin-
ciple a complaint is not arguable if there is no prima facie risk of refoulement.
Occasionally, the European Court of Human Rights has considered com-
plaints under Article 13 ECHR although the claim under Article 3 ECHR was
“manifestly unfounded”.172 But in a recent admissibility decision, it stated that
an applicant had no “arguable claim”, as his complaint of violation of Article
3 ECHR was “manifestly ill-founded”.173 So in sum, Article 13 ECHR requires
an effective remedy in expulsion proceedings, unless there is no prima facie
risk that the expulsion would violate Article 3 ECHR.
[412] The authority that should offer the remedy “may not necessarily in all
circumstances be a judicial authority in the strict sense”, but if it is not, its
powers and the guarantees as to its impartiality and independence are relevant
in determining whether the remedy is effective.174 For a remedy must satisfy
two requirements in order to be effective. Firstly, it must allow the competent
authority to deal with the “substance” of the complaint (see below). Secondly,
the remedy must allow the authority to grant the protection seeker appropriate
relief,175 i.e. it must be competent to quash the decision to expel176 and to sus-
pend its implementation (the expulsion).177 The scrutiny on both requirements
must be both “independent” from the scrutiny by the decision maker,178 as well
as “rigorous”.179 In Jabari, the European Court of Human Rights further
explicitly stated that even if the authority that decided at first instance has
made “no assessment […] of the applicant’s claim to be at risk [of ill-treat-
ment] if removed”, the appeal authority should address “the substance of the
applicant’s complaint”.180 
[413] Hence, a remedy is effective only if the competent authority can deal
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with the substance of the claim, that is, consider the appeal on its merits. Just
how “rigorously” it should consider those merits is somewhat unclear. Does
the effectiveness requirement entail that the competent authority can submit a
decision to a full judicial review, or does a limited judicial review suffice? And
should the authority be competent to reach findings of fact for itself?181
These issues have been brought forward in a couple of cases where appli-
cants complained that the remedy afforded by UK courts was not effective for
the purposes of Article 13 ECHR, because of the applied standard of judicial
review.182 The European Court however accepted that standard of review as
sufficiently effective, observing that the test as applied in expulsion cases
does not allow for “a wide area of discretion afforded to the authorities”.183
Further, in both Hilal as well as Bensaid the Court renders the “relevant
domestic practice”, the way in which UK courts apply this standard of review
as follows:
“the domestic court’s obligation on an irrationality challenge in an Article
3 case is to subject the Secretary of State’s decision to rigorous examina-
tion and this it does by considering the underlying factual material for itself
to see whether it compels a different conclusion to that arrived at by the
Secretary of State. […] In circumstances such as these, what has been
called the ‘discretionary area of judgement’ - the area of judgement within
which the Court should defer to the Secretary of State as the person prima-
rily entrusted with the decision on the applicant’s removal is a decidedly
narrow one [emphasis added, HB].”184
It appears that the Court accepts that the UK standard of review as it is ren-
dered here, is “effective” for the purposes of Article 13 ECHR. In itself, it does
not follow that that Article 13 ECHR requires that the appeal authority consi-
ders the facts for itself, and that the area of judgement left to the decision
maker is “a decidedly narrow one”. But arguably, a judicial authority that can-
not consider the facts, and that does allow the decision-maker a considerable
degree of discretion, would not perform an “independent and rigorous scruti-
ny” of the substance of the claim as required by Article 13. 
Moreover, both requirements on the domestic remedy follow from the very
system of human rights protection under the Convention. The obligation to
ensure that the rights and freedoms laid down in the European Convention are
being observed lies primarily with the Contracting states. In order to perform
under this obligation, the States must establish, pursuant to Article 13 ECHR,
an independent authority that can offer redress in individual cases. The Court’s
surveillance of the state’s compliance to the Convention is subsidiary to this
surveillance by domestic courts.185 This tenet is reflected in the requirement for
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admissibility before the Strasbourg organs, that all domestic remedies have
been exhausted.186 If domestic procedures offered lesser procedural safeguards
than the appeal procedure in Strasbourg, the latter would lose its subsidiary
nature. And the European Court does, if necessary, do findings of facts for
itself,187 and its review in expulsion cases under Article 3 ECHR can only be
described as full. 
[414] Finally, the procedure before the European Court provides for some
guidance as to the implications of the requirement of effectiveness. In
Mamatkulov I, the Court elaborated upon the implications of the “effective
exercise of the right of appeal” to the Court under Article 34 ECHR: the prin-
ciple of “equality of arms” and “the applicant’s right to sufficient time and suf-
ficient facilities in which to prepare his or her case” should be respected.188
Because of the subsidiary nature of the Court’s scrutiny, domestic asylum pro-
cedures should at least offer the same level of procedural protection as the
Court’s procedures do. Both principles therefore apply to domestic asylum
proceedings. 
Article 2(3) CCPR
[415] Article 2(3) CCPR provides that
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: 
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recog-
nized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that
the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capa-
city; 
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right
thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative
authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the
legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial
remedy; 
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies
when granted.”
Article 2(3) CCPR confers an obligation similar to the one laid down in
Article 13 ECHR. The Human Rights Committee appears to follow the case
law of the European Court, where it only requires that a person has a ‘claim’
that his CCPR rights have been violated, rather than that these violations had
already occurred before Article 2(3) can apply.189 It does not follow from the
Committee’s views that Article 2(3)(a) sets stricter requirements on the effec-
tiveness of the remedy than Article 13 ECHR does.190
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In addition to Article 13 ECHR, Article 2(3)(b) requires that the Contracting
states “develop the possibilities of judicial remedy”. According to Boeles, it
follows that the notion of an “effective remedy” ex Article 2(3) CCPR should
be understood as an appeal to the judiciary, unless the nature of the human
rights violation and the nature of the domestic judicial system render interven-
tion by another authority more effective.191 Boeles goes on to say that states
cannot turn back an already developed judicial remedy; and at a certain
moment in time, the development of judicial remedy must be completed. But
arguably, the provision rather suggests a certain margin of appreciation for the
states to choose the authority that should offer the remedy,192 and the wording
of the provision is too general to infer from it a standstill clause. In summary,
it appears that Article 2(3) has little if any significance for protection proce-
dures in the European Union next to Article 13 ECHR.
The prohibitions of refoulement
[416] The prohibitions of refoulement set conditions on asylum proceedings
(see number [365]), and hence also on appeal proceedings. Next to Articles 13
ECHR and 2(3) CCPR, Articles 3 ECHR and 7 CCPR have little practical
meaning (see, however, number [499]). As to Article 33 RC, we saw above that
the provision does not require specific types of asylum procedures. In parti-
cular, the provision does not require appeal proceedings. This follows from a
reading in accordance with Article 32 RC. The latter provision, on expulsion
of “lawfully present” refugees, explicitly requires the opportunity to appeal to
a court (see under paragraph 6.5.1). It follows that this opportunity is not
implied by the prohibition on expulsion. It would be unreasonable to assume
that it is implied by the prohibition on refoulement.193
But if Contracting states do set up appeal procedures, they must give full
effect to Article 33 RC (number [365]). Most important in this respect is the
obligation not to expel unrecognised refugees (asylum seekers) pending
appeal proceedings, provided their claim meets a certain threshold. Article 33
RC demands so for two reasons. Firstly, because of the irreparable nature of
expulsion, i.e. the effectiveness principle. Secondly, the fact that in status
determination procedures the refugee is usually the most important source of
proof. This requires his presence for proper decision-making by the highest
authority concerned – that is, if domestic law provides for appeal to a court,
the judiciary. Accordingly, the UNHCR Handbook states that the applicant
“should be permitted to remain in the country while an appeal to a higher
administrative authority or to the courts is pending”.194 Confirmation can be
found in a judgement by the Dutch Supreme Court. In Mosa II, it stated that
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pursuant to Article 33 RC, appeal against a negative decision on a claim for
refugee status must suspend expulsion, unless it has been established beyond
reasonable doubt that the alien is not a refugee.195 This standard is quite simi-
lar to the “arguable claim” threshold that applies under Articles 13 ECHR and
2(3) CCPR.
Community law requirements
[417] The Preamble to the Procedures Directive observes that
“It reflects a basic principle of Community law that the decisions taken on
an application for asylum and on the withdrawal of a refugee status must
be subject to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal in the meaning
of Article 234 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. The
effectiveness of the remedy, also with regard to the examination of the rele-
vant facts, depends on the administrative and judicial system of each
Member State seen as a whole”.196
Indeed the Luxembourg Courts have elaborated a set of general principles of
Community law that have to do with the right to a fair trial, such as the “prin-
ciple that everyone is entitled to fair hearing or a process within a reasonable
time”,197 the “principle of equality of arms” in administrative proceedings,198
and the “principle of effective legal protection” whereto the PD Preamble
refers (the content of the latter principle will be discussed extensively in para-
graph 9.1.1).199
According to well-established case-law of the European Court of Justice,
these principles are inspired by Article 6 and Article 13 ECHR.200 But impor-
tantly, unlike the European Court of Human Rights (see number [410]), the
European Court of Justice has never limited the scope of the principles
inspired by Article 6 ECHR to “civil rights and obligations or criminal
charges”. Rather, it appears that “everyone” is entitled to the protection affor-
ded by these principles. The issue was touched upon in Z v European
Parliament.201 Z complained that the Community authorities had not observed
some time limit laid down in a Staff Regulations provision in the disciplinary
proceedings against him. He stated that the proceedings were therefore not in
accordance with his right to fair hearing within a reasonable time under
Article 6(1) ECHR. The European Court of Justice stated:
“As regards the argument based on Article 6(1) of the Convention, and
without there being any need to determine whether that provision is appli-
cable to the disciplinary proceedings provided for in the Staff Regulations,
it should be recalled that Article 6(1) provides that in the determination of
his civil rights or obligations or of any criminal charge against him, every-
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one is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time, by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law. As its wording clear-
ly shows, Article 6(1) of the Convention does not lay down precise time-
limits […] As regards the application of the general principle of
Community law that everyone is entitled to legal process within a reason-
able period see Case C-185/95 P Baustahlgewebe v Commission [1998]
ECR I-8417, paragraph 21) […; emphasis added, HB].”202
Thus, the European Court of Justice distinguishes between on the one hand the
testing to the wording of Article 6(1) ECHR (which as the Court suggests may
not apply to the disciplinary proceedings), and on the other hand the testing to
the Community principle. The Court of Justice implies here that restrictions
on the scope of Article 6 ECHR do not apply to the general principle of
Community law. 
[418] Hence, the case-law of the European Court of justice suggests that the
general principles of Community law inspired by Article 6 ECHR apply to any
proceeding, not only to those on civil rights and obligations or criminal
charges. Advocate General Alber explicitly stated that the procedural safe-
guards meant in Article 6 ECHR apply to any “right ‘guaranteed by the law of
the Union’”.203 He referred in that connection to Article 47 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights. According to this provision,
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union
are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in com-
pliance with the conditions laid down in this Article.
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by
an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone
shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented.
Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources
insofar as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice.”
The first paragraph corresponds to the text of Article 13 ECHR, save for the
requirement that the remedy should be “before a tribunal”. The right to a fair
hearing in the first clause of the second paragraph corresponds to the first
clause of Article 6 ECHR. The second clause of the second paragraph has no
literally corresponding counterpart in Article 6 ECHR; probably it is inspired
by Article 6(3)(c) ECHR (that applies to criminal charges).204 The third para-
graph of Article 47 is, according to the Explanation, a codification of relevant
case law by the European Court of Human Rights on Article 6; finally, the
Explanation states that “the guarantees afforded by the ECHR apply in a sim-
ilar way to the Union.”205
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[419] Thus, Article 47 Charter encompasses all procedural safeguards affor-
ded by Articles 6 and 13 ECHR. The absence of a restriction to “the determi-
nation of civil right and obligations” as in Article 6(1) ECHR appears to be
intentional: according to the Explanation, it follows from the case law of the
European Court of Justice that this restriction does not apply to Union
(Community) law.206 It would follow that asylum proceedings do fall within the
scope of the provision.
But the wording of the provision nevertheless yields some uncertainty on
its scope of application. Pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 47, read in
accordance with the relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights
(cf. number [411]), anyone who has an “arguable claim” that his Union rights
are or will be violated is entitled to the protection afforded by the provision.207
Article 6(1) ECHR however “secures to anyone the right to have any claim
relating to his civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal”.208
Hence, Article 6(1) ECHR applies to a mere claim, not only to “arguable”
claims. Should we assume that Article 47 Charter does not apply to claims that
are not arguable? Arguably, we should not. It follows from object and purpose
of the Charter as well as from the Explanation to Article 47 Charter that the
difference in wording from Article 6 ECHR was meant to expand the scope of
application, and not to set a higher threshold. Article 52(4) Charter corrobo-
rates this reading.209 So despite the text of the first paragraph of Article 47
Charter, we may assume that the right to access to a Court and the relevant
standards apply to any claim concerning a Union right. In fact, the provision
would then apply in case of a “contestation” on a Union right.210
Conclusions
[420] The obligations as to appeal proceedings resting on the Member States
pursuant to international law amount to the following. The Member States
must provide for an effective remedy against a decision to expel if the alien
can present an “arguable claim” that expulsion will result in ill treatment
(Articles 13 ECHR and 2(3) CCPR). A claim is arguable for the purposes of
Article 13 ECHR if the claimant runs prima facie a real risk of ill treatment
upon expulsion. The remedy must satisfy several conditions. The “authority”
that is to offer the remedy must perform an independent and rigorous scrutiny
(Article 13 ECHR). This implies that it can do findings of fact for itself, and
that the review of the decision to expel is not limited to issues of law (Article
13 and 3 ECHR). The principle of equality of arms applies, and the applicant
should be offered sufficient time and facilities to prepare the case (Article 34
read in conjunction with 13 ECHR, see number [414]). The authority must
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have the power to suspend expulsion of those who have an arguable claim that
expulsion will result in ill treatment (Article 13 ECHR). Arguably, states can-
not expel an alien who appealed to Article 3 ECHR without allowing him to
apply for leave to remain to this authority, as it is this authority who decides
on the arguability of the claim. If the alien claims to be a refugee, he cannot
be expelled until the authority has decided upon the case unless it is beyond
reasonable doubt that he is not a refugee (Article 33 ECHR). 
International law has served as a source of inspiration for the general princi-
ples of Community law concerning appeal proceedings, as well as for Article 47
Charter. But these principles and this Charter provision offer in several respects
more extensive protection. To begin with, they require an effective remedy if a
right guaranteed by Community law is affected (the “arguable claim” require-
ment does not apply). Moreover, the obligations laid down in Article 6 ECHR
apply to all Community rights (thus not only to “civil rights and obligations or
criminal charges”) – including administrative proceedings, such as asylum pro-
cedures. It follows that under Community law, the effective remedy must be
offered before a court or tribunal, and legal aid must be available. 
6.3.2 CEAS provisions on appeal in asylum procedures
The Procedures Directive addresses three issues concerning appeal. First, it
stipulates against which decisions applicants have “the right to an effective
remedy before a court or tribunal”. Second, it states some procedural safe-
guards on appeal proceedings. Third, it imposes the obligation on Member
States to issue domestic legislation on a number of issues concerning the
organisation of appeal proceedings, and the safeguards that apply.
Scope of application
[421] According to Article 38(1),
“Member States shall ensure that applicants for asylum have the right to an
effective remedy before a court or tribunal, against the following:
(a) a decision taken on their application for asylum, including a decision:
(i) to consider an application inadmissible pursuant to Article 25(2),
(ii)at the border or in the transit zones of a Member State as described
in Article 35(1);
(iii) not to conduct an examination pursuant to Article 35A;
(b) a refusal to re-open the examination of an application after its discon-
tinuation pursuant to Articles 19 and 20;
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(c) a decision not to further examine the subsequent application pursuant
to Articles 33 and 34;
(d) a decision refusing entry within the framework of the procedures pro-
vided for under Article 35(2)”. 
Article 38(1) PD does not make explicit mention of all negative decisions that
may be taken in the procedure at first instance. Absent from the list is an
explicit reference to the decision to reject a claim as unfounded (or manifest-
ly unfounded) pursuant to Article 29 PD. But undoubtedly, any decision pur-
suant to Article 29 PD is “a decision on [an] application for asylum” as meant
in Article 38(1)(a) (which gives a non-exhaustive list, cf. the term “inclu-
ding”). Not mentioned either is the decision to dismiss an application because
another Member State is responsible according to the Dublin Regulation.
Articles 19 and 20 of that instrument state that such decisions “may”, not
must, “be subject to an appeal or review”. Hence, the Dublin Regulation
leaves the Member States discretion in this matter. As argued under number
[363], relevant domestic law is subject to the obligations imposed by the
Procedures Directive. Therefore, Member States must offer an effective reme-
dy before a court or tribunal from a decision to reject an application based on
the Dublin Regulation pursuant to Article 38(1) first clause and under (a) PD.
Finally, the decision to discontinue or reject the application in accordance with
Articles 19 or 20 PD is not mentioned, but Article 38(1)(b) offers redress in
such cases. 
In summary, Article 38(1) PD requires the opportunity of a remedy against
any negative decision in the asylum procedure, in accordance with relevant
international and Community law.
Organisation
[422] The Procedures Directive provides for only a few rules on the organisa-
tion of appeal procedures. They must be before a court or tribunal.211 Domestic
legislation “shall provide for time limits and other necessary rules for the
applicant to exercise his/her right to an effective remedy”.212 Applicants may
be required “to cooperate”, which could entail inter alia a duty “to report in
person” “at a specified time”.213 The Member States may provide for legisla-
tion on “the conditions under which it can be assumed that an applicant has
implicitly withdrawn or abandoned” the remedy.214 Article 38(5) PD suggests
another ground for a negative final decision: when the applicant has a status
equivalent to refugee status by virtue of the Qualification Directive, he 
“may be considered to have an effective remedy where a court or tribunal
decides that the remedy pursuant to paragraph 1 is inadmissible or unlike-
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ly to succeed on the basis of insufficient interest on the part of the appli-
cant in maintaining the proceedings”. 
However, beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status are excluded from the
right to family reunification set out in the Family Reunification Directive,
which does contain a favourable arrangement for refugees (see paragraph
8.4.3). The Family Reunification Directive thus invests subsidiary protection
beneficiaries with family members in the country of persecution with “suffi-
cient interest” to challenge his failed request for refugee status.
Domestic law “may” provide for time limits for the court or tribunal to
examine the decision by the determining authority.215 In case the applicant is
held in detention, Member States “shall ensure that there is the possibility of
speedy judicial review”.216
Safeguards
[423] Among the safeguards that the Procedures Directive imposes on appeal
proceedings, the most important one is doubtless the requirement that they be
“effective”.217 Several safeguards laid down in the Directive serve to secure the
effectiveness. Applicants (or their legal representatives) must be given notice
“in reasonable time” of the decision at first instance.218 Applicants must be
informed about inter alia how they can “challenge a negative decision”.219
During appeal procedures, they must receive the services of an interpreter for
submitting their case whenever necessary and they must not be denied the
opportunity to communicate with UNHCR.220 Important for the opportunity to
challenge the decision effectively are further the requirements that the nega-
tive decision be motivated, and that the applicant has access to the report of
the interview.221 The appeal authorities must have “access” to the determining
authority’s “general information” on the country of origin,222 and to all infor-
mation in the applicant’s file, “except where such access is precluded in
national security cases.”223 These requirements serve the effectiveness of the
access to the court (as required by Article 47 Charter).
[424] Importantly, in appeal proceedings free legal assistance must be provi-
ded on request.224 However, this obligation is subject to a number of excep-
tions. Member States may provide inter alia that free legal assistance is avai-
lable only in appeal “in accordance with Chapter V” (i.e. Article 38 PD), thus
not to further appeal, and/or only “if the appeal or review is likely to suc-
ceed”.225 Obviously, especially the last-mentioned ground seriously affects the
effectiveness of the safeguard, and may amount to circular reasoning. The
Directive appears to appreciate this where it states that
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“Member States shall ensure that legal assistance and/or representation
granted under subparagraph (d) is not arbitrarily restricted”.226
Arguably, in order to give this clause and the right to free legal assistance any
meaning, we must assume that the decision on whether or not free legal assis-
tance may be denied pursuant to Article 13(3)(d) PD must be taken by another
authority than the determining authority (that issued the negative decision and
hence by definition holds the view that the appeal is not likely to succeed). This
reading is also warranted by the relevant general principle of Community law,
as well as the right to legal aid laid down in the third clause of Article 47 Charter. 
The counsellor should have access “to such information in the applicant’s file
as is liable to be examined by” the court or tribunal, but only “insofar as the
information is relevant for the examination”. Further exception may be made 
“where disclosure of information or sources would jeopardise national
security, the security of the organisations or persons providing the informa-
tion or the security of the person(s) to whom the information relates or
where the investigative interests relating to the examination of applications
of asylum by the competent authorities of the Member States or the inter-
national relations of the Member States would be compromised”.227
Obviously, restrictions to access to the applicant’s file may seriously affect the
effectiveness of the remedy.
[425] An important issue is suspension of expulsion during appeal procee-
dings, required by Article 13 ECHR and Article 33 RC and relevant
Community law.228 According to Article 38(3), 
“Member States shall, where appropriate, provide for rules in accordance
with their international obligations dealing with:
(a) the question of whether the remedy pursuant to paragraph 1 shall have
the effect of allowing applicants to remain in the Member State con-
cerned pending its outcome; and
(b) the possibility of legal remedy or protective measures where the reme-
dy pursuant to paragraph 1 does not have the effect of allowing appli-
cants to remain in the Member State concerned pending its outcome.
Member States may also provide for an ex officio remedy”. 
Thus, the Procedures Directive acknowledges that the matter is relevant for
performance under relevant international law, but leaves the organisation to
domestic legislation. 
As to appeal against negative decisions based on the Dublin Regulation,
Articles 19(2) and 20(1)(e) DR state that the appeal (or review) 
“shall not suspend the implementation of the transfer unless the courts or
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competent bodies so decide on a case by case basis if national legislation
allows for this.” 
Should we assume that the Member States are prohibited from adopting or
maintaining legislation stating that appeal suspends expulsion? Vermeulen
observes that this implication would be at variance with the subsidiarity princi-
ple.229 Further, the legal basis of procedural rules in the Dublin Regulation is not
Article 63(1)(a), but 63(1)(d) TEC (see number [187]). The Dublin rules on
suspension are hence minimum standards that allow Member States to retain or
introduce legislation departing from Articles 19 and 20 DR to the benefit of
applicants. Suspension of expulsion until the appeal authority has reached a
final decision by virtue of legislation, secures protection from refoulement far
better than the possibility of requesting it during appeal proceedings. Arguably,
then, Article 19 and 20 DR should be read as allowing for such legislation. 
6.3.3 Conclusions 
[426] The Procedures Directive addresses a number of the standards set by
international law on appeal procedures. According to Article 38(1) PD, all
types of negative decisions on an application must be open to a remedy, and
this remedy must be offered before a court or a tribunal. Both requirements are
in excess of international law standards (that require a remedy only in case of
an “arguable claim”, and not necessarily before a court), and in compliance
with relevant Community law (number [420]). In this context, the grounds for
inadmissibility ex Article 38(5) deserve attention: it states that appeal against
a negative decision on an application for refugee status by subsidiary protec-
tion beneficiaries can be declared inadmissible, if under national law this
applicant is entitled to all benefits that the Qualification Directive bestows on
refugees. This denial of access to a remedy is not at variance with Articles 33
RC, 3 read in conjunction with 13 ECHR or Article 7 read in conjunction with
2(3) CCPR, as the subsidiary protection status protects the applicant from
refoulement. But the rules on family reunification in the Family Reunification
Directive that apply only to refugees (see numbers [583] and [598]) may invest
the applicant with sufficient interest in appeal from the negative decision on
his application for refugee status. Inadmissibility would then be at variance
with relevant principles of Community law, and with Article 47 Charter. 
Article 38(1) PD further requires that the remedy be “effective”, in accor-
dance with both international and Community law. But the Procedures
Directive secures the effectiveness of the remedy only partially. The important
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matter of suspension of expulsion during appeal proceedings is left to domes-
tic legislation, subject to the condition of accordance with international law.
Another important issue is not addressed at all: the scope of judicial review.
And the right to legal aid and to access to the files allows for many exceptions,
which may seriously affect the “rigorousness” of the review by the court, as
required by international law. Thus, Article 38 PD secures the right to an effec-
tive remedy as laid down in international law only partially.
6.4 Grounds for refusal
The CEAS establishes six grounds for refusal of a request for protection: (1)
inadmissibility; (2) the decision not to continue the examination because of
withdrawal of the application; (3) the decision not to further examine a subse-
quent application; (4) manifest unfoundedness; (5) unfoundedness otherwise,
and (6) application of the safe third neighbouring country procedure. 
In the following paragraphs, I briefly discuss the grounds for inadmissibi-
lity (in paragraph 6.4.1), the decision to discontinue examination and the
grounds for manifest unfoundedness (in paragraphs 6.4.2 and 6.4.3). The
Procedures Directive elaborates on three particular grounds for refusal, which
therefore merit more detailed discussion. First, subsequent applications
(addressed in par. 6.4.4); second, the concept of the ‘safe country of origin’
(addressed in paragraph 6.4.5) and third, requirements on application of the
safe third country exception. These rules, including the Dublin allocation
rules, are discussed separately, in Chapter 7. Grounds for considering an appli-
cation as unfounded “pursuant to the Qualification Directive” (cf. Article
29(1) PD) were discussed in Chapter 5.
6.4.1 Inadmissibility
[427] According to Article 25 PD, Member States “may” consider applications
inadmissible on nine grounds, which address three types of cases: 
(1) the exception of the safe third country as regulated in Article 26 or 27 PD
applies;230
(2) the applicant lodged an “identical” application after a final decision, or is a
“dependant” of another applicant, and consented in making his own application
part of the latter’s, and presented no facts justifying a separate application;231
(3) the applicant enjoys refugee status in another Member State232 or “equiva-
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lent” protection in the Member State where he applied,233 or has applied for
such equivalent protection.234
Is the decision to apply the Dublin Regulation an admissibility decision? The
Procedures Directive is somewhat indeterminate on the matter. On one hand,
it addresses this decision under the heading “cases of inadmissible applica-
tions”, but on the other hand it avoids labelling it as “inadmissible”.235 The rea-
son for avoiding this label could be, that when the Dublin Regulation is
applied, the exception from the obligation to examine follows from the Dublin
Regulation, not from the Procedures Directive.236 But as far as considering
qualification for protection status is concerned, the decision not to examine
the merits of a claim because another Member State is responsible (Articles
19(2) and 20(1)(f) DR) and an inadmissibility decision based on Article 25 PD
amount to the same. Hence, we may classify the Dublin decision under the
first group of grounds for inadmissibility.
[428] The first type of grounds for inadmissibility, all variants of the safe third
country exception, will be discussed in Chapter 7. The second type concerns
subsequent applications, to be discussed in paragraph 6.4.4.
The rationale behind the third type of grounds seems to be absence of inter-
est: the applicant already enjoys protection. The assumption that recognition
as a refugee by another state amounts to sufficient protection may also be seen
as a particular type of the safe third country exception, and will be discussed
in that context (see further paragraph 7.5.4). Inadmissibility because the appli-
cant enjoys “a status equivalent to the rights and benefits of refugee status by
virtue of ” the Qualification Directive reflects the assumption that Directive
refugee status is up to the standards set by international law. This assumption
is unjustified, if only because the Qualification Directive does not address the
full range of Refugee Convention benefits (see further paragraph 8.4.2).
Moreover, the benefits of the Family Reunification Directive apply only to
recognised refugees, not to persons enjoying some “equivalent” status.
Declaring a claim to refugee status inadmissible on the grounds of Article
25(2)(d) PD would entail denial of those benefits. Arguably, Member States
may therefore not apply this ground for inadmissibility when the applicant can
claim the relevant Refugee Convention or Family Reunification benefits.
6.4.2 Withdrawn applications
[429] The second type of grounds for refusal of a request for protection con-
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cerns withdrawn applications.237 The Procedures Directive distinguishes
between applications that are “explicitly”, and those that are “implicitly” with-
drawn (Articles 19 and 20 PD).
As to the first category, the Member States whose domestic law does “fore-
see the possibility of explicit withdrawal of the application” must in case of
explicit withdrawal decide either to “reject” or to “discontinue” the examina-
tion238 or “enter a notice” to the same effect in the applicant’s file. As the deci-
sion to discontinue examination is not open to appeal (see number [421]),
entering a notice instead of taking a decision does not in itself affect the legal
position of the applicant. 
As to implicitly withdrawn applications, Member States must ensure that
the determining authority decides to “discontinue” or “reject” the examination
when “there is reasonable cause to consider” that the applicant has either
“implicitly withdrawn”, or “abandoned” his application.239 Apparently, this
obligation applies also if domestic law did not “foresee the possibility of ”
implicit withdrawal or abandonment.240 Member States “may” (not must) con-
sider that the applicant implicitly withdrew his request “in particular” in two
situations. First, if the applicant
“has failed to respond to requests to provide information essential to
his/her application in terms of Article 4 [QD], or has not appeared for an
personal interview as provided for in Articles 10, 11 and 12 [PD], unless
the applicant demonstrates within a reasonable time that his failure was
due to circumstances beyond his control.”241
Second, the application has implicitly been withdrawn if the applicant left
without authorisation the place where he lived or was held, and did not con-
tact or report in time.242
Pursuant to the arrangement on “implicitly withdrawn” applications,
Member States may sanction failure to comply with procedural requirements
by rejecting the claim. According to relevant international law, procedural
requirements should “normally” be complied with (see number [369]). The
sanction of rejection is in itself not in violation of international law, provided
that the alien can still effectively invoke the prohibitions of refoulement.
Whether he can, will be discussed in the context of subsequent applications
(paragraph 6.4.4).
6.4.3 Manifestly unfounded applications
[430] The third type of grounds for refusal, “manifest unfoundedness or mani-
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festly unfounded”, is established in Article 29(2) PD that provides that
“In the cases mentioned in Article 23(4)(b) and in cases of unfounded appli-
cations for asylum in which any of the circumstances listed in Article
23(4)(a) and (c) to (o) apply, Member States may also consider an applica-
tion, if it is so defined in the national legislation, as manifestly unfounded”. 
So, Member States may label cases where one of the grounds for refusal lis-
ted in Article 23(4) applies as “unfounded” cases, or as “manifestly unfoun-
ded” ones. Oddly, the concept of “manifest unfoundedness” lacks any legal
consequences under the Procedures Directive.243 According to the first clause
of Article 23(4) PD, the listed (manifestly) unfounded cases may be dealt with
in the “accelerated” or “prioritised” procedure. But so may “any” case, pur-
suant to Article 23(3) PD (cf. number [376]). Articles 23(4) and 29(2) PD
appear to be the remnants of an arrangement in earlier drafts that was not
adopted.244
[431] For the purposes of European asylum law, the fifteen grounds listed in
Article 23(4) PD are therefore mere examples of unfounded claims. They con-
cern five types of cases: 
(1) the case is manifestly unfounded in the narrow sense: the applicant raised
issues that are “not relevant or of minimal relevance” for examination of
the merits, or the applicant “clearly” does not qualify,245 the applicant’s
statements are of such a kind that they make his claim “clearly unconvin-
cing”,246 or he made the application “merely in order to delay or frustrate”
expulsion based on an earlier decision;247
(2) the safe third country or safe country of origin arrangements apply;248
(3) the applicant lied or committed fraud249 or he is not co-operative;250
(4) the applicant “is a danger to the national security or the public order of the
Member State”,251 or 
(5) the applicant made a subsequent application, or he is a minor and the appli-
cation of his parents was rejected (and he stated no relevant new facts).252
[432] The fifth group, subsequent applications, will be addressed in paragraph
6.4.4; as to the second group, the safe country of origin concept is discussed
in paragraph 6.4.5 and the safe third country exception in Chapter 7. Here, we
should briefly address the relation of the first, third and fourth type with the
Qualification Directive. How are these grounds of (manifest) unfoundedness
classified in the terms of the latter instrument? 
The first type, manifestly unfounded cases in the narrow sense, concerns
cases where the applicant has (“clearly”) not sufficiently substantiated his
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claim. We should observe that if “aspects” of the claim are not supported by
evidence, they need no confirmation if the requirements of Article 4(5) QD
are fulfilled (see number [283]). Hence, application of Article 23(4)(a) and (b)
is limited by Article 4 QD. 
The third category concerns, in the terms of Article 4(1) of the
Qualification Directive, cases where the applicant failed to substantiate his
claim by submitting the elements mentioned in Article 4(2) QD, and hence did
not fulfil the requirement ex Article 4(5)(a) QD (see number [283]). As far as
the qualification is concerned, these cases therefore all amount to one ground
for unfoundedness. 
The fourth ground concerns rejection of the application because the appli-
cant “is a danger to the national security or the public order of the Member
State”. We may observe that Article 14(6) of the Qualification Directive esta-
blishes a special status of sorts for persons who qualify as refugees in the
sense of Article 2(c) QD, but who may be expelled in accordance with Article
33(2) RC because they are a danger to the security or community of the
Member State (cf. number [342]). Simple rejection of the application after
finding that one of these grounds applies entails denial of the benefits listed
in Article 14(6) QD. In order to comply with Article 14 QD, Member States
should therefore examine whether such an applicant qualifies as a refugee
under Article 2(c) QD.
6.4.4 Subsequent applications
6.4.4.1 Introduction
[433] According to the Preamble to the Procedures Directive, subsequent
applications warrant special procedural rules:
“[w]here an applicant makes a subsequent application without presenting
new evidence or arguments, it would be disproportionate to oblige Member
States to carry out a new full examination procedure”.253
If it has been established in a previous procedure that an applicant is not eligi-
ble for refugee or subsidiary protection, assessment of exactly identical facts and
circumstances upon a subsequent application would lead to the same outcome.
Hence, Member States are indeed justified in requiring that applicant states
“new” facts, that is, facts that were not assessed in the previous examination. 
But the procedural requirements on facts or circumstances that the subse-
quent applicant should submit may not result in raising the burden or standard
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of proof applicable under Article 1A(2) read in conjunction with33 RC or the
other prohibitions of refoulement.254 These prohibit expulsion in the case that
the alien has a well-founded fear of persecution or runs a real risk of ill-treat-
ment upon expulsion. In a subsequent as well as in a first procedure, the
assessment of this fear or risk of must include all relevant facts and circum-
stances at the time of taking the decision on the application.255 The circum-
stance that some relevant fact has not been stated in a previous procedure does
therefore not affect its relevance for the assessment of the applicant’s fear or
risk. Hence, the grounds stated in the subsequent application should be “new”
only in the sense that they were not assessed in the previous procedure.
Further, the “new” grounds need not, taken alone, suffice to substantiate the
claim. Rather, they should be assessed together with all other relevant facts
and circumstances – including those addressed in the previous examination. 
[434] In the Procedures Directive, three types of such “subsequent applica-
tions” can be distinguished. First, applications that were lodged after a deci-
sion on a previous application was reached. Second, applications that were
lodged after the applicant consented to the lodging of an application by a part-
ner or parent on his behalf. Third, applications that were lodged after the pre-
vious one was explicitly or implicitly withdrawn. In order to distinguish these
types I will refer to them as ‘repeated application’, ‘application by a depen-
dant’ and ‘application after withdrawal’; ‘subsequent application’ serves as the
generic term that covers all three types. The several arrangements for dealing
with each these types of subsequent applications are discussed in paragraphs
6.4.4.3, 6.4.4.4 and 6.4.4.5; paragraph 6.4.4.2 deals with an arrangement that
may apply to several types.
6.4.4.2 Subsequent applications lodged during the processing of the
former application
[435] A “subsequent application” as well as “further representations” may be
examined “in the framework” of the examination of the first application or
appeal proceedings against the earlier decision, “insofar as the competent
authorities can take into account and consider all the elements underlying the
further representations or subsequent application within this framework”.256
Thus, if a new application or new facts and circumstances are submitted
before a final decision was reached on the earlier application, the Member
States may deal with them in those proceedings. 
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This arrangement applies, it appears, both to ‘repeated applications’ as well as
to ‘applications by dependants’.257 The Procedures Directive gives no rules for
how the Member States should deal with subsequent submissions during the
previous procedure. 
In one case, the Procedures Directive explicitly provides for a new, subse-
quent procedure before the previous procedure has come to an end. A subse-
quent application lodged after the decision at first instance, hence before a
“final decision” in the previous procedure was reached (when appeal against
that decision is still open),258 may also be dealt with in the ‘preliminary proce-
dure’.259 This arrangement will be discussed immediately below. 
6.4.4.3 Repeated applications
[436] Repeated applications lodged after a final decision may be dealt with in
the ‘preliminary procedure’ (Articles 33 and 34 PD), or in other procedures be
dismissed as ‘inadmissible’ (Article 25(2)(f) PD) or as ‘manifestly unfounded’
(Article 23(4)(h) PD). These provisions state different criteria for deciding
whether the repeated application merits examination. 
If considered in the ‘preliminary procedure’, the repeated application must
according to Article 33(3) read in conjunction with (4) PD be “further” exa-
mined in the ‘normal examination’ or ‘border procedure’260 if 
“new elements or findings arise or have been presented by the applicant
which significantly add to the likelihood of the applicant qualifying as a
refugee by virtue of [the Qualification Directive]”
(or of his qualifying as a person eligible for subsidiary protection, we may
assume; cf. number [362]). Member States “may, in accordance with national
law”, further examine the repeated application “for other reasons” also. 261
Article 25(2)(f) PD states that an application may be declared inadmissi-
ble if “the applicant has lodged an identical application after a final deci-
sion”. Member States may declare the repeated application manifestly
unfounded, if “no relevant new elements were raised with respect to his/her
particular circumstances or to the situation in the country of origin”.262 The
provision does not state when examination of the foundedness of an “identi-
cal application” is warranted. We should observe that all other variants of the
subsequent application require that (further) examination takes place, and
that certain conditions are fulfilled. Arguably, we must therefore take the
term “identical” literally: only if the subsequent application is based on
exactly the same grounds as the previous one, may it be declared “inadmissi-
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ble”. If the applicant raises new elements, the application can therefore not
be declared “inadmissible”.
[437] What grounds are “new” for the purpose of Article 33(4) PD? Not only
new grounds that “arise”, but also new grounds that are “presented by the
applicant” after the previous examination merit “further examination” of the
application. It is therefore not required that the new facts or circumstances that
the applicant presents “arose” after the previous examination. It appears to be
sufficient that the applicant presents elements or findings that are “new” in the
sense that they were not addressed in the previous examination - quite in
accordance with relevant international law (see number [433] above). 
The term “raised”, employed in Article 23(4)(h) on (manifestly) unfounded
claims, is indeterminate in this respect. A reading in accordance with relevant
international law implies that it also concerns newly presented evidence that
could have been presented before. The context of Article 33(4) suggests so
too. We saw that it follows from Article 33(4) that even if the applicant pre-
sents new facts that he could have presented in the previous procedure, his
application merits further examination – that is, examination in the ‘normal’
or ‘normal border procedure’. In these procedures, Article 23(4)(h) PD
applies. The stipulation of Article 33(4) that these new facts merit further
examination would serve no purpose if those new facts may be disregarded
under Article 23(4)(h) PD. 
[438] Article 33(4) further requires that the new grounds “add significantly to
the likelihood” of the applicant’s eligibility. As argued above, any relevant fact
or circumstance submitted in the repeated application may, in combination with
the previously stated facts and circumstances, substantiate the claim for protec-
tion (see number [433]). Excluding facts that are relevant, and thus “add to the
likelihood” that the applicant is a refugee, but not significantly so, may result
in expulsion contrary to the prohibitions of refoulement and is therefore at vari-
ance with international law. Arguably, the “significance” requirement may
merely exclude grounds that (assessed in combination with facts and circum-
stances assessed in the previous procedure) are of only “minimal relevance” for
the qualification, as after further examination of such evidence, the application
would be considered only “manifestly unfounded” (cf. Article 23(4)(a) PD). 
Article 23(4)(h) PD does not stipulate that the new facts should “signifi-
cantly add to the likelihood” of qualification. It follows that the normal bur-
den of proof as established by the Qualification Directive applies. 
The new grounds that were submitted in the repeated application should be
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assessed in conjunction with facts and circumstances addressed in the previ-
ous examination (number [434] above). Indeed, the ‘preliminary procedure’
requires this. This follows from the term “add” in Article 33(4), and from
Article 3A(2)(c) PD that requires that the authority responsible for the
preliminary examination “has access to the applicant’s file regarding the pre-
vious application”. Article 23(4)(h) does not address the matter.
[439] Finally, Article 34(2) states that
“Member States may lay down in national law rules on the preliminary
examination pursuant to Article 33. Those rules may inter alia:
(a) oblige the applicant concerned to indicate facts and substantiate evi-
dence which justifies a new procedure;
(b) require submission of the new information by the applicant concerned
within a time limit after which it has been obtained by him or her”. 
It appears that Article 33(4)(2)(a) allows Member States to make exception to
Article 4(5) QD. According to the latter provision, statements by the applicant
need no further evidence if, inter alia, the applicant is, in general, credible (see
number [283] above). Article 34(2)(a) PD on the other hand allows for natio-
nal law that obliges the subsequent applicant to “substantiate evidence” that
justifies the new procedure. So the benefit of the doubt does not (necessarily)
apply to the subsequent applicant. As a result, a higher burden of proof applies
to subsequent applications than to first applications. As observed above, such
a rule is at variance with international law (number [433]). In this context, we
should observe that in the case of Hilal, the UK government had argued before
the Strasbourg Court that the belated statements of facts by Hilal negatively
affected his credibility.263 The European Court of Human Rights however did
not draw this belated statement into consideration when addressing the appli-
cant’s credibility.264 Rather, it applied the usual criterion for assessing whether
or not Hilal ran a real risk of being subjected to ill-treatment upon removal.265
As to Article 34(2)(b), we may observe again that the assessment of the
applicant’s eligibility for protection from refoulement should, according to
relevant international law, include all relevant facts. In order to conduct a
meaningful assessment of the claim, facts may therefore not be excluded from
assessment because they are submitted after the lapse of a time limit.
6.4.4.4 Applications by dependants
[440] Applications by dependants may be dealt with in the ‘preliminary pro-
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cedure’ (Article 33(7) PD), and turned down as ‘inadmissible’ (Article
25(2)(g) PD) or ‘manifestly unfounded’ (Article 23(4)(o) PD) in the other pro-
cedures. Article 33(7) PD states that the ‘preliminary examination’
“will consist of examining whether there are facts relating to the depen-
dant’s situation justifying a separate application”.266
The same condition applies to admissibility of applications by dependants.267
Neither Article 33(7) nor Article 25(2)(g) requires that the facts are “new”;
they merely must “relate to the dependant’s situation”. In the case of depen-
dant applicants, the previous examination addressed the application lodged by
the partner or parent on their behalf. Arguably, facts that were assessed in this
previous examination, but were (apparently) insufficient for substantiating the
claim of the parent or partner, could nevertheless qualify as facts that justify a
separate application by the dependant. Still, these provisions do not secure
compliance with international law as they do not state when such facts “justi-
fy” the separate application. Moreover, in cases where the dependant applica-
tion is processed in the ‘preliminary procedure’, the applicant may be denied
the opportunity of stating in a personal hearing why those facts justify a sepa-
rate application (see number [402]). 
Article 23(4)(o) addresses the minor whose previous application was
deemed, according to domestic law, to be part of the application of a 
parent;268 the minor hence did not “consent”.269 If the latter application has
been rejected, the “subsequent application” of the minor is (manifestly)
unfounded if “no new elements were raised with respect to his/her particu-
lar circumstances or to the situation in his/her country of origin”.270 The term
“new” distinguishes facts and circumstances not yet assessed in the previous
examination. But “elements” addressed in the examination of the application
of the parent may warrant of examination of the minor’s claim. In order to
comply with international law, the Member States should therefore disregard
the term “new” in Article 23(4)(o) PD, and include in the assessment all
relevant facts concerning the minor’s individual circumstances or the gene-
ral circumstances in the country of origin, relevant for the minor’s claim,
regardless of whether these facts were also assessed in the examination of
the parent’s application. 
6.4.4.5 Applications after withdrawal
[441] Article 20(2) PD offers the Member States two courses of action in the
case that an applicant “reports again” after a decision to discontinue the
341Asylum procedures
examination of his (first) application has been taken (see number [429]
above).271 First, they can examine the “request” as a subsequent application
in the preliminary procedure. Second, if they do not do so, they “shall
ensure” that the applicant has the opportunity to request that his case is 
“re-opened”. 
If the request is dealt with in the preliminary procedure, Member States
must “further examine” the application if “new facts or findings have arisen
that add significantly to the likelihood” of his eligibility for protection272 – the
same condition that applies to the repeated application (number [438] above).
But applications lodged after “withdrawal” differ from repeated applications
in that no previous assessment of facts and circumstances has taken place: the
decision in the previous procedure only addressed the applicant’s lack of co-
operation (or decision to withdraw). Hence, there are no grounds to consider
that facts and circumstances adduced in the previous application do not merit
eligibility for protection. The requirement that “new” grounds did arise or are
presented therefore lacks justification. In order to comply with their obliga-
tions under the prohibitions of refoulement, the Member States must “further
examine” any facts or circumstances that the applicant submits. Indeed,
Article 33(5) explicitly allows Member States to “further examine a subse-
quent application where there are other reasons according to which a proce-
dure has to be reopened”, “in accordance with national legislation”. 
[442] As to the second option, Article 20(2) does not state when the Member
States must “re-open” the case, but allows them to “provide for a time-limit
after which the applicant’s case can no longer be re-opened”. It appears that
after the lapse of this time limit, the application may be dealt with as a repea-
ted application, and hence may be limited to “new” facts or findings. Thus, the
facts and circumstances submitted in the previous application may be regar-
ded as if they were assessed and do not merit eligibility for protection. Article
20(2) PD shows awareness of the violation of international law to which this
fiction may lead where it states that 
“Member States shall ensure that such a person [i.e. a person whose
request to re-open the case is turned down] is not removed contrary to the
principle of refoulement”.
Accordingly, the provision continues as follows: 
“Member States may allow the determining authority to take up the exami-
nation at the stage where the application was discontinued”.
It follows from the above-said that the Member States should do so in order to
comply with their obligations under international law. 
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6.4.4.6 Concluding remarks
[443] The Procedures Directive does not introduce a common concept for
dealing with ‘subsequent applications’. Rather, the same kind of case may be
dealt with in different procedures, and different criteria of assessment may
apply. For example, ‘repeated applications’ (an application that was lodged
after a previous one by the same applicant was decided upon) may be exa-
mined in the ‘preliminary procedure’ as subsequent applications, or in another
procedure as inadmissible or as (manifestly) unfounded applications, depend-
ing on how a Member State’s asylum procedures happen to be organised. In
this respect, the Directive hardly establishes approximation of law. As a con-
sequence, the Directive allows for disharmony as to the application of “basic
principles and safeguards” to identical types of cases. For if the repeated appli-
cation is dealt with as grounds for inadmissibility in the ‘examination’ or ‘nor-
mal border procedure’, all “basic safeguards and guarantees” in Chapter II
apply. But if it is grounds for manifest unfoundedness, no personal interview
has to be held. And if the Member State happens to apply the ‘preliminary pro-
cedure’, very few safeguards apply. If the “basic principles and safeguards”
serve to ensure compliance with relevant international law, there is no justifi-
cation for this variation in treatment. 
[444] International asylum law allows the Member States to require that sub-
sequent applicants state new facts or circumstances. But the requirements may
not amount to raising the standard or burden of proof beyond well-founded
fear or real risk. Several provisions however (Articles 33(4), 23(4)(o) and
20(2) PD) do suggest standards that, if applied, would raise the standard of
proof. 
We should further observe that several arrangements concerning subse-
quent applications seem to serve the purpose of sanctioning belated statement
of facts, or lack of co-operation on the side of the applicant. Thus, Article 20
PD allows the Member States to do without examination in case of failure of
the applicant to report, and leaves them discretion as to the conditions on the
reopening the examination. Further, time limits may block relevant facts from
being assessed as to their relevance for qualification for protection (cf.
Articles 34(2)(b) and 20(2) PD). Finally, Member States may sanction belated
statement of facts by applying a special standard and burden of proof in the
preliminary procedure (Articles 33(4) and 34(2)(a) PD). Such arrangements
may be desirable for expeditious decision-making, but they exclude from
examination facts that are relevant for qualification as a refugee or as a person
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entitled to protection from refoulement. The obligation to provide for effective
protection from refoulement requires that these standards not be applied. 
6.4.5 The safe country of origin
6.4.5.1 Introduction
The concept
[445] The safe country of origin concept entails that the general situation in a
country of origin justifies the presumption that its nationals do not in general
qualify as refugees (or as persons in need of subsidiary protection).273 The safe
country of origin concept bears some resemblance to the safe third country
concept (to be discussed in Chapter 7). Both concepts entail a presumption
that a country is “in general safe” for applicants; in both cases, rebuttal of the
presumption may be allowed under certain conditions. However, the two con-
cepts address different questions. The safe third country exception concerns
the “safety” of a state other than the country of origin of the applicants. It does
not address – and is without prejudice to – the alien’s qualification as a refugee
or as a person within the scope of one of the prohibitions of refoulement. The
assumption that a third country is a “safe third country” for a particular appli-
cant entails that he could (and should) apply for protection there. The safe
country of origin exception, on the other hand, does address that qualification.
The assumption that a country is a safe country of origin for a particular appli-
cant means that he is not eligible for refugee or subsidiary protection, and
hence can be sent back to his country of origin.274
[446] The Procedures Directive lays down rules for two modalities of the safe
country of origin concept. First, the designation of third countries (i.e. non-
Member States) as safe by the Council. According to Article 30(1) PD, the
Council shall draw a “minimum common list” of safe third countries of ori-
gin. All Member States must (obligatorily) consider these countries as safe.
Applicants from those countries must have an opportunity to try and rebut this
presumption of safety under certain conditions (Article 30B(1) PD, see further
under number [454]). If the applicant does not manage to do so, the applica-
tion must (obligatorily) be turned down (Article 30B(2) PD, see further num-
ber [459]). 
Second, Article 30A PD allows Member States to draw national lists of safe
countries of origin (“national designation”). Applicants from those countries
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must have an opportunity to try and rebut this presumption of safety under cer-
tain conditions (Article 30B(1) PD). The Directive does not impose an obliga-
tion to turn down the application if the applicant does not manage to rebut the
presumption (see number [461]). 
A third modality of the concept is laid down in the Spanish Protocol
attached to the Treaty on European Community,275 and designates the Member
States as safe countries of origin. This Protocol does not make part of the
Common European Asylum System presently under discussion, as it addres-
ses applications by EU nationals. But its rules and the scholarly comment on
it are valuable for assessing the safe third country of origin exception and its
compatibility with international law, and will therefore be referred to below.
The safe country of origin concept and international law
[447] In order to assess the compatibility of the safe country of origin concept
with international law, we should address the way the exception fits into the
examination of applications for asylum. For safe country of origin arrange-
ments can function in two ways.276
First, the presumption of safety may function as an obstacle for access to
individual examination. Then, the applicant has first to rebut the presumption
that his country of origin is safe; if he manages to do so, he still must substan-
tiate his claim. Then, the rebuttal of the presumption of safety entails an extra
requirement that heightens the burden of proof resting on applicants who
come from safe countries. Application of the safe country of origin concept in
this way would collide with international law for two reasons. First, any
increase in the burden of proof entails differential treatment of refugees and
other applicants from certain countries that would amount to discrimination
on the grounds of nationality, prohibited by Article 3 RC, 26 CCPR and 14
ECHR.277 Secondly, if the burden of proof on the applicant is heightened
beyond the standard set by Article 1A(2) read in conjunction with 33 RC, or
by another prohibition of refoulement, expulsion upon rejection on this ground
could result in a breach of those prohibitions on refoulement.
But in another, second reading, the concept does no more than spell out a
consequence of the interplay between general and individual circumstances
involved in the assessment of the well-foundedness of the fear (or reality of
the risk). As acknowledged in Article 4(3) QD, next to individual circum-
stances, the general situation in the country of origin may and should be taken
into account in the assessment of a claim (cf. number [281]). If the general
situation is one of systematic human rights violations, an applicant needs to
produce relatively little evidence of his individual circumstances to substanti-
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ate his claim. But if the situation in the country of origin is, in general, per-
fectly satisfactory, the applicant faces a relatively extensive burden of proof.
As Hathaway puts it, applicants from such countries “must counter the esta-
blished perception that their country is one that can be relied upon to afford
them meaningful protection”.278
Importantly, the legal sense of this “established perception” is, in itself, not
affected by putting it down in writing (instead of relying on it as some gene-
rally known fact on a case by case basis), or by labelling it as a “presumption
of safety” that should be “rebutted”. If the various modalities of the safe coun-
try of origin concept can be read as mere statements of the established percep-
tions that these countries are generally safe, without affecting the burden of
proof resting on applicants from those countries, they do not collide with
international law. 
[448] Which of these two readings applies to the modalities of the safe coun-
try of origin concept in European asylum law? The rationale for the introduc-
tion of the concept appears to be expeditious decision making. Applications by
persons coming from a safe country of origin may be considered as manifest-
ly unfounded according to Article 29(2) read in conjunction with 23(4)(c) PD,
and to Sole Article under (d) of the Spanish Protocol. Pursuant to Article
23(4)(h), applications by such persons may furthermore be “accelerated”. For
the same purpose, Member States may do without a personal interview of
these applicants.279 All this points in the direction of the first reading. 
However, the requirement of “accordance” with the Refugee Convention
and other relevant international law ex Article 63(1) TEC, relevant general prin-
ciples of Community law and the “respect” for Articles 18 and 19 Charter (cf.
Preamble recital (8) PD), all call for the second reading, as far as Articles 30 –
30B PD are concerned. The same applies to the Spanish Protocol, in order to
avoid collision with Member State obligations under international asylum law.
Below, I will first address the rules on the designation and on application
for all three modalities of the safe country of origin concept. Then, their com-
patibility with international law and (where relevant) with primary
Community law will be assessed.
6.4.5.2 The designation
The “common minimum list”
[449] According to Article 30(1) PD, 
346 Chapter 6
“[t]he Council shall, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the
Commission and after consultation with the European Parliament, adopt a
minimum common list of third countries that shall be regarded by Member
States as safe countries of origin in accordance with Annex II.”
No such list has been adopted.280
It appears from the Preamble that the drawing of the list is informed not
only by legal considerations, but by political ones as well:
“[i]n the light of the political importance of the designation of safe coun-
tries of origin, in particular in view of the implications of an assessment of
the human rights situation in a country of origin and its implications for the
policies of the European Union in the field of external relations, the
Council should take any decisions on the establishment or amendment of
the list, after consultation with the European Parliament”.281
The Preamble further states that 
“It results from the status of Bulgaria and Romania as candidate countries
for the accession to the European Union and the progress made by these
countries for membership that they should be regarded as constituting safe
countries of origin for the purposes of this Directive until the date of their
accession to the European Union”.282
As yet, this statement is indeed a merely political one. For in the absence of a
“common minimum list”, the relevant arrangement cannot apply to these can-
didate countries; and as “national designation” is not obligatory (see number
[461]), Community asylum law as yet contains no rules that require that the
Member States treat these candidate countries as safe countries of origin. 
[450] Designation of a third country of origin as safe must, according to
Article 30(1) PD, be “in accordance with Annex II”. What do the criteria of
this Annex entail? A country is safe if there is “generally and consistently no
persecution as defined in Article 9” QD, “no torture or inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment”, and “no threat by reason of indiscriminate violence
in situations of international or internal armed conflict”, the types of serious
harm addressed in Article 15(b) and (c) QD. The absence of persecution or
“mistreatment” (apparently a generic term for serious harm as meant in both
Article 15(b) and (c) QD) must be shown “on the basis of the legal situation,
the application of the law within a democratic system and the general politi-
cal circumstances”; further, 
“[i]n making this assessment, account shall be taken inter alia of the extent
to which protection is provided against persecution or mistreatment
through: 
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(a) the relevant laws and regulations of the country and the manner in
which they are applied; 
(b) observance of the rights and freedoms laid down in the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms and/or the International Covenant for Civil and Political
Rights and/or the Convention against Torture, in particular the rights
from which derogation cannot be made under Article 15(2) of the said
European Convention; 
(c) respect of the non-refoulement principle according to the Geneva
Convention; 
(d) provision for a system of effective remedies against violations of these
rights and freedoms”. 
We may observe that according to Article 4(3) first clause and (a) QD, assess-
ment of an application 
“includes taking into account [….] all relevant facts as they relate to the
country of origin at the time of taking the decision on the application;
including […] the relevant laws and regulations of the country and the
manner in which they are applied.”
Apparently, Annex II under (b) to (d) address the “relevant facts” other than
the country’s “laws and regulations”. 
[451] Does the application of these criteria establish a country’s safety in a
meaningful kind of way? Annex II implies some formal standards for asses-
sing the safety of the third country. Thus, third countries must have in force
“laws and regulations” providing for protection. The requirement that the
country “observes” relevant instruments of international law, arguably, implies
that it is party to them. We may observe in this respect that the Annex allows
for designation of a country as safe if it ratified only the Convention Against
Torture – a scope of obligations under international law far narrower than “in
particular” the rights meant under Article 15(2) ECHR.283 The material stan-
dards appear, however, to be more important: prevalence of the rule of law and
a democratic system are required, as well as protection from persecution or
“mistreatment”284 through the manner in which relevant laws are applied, and
remedies should be effective. Hence, the Annex states material criteria for the
assessment of safety.
Still, the designation of a country as safe by appearance on the common list
has limited validity. First, the safety criteria laid down in the Annex only par-
tially address the relevant criteria set out in the Qualification directive. Most
conspicuously, it appears that the occurrence of the “death penalty or execu-
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tion” (Article 15(a) QD) does not preclude designation as “safe” pursuant to
the Annex.285 Designation of a country as safe pursuant to these criteria hence
does not establish any meaningful presumption that the country is indeed safe
for applicants falling exclusively into that category. Second, it appears from
the Preamble to the Procedures Directive (see number [449]) that application
of the criteria is connected with the external politics of the Union, and hence,
it appears, partially informed by political rather than asylum law considera-
tions. Third, the qualified majority voting means that Member States are
obliged to regard states occurring on the list as safe, even though they did not
consider them safe themselves. 
National designation 
[452] A somewhat different regime applies to “national designation” of safe
countries of origin. Individual Member States “may” designate as “safe” states
that do not occur on the common minimum list, in accordance with Annex
II.286 Countries removed from the common list may therefore turn up on
national lists. Member States may furthermore designate a part of a third
country as safe, if that part fulfils the requirements of Annex II.287 Moreover,
they may retain legislation already in force at the time of adoption of the
Procedures Directive that designates countries, or parts of countries as safe, or
countries or parts of countries as safe for a specified group, in accordance
with only some of the relevant requirements.288 It suffices if 
“persons in the third countries concerned are generally289 neither subject to: 
(a) persecution as defined in Article 9 [QD]; nor 
(b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. 
Hence, neither serious harm as meant in Article 15(c) QD, nor the require-
ments that the countries provide for protection as meant in Annex II such as
ratification of relevant instruments of international law, nor observance of the
rule of law or a functioning democratic system are required for such national
designation.
The Spanish Protocol
[453] According to the Sole Article of the Spanish Protocol, “Member States
shall be regarded as constituting safe countries of origin in respect of each
other for all legal and practical purposes in relation to asylum matters”. This
presumption of safety is based on “the level of protection of fundamental
rights and freedoms by the Member States of the European Union”. What level
exactly the masters of the Treaty had in mind is clarified to a certain extent by
the circumstances when this assumption of safety is lifted: 
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“(a) if the Member State of which the applicant is a national proceeds after
the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, availing itself of the
provisions of Article 15 of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, to take measures derogating its ter-
ritory from its obligations under that Convention; 
(b) if the procedure referred to in Article F.1(1) of the Treaty on European
Union has been initiated and until the Council takes a decision in
respect thereof; 
(c) if the Council, acting on the basis of Article F.1(1) of the Treaty on
European Union, has determined, in respect of the Member State of
which the applicant is a national, the existence of a serious and persis-
tent breach by that Member State of principles mentioned in Article
F(1) […]”
Article 7(1) TEU (formerly F.1(1)) provides for “recommendations” to a
Member State in case of “a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State
of principles mentioned in Article 6(1)” TEU, that is “the principles of liber-
ty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the
rule of law”. These standards are quite similar to those set out in Annex II.
The provision under (c) parallels removal of a third country from the com-
mon minimum list (see number [454] below), the provision under (b) the
suspension arrangement applying during the handling of a request for
removal. 
So far, the criteria for regarding Member States as safe are pretty similar
to those for regarding third countries figuring on the “minimum common
list” as safe. But as to the grounds mentioned under (a), the matter is differ-
ent. The presumption that a particular Member State is safe can be lifted if it
avails itself of its competence under Article 15 ECHR: that is, when it dero-
gates from rights and freedoms in the European Convention of Human Rights
as far as Article 15 allows for it. That State would still be fully bound to
observe the non-derogable rights of Article 15(2) ECHR. But pursuant to
Annex II PD, third countries may occur on the minimum common list if they
“observe” “in particular” the rights meant in Article 15(2) ECHR: whether or
not they observe the other rights and freedoms set out in the European
Convention is therefore not particularly relevant. A Member State therefore
need not be regarded as a safe country of origin if it derogates from rights
derogable under Article 15 ECHR, whereas the same derogation does not pre-
clude designation of a third country as safe. So remarkably, the conditions
regarding Member States as safe are stricter in this respect than those apply-
ing to third countries.
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6.4.5.3 The application
The minimum common list
[454] Appearance on the minimum common list establishes the presumption
that the country is “safe” for nationals of that country.290 We saw that this pre-
sumption is obligatory: these countries “shall be regarded” as safe (Article
30(1) PD). According to Article 30B(2) PD, 
“Member States shall, in accordance with paragraph 1, consider the appli-
cation for asylum as unfounded where the third country is designated as
safe pursuant to Article 30”. 
Thus, rejection of applications by nationals from safe countries of origin is
obligatory. This obligation is however subject to two conditions. First, Article
30B(1) states grounds for rebuttal. Second, the obligation is lifted upon
request for removal of a country from the common minimum list. 
As to the first condition, the rebuttal, Article 30B(1) states that a country
figuring on the common minimum list
“can, after an individual examination of the application, be considered as a
safe country of origin for a particular applicant for asylum only if […; the
applicant] has not submitted any serious grounds for considering the coun-
try not to be a safe country of origin in his/her particular circumstances in
terms of his/her qualification as a refugee in accordance with [the
Qualification Directive].”
Article 30B confirms that an “individual examination” of the application is
obligatory.291 Moreover, it requires that the presumption of safety is lifted in
case the applicant submits “serious grounds for considering the country not to
be safe in his/her particular circumstances” (emphasis added).292
As to the second condition, the obligation to reject applications as
unfounded by virtue of Article 30B(2) may be “suspended”. Suspension may
occur in two circumstances. First, it is suspended for all Member States when
the Council requests that the Commission submits a proposal for removing a
third country from the list.293 Second, if a Member State requests removal of a
country from the list, the obligation to reject applications from nationals of
that country as unfounded is suspended for that particular Member State.294
Such suspensions end when the Council rejects a proposal for removal, and
when the Commission does not submit a proposal within three months.295
[455] Is it possible to interpret this arrangement as compatible with relevant
international law and Community law, the second way the third country excep-
tion may function as suggested under number [447]? The appearance of coun-
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tries on the minimum common list does not, in itself, affect the procedural
position of the applicant. Nor is the position of the applicant adversely affec-
ted by the requirement of Article 30B(1), that he should submit “grounds for
considering the country not to be a safe country of origin in his/her particular
circumstances in terms of his/her qualification as a refugee in accordance
with” the Qualification Directive. Any applicant should submit grounds for
substantiating his request for protection. Thus, both aspects of the arrange-
ment seem in themselves compatible with designation of the safe country of
origin as a statement of “general facts and circumstances” on that country. 
[456] This leaves three problematic aspects of the arrangement: the standard
for rebuttal, the discriminatory aspects of the arrangement and the obligatory
nature. 
As to the standard for rebuttal of the presumption of safety stated in Article
30B(1) PD, the English and German versions of Article 30B(1) require “seri-
ous grounds” and “schwerwiegende Gründe”; pursuant to Article 2(e) and
4(1) QD, applicants must show “substantial grounds” for “substantiating” the
claim (present “stichhaltige Gründe” “zur Begründung”). Possibly, only “seri-
ous grounds” (“schwerwiegende Gründe”) would be sufficient for “substanti-
ating” the claim (would be “stichhabend”). But rebuttal of the presumption of
safety of the country of origin does not entail qualification: the applicant
should after this rebuttal still “substantiate” his claim for refugee or subsidiary
protection status. Therefore, any standard beyond mere “grounds” for rebuttal
of the presumption of safety does, arguably, heighten the burden of proof.
However, not all language versions imply this heightened burden of proof. The
“raisons sérieuses” in the French language version of Article 30B(1) PD seem
to state a similar standard as Article 2(e) QD, which speaks of “motifs
sérieux”.296 As to the Dutch language version, the standard of Article 30B(1)
(“substantiële redenen”) is, if anything, lower than the one that applies pur-
suant to Article 2(e) QD (“zwaarwegende gronden”).297
Should we assume that Article 30B(1) PD sets a higher, equal or lower
standard for rebuttal than the standard of proof in Article 4(1) read in conjunc-
tion with 2(e) QD? A heightened standard of proof would adversely affect the
position of refugees from safe countries of origin, and hence constitute dis-
crimination. A reading in accordance with international law therefore favours
the French language version. Arguably, relying on the French and Dutch lan-
guage versions, we should disregard the words “serious” and “schwer-
wiegend” in the English and German language versions and assume, that
Article 30B(1) PD does not imply a higher standard of proof for nationals
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from safe countries of origin than for other nationals, in accordance with inter-
national law. 
[457] Incidentally, we may note that even if Article 30B(1) PD did raise the
standard of proof, application of this standard would not be obligatory. For
Article 30B(1) does not preclude Member States from application of the nor-
mal burden of proof. A reading “in accordance with” the Refugee Convention
and other relevant international asylum law would require that Member States
disregard this “serious grounds” standard and allow any grounds for lifting the
presumption. Allowing for more liberal standards for rebuttal than “serious
grounds” would serve the purpose of the provisions, which is, apparently, pre-
cluding application of the presumption of safety in an “absolute” manner.298 The
context would also endorse this reading. Article 30B(3) explicitly allows, even
obliges, Member States to “lay down in national legislation further rules and
modalities of the safe third country of origin concept”. Finally, the legal char-
acter of the provision strongly supports this reading: according to Article
63(1)(d) TEC, the provision can merely set a minimum standard, and hence
should allow Member States to apply more beneficiary standards (see further
number [459] on the minimum standard character of the provision).299 Thus,
Member States could disregard the “serious grounds” requirement, in order to
avoid violation of international asylum law and hence primary Community law.
[458] The second problematic feature of the safe third country of origin
arrangement is that a disadvantageous procedural position of nationals from
countries occurring on the common minimum list may amount to discrimina-
tion. Designation of applications of such nationals as manifestly unfounded
pursuant to Article 29(2) read in conjunction with 23(4)(c) PD does not in itself
adversely affect their procedural position, as the Directive does not attach legal
consequences to manifest unfoundedness. Nor does accelerated examination of
their applications, as any application may be dealt with in an accelerated pro-
cedure. But according to Article 10(2)(c) PD read in conjunction with 23(4)(c)
PD, Member States may omit the personal interview because the applicant
comes from a safe third country. Omitting the personal interview would seri-
ously affect the applicant’s opportunities to rebut the presumption of safety of
his country of origin and hence, to substantiate his claim for protection. In
order to avoid discrimination on the ground of nationality, Member States
therefore should not omit the personal interview on these grounds. 
[459] The third problematic feature is the obligatory nature that could be at
353Asylum procedures
variance with the minimum standard character of the arrangement. The
modalities of the safe country of origin exception laid down in the Procedures
Directive should, pursuant to Article 63(1) and (2) TEC, lay down minimum
standards. If the safe third country of origin arrangements required Member
States to issue negative decisions at variance with their obligations under
international law, they would not set minimum standards and on those grounds
be at variance with Article 63 TEC (cf. number [217] above). 
We saw that the Member States must regard the countries that occur on the
minimum common list as “safe”, and that they must reject an application as
unfounded if the applicant from such a country does not manage to rebut the
presumption of safety (Articles 30(1) and 30B(2) read in conjunction with 1
PD). Article 30B(1) PD allows as we saw for any standard of rebuttal. In this,
the arrangement would therefore seem to set, in effect, a minimum standard,
despite the obligatory wording of Article 30B(2) PD. 
We should, however, observe that application of the presumption that a
country is safe can be in conformity with Article 1A(2) read in conjunction
with 33 RC (and with the other prohibitions of refoulement) only as long as
the situation in the country warrants it. In the case of group persecution in a
country, there is no place for the assumption that persons from that country
should rebut the perception that it is safe. Article 4(3)(a) QD quite correctly
requires assessment of the situation in the country of origin “at the time of 
taking a decision on the application”. But the rules on removal of countries
from the common minimum list hardly allow for quick response. True, the
obligation to reject applications by nationals from a state on the common list
is suspended when Member States request removal of that state from the list.
If a country is not safe any more, a Member State is obliged, pursuant to its
obligations under international law, to request removal of that state from the
list upon an application by a national from that state. Still, the value of this
suspension arrangement as a safety valve is limited. A negative Council deci-
sion to the request terminates the suspension, upon which the obligation to
reject revives. The relevant rules do not explicitly prohibit a Member State
from submitting a subsequent request on the same grounds. As these rules set
minimum standards, we should assume that they allow for such subsequent
requests for removal from the list.
Arguably, then, it is possible to construe Article 30 read in conjunction
with 30B PD as a minimum standard. Article 30B allows Member States to
apply a more beneficiary standard of proof to applicants from safe countries
of origin than the standard suggested in Article 30B(1). The possibility of sus-
pending application of the minimum common list by requesting removal of a
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country is a device that secures their competence to deviate from the arrange-
ment to the benefit of third country nationals. Still, one could argue that lea-
ving the Member States a possibility to suspend the working of provision that
explicitly prevents them setting more favourable domestic standards is not the
same as allowing them to “introduce or maintain more favourable provisions
for third country nationals [….] who ask for protection”,300 and hence not a
minimum standard. 
[460] In summary, it follows from a comparison of several language versions
and a reading in accordance with relevant international law that the standard
for rebuttal of the safety of the state on the common minimum list stated in
Article 30B(1) PD is not higher than the standard of proof that applies to any
other applicant pursuant to Articles 2(e) and 4(1) QD. Still, the safe third
country concept ex Article 30 read in conjunction with 30B PD shows two
major flaws. First, Articles 30 – 30B read in conjunction with 23(4)(c) read in
conjunction with 10(2)(c) allow for omitting the personal interview merely on
the grounds that the applicant comes from a country figuring on the common
minimum list. As omitting the interview on these grounds would amount to
discrimination on the grounds of nationality, Member States may not make use
of the competence.
Second, the obligatory application of the presumption of safety is in line
with international law only as long as the country is indeed safe (that is, as
long as the situation in that country justifies the perception that it can offer its
nationals protection). Individual Member States that regard a particular coun-
try on the list as unsafe can evade application of the concept only by lodging
(continuous) requests for removal of that country from the common minimum
list. Hence, the arrangement does offer a possibility to set more favourable
domestic standards. Still, one may feel that offering a sort of escape route is
not the same as allowing Member States to maintain or introduce more
favourable national legislation.
National designation
[461] The Procedures Directive does not require that Member States reject as
unfounded applications by nationals of countries designated as safe in natio-
nal legislation,301 instead leaving the matter to domestic legislation.302 It only
states that the presumption must be open to rebuttal on the same conditions
that apply to the countries figuring on the “common minimum list”.303 The
Procedures Directive’s rules on national designation of safe third countries of
origin are therefore true minimum standards, and the competence of Member
355Asylum procedures
States to lay down in national legislation further rules for the application of the
concept allows them to ensure performance under their obligations under
international law. But we may observe that the Procedures Directive does not
secure that such domestic application of the concept is in conformity with
relevant international law standards.
Article 10(2)(c) read in conjunction with 23(4)(c) read in conjunction
with30A PD allow Member States to waive the personal interview of nationals
from countries designated as safe under national law. As argued above, this
would amount to discrimination on the ground of nationality; the competence
to waive the interview on this ground may therefore not be made use of. 
The Spanish Protocol
[462] The Spanish Protocol obliges Member States to regard each other as safe
countries of origin, unless the presumption is lifted pursuant to one of the
grounds discussed above (number [453]). If none of these grounds apply, a
state may nevertheless take an application by a Member State national into
consideration
“(d) if a Member State should so decide unilaterally in respect of the appli-
cation of a national of another member State; in that case the Council shall
be immediately informed; the application shall be dealt with on the basis
of the presumption that it is manifestly unfounded without affecting in any
way, whatever the cases may be, the decision-making power of the Member
State.”
Thus, the processing of applications of nationals of other Member States is
subject to two conditions. First, the Member State must “immediately” inform
the Council (to what effect is unclear, as the Council is not attributed any com-
petence in this matter). Second, the Member State must presume that the appli-
cation is manifestly unfounded. As Noll observes, this requirement is in utter
contradiction with the stipulation that the “decision-making power of the
Member States” remains unaffected; he observes that in a reading in confor-
mity with relevant rules of international law, the Member States are obliged to
“decide” that the application will be examined.304
Thus, the Spanish Protocol does not block access to examination proce-
dures. Still, it affects the position of any EU applicant by requiring that appli-
cations by EU nationals are dealt with “on the basis of the presumption that it
is manifestly unfounded” – which implies differential treatment. Noll holds that
this amounts to discrimination, on the assumption that the position of EU
nationals is adversely affected by the requirement that their applications are
regarded as “manifestly unfounded”.305 However, neither the Spanish Protocol
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nor any other Treaty provision attaches any legal consequences to the labelling
as “manifestly unfounded”. We cannot, therefore, state that this labelling in
itself adversely affects the legal position of applicants from the Member States.
It is possible and, in the light of relevant treaty obligations, required to read the
Sole Article of the Protocol as stating as “relevant generally known facts” that
the Member States do in general not indulge in persecutory behaviour. 
6.4.5.4 Concluding remarks
[463] International asylum law allows for application of safe country of origin
arrangements on two conditions. First, the general situation in such countries
should warrant the “perception” or presumption that meaningful protection
from persecution or harm is available there. Second, conditions on the coun-
tering of this perception (or rebuttal of this presumption) may not result in a
burden or standard of proof differing from those applicable to applicants from
other countries, for differential treatment on grounds of nationality would
amount to discrimination prohibited by Articles 3 RC, 26 CCPR and 14 read
in conjunction with 3 ECHR. Moreover, imposition of a burden or standard of
proof raised beyond the level set by the prohibitions of refoulement would
amount to breach of those prohibitions.
As to the first issue, Annex II to the Directive proposes relevant criteria,
which could establish a country’s safety in a meaningful kind of way. But
appearance on the list can do so only to a limited extent. Most importantly, it
follows from the Preamble that the drawing of the list may be informed by
political considerations, and individual Member States that are not convinced
that a particular country is safe may be overruled, as the Council adopts the
list by qualified majority. 
Only part of the standards set out in Annex II must be applied to the natio-
nal designation of safe third countries of origin. As far as such national desig-
nation may deviate from these standards, the validity of the presumption is
adversely affected. 
The Member States must regard countries appearing on the common mini-
mum list as safe; applications by their nationals must be rejected, unless these
nationals manage to rebut the presumption. This obligation collides with inter-
national law where the grounds for regarding the country as safe do not apply
(any more). But Member States may lift the presumption of safety by requesting
removal of the country concerned from the common list. International asylum
law requires that Member States make use of this competence where necessary.
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As to the second issue, in one instance the Procedures Directive proposes dif-
ferential treatment. Article 10(2)(c) PD states that Member States need not
offer nationals from safe third countries of origin the opportunity of a perso-
nal interview. Such omission would affect the possibility of substantiating
their claim to protection. Therefore, Member States may not omit the inter-
view on this ground. 
The Spanish Protocol allows Member States to process applications by
nationals of other Member States. International law obliges them to make use
of this competence. Applications by EU nationals must be treated as if they
were manifestly unfounded. As the instrument does not attach any particular
legal consequence to such designation, this obligation is, as such, not discrimi-
natory.
[464] Hence, the Procedures Directive suggests rules whose application would
give rise to discrimination or even breach of the prohibitions of refoulement.
Furthermore, it requires rejection of claims by nationals from states that figure
on the minimum common list, who do not manage to rebut the presumption of
safety. It is hard to see how this obligation to issue a negative decision on an
application could serve the purpose set out in Article 1 PD, of establishing
minimum standards on procedures. Although application in a way compatible
with international asylum law appears to be possible, it is not self-evident that
they set minimum standards. 
6.4.6 Concluding remarks 
[465] Before summarising the findings on the grounds for refusal, one final
question must be addressed: does European asylum law impose an order of
application of these grounds? The 1992 London Resolution concerning Host
Third Countries did so. This instrument implied that Member States should
first consider expulsion to a non-Member State in accordance with the excep-
tion of the safe third country; if not applicable, responsibility of another
Member State should be addressed and only finally whether the application is
well founded.306 A similar order however does not prevail under European asy-
lum law. Article 4(1) of the Dublin Regulation states that the “process of deter-
mining the Member State responsible under this Regulation shall start as soon
as an application for asylum is first lodged with a Member State”, which
implies that Member States should first consider application of the Dublin
Regulation. But this provision is without prejudice to the “right” of Member
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States to send applicants to safe third countries.307 And there is no reason to
assume that a Member State violates the Dublin Regulation when it examines
the merits of a claim without previous determination of responsibility: pur-
suant to Article 3(3) DR, it may examine any application for asylum lodged
with it. Under the Procedures Directive, the exception of the safe third coun-
try may be a ground for declaring a claim “manifestly unfounded”, which
implies admissibility of, and responsibility for that claim. According to Article
25(2)(a) PD, the claim of an applicant whose refugee status has previously
been recognised by another Member State can be declared inadmissible, but
the same circumstances could serve to establish responsibility of another
Member State under the Dublin Regulation.308 Determining responsibility
apparently does not necessarily precede examination of admissibility ex
Article 25(2) PD. In summary, European asylum law neither explicitly impo-
ses nor tacitly implies there is an order of application of the various grounds
for refusal. 
A number of grounds for refusal discussed in this paragraph raise ques-
tions as to their compatibility with international asylum law or other European
legislation. Inadmissibility on the ground that the applicant enjoys “a status
equivalent to the rights and benefits of the refugee status by virtue of [the
Qualification Directive]” (Article 25(2)(d) PD) may entail denial of Refugee
Convention benefits that are not laid down in that Directive, and of the bene-
fits applying to recognised refugees by virtue of the Family Reunification
Directive. Declaring a claim (manifestly) unfounded because a person “is a
danger to the national security or the public order of the Member State”
(Article 23(4)(m) PD) entails denial of the benefits of Article 14(6) QD. 
The Procedures Directive contains several arrangements according to
which “subsequent applications” (which may be applications by dependants,
or repeated applications) can be dismissed in the case that no “new” grounds
are stated. It follows from a contextual reading that for the purposes of
Articles 33(4) and 25(2)(f) PD, grounds that could have been stated in the pre-
vious procedure must be addressed in the subsequent one. Article 34(2) and
33(4) imply, however, raised standards of proof for subsequent applications, at
variance with international law. 
Finally, and most remarkably, the obligatory dismissal of an application by
a claimant, if he comes from a safe third country of origin that figures on the
“minimum common list”, and if he cannot rebut this presumption of safety
(Articles 30 read in conjunction with 30B PD). This arrangement may be read
as a device that merely formalises the perception that a country is prima facie
safe, in accordance with relevant international law. Member States may sus-
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pend this obligation by requesting that a state should be removed from the list.
Although the arrangement can be read as allowing member States to set more
favourable domestic standards, its minimum standard character is an object of
doubt. Finally, denial of the opportunity to a personal interview to persons
from such safe countries would amount to differential treatment, which would
be at variance with international law.
6.5 Termination procedures 
In this paragraph, I discuss the procedural rules on the termination of refugee
status (par. 6.5.2) and of temporary protection status (par. 6.5.3). European
asylum law does not state procedural rules on withdrawal of subsidiary pro-
tection status (cf. number [472]). 
Procedures on the termination of protection statuses may be subject to the
rules of international and of Community law on asylum procedures discussed
in the paragraphs 6.2.1 and 6.3.1. If the decision to terminate the status
amounts to a decision to expel the alien, the prohibitions of refoulement may
be engaged. As far as the protection status implies rights protected by
Community law, relevant general principles of Community law apply. Further,
two provisions of international law more specifically address the termination
of the protection status: Articles 32 RC and 13 CCPR (discussed in paragraph
6.5.1). 
6.5.1 International law
[466] According to Article 32 RC,
“1. The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their terri-
tory save on grounds of national security or public order.
2. The expulsion of such a refugee shall only be in pursuance of a decision
reached in accordance with due process of law. Except where com-
pelling reasons of national security otherwise require, the refugee shall
be allowed to submit evidence to clear himself, and to appeal to and be
represented for the purpose before competent authority or a person or
persons specially designated by the competent authority. […]”
As will be argued under number [562], this provision applies only to recog-
nised refugees; applicants and temporary protection beneficiaries therefore
fall out of its scope. It applies to refugees who are “lawfully in the territory”
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of the Member States. A reasonable interpretation leads to application of this
Article to withdrawal of a refugee’s residence permit: withdrawal of the per-
mit ends the lawfulness of the sojourn.309
The second paragraph lists some procedural requirements. First, the deci-
sion to expel must be reached “in accordance with due process of law”.310
Secondly, “the refugee shall be allowed to submit evidence to clear himself ”
and thirdly he has the right to appeal to a “competent authority”. 
[467] Article 13 CCPR runs as follows:
“An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present Covenant
may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in
accordance with law and shall, except where compelling reasons of nation-
al security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons against his
expulsion and to have his case reviewed by, and be represented for the pur-
pose before, the competent authority or a person or persons especially
designated by the competent authority.”
The provision guarantees several safeguards in expulsion cases for “lawfully
present” aliens. The term “lawful” implies that the alien’s presence is in con-
formity with relevant domestic law.311 According to the Human Rights
Committee, the protection of the provision extends to decisions “leading to
expulsion”, such as the assessment of the risk of ill treatment upon removal.312
The provision accords two safeguards. First, the decision to expel must be
reached in accordance with the law. Second, the lawfully present alien is entitled
to review of the decision by an “authority”. According to the Human Rights
Committee, the provision also sets a material standard to the review procee-
dings: the remedy must be “effective”.313 The remedy does not have to be
appeal to the judiciary – review by the authority that took the decision to expel
would satisfy the provision.314 It seems that the provision does not require that
the review proceedings suspend the expulsion.315
6.5.2 Termination of refugee status 
[468] Chapters IV and V of the Procedures Directive (Article 36, 37 and 38)
state rules on the termination of refugee status. Refugee status may end in two
ways. First, it may be withdrawn in withdrawal procedures; the Member States
must obligatorily provide for this procedure.316 Second, Member States “may”
(not must) decide that refugee status lapses by law in case of cessation; the
rules for withdrawal procedures then do not apply.317
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Withdrawal means 
“the decision by a competent authority to revoke, end or refuse to renew
the refugee status of a person in accordance with [the Qualification
Directive]”.318
Withdrawal can take place on the grounds mentioned in Article 14 QD,319 dis-
cussed in paragraph 5.6.2 – roughly, cessation or exclusion pursuant to Article
1C, 1D, 1E or 1F RC, applicability of Article 33(2) RC,320 or if fraud on the
side of the applicant was decisive for granting the status. Examination of with-
drawal may be started only when “new elements or findings arise indicating
that there are reasons to reconsider the validity” of the refugee status.321 Hence,
elements or findings known before the status was granted can not give rise to
withdrawal. 
Cessation by law may take place only on the grounds mentioned in Article
11(a), (b), (c) and (d) QD,322 that is, grounds equivalent to Article 1C(1)(a)-(d)
RC: roughly, where some personal conduct of the refugee indicates that he has
regained protection from or in the country of origin, or protection from a new
country of nationality (see number [346]). Change of circumstances in the
country of origin (or former habitual residence) as meant in Article 1C(5) and
(6) RC, and Article 11(1) (e) and (f) QD can hence not lead to lapse of refugee
status by law, but only to termination after “withdrawal”. 
[469] A “competent authority” does the examination in withdrawal procee-
dings.323 This competent authority must be able to obtain “precise and up to
date information from various sources, such as […UNHCR], as to the general
situation in the country of origin of the persons [sic] concerned.” The
Procedures Directive states no rules for the organisation of this examination.324
The basic principles and guarantees listed in Chapter II PD do not apply,
as they address “applications”. Therefore, the material standard for examina-
tion of applications, that the examination should be “appropriate”, and con-
ducted “objectively and impartially” (cf. number [390] above), does not apply,
but it follows from Article 36 that the examination should be conducted “indi-
vidually”.325 Further, Article 37 PD states a number of guarantees that apply to
withdrawal examination, partially by reference to Chapter II. When the com-
petent authority considers withdrawal, the person concerned must be informed
thereof, and of the reasons, and 
“be given the opportunity to submit, in a personal interview in accordance
with Article 9(1)(b) and Articles 10 to 12 or in a written statement, reasons
as to why his/her refugee status should not be withdrawn”.326
A personal interview is not required. The competent authority should take care
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not to disclose information to the persecutors of the alien.327 The decision to
withdraw must be in writing, and be motivated. Upon this decision, the person
concerned is entitled to free legal assistance pursuant to Article 13(2) PD,
access of the counsellor and of UNHCR must be secured in accordance with
Article 14(1) and 21 PD.328
[470] Article 38(1)(e) provides for the right to appeal from “a decision for the
withdrawal of refugee status pursuant to Article 37”. Article 38 does not fur-
ther address appeal against withdrawal decisions: Articles 38(2) (6) address
appeal by applicants only. Lapse of refugee status by law pursuant to Article
37(4) does not take a “decision”, and is therefore not covered by the provision.
Lapse by law may require an implementing decision – repeal of the residence
permit, for example, but such a decision is not a decision “pursuant to Article
37”. As the implementation of such cessation affects rights protected under
Community law (the right to refugee status ex Article 13 QD, and the attached
secondary rights), the Member States must afford an effective remedy pur-
suant to general principles of Community law. 
The safeguards on termination of refugee status address most issues men-
tioned in Articles 32 RC and 13 CCPR: the refugee has the opportunity to sub-
mit evidence to clear himself, the right to appeal and to legal representation.
The effectiveness of the opportunity to rebuttal is however affected by absence
of a personal interview.
6.5.3 Termination of temporary protection
[471] Temporary protection can end in two ways. First, by law, that is upon the
lapse of the Council decision installing it.329 The possibility of appeal against
this decision will be discussed in Chapter 9 (number [634]). Second, a person
may be “excluded” from temporary protection.330 Article 29 TPD states one
procedural rule on the matter: the excluded person is “entitled to mount a legal
challenge in the Member State concerned”. The term “legal challenge”
implies that administrative proceedings might; the words “within the Member
State” imply that those proceedings are to have suspensive effect. 
6.5.4 Concluding remarks
[472] The CEAS rules on termination of refugee and of temporary protection
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status do not raise particular questions as to their compatibility with interna-
tional law, if only because the arrangements are most succinct. In this context,
we should observe that procedures on termination of subsidiary protection sta-
tus are not addressed in the Procedures Directive.331 The decision to withdraw
this status is, however, subject to relevant general principles of Community
law that require the possibility appeal (cf. number [417]). 
6.6 Assessment
[473] When assessing the rules on procedures that are stated, we must bear in
mind that they aim to establish only a “minimum framework”.332 Meanwhile,
the relevant legislation is intended to produce approximation of law on the
matter, to provide a first step towards common asylum procedures, and to set
standards for procedures that should be both “efficient” and “fair”.333 These
rules should further be in accordance with relevant international law.
European asylum law does indeed provide a number of provisions that do
secure to a certain extent the aim of introducing “a minimum framework in the
European Community on procedures for granting and withdrawing refugee
status”.334 Articles 3(1) DR read in conjunction with 23(1) and 29(1) PD esta-
blish the right to an individual examination of the foundedness of the applica-
tion in terms of the Qualification Directive. Furthermore, the Procedures
Directive and the Dublin Regulation require observance of some important
safeguards on procedures at first instance and on appeal procedures.
Applicants should receive the services of an interpreter, they must, in princi-
ple, have the opportunity of a personal interview, and moreover an “effective
remedy” before a court or tribunal from any decision must be provided for. 
However, the rules on procedures secure observance of norms of international
law only to a limited extent. The most obvious gap in protection is the absence
of rules on procedures on the termination of subsidiary protection status, as
well as on the granting of this status in some of the Member States. The gran-
ting and termination of temporary protection status is addressed only very
scantily. Further, crucial issues such as time limits for decision making and
other aspects of the procedures at first instance, as well as the suspensive
effect of appeal and the scope of judicial review are not addressed. In several
respects, the Procedures Directive appears to confirm divergences in state
practice, rather than establishing even a “minimum framework” for the pro-
cessing of claims. Thus, it allows for no less than three “border procedures”.
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The same grounds for refusal serve to declare the application inadmissible,
unfounded, manifestly unfounded or be addressed in the context of some spe-
cial procedure. 
[474] In itself, the level of harmonisation aimed at or attained is not relevant
for the purposes of the present study. But incongruities in the legislation do
affect the legal position of protection seekers, as different safeguards apply to
the various procedures. The Procedures Directive suffers not only from a lack
of conceptual coherence as to the organisation of procedures, it also lacks a
coherent view on the question of which safeguards are required to perform an
examination of a request for asylum in accordance with relevant standards of
international law. If the safeguards of Article 9(1) PD must apply to the pre-
liminary procedure (Article 34(1) PD), why do paragraphs (c) and (d) not
apply to the ‘special border procedure’ (Article 35(3) PD)? If all “relevant
facts” should be taken into account when assessing the ‘subsequent’ applica-
tion by a dependant in a ‘preliminary procedure’ (Article 33 PD), why can the
same request be dismissed as unfounded if no “new facts” were stated (Article
23(4)(o) PD)? 
Such incongruities cannot be justified from the point of view of international
law. And the result may be that Member States are tempted to adapt their
domestic legislation to the lowest standards that the Procedures Directive
offers – quite contrary to the instrument’s objective of safeguarding the rights
of the protection seeker. 
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123 Amended Proposal PD, Comment on Article 10.
124 Article 11(3)(a) PD. In case of an unaccompanied minor, the interview must be held by “a per-
son who has the necessary knowledge of the special needs of minors” (Article 15(4)(a) PD). 
125 Article 9(1)(b) PD; cf. UNHCR Handbook 192 under (iv), quoted in footnote 114. 
126 Article 11(3) PD.
127 Article 11(2) PD; accordingly, family members should, in principle, not be present - Article
11(1) PD.
128 Article 14(4) PD. 
129 Article 12(1) PD.
130 Article 12(2) PD. Cf. Article 12(3): “Member States may request the applicant’s approval
on the contents of the report of the personal interview. Where an applicant refuses to
approve the contents of the report, the reasons for this refusal shall be entered into the
applicant’s file. The refusal of an applicant to approve the contents of the report of the per-
sonal interview shall not prevent the determining authority from taking a decision on
his/her application.”
131 Article 38(1) PD: “Member States shall ensure that applicants for asylum have the right to
an effective remedy […] against the following: (a) a decision taken on their application for
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asylum, including a decision: (i) to consider an application inadmissible pursuant to Article
25(2) […].”
132 Article 10(1) PD. 
133 Article 10(1) PD. Domestic legislation may provide that the “personal interview” is held
with the representative of an unaccompanied minor, in the latter’s absence (Article 15(1) PD
last clause).
134 Article 10(6) PD. 
135 Article 20(1) PD; see on the Directive’s rules on implicit withdrawal further par. 6.4.2.
136 Article 10(6) is “without prejudice to” Article 20(1) PD. 
137 Article 10(3) PD. 
138 Cf. Articles 11(5) and 12(4) PD. The relevant requirements were mentioned under number
[397]. 
139 Article 10(3) PD. 
140 Article 10(2)(c) and 23(4)(c) PD.
141 Article 10(2)(c) and 23(4)((a), (g), (h) and (j) PD; cf. number [431]. 
142 Article 10(4) PD.
143 The “further” examination would take place in the ‘normal examination procedure’ or the
‘border procedure’, cf. number [380] above; during that procedure, the subsequent appli-
cant would then be protected from refoulement pursuant to Article 6(1). This protection
would lose all sense and meaning if the applicant could have been expelled before. 
144 Both Article 20(1) and Article 38(1)(c) PD state that the outcome of the preliminary proce-
dure to discontinue examination is a “decision”. 
145 Amended PD Proposal, Commentary on Article 6.
146 Preamble recital (5) PD: “The main aim of this Directive is to introduce a minimum frame-
work in the European Community on procedures for the determination of refugee status,
ensuring that no Member State expels or returns an applicant for asylum in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or polit-
ical opinion”. 
147 Preamble recital (7) PD.
148 Arguably, Article 34(2) last clause presupposes a right to access to procedures. The provi-
sion first lists a number of rules (in fact requirements) that the Member States may “inter
alia” impose upon subsequent applicants. Then, Article 34(2) states that these “conditions
shall not render the access of applicants for asylum to a new procedure impossible nor result
in the effective annulment or severe curtailment of such access.” But this clause cannot rea-
sonably be construed as if it encompasses all basic guarantees of Article 5, the right to
access (see number [394]). It follows from the term “inter alia” that other requirements (in
fact restrictions) on the right to access may also be imposed. Furthermore, it is stipulated
that these “conditions” should not “result” in “severe curtailment of such access” – some or
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even considerable curtailment would hence fall within the scope of appreciation of the
Member States. 
149 Cf. the Amended PD proposal, Commentary on Article 35 p. 16: “a special approach to
applications made at a border post is proposed [that] allows Member States to “fall below”
common procedural standards”. 
150 That is, without prejudice to the exceptions on the prohibitions of refoulement ex Article
6(2) (see number [393]). 
151 Cf. Articles 8, 9(1)(c), (d) and (e) and 13(2) PD. 
152 But he should have the opportunity to make use of the services of an interpreter during the
interview, cf. Articles 9(1)(b) and 35(3) second indent PD.
153 Cf. Articles 17 and 14 PD.
154 Cf. Articles 9(1)(c) and 21 PD.
155 Article 35A(2) PD. 
156 Article 38(1)(a)(iii) PD, see number [421]. 
157 Article 35A(5) PD.
158 So Boeles 1997, pp. 133-140.
159 The French and Russian language versions quite explicitly refer to civil rights proceedings:
“des contestations sur ses droits et obligations du caractère civil”, “при определении его
прав и обязанностей в каком-либо гражданском процессе” (literally, “when defining
his rights and obligations in some civil proceeding”). 
160 According to McGoldrick 1994, pp. 397-399, the views of the HRC on the matter are far
from clear. In its view of 15 November 2000, CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993 (Apirana Mahuika
et al. v. New Zealand ), the Human Rights Committee “[…] notes that article 14(1) encom-
passes the right to access to court for the determination of rights and obligations in a suit
at law. In certain circumstances the failure of a State party to establish a competent court
to determine rights and obligations may amount to a violation of article 14(1). (…) The
Committee considers that whether or not claims in respect of fishery interests could be con-
sidered to fall within the definition of a suit at law [….]” (par. 9.11). Arguably, it follows
that the Human Rights Committee still assumes that the determination of rights and obliga-
tions of administrative nature may fall outside the scope of the Article.
161 HRC 29 March 2004, CCPR/C/80/D/1051/2002 (Ahani v. Canada), par. 10.9.
162 Boeles 1997, pp. 75-77 and 81-83.
163 The Article is placed in Chapter II of the Refugee Convention, headed “juridical status”.
Boeles (o.c.) states that if a national has a right of appeal on decisions concerning his
“juridical status”, a refugee is entitled to the same treatment if status determination and
admission are concerned. But the notion of “juridical status” is a vague one. It has not been
established, as far as I know, that international law or common Member State practice con-
fers in general a right of appeal against decisions on someone’s juridical status.
Furthermore, as Spijkerboer and Vermeulen point out, Article 16(2) RC does not prohibit
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the contracting State to take account of the special position of refugees (Spijkerboer &
Vermeulen 1995, p. 381).
164 Article 6(1) ECHR: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any crimi-
nal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reason-
able time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be
pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial
in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where
the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to
the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.”
165 ECtHR 21 February 1975, Ser. A vol. 18 (Golder v. UK), par. 36. 
166 ECtHR 5 October 2000, Rep. 2000-X (Maaouia v. France), par. 40.
167 ECtHR 25 March 1983, Ser. A vol. 61 (Silver and Others), par 113. 
168 ECtHR 27 April 1988, Ser. A vol. 131 (Boyle and Rice), par. 55: “The Court does not think
that it should give an abstract definition of the notion of arguability. Rather it must be deter-
mined, in the light of the particular facts and the nature of the legal issue or issues raised,
whether each individual claim of violation forming the basis of a complaint under Article 13
was arguable and, if so, whether the requirements of Article 13 were met in relation thereto.”
169 ECtHR 26 March 1987, Ser. A vol. 116 (Leander), par. 77.
170 ECtHR 21 February 1990, Ser. A vol. 172 (Powell and Reyner), par. 33. 
171 ECtHR 9 October 1979, Ser. A vol. 32 (Airey), par. 18, affirmed in Boyle and Rice, par. 54.
172 ECtHR 7 March 2000, Rep. 2000-III (decision) (T.I. v. UK), under “Concerning Article 13
of the Convention”. 
173 ECtHR 29 June 2004, Appl. No. 6276/03 and 6122/04 (decision) (Taheri Kandomabadi v.
The Netherlands): “The Court has found above that the applicant’s complaints under
Articles 2 and 3 about the rejection of his request for asylum are manifestly ill-founded. It
follows that the applicant does not have an “arguable claim” and these complaints do not
attract the guarantees of Article 13”. 
174 ECtHR 6 September 1978, Ser. A vol. 28 (Klass), par. 67.
175 Silver and Others, par. 113.
176 ECtHR 7 July 1989, Ser. A vol. 161 (Soering v. United Kingdom), par. 121; ECtHR 30
October 1991, Ser. A vol. 215 (Vilvarajah), par. 123.
177 ECtHR 11 July 2000, Rep. 2000-VIII (Jabari), par. 50; ECtHR 5 February 2002, Rep. 2002-
I (Čonka), par. 79.
178 ECtHR 15 November 1996, Rep. 1996-V (Chahal), par. 151.
179 Jabari, par. 50: “[T]he notion of an effective remedy under Article 13 requires independent
and rigorous scrutiny of a claim that there exist substantial grounds for fearing a real risk
of treatment contrary to Article 3 and the possibility of suspending the implementation of
the measure impugned”. 
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180 Jabari, par. 49.
181 See on the implications of Article 13 ECHR for asylum proceedings also Essakili 2005. 
182 Cf. Vilvarajah, par. 118, ECtHR 2 May 1997, Rep. 1997-III (D v. UK), par. 66, T.I. v UK,
under 3, third par., ECtHR 6 March 2001, Rep. 2001-II (Hilal v. UK), par. 78 and ECtHR 6
February 2001, Rep. 2001-I (Bensaid v. UK), par. 51.
183 Bensaid, par. 57. 
184 Hilal, par. 37, Bensaid, par. 28. 
185 Verdussen 2000, pp. 45-50. 
186 ECtHR 7 December 1976, Ser. A vol. 24 (Handyside v. UK), par. 48, ECtHR 18 December
1998, Rep. 1996-VI (Aksoy v. Turkey), par. 51.
187 E.g. Hilal, par. 63. 
188 ECtHR (First Section) 6 February 2003, Appl. No. 46827/99 and 46951/99 (Mamatkulov I),
par. 96. The Grand Chamber ruling Mamatkulov II of 4 February 2005, Appl. No. 46827/99
and 46951/99, likewise stresses that proceedings before it should be “effective” (pars. 101
and 102), although it does not address these particular requirements.
189 McGoldrick 1994, pp. 285-286; for example HRC 30 July 1993, No. 470/1991 (Kindler v.
Canada), pars. 13.1 and 13.2.
190 McGoldrick 1994, pp. 279-281 and 285-287; Boeles 1997, pp. 117-118.
191 Boeles 1997, pp. 107-111. 
192 The HRC views Boeles invokes either concerned Article 9(4) CCPR as well, which provi-
sion explicitly demands appeal to a court in case of alleged unlawful detention, or con-
cerned cases where the domestic system happened to provide for judicial appeal.
193 Such a reading would further run counter to the ‘incremental system’ of Refugee
Convention benefits – see paragraph 8.2.2.
194 UNHCR Handbook, par. 192 under (vii). 
195 Hoge Raad 13 May 1988, RV 1988, 13, par. 3.1 (my translation, HB): “[The state argues
that] the question of violation of the prohibition of refoulement in Article 33 of the Geneva
Convention by the Netherlands authorities […] can occur only in case it is plausible for the
moment that the alien is a refugee as meant in the Convention. It follows from this argument
that an alien who claims to be a refugee is not protected by Article 33 of the Geneva
Convention in the situation – according to the court, concerned here – that for the moment
only one thing is certain: that it has not been proved that between reasonable people there
can be no doubt that the alien, considering objectively, is not in a flight situation. This argu-
ment cannot be accepted as correct. It fails to appreciate the fact that in the last mentioned
situation too the protection offered by Article 33 can not be missed, in order to give objec-
tive and purpose of the provision its due”. 
196 Preamble recital (28) PD. 
197 ECJ 17 December 1998, C-185/95, [1998] ECR, p. I-08417 (Baustahlgewebe GmbH v.
Commission), pars 20 and 21: “It should be noted that Article 6(1) of the EHRC provides
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that in the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by
an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. […] The general principle of
Community law that everyone is entitled to fair legal process, which is inspired by those
fundamental rights […], and in particular the right to legal process within a reasonable
period, is applicable in the context of proceedings brought against a Commission decision
imposing fines on an undertaking for infringement of competition law.”
198 CFI 29 June 1995, T-30/91, [1995] ECR, p. II-1775 (Solvay v. Commission), par 101.
199 ECJ 15 May 1986, C-222/84, [1986] ECR, p. 621 (Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal
Ulster Constabulary), par. 18: “The requirement of judicial control stipulated by that arti-
cle reflects a general principle of law which underlies the constitutional traditions common
to the Member States. That principle is also laid down in Articles 6 and 13 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November
1950. As ... the Court has recognised in its decisions, the principles on which that
Convention is based must be taken into consideration in Community law”. 
200 Cf. for example the cases quoted in footnotes 197 and 199. 
201 ECJ 27 November 2001, C-270/99, [2001] ECR, p. I-09197 (Z v. European Parliament). 
202 Z v European Parliament, pars. 23-24.
203 Opinion A-G Alber 24 October 2002, C-63/01, n.y.p. (Samuel Sidney Evans v. The Secretary
of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions and The Motor Insurers’ Bureau),
par 85, relying on both case-law of the European Court of Justice on relevant general prin-
ciples of Community law, and using Article 47 Charter as a “a standard of comparison, at
least in so far as it addresses generally recognised principles of law” (par. 80). The United
Kingdom had argued that Evans’ claim fell outside the scope of Article 6(1) ECHR. The
European Court of Justice did not explicitly address the applicability of Article 6 ECHR
(ECJ 4 December 2003, C-63/01, n.y.p.). 
204 Article 6(3) ECHR: “Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum
rights: […] c. to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing […].”
205 That is, “in all respects other than their scope”, see immediately below; CHARTE 4473/00
p. 41, CONV 828/1/03 REV 1 p. 41. 
206 CHARTE 4473/00 p. 41, CONV 828/1/03 REV 1 p. 41.
207 Thus, in contrast to the text of Article 13 ECHR, a “violation” is not required (cf. number
[411] above). 
208 ECtHR 21 February 1975, Ser. A vol. 18 (Golder v. UK), par. 36. 
209 Article 52(4) Charter: “Insofar as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights
guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by
the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive
protection” (see number [143]).
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210 Relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights relies on the French language
version, which speaks of “contestations sur des droits et obligations du charactère civil”,
cf. ECtHR 23 October 1985, Ser. A vol. 97 (Benthem v. The Netherlands), par. 32.
211 Article 38(1) PD.
212 Article 38(2) PD.
213 Article 9A(1) and (2)(a) PD. Article 9A concerns obligations of the applicant towards
“competent authorities”, including appeal authorities (cf. number [390]). 
214 Article 38(6) PD.
215 Article 38(4) PD. 
216 Article 17(2) PD. 
217 Article 38(1) PD. 
218 Article 9(2) read in conjunction with 9(1)(d) PD. 
219 Article 9(1)(e) PD. This duty to inform applies “in accordance with Article 8(2)” PD, that
is, “in conjunction with the negative decision” no information on how to challenge it has to
be given “where the applicant has been informed at an earlier stage either in writing or by
electronic means accessible to the applicant” on the matter.
220 Article 9(2) read in conjunction with 9(1)(b) and (c) PD. 
221 Articles 8(2) and 12(2) PD, cf. numbers [396] and [397] above. 
222 Article 7(3) PD. 
223 Article 14(1) PD.
224 Article 13(2) PD. According to Article 13(4) PD, the Member States may provide for rules
on “modalities for filing and processing such requests”.
225 Article 13(3) PD. The right to free legal assistance may further be restricted by imposing
monetary and time limits (Article 13(5) PD). 
226 Article 38(3) PD. 
227 Article 14(1) PD.
228 It will be remembered that Article 6 PD prohibits expulsion only up to the decision at first
instance (see number [392]).
229 Vermeulen 2003, pp. 441-442. 
230 Article 25(2)(b) and (c) PD. 
231 Article 25(2)(f) and (g) PD.
232 Article 25(2)(a) PD. 
233 That is, “the applicant is allowed to remain in the Member State concerned on some other
grounds and as result of this he/she has been granted a status equivalent to the rights and
benefits of the refugee status by virtue of [the Qualification Directive]”- Article 25(2)(d) PD
(see below). 
234 Article 25(2)(e) PD: “the applicant is allowed to remain in the territory of the Member State
concerned on some other grounds which protect him/her against refoulement pending the
outcome of a procedure for the determination of a status pursuant to (d)”. 
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235 Article 25(1) PD. 
236 Cf. Article 3(1) DR. 
237 Article 29(1) PD.
238 Article 19(1) PD. 
239 Article 20(1) PD.
240 As in the case of explicit withdrawals, cf. Article 19(1) PD.
241 Article 20(1) under (a) PD.
242 Article 20(1) under (b) PD. 
243 Other provisions may address particular grounds mentioned under Article 23(4) – cf. Article
10(2) PD (number [399] above). But then it is Article 10(2) that attaches the legal conse-
quence, not the “manifest unfoundedness”. 
244 Cf. Council doc. 8158/04 of 5 April 2004, Asile 2004/24: Article 29(2): “In the cases men-
tioned in Article 23(4) […], Member States may also consider an application, if it is so
defined in the national legislation, as manifestly unfounded and may apply rules under
Article 39(3)(b)”; Article 39(3)(b): “Member States […] may provide in their national legis-
lation that appeals or reviews according to Article 38 shall not have the effect of allowing
the applicant to remain in the Member State concerned in the following cases: (b) where
the application is considered to be unfounded pursuant to Article 29(1) and any of the cases
listed in Article 23(4) apply”. The latter provision confirms that “manifestly unfounded”
cases were considered “unfounded” for the purposes of Article 29(1) PD. 
245 Article 23(4)(a) and (b) PD.
246 Article 23(4)(g) PD.
247 Article 23(4)(j) PD.
248 Article 23(4)(c) PD.
249 Article 23(4)(d), (e) and (f) PD.
250 Article 23(f), (i), (k), (l) and (n) PD.
251 Article 23(4)(m) PD.
252 Article 23(4)(h) and (o) PD.
253 Preamble recital (15) PD. 
254 See for a detailed discussion of the implications of Articles 3, 13 and 35 ECHR for the
examination of subsequent applications Van Rooij 2004, pp. 17-30 and 34-39. 
255 Cf. number [281] and Article 4(3)(a) QD. 
256 Article 33(1) PD.
257 It appears that in the context of Article 33(1) PD, the term “subsequent applicant” addresses
all three types of subsequent applications. The provision is headed “subsequent applica-
tions” and addresses in the second and seventh paragraphs all three types (see immediately
below in the main text). As to withdrawn applications, the provision could not possibly
apply before a decision to discontinue examination (cf. Article 20(1) PD) has been reached. 
258 See for the meaning of the terms “decision” and “final decision” numbers [379] and [398] above.
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259 Article 33(2)(b) read in conjunction with 20 PD. 
260 Article 33(4) PD speaks of examination “in conformity with Chapter II”. 
261 Article 33(5) PD. According to Article 33(6) PD, “Member States may decide to further
examine the application only if the applicant concerned was, through no fault of his/her
own, incapable of asserting the situations set forth in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 in the previous
procedure, in particular by exercising his/her right to an effective remedy pursuant to
Article 38” [emphasis HB]. The obligatory language “may only” is out of place as no
Procedures Directive provision, in particular Article 33(3), (4) or (5), states the obligation
to apply the preliminary procedure, or turn down a subsequent application. 
262 Article 23(4)(h) PD. 
263 Cf. ECtHR 6 March 2001, Rep. 2001-II (Hilal), par. 56. 
264 Hilal, par. 62. 
265 Hilal, pars. 60f. Likewise, the European Court of Human Rights paid no attention to the cir-
cumstance that certain evidence relied on by the applicant (a report by Amnesty
International) was brought in well after the rejection of the asylum claim and the appeal
against the rejection in its judgement of 7 July 2005, appl. no. 2345/02 (Said v The
Netherlands).
266 Article 33(7) PD. Arguably, in the latter provision justification of not a separate application,
but of a separate examination is meant: the making of an application is, under the
Procedures Directive, not subject to approval of the authorities; moreover, the gist of the
‘preliminary procedure’ is sorting out whether a full examination is warranted or not.
267 Article 25(2)(g) PD.
268 Article 5(4)(c) PD.
269 Cf. Article 5(3) PD, see number [394] above. 
270 Article 23(4)(o) PD. 
271 Article 20(2) PD: “Member States shall ensure that the applicant who reports again to the
competent authority after a decision to discontinue as referred to in paragraph 1 is taken,
is entitled to request that his/her case be re-opened, unless the request is examined in accor-
dance with Articles 33 and 34”. It would appear from the wording that the obligation to offer
the opportunity to request for re-opening or to examine it in the preliminary procedure
applies only in case of a “decision to discontinue the examination”, and hence not when the
Member State decided to “reject” the implicitly withdrawn application pursuant to Article
20(1), and even less to a decision based on Article 19, that is, after “explicit” withdrawal of
the application. However, Article 38(1)(b) requires the possibility of appeal from “a refusal
to re-open the examination of an application after its discontinuation pursuant to Articles
19 and 20”. Despite the wording of Article 20(2), we must therefore assume that its provi-
sions apply to any decision on an implicitly or explicitly withdrawn application pursuant to
Articles 19 and 20 PD. Likewise, the preliminary procedure may be applied to subsequent
applications after explicit withdrawals ex Article 20 PD.
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272 Article 33(4) PD. 
273 Cf. Preamble recital (17) PD.
274 See for an analysis of differences and similarities between the concepts of the safe third
country and the safe country of origin Hailbronner 1993, pp. 31-66.
275 Protocol (29) on asylum for nationals of Member States of the European Union (1997), OJ
[1997] C 340.
276 See Steenbergen et al. 1999, pp. 148f. 
277 See on the matter extensively Noll 2000, pp. 536-557.
278 Hathaway 1991, pp. 80-1. 
279 Article 10(2)(c) read in conjunction with 23(4)(c) PD; cf. number [399].
280 Situation as of 1 August 2005. For a time, the Council considered adoption of an Annex
containing a “common minimum list” together with the Directive, hence by unanimity voting.
As it did not manage to reach “full agreement” on a list that would “be useful in practice”
(Council doc. 14383/04, Asile 2004/65 of 9 November 2004, pp. 2-3), it was decided to
adopt the Procedures Directive without the list. Adoption by “qualified majority voting”
allows for overruling Member States that do not consider some particular country of origin
as safe.
281 Preamble recital (19) PD.
282 Preamble recital (20) PD.
283 Article 15(2) ECHR addresses next to torture also other forms of ill-treatment meant in
Article 3 ECHR, and further the right to life, freedom from slavery and servitude, and from
retroactive criminal liability. 
284 This term seems to be designed to cover both types of serious harm defined in Article 15(b)
and (c) QD. 
285 According to a statement to the Council minutes re Annex II PD, “The Council stresses its
support for the abolition of the death penalty, as expressed in Protocols No. 6 and 13 to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. However, the
Council recognises that ceasing to impose and execute the death penalty is a significant
step towards abolishing the death penalty and encourages countries to continue their
progress towards this end” (Council doc. 8771/04, Annex III, p. 66). It seems that the
Council holds that the occurrence of death penalties does not preclude safety, whereas “exe-
cution” does. In the absence of reference to this statement in the Directive, it has however
“no legal significance” for the interpretation of the Annex (see number [73]). 
286 Article 30A(1) PD.
287 Ibid. In the absence of a similar statement in Article 30 PD, we must assume that the “com-
mon minimum list” cannot designate parts of countries as safe. It appears that pursuant to
this arrangement, the “internal flight alternative” (see number [317] above) may count as a
“safe part of a country of origin” for the purposes of Article 30A (and 30B) PD. Article 8
read in conjunction with7 QD allow for assuming that internal protection is offered by third
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parties or international organisations (number [320]. But as the actor of protection should
“observe” relevant international obligations (Annex II under (b) PD), only a state could pro-
vide for protection for the purposes of the safe country of origin arrangement.
288 Article 30A(2) PD. 
289 Annex II requires that the country does so “generally and consistently” (see number [450]). 
290 Or stateless persons, formerly habitually resident in that country – Article 30B(1) under (a)
and (b) PD. 
291 Confirms, as this obligation follows from Article 23(1) read in conjunction with 29(1) PD.
Cf. Preamble recital (21) PD. 
292 Cf. Preamble recital (21) PD: “By its very nature, the assessment underlying the designa-
tion can only take into account the general civil, legal and political circumstances in that
country and whether actors of persecution, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment are subject to sanction in practice when found liable in the country concerned.
For this reason, it is important that, where an applicant shows that there are serious rea-
sons to consider the country not to be safe in his/her particular circumstances, the desig-
nation of the country as safe can no longer be considered relevant for him/her [emphasis
added, HB]”.
293 Article 30(3) PD.
294 Article 30(4) PD - a proposal for removal submitted by the Commission on its own initia-
tive does not, apparently, suspend the obligation.
295 Article 30(6) PD.
296 The term “motifs sérieux” in Article 2(e) QD refers to the relevant term in Strasbourg case-
law on Article 3 ECHR. Article 4(1) QD in the French language version throws little light
on the matter, where it speaks of “étayer sa demande”. 
297 Like the French one, Article 4(1) in the Dutch language version is neutral where it speaks
of “staving van het verzoek”. – Arguably, the term “zwaarwegende gronden” in the Dutch
language version of Article 2(e) QD is a translation error. For the standard refers to the term
“substantial grounds” as employed by the European Court of Human Rights (cf. number
[15]); and the latter term is translated as “substantiële gronden” (so “substanatial”, not
“serious” grounds) in Article 29(1)(b) of the Dutch Aliens Act 2000 (Stb. 2001, 495). 
298 Cf. Preamble recital (21) PD: “The designation of a third country as a safe country of ori-
gin for the purposes of this Directive cannot establish an absolute guarantee of safety for
nationals of that country. By its very nature, the assessment underlying the designation can
only take into account the general civil, legal and political circumstances in that country
and whether actors of persecution, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment are subject to sanction in practice when found liable in the country concerned. For this
reason, it is important that, where an applicant shows that there are serious reasons to con-
sider the country not to be safe in his/her particular circumstances, the designation of the
country as safe can no longer be considered relevant for him/her”. 
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299 Maybe the safe country of origin arrangement is rather a standard on qualification for
refugee or subsidiary protection status than a standard on procedures. If so, Article 63(1)(c)
and (2)(a) TEC provide for its legal basis. But legislation pursuant to these provisions also
sets minimum standards. 
300 Preamble (7) PD, defining the “nature” of minimum standards – see number [259]. 
301 Article 30B(2) refers to countries “designated as safe pursuant to Article 30” PD only. 
302 Article 30B(3) PD. 
303 Article 30B(1) PD. 
304 Noll 2000, pp. 537-540. 
305 Noll 2000, pp. 540f. 
306 See Article 1 of the Resolution on a Harmonized Approach to Questions concerning Host
Third Countries (London, 30 November and 1 December 1992), recorded in Van Krieken
2000, p. 183 (cf. number [44]).
307 Article 4 elaborates on the obligation to have the application examined by the responsible
Member State set out in Article 3(1) DR. Article 3(3) derogates from this obligation where it
states that “Any Member State shall retain the right, pursuant to its national laws, to send an
asylum seeker to a third country, in compliance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention”. 
308 Cf. Article 9(1) DR. 
309 Boeles 1997, p. 78; see also number [546] below.
310 Goodwin-Gill states that the concept of “due process” includes as minimum requirements
(a) knowledge of the case against one, (b) an opportunity to submit evidence to rebut that
case, (c) reasoned negative decisions and (d) the right to appeal against negative decisions
to an impartial tribunal (Goodwin-Gill 1998, p. 307). We should observe that the second
requirement in Article 32(2) covers the first three issues mentioned by Goodwin-Gill
(Steenbergen et al. 1999, p. 162). Further, the French language version speaks of “une déci-
sion rendue conformément à la procédure par la loi”, and hence lacks an equivalent to the
word “due”. It seems that the Article demands decision making in accordance with the law
in all circumstances; the additional requirements mentioned under Article 32(2) RC apply
only when there are no compelling reasons of national security. The right to appeal before
an impartial tribunal (mentioned by Gill under d) not being mentioned in Article 32(2), it
seems unreasonable to assume it nevertheless applies (Steenbergen et al. 1999, pp. 162-3).
311 HRC 9 April 1981, No. 58/1979 (R.13/58) (Maroufidou v. Sweden), “The reference to
“law” in this context is to the domestic law of the State party concerned […]”.
312 HRC 29 March 2004, CCPR/C/80/D/1051/2002 (Ahani v. Canada), par. 10.8. 
313 General Comment on the position of aliens under the Covenant, GAOR/41, sup. 40, p. 119.
314 Boeles 1995, pp. 106-7.
315 Boeles 1995, pp. 107-108, referring to relevant views and scholarly comments.
316 Article 36 PD: “Member States shall ensure that an examination may be started to with-
draw the refugee status [….; emphasis added, HB].” 
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317 Article 37(4) PD. 
318 Article 2(k) PD.
319 Article 37(1) PD. 
320 We may observe that for the purposes of the Procedures Directive, the term “refugee sta-
tus” means recognition by a Member State of a third country national as a “person who ful-
fils the requirements of Article 1 [Refugee Convention] as set out in [the Qualification
Directive]” (Article 2(g) and (f) PD). It would follow that Article 37 PD does not address
withdrawal of status because the grounds meant in Article 33(2) RC apply (Article 14(4)
QD), for such a person would still be a refugee in the sense of Article 1 RC. Read to object
and purpose Article 37 PD also addresses withdrawal of refugee status pursuant to Article
14(4) QD.
321 Article 36 PD. 
322 Article 37(4) PD. 
323 Article 37(1) PD. Article 2(e) and 3A PD (cf. paragraph 6.2.4.1 above) address only
authorities dealing with applications, not with withdrawal. 
324 Article 37(1)(c) PD; cf. Article 7(2)(b) PD.
325 Article 36 speaks of the examination to withdraw the status “of a particular person”. 
326 Article 37(1)(a) and (b) PD. 
327 Or to those who pose a threat to life and freedom of his family members; Article 37(1)(d)
PD. Cf. Article 22 PD.
328 Article 37(2) and (3) PD; see on the Chapter II guarantees referred to numbers [396] and
[423] above.
329 I.e. either by expiry of the time limit stated in that decision or, before that moment, by a
Council Decision adopted by qualified majority upon a Commission proposal - Article 6(1)
TPD.
330 Article 28 TPD, see number [340]. 
331 As art. 36-37 PD address “withdrawal of refugee status”, the rules cannot apply to sub-
sidiary protection in a way similar to those on “applications for asylum” (cf. number [362]).
332 Preamble recital (5) PD. 
333 Preamble recitals (6) and (3) PD.
334 Preamble recital (5) PD. 
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Chapter 7
Allocation and safe third country arrangements 
In the Common European Asylum System, the exception of the safe third
country functions in two ways. First, Member States may apply the exception
and expel to applicant to a safe non-Member State. Then, the merits of the
application for asylum are not considered within the European Union. This
topic is addressed in paragraphs 7.4 and 7.5. Second, the system for allocation
of applicants within the European Union (the “Dublin system”) is a variant of
the exception of the safe third country. This topic is addressed in paragraphs
7.2 and 7.3.
7.1 Introduction
[475] Member States do not have to examine the merits of a claim for protec-
tion “where it can be reasonably assumed that another country would do the
examination or provide sufficient protection”1 – in other words, when the
exception of the safe third country applies.2 In this context, the country of ori-
gin is labelled the first country, the Member State where he made his claim the
second, and the state to which he is expelled, the third country.
European asylum law provides for five variants of the safe third country
exception. To begin with, the Dublin Regulation allows for the “transfer” of
applicants to another Member State that is “responsible” for examining their
claims (1). Further, the Procedures Directive offers three arrangements on the
designation of non-EU Member States as safe third countries.3 Article 27 PD
addresses the “safe third country concept” at large, and may apply to any third
country, and to any applicant for asylum (2). Article 26 PD lays down a par-
ticular variant of the safe third country exception that also may apply to any
third country, but only to applicants who have already found a form of durable
protection - the “country of first asylum” concept (3). Article 35A establishes
a special examination regime for expulsion of illegal applicants who enter or
have entered from a neighbouring non-Member State (4). Finally, according to
Article 25(2)(a) PD, an application may be declared inadmissible if another
Member State has recognised the applicant as a refugee - that is, if another
Member State is a “country of first asylum” (5). To this list we may add a sixth
arrangement that does not form part of Community law, but functions in its
context: expulsion (“transfer”) to Denmark or to the non-Member States
Iceland, Norway and Switzerland pursuant to the Dublin Convention or rela-
ted agreements (6). I will address them in the context of the discussion of the
Dublin Regulation (i.e. variety (1)). 
The “safe third country concept” essentially embraces two elements: criteria
for establishing responsibility for processing a claim for protection, and rules
for securing readmission of the asylum seeker.4 In paragraph 7.2 I address the
criteria for establishing responsibility or “allocation criteria” laid down in the
several arrangements, in paragraph 7.3 procedures on readmission. In para-
graph 7.4 I discuss the implications of international asylum law for applica-
tion of safe third country exception. Whether the six arrangements mentioned
above meet these requirements is the subject of paragraph 7.5. 
7.2 Allocation criteria 
The Dublin Regulation, its predecessor the Dublin Convention and related
agreements regulate allocation of applicants within the European Economic
Area (henceforth also: EEA). These instruments are discussed in paragraph
7.2.1. For allocation of temporary protection beneficiaries, the Temporary
Protection Directive sets separate rules, which will be discussed in paragraph
7.2.2. The allocation criteria that can be detected in the various safe third
country arrangements laid down in the Procedures Directive are addressed in
paragraph 7.2.3.
7.2.1 Allocation of applicants within the European Economic Area
Scope
[476] The European Economic Area was established by agreement between
the Community and the European Free Trade Association (henceforth also:
EFTA) that currently consists of Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and
Liechtenstein. The Dublin Regulation and related agreements under interna-
tional law regulate allocation of applicants within this European Economic
Area. 
The Dublin Regulation itself regulates the allocation of applicants among
all Member States apart from Denmark. The predecessor to the Dublin
Regulation, the Dublin Convention, still applies to transfers between those
Member States and Denmark; an agreement that renders the content of the
Dublin Convention regulates allocation among all Member States and the
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EFTA states Iceland and Norway.5 The Community signed new agreements
with Denmark and EFTA state Switzerland that render the content of the
Dublin Regulation, Dublin Application and Eurodac Regulations (which
agreements have not yet entered into force); in the future, a similar agreement
should replace the present agreement with Iceland and Norway. The Dublin
Application Regulation already “applies” to both EEA states.6 Together, these
instruments thus cover the whole of the European Economic Area, except for
Liechtenstein.
[477] These instruments do not address allocation within that Area of all per-
sons entitled to CEAS protection statuses. The Dublin Convention applies only
to “a request whereby an alien seeks protection from a Member State under
the Geneva Convention by claiming refugee status within the meaning of
Article 1 of the [Refugee Convention]”;7 hence not to persons who (explicitly)
request subsidiary or temporary protection status. The Dublin Regulation
applies to “applications”, that is to any “application for international protec-
tion, unless a third-country national explicitly requests another kind of protec-
tion that can be applied for separately”.8 This personal scope encompasses
necessarily all (future) beneficiaries of refugee status, as well as all subsidiary
protection status beneficiaries in those Member States that run a single proce-
dure for examining applications for both statuses.9 Neither the Dublin
Regulation nor any other instrument of Community asylum law addresses
allocation of applicants who explicitly request subsidiary protection in states
that examine applications in separate procedures. 
Objectives
[478] Before the entry into force of the Dublin Regulation, the Dublin
Convention applied to allocation of applicants between all Member States.
The Dublin Regulation is intended 
“while making the necessary improvements in the light of experience, to
confirm the principles underlying the [Dublin] Convention”.10
What are the “principles underlying” the Dublin Regulation and the Dublin
Convention? Both instruments are flanking measures for the establishment of
an area without internal frontiers, “open to those who, forced by circum-
stances, legitimately seek protection in the Community”.11 This entails a dual
aim (cf. paragraph 4.4). First, prevention of “secondary movements” made
possible by the abolition of border controls or, as the Explanatory memoran-
dum to the Proposal for the Dublin Regulation puts it, 
“to prevent abuse of asylum procedures in the form of multiple applica-
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tions for asylum submitted simultaneously or successively by the same per-
son in several Member States with the sole aim of extending his stay in the
European Union”.12
Though not explicitly stated, the “principle” that serves to achieve this aim is
the “one-chance only principle”: applicants should not have the opportunity to
lodge subsequent applications in different Member States.13 Thus, the Dublin
Convention and the Dublin Regulation seek to establish that only one Member
State is responsible for processing a claim on behalf of all Member States. 
Second, it serves the aim of securing access to protection. If several states
consider each other as safe third countries, none of them will examine the
merits of the claim of an applicant but expel them to each other. As a result,
the applicant is a “refugee in orbit”: neither expelled to his country of origin,
nor able to find a safe haven. 
The Dublin Regulation serves to prevent this kind of situation and to
“guarantee effective access to the procedures for determining refugee sta-
tus”14; moreover, it “seeks to ensure full observance of the right to asylum
guaranteed by Article 18 [Charter]”.15 The Dublin Convention should “guaran-
tee adequate protection to refugees in accordance with the terms of the
[Refugee Convention]”, and “provide all applicants for asylum with a guaran-
tee that their applications will be examined by one of the Member States and
to ensure that applicants for asylum are not referred successively from one
Member State to another without any of these States acknowledging itself to
be competent to examine the application for asylum”.16
Whether both instruments do indeed secure access to protection will be
addressed below, under number [483]. The allocation criteria that should
reflect these principles are “objective” and “fair […] for the Member States
and for the persons concerned” and in particular, they should allow for “rapid
decision making”.17
[479] Thus, the principles underlying both the Dublin Regulation and the
Dublin Convention are that the applicant’s claim to protection should be con-
sidered by one Member State only, that his access to protection is secured, and
that decision-making should be rapid. The Dublin Regulation moreover hints
at an equitable allocation of responsibility where it speaks of principles that
are “fair for the Member States concerned”, and where it refers to the neces-
sity of striking “a balance between responsibility criteria in a spirit of soli-
darity”.18 The question of in which respects the Dublin Regulation brought the
“necessary improvements” (as envisaged according to its Preamble) will be
addressed after discussion of the responsibility criteria. 
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Responsibility for determining responsibility
[480] Both the Dublin Convention and the Dublin Regulation set rules on esta-
blishing responsibility for two issues. First, they contain rules for determining
which Member State is responsible for the examination of an application. These
rules are laid down in Articles 5 to 14 DR (and Articles 4 to 9 DC; see below).
Second, they establish which Member State is responsible for that determi-
nation, that is, which Member State must sort out, by applying those criteria,
which Member State is responsible for examination of the claim. This second
form of responsibility rests in principle with the Member State with which the
application was lodged.19 This rule is subject to three exceptions. First, if an
application is lodged with a Member State by an applicant present in another
Member State, the latter state must determine which Member State is “respon-
sible” under the regulation criteria, and is regarded as the state with which the
application was lodged.20 Second, the responsibility of the state where the
application was lodged ceases, when the applicant left its “territories” for over
three months, or, third, obtained a residence permit from another Member
State.21
Responsibility for considering applications
[481] The Dublin Regulation states in Articles 6 to 14 criteria for determining
the Member State responsible for considering applications for asylum. These
criteria apply in the order in which they appear in the Regulation.22 Thus, only
if Article 6 does not apply, can a Member State be responsible according to
Article 7, and so on. The criteria can be divided into three groups.
(1) Criteria concerning family unity. Articles 6-8 and 14 DR bestow responsi-
bility to the state where a family member of the applicant is present.23
These criteria seem inspired by human rights considerations, especially
respect for family life and the rights of the child,24 but also by efficiency
considerations: applications of family members can be processed more
quickly by one Member State.25 These rules concerning family unity will
be further discussed below in paragraph 8.7.3.
(2) Criteria concerning a state’s involvement in the legal or illegal entry of the
applicant. A state is responsible if 
(a) it issued a visa or residence permit to the applicant;26
(b) the asylum seeker entered it illegally, coming from a non-Member
State. This ground of responsibility expires 12 months after the alien
entered the Member State 27 or, 
(c) if the previous grounds do not (or no longer) apply, the applicant has
lived for a continuous period of at least five months in it;28
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(d) if the applicant did not need a visa to enter that state (and hence could
not enter it illegally), entered it legally;29
(e) the applicant, on his way to a non-Member State, lodged his application
at the transit zone of an airport on its territory.30
(3) If none of these criteria apply, the responsibility lies with the Member State
where the asylum seeker lodged his application, hence presumably the
state of his preference.31
[482] These criteria do not exhaustively regulate the allocation of responsibi-
lity for examination of applications: both the Dublin Regulation as well as the
Dublin Convention set supplementary rules. The obligations implied by
responsibility cease (for practical purposes, the “responsibility” ceases) when
the applicant has left the “territory” of the (formerly responsible) Member
State for at least three months,32 or when another Member State has issued a
residence document to the applicant.33 Failure to meet the time limits in the
procedures for establishing responsibility entails transfer or acquisition of
responsibility (see below numbers [490] and [491]). Finally and most impor-
tantly, Member States can themselves voluntarily assume responsibility. The
“Sovereignty clause” of Article 3(2) DR confirms the sovereign right of the
states to process any application for asylum lodged with them.34 Further, pur-
suant to the “humanitarian clause” (Article 15 DR), Member States can
assume responsibility also for claims lodged elsewhere, and for which they are
not responsible pursuant to Articles 5-14 DR, on “humanitarian grounds” (see
further number [616]).35
[483] The Dublin Convention contains the same types of grounds for respon-
sibility that apply in the same order,36 but the Dublin Regulation criteria differ
from them in two important respects. First, the grounds for responsibility con-
cerned with family unity are far more elaborate, and hence are likely to have
far greater numerical impact (see further number [615]). Second, cessation of
responsibility because of illegal entry after twelve months (ground 2(b)) and
incurring responsibility because the alien has been present for five months
(ground 2(c)) are absent in the Dublin Convention. 
Both changes in the allocation criteria seem to serve to bring “necessary
improvements” referred to in the Preamble to the Dublin Regulation (see num-
ber [478] above). The first set of criteria serves to preserve family unity. As to
the second set of criteria, we may observe that the changes brought by grounds
2(b) and (c) shift responsibility from the states where illegal immigration into
the European Union takes place, i.e. border states, to the countries of destina-
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tion of those illegal immigrants. Does the arrangement serve to promote bur-
den sharing between the Member States, that is, a more equitable distribution
of applicants? Noll has shown that the Dublin system of allocation rather has
the opposite effect, and leads to concentration of the burden.37 We should note
that all the criteria of the second group put responsibility on the state that
made the applicant’s entry into the European Union possible, with the excep-
tion of ground 2(c). This new arrangement provides the border Member States
with an interest in better registering immigration, and may therefore improve
the functioning of the Dublin system. We should finally observe that if the
rationale behind allocating responsibility for illegal entry was to provide an
incentive to reinforce border controls, the Dublin system now also provides an
incentive to reinforce the control on illegal presence.
7.2.2 Allocation of temporary protection beneficiaries
[484] The Temporary Protection Directive does not set up an alternative system
for the allocation of displaced persons (or for allocation of responsibility for
them). But Chapter VI of the Directive, on “solidarity” between the Member
States, does provide for some rules that should contribute to equitable distribu-
tion.38 First, expenses made for temporary protection can be compensated for
from the European Refugee Fund - a form of financial burden sharing.39
Second, “physical” burden sharing, i.e. distribution of displaced persons over
the Member States should take place “in a spirit of Community solidarity”.40
This means that the Member States must indicate their reception capacity,
which information is published in the Council decision introducing temporary
protection.41 This may very well lead to both political and media pressure on
Member States to adapt reception numbers to those of other Member States.
Finally, Member States must co-operate on the transfer of beneficiaries.42
[485] European asylum law is unclear about the relation between the alloca-
tion rules in the Dublin Regulation and the Temporary Protection Directive.
Persons applying for temporary protection are, in principle, applicants for asy-
lum in the sense of Article 2(d) DR.43 The Dublin Regulation therefore may, in
principle, apply to them. Under the Community rules for asylum procedures,
a Member State may reject an application because another state is responsible
according to the Dublin Regulation, without examining the merits of the claim
(cf. number [427] above). Temporary protection therefore does not affect the
working of the Dublin system, for the responsibility criteria will usually be
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applied before the grounds of the application are considered (cf. number
[465], hence before addressing the question of whether or not the applicant is
a temporary protection beneficiary. The Council decision installing temporary
protection may offer clarification.
How does transfer according to the Temporary Protection Directive as
described above fit into the Dublin system? The Dublin Regulation offers two
grounds for voluntary responsibility. On the basis of Article 3(2) DR, the
Member State where an application was lodged may assume responsibility for
it, and under Article 15 DR a state may take over relatives on humanitarian
grounds. It is unlikely that the physical burden sharing scheme of the
Temporary Protection Directive was intended to be restricted to these cate-
gories. Arguably, “transferral” as meant in Article 26 TPD might take place in
other cases also, that is to a state where the applicant did not request protec-
tion, and has no relatives. 
Article 18 TPD states that in the context of “access to asylum procedures”
(the heading to the chapter where the provision is placed) the Dublin
Regulation rules apply; 
“[i]n particular, the Member State responsible for examining an asylum
application submitted by a person enjoying temporary protection pursuant
to this Directive, shall be the Member State which has accepted his trans-
fer onto its territory”. 
Neither the Dublin Regulation nor the Temporary Protection Directive elabo-
rates how these grounds for responsibility fits into the criteria system of the
Dublin Regulation; the provision seems to refer to responsibility based on
Article 9 DR, ground 2(a) as mentioned under number [481]. Domestic law
implementing Article 18 TPD does not have precedence over the directly
applicable Regulation provisions Article 6 till 8 DR. Thus, notwithstanding
Article 18 TPD, the applicant can invoke the Articles 6, 7 and 8 DR concern-
ing family unity. 
7.2.3 Allocation to non-Member States
[486] The allocation criteria laid down in the safe third country arrangements
in the Procedures Directive are far less elaborate than those discussed above.
Articles 26, 27 and 35A PD all set or imply only two criteria.
Under Article 35A(1) PD (which applies in case of illegal entry from cer-
tain neighbouring non-Member States – see number [383]), responsibility lies
first with the neighbouring third country, where the applicant was previously
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present. The safe third country exception of Article 27 PD applies in case of a
“connection between the person seeking asylum and the third country con-
cerned based on which it would be reasonable for that person to go to that
country”.44 The Procedures Directive does not determine when this connection
is established. Both provisions stipulate that if the third country does not read-
mit the applicant, the expelling Member State (where the application was
lodged) shall “ensure” that “access to a procedure is given in accordance with
the basic principles and guarantees described in Chapter II” PD.45 This does
not necessarily entail that the expelling Member State, the state where the
application was lodged, will examine whether the applicant qualifies for
refugee or subsidiary protection. For pursuant to the Dublin rules for respon-
sibility, this obligation may rest with another Member State. 
Article 26 PD applies if an applicant “has been recognised as a refugee in
a non-Member State,” and can still avail himself of that protection, or if he
“enjoys otherwise sufficient protection” there. Thus, responsibility lies in the
first place with the non-Member State that previously offered protection, and
second with the Member State that is responsible according to the Dublin
Regulation criteria. 
[487] Article 27 PD applies to non-Member States, and hence also to Norway,
Iceland and Switzerland (unless Article 35A PD would apply). Arguably, the
Dublin allocation rules provide for the “connection” with these states as
required by Article 27 PD. The obligation to readmit and process the applica-
tion ex Article 27 PD concurs with the obligation to do so ex Articles 10 and
13, and 3 DC (see numbers [481] and [482]).
7.2.4 Concluding remarks
[488] The allocation criteria of all arrangements discussed above share one
feature: the preferences of the applicant play only a modest role. Under the
Dublin Regulation, a Member State is responsible for an applicant on account
of presence of a family member only “provided that the persons concerned so
desire”.46 Through the “connection” requirement, the preferences of the appli-
cant are relevant for application of Articles 27 and 26 PD (the safe third coun-
try and first country of asylum exceptions). The implications of these criteria
for performance under international asylum law will be discussed in para-
graph 7.4. But we may observe that as international asylum law does not grant
a right to asylum from the state preferred by the protection seeker (see num-
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ber [11]), the criteria discussed above are not in themselves at variance with
international asylum law. 
7.3 Allocation mechanisms
Introduction
[489] In addition to allocation criteria, the safe third concept embraces allo-
cation mechanisms (cf. number [475]). Both the Dublin Regulation as well
as the Dublin Convention set elaborate rules on the procedures for deter-
mining which state is responsible, which I will discuss briefly below.
European asylum law does not establish procedures for securing admission
to non-EU Member States when the safe third country, the first country of
asylum or the safe neighbouring third country exceptions are applied. Such
procedures or mechanisms may be laid down in readmission agreements
between the Community (or individual Member States) and these third
countries.47
“Rapid” decision-making figures among the objectives of both the Dublin
Regulation and the Dublin Convention (number [478]). The Dublin
Convention has been criticised because its application caused long processing
delays.48 One of the “necessary improvements” brought by the Dublin
Regulation addresses the time limits that apply in the transfer procedures.
Moreover, the Eurodac Regulation establishes a system for the comparison of
fingerprints, which should “facilitate the implementation” of the Dublin
Regulation.49 Implementation rules that are relevant for procedures are further
laid down in the Dublin Application Regulation.
The Dublin Regulation and the Dublin Convention distinguish between
procedures for “taking charge”, and procedures for “taking back” applicants.
An applicant is “taken charge” of when the application was made in a “dif-
ferent” (i.e. non-responsible) Member State and has not yet been examined by
the responsible Member State, and “taken back” when the application has
been withdrawn, or when it is being examined and the applicant absconded to
another Member State without permission, or when it was rejected.50
Procedures for taking charge
[490] Both instruments set time limits for three subsequent state actions. First,
for the request “to take charge”, that is, the request to another state to accept
its responsibility; second, for the reply by the requested state; and third, for the
transfer if the requested state accepts is responsibility. 
394 Chapter 7
Unlike the Dublin Convention, the Dublin Regulation distinguishes between
normal and accelerated procedures for taking charge. The accelerated proce-
dure applies when an application “was lodged after leave to enter or remain
was refused, after an arrest for an unlawful stay or after the service or execu-
tion of a removal order and/or where the asylum seeker is held in detention”.51
In both variants, the request for taking charge must be made within three
months of the application being lodged.52 This time limit is fatal: if exceeded,
the Member State where the application was lodged is repsonsible.53 The time
limit applying under the Dublin Convention is twice as long (and also fatal).54
Under the Dublin Regulation, the requested state must react within two
months;55 if the request was “urgent” (and hence the ‘accelerated’ procedure
applies), it must react if possible within the time-limit set by the requesting
Member State or ultimately within one month.56 Both time limits are fatal.57
Under the Dublin Convention, the time limit is set at three months, and also
fatal.58
If the requested state accepts its responsibility, transfer of the applicant
must, according to the Dublin Regulation, take place within six months of it
being accepted, or after appeal if appeal has suspensive effect; again, all time
limits are fatal.59 The Dublin Convention sets the period for transfer at one
month, which appeared to be unduly short; moreover, this time limit is not
fatal.60
Taking back
[491] The Dublin Regulation establishes a procedure for taking back appli-
cants that takes far less time. No time limit for the request to take back is set,
but in fact it must be made within three months of the applicant leaving the
other Member State.61 If the request is based on data from the Eurodac system,
the time limit for reply is two weeks, otherwise one month.62 Transfer must
take place within six months of the requested Member State acceptance, or
after the appeal against this decision.63 All time limits are fatal.64 Under the
Dublin Convention, the requested Member State must reply within eight days,
and the transfer must take place within one month; neither of these time limits
is fatal.65
Proof and exchange of information
[492] In order to further smooth the procedure for determining responsibility,
the Dublin Regulation establishes rules on the elements of (formal) proof and
circumstantial evidence. A means of “proof ” is sufficient for establishing
responsibility, but “circumstantial evidence” suffices only if it is “coherent,
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verifiable and sufficiently detailed to establish responsibility”.66 The Dublin
Regulation and the Dublin Application Regulation elaborate what exactly
counts as “proof ” and what counts as “circumstantial evidence” for the appli-
cation of the various provisions.67 For example, for establishing family ties,
extracts from registers count as proof, statements of family members as cir-
cumstantial evidence.68 The Dublin Convention itself does not address the
means of proof. The Committee established by Article 18 DC laid down rules
on the matter in its Decision 1/97 (cf. number [43]). 
In addition, and finally, the Dublin Regulation contains rules on exchange
of information on applicants. Member States have the obligation to communi-
cate personal data necessary for determining responsibility, for examining the
application and for “implementing any obligation arising under this
Regulation”,69 that is in particular for taking charge of or taking back the appli-
cant. Of particular relevance in this connection is information from the
Eurodac system.
The personal data to be communicated may concern the identity, travel
route and place of residence of the applicant, as well as the date of application
and the stage of procedures.70 Grounds for decisions may be communicated
only “if necessary”, and if the applicant approves.71
Concluding remarks
[493] The Dublin Regulation does not regulate transfer procedures exhaustive-
ly: according to Preamble recital (9) DR, 
“[t]he application of this Regulation can be facilitated, and its effective-
ness increased, by bilateral arrangements between Member States for
improving communications between competent departments, reducing
time limits for procedures or simplifying the processing of requests to
take charge or take back, or establishing procedures for the performance
of transfers”. 
Such agreements may be considered desirable, as the Dublin Regulation does
not necessarily do away with the processing delays. The maximum time span
for taking charge from application to transferral under the Dublin Regulation
is 11 months (or 10, if the accelerated procedure applies), as compared to 10
months under the Dublin Convention. We should bear in mind that after the
transfer, the examination of the applicant has yet to start – an examination that
should in principle take no longer than six months, so the Procedures Directive
suggests (see number [376]). Still, the procedures have improved in that all
time limits under the Dublin Regulation are fatal, and that the applicant is left
in doubt for a shorter time as regards the outcome of his application in the
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non-responsible Member State. The stricter rules on proof and information
exchange may result in a quickening of transfer proceedings.
7.4 The exception of the safe third country in 
international law
7.4.1 Introduction
[494] From the perspective of international law, the Dublin allocation system,
the “safe country of first asylum concept”, the “safe third country concept”
and the “safe third neighbouring country procedure” are all variants of the
same concept – the exception of the safe third country. What is the basis for
this concept in international law? In paragraph 1.4.2 we saw that states are free
to expel aliens, unless treaty obligations forbid them to do so. The prohibitions
of refoulement abridge this right to expel, but only to a limited extent: they
prohibit expulsion that results in refoulement. States may expel persons in
need of protection to other states.72 Meanwhile, the prohibitions of refoulement
also set conditions on expulsion to such states. Obviously, expulsion to a third
state is in breach of the prohibitions of refoulement, if it amounts to “direct
refoulement”- if the alien has a well founded fear of being persecuted, or runs
a real risk of being subjected to ill treatment by or in that third state.73
Furthermore, all prohibitions of refoulement forbid “indirect refoulement”,
that is expulsion to a state, where the alien is at risk of being subsequently
expelled to a state where he fears persecution or ill treatment.74 Hence, the
application of the safe third country exception raises the question of when a
third state may be regarded as “safe”. In paragraph 7.4.2 I will discuss which
conditions apply to the third country. 
[495] Application of the safe third country exception raises yet another ques-
tion: how should the second state assess the safety of the third state? Here, we
should distinguish between the assessment of the risk of persecution or seri-
ous harm in the first country, and assessment of the risk that the third state will
expel the alien contrary to the prohibitions of refoulement. According to
Articles 25(2) PD, 19(1) and 20(1)(e) DR, the Member States do not have to
examine the foundedness of the claim if one of the variants of the safe third
country applies. Hence, when the Member States expel aliens pursuant to
these arrangements, they have not assessed whether the alien has well-foun-
ded fear of persecution or runs a real risk of ill-treatment in his country of ori-
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gin. In and of itself, omitting this examination is not at variance with interna-
tional law: the state may do without examination as long as it treats the alien
as if he were entitled to protection, for the prohibitions of refoulement forbid
expulsion, if it has not been established that the third state will offer effective
protection from refoulement.75 If the second state manages to establish that the
alien can get effective protection in the third state, it can expel him. Hence,
expulsion without previous examination of the merits of the case is compati-
ble with the prohibitions of refoulement, if it is sufficiently sure that the third
state is safe.76
But another question is whether states can properly assess the safety of
the third state without addressing the particular circumstances of the claim.
Can states rely on the mere fact that the third state ratified relevant instru-
ments of international law? Or should the second state assess in each indi-
vidual case the safety of the third state in the particular circumstances of that
case? And does such an examination entail assessment of the risk on human
rights violations in the first state? These questions will be discussed in para-
graph 7.4.3. 
7.4.2 Conditions on the third state
Introduction
Third states can offer effective protection from indirect refoulement in two
ways: by granting permission to stay, or by offering access to an examination
procedure. Both ways will be discussed below under the heading “durable
solution”. Next, I discuss some other requirements that have been suggested
in views by monitoring bodies or academic writing: admission to the third
state, observance of basic human rights in the third state, and the alien’s pre-
vious presence in or close ties with the third state. Some other factors relevant
for considering a third state safe, such as ratification of relevant instruments
of international law and its co-operation with monitoring bodies, are more
conveniently addressed in paragraph 7.4.3. 
Durable solution 
[496] The third state can afford effective protection from refoulement in seve-
ral ways.77 Spijkerboer and Vermeulen observe as regards to Article 33 RC,
that one way would be the issue of a permission of some sort to stay in the
third state. As there is no risk of expulsion then there is no risk of breach of
the prohibition on indirect refoulement. As it is this result that counts, it does
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not matter on what grounds the permission is granted. Hence, refugee status
determination by the third country is not required. 
The same reasoning applies to Article 3 ECHR. In T.I. v UK, the European
Court of Human Rights had to rule on expulsion of an applicant from Sri
Lanka (the first state) by the United Kingdom (the second state) to Germany
(the third state), and addressed the question which safeguards the third state
should offer. In this context, 
“[t]he Court’s primary concern is whether there are effective procedural
safeguards of any kind protecting the applicant from being removed from
Germany to Sri Lanka”, 
that is, whether the proceedings in Germany could offer T.I. “effective protec-
tion”.78 But the Court’s final considerations in T.I. v UK make clear that “effec-
tive protection” can be afforded also by other means than procedural safe-
guards: 
“the Court finds that it is not established that there is a real risk that
Germany would expel the applicant to Sri Lanka in breach of Article 3 of
the Convention. Consequently, the United Kingdom have not failed in their
obligations under this provision by taking the decision to remove the appli-
cant to Germany. Nor has it been shown that this decision was taken with-
out appropriate regard to the existence of adequate safeguards in Germany
to avoid the risk of any inhuman or degrading treatment (see e.g. Soering
v. the United Kingdom judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A no. 161, §§ 97-
98, Nsona and Nsona v. the Netherlands judgment of 28 November 1996,
Reports 1996-V, § 102, and D. v. the United Kingdom judgment of 2 May
1997, Reports 1997-III, § 52)”. 
Thus, the second state complies with its obligations under the prohibition on
indirect refoulement if it has “appropriate regard” that the third state provides
for “adequate safeguards” of some kind. The case law referred to gives indi-
cations as to the kind of safeguards that would be adequate. They may follow
not only from “effective procedural safeguards”, as addressed in the case of
T.I, but also from undertakings by the expelling state to take away such risk,
as discussed in the paragraphs of Soering to which the Court refers,79 or from
the offer of appropriate reception, addressed in the cases of Nsona and of D v
UK.80 Arguably, the same approach applies to the other prohibitions of refoule-
ment.81
[497] A third country, therefore, is safe if there is some safeguard that protects
a particular applicant from expulsion to his country of origin, such as a previ-
ously issued residence permit. But usually, there will be no such safeguard for
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the particular applicant. In such a case, there may nevertheless be a safeguard
in the form of access to examination procedures in the third country. If it is
sufficiently sure that the third country will sort out whether the applicant is in
need of protection, the third state is safe for the purposes of the prohibitions
of refoulement.
The matter is complicated as the third state can comply with the prohibi-
tion of refoulement in two ways. First, it can examine the foundedness of the
claim for protection; second, it can in its turn apply the exception of the safe
third country and expel the alien to a subsequent (fourth) state. Would the sec-
ond state comply with the prohibition of refoulement if it foresees this second
type of examination by the third state? Arguably, in case of imminent chain
expulsion to a fourth state (and maybe further subsequent states), the second
state cannot establish with sufficient certainty that the refugee will not, as a
result of its expulsion, ultimately find himself at the frontiers of the first
state.82 Arguably, then, the second state does not offer effective protection from
refoulement if there is no prospect of a durable solution in the third (or a sub-
sequent) state. Indeed, several authors state that the Refugee Convention
requires that the refugee have access to a refugee status determination proce-
dure in the third state, resulting in permission to reside if he is in fact a
refugee.83 Confirmation may be found in ExCom Conclusion from 1998,
which states that the third state should offer the refugee the possibility “to seek
and enjoy asylum”.84 In this context, the possibility to seek and enjoy asylum
is the possibility to obtain admission to the third state and to apply for asylum
there (the right to obtain admission will be discussed below, under number
[500]).85 The same reasoning applies to the other prohibitions of refoulement.
In summary, effective protection from refoulement implies that (in the
absence of an adequate safeguard for the particular applicant as discussed in
the previous number) the second state will not expel an applicant to a third
state unless it has established that the merits of his claim for protection will be
examined in the third (or a subsequent) state. 
[498] One might argue that the requirement of a durable solution for appli-
cation of the safe third country exception as advocated here is in excess of
the obligations under international law of the Member States, as it implies a
right to status determination or even to asylum, both absent from interna-
tional law. Indeed, the Refugee Convention does not in general confer a right
to refugee status determination (see paragraph 8.2.4), and even less does the
Refugee Convention or any other instrument of international law confer a
right to asylum (number [11]). But we should observe that the requirement
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of a durable solution in the third or subsequent state is not based on, and
hence does not presuppose, a right to status determination or to asylum.
Rather, it is a side effect of the prohibition of refoulement. The prohibition
entails the same side effect in case a refugee reaches the frontier of a
Contracting state, and the exception of the safe third country cannot be
applied to him. For then, the Contracting state will have to condone his 
presence in order to comply with the prohibition of refoulement – that is, it
will have to offer a durable solution. 
Procedural safeguards
[499] Thus, all prohibitions of refoulement require that examination of the
merits of the case will take place in the third (or a subsequent) state. This
entails that in expulsion proceedings, the third state (and as the case may be,
a subsequent state) should offer the procedural guarantees implicit in the pro-
hibitions of refoulement (discussed above, in paragraphs 6.2.1 and 6.3.1). 
Should the third state comply with the other procedural safeguards that the
Member States must offer, such as Article 13 ECHR or 2 CCPR (cf. par.
6.3.1)? In itself, there is no reason to assume so. Other provisions than Articles
33 RC, 7 CCPR, 3 CAT and 3 ECHR may imply a prohibition of refoulement
(see number [16]), but these have not yet materialised. There is no reason to
assume that the absence of the safeguards in the third country required by, say,
Article 2 CCPR, bars expulsion. 
Arguably, however, Article 3 ECHR does in fact require that proceedings
in the third state should comply with several standards set by Article 13
ECHR. It follows from T.I. v UK that Article 3 ECHR requires that the third
state offers “effective protection”, and that it satisfies this condition if it offers
“effective procedural safeguards”. In T.I. v UK, the discussion of the German
(i.e. the third state’s) procedural safeguards by the European Court of Human
Rights is narrowly tailored to the submissions of the parties, and therefore
hardly allows for general conclusions on which conditions a third state should
meet in order to offer “effective protection”. Still, we should note that the
Court observes in this context that
“[a]s the previous deportation order against the applicant was made more
than two years earlier, the applicant could not be removed without a fresh
deportation order being made, which would be subject to review by the
Administrative Court, and to which the applicant could make an applica-
tion for interim protection within one week. He would not be removed until
the Administrative Court had ruled on that application.”86
Availability of an effective remedy (“review by the Administrative Court”) and
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the suspensive effect of proceedings against a deportation order appear to be
relevant for the assessment of the effectiveness of the German procedural safe-
guards. It appears that Article 3 ECHR requires that the third state offers an
effective remedy that is up to the standards of Article 13 ECHR (cf. number
[412]). 
At first sight, this finding is remarkable, as it is Article 13, not 3 ECHR
that requires presence of an effective remedy in the second, expelling state.
But as discussed in Chapter 6.2.1, it follows from the Jabari judgement that
Article 3 ECHR (not Article 13 ECHR) requires that the expelling state makes
a “meaningful assessment” of the claim that the expulsion will lead to ill treat-
ment. Further, Article 33 RC requires that applicants for refugee status can
apply for leave to remain during appeal proceedings (see number [416]); the
same reasoning applies to Article 3 ECHR. All these procedural safeguards
that are implied by Article 3 ECHR are usually not addressed, because in cases
of direct refoulement the individual can rely on the more explicit right to an
effective remedy ex Article 13 ECHR. But in the assessment of the effective-
ness of the procedural safeguards in the third state in T.I. v UK, Article 13 does
not come into play: that provision addresses proceedings in the second, not in
the third state. Therefore, all procedural requirements implicitly required for
effective application of Article 3 ECHR come to the fore – and these show
considerable overlap with Article 13 ECHR. 
In summary, Article 3 ECHR requires that the third state offers “effective
protection” from refoulement. Arguably, this effective protection entails that it
should make a meaningful assessment of the claim, and offer an effective
remedy in case of a negative decision. 
Admission
[500] Does Article 33 RC require that the third state admits the refugee to its
territory? Effective protection from indirect refoulement implies that access to
the third state is secured, if only for the purpose of examination of his claim
for protection. Otherwise, there would be no guarantee that the refugee has an
opportunity to invoke the protection of Article 33 RC (see above). 
The context, however, seems to suggest otherwise: whereas Article 33 RC
does not mention a claim to seek admission, Articles 31 and 32 RC do.
Articles 31(2) and 32(3) RC require that certain categories of refugees are
allowed “a reasonable period and all the necessary facilities to obtain admis-
sion into another [third] country” or “a reasonable period to seek legal admis-
sion” into a third country. But arguably, these provisions address the opportu-
nity to “obtain” or “seek” admission in a third country of the refugee’s prefe-
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rence, whereas the condition of access implicit in Article 33 RC concerns
mere admission, irrespective of the preferences of the refugee. Zwaan shows
that the travaux préparatoires to the Refugee Convention confirm this rea-
ding: the drafters assumed that a state may not send a refugee to a third state
without a visa giving access.87 In summary, the effective protection required by
Article 33 RC entails that the refugee has access to the third state for the pur-
pose of examination of his claim to protection. 
[501] As to Article 3 ECHR, the requirement of access was touched upon side-
ways in the judgement Amuur v France88. Amuur and several other Somali had
requested asylum in France. Asylum was denied, and they were expelled to
Syria. In the meantime, they had been held in detention at an airport, not
authorised to enter France. Amuur cum suis complained of detention contrary
to Article 5(1)(f) of the European Convention (cf. number [604]). According
to France, their forced stay at the airport did not amount to detention because
they had the opportunity to leave the country and go to Syria. The European
Court of Human Rights observed: 
“[the] possibility [for asylum-seekers to leave voluntarily the country]
becomes theoretical if no other country offering protection comparable to
the protection they expect to find in the country where they are seeking
asylum is inclined or prepared to take them in. Sending the applicants back
to Syria only became possible, apart from the practical problems of the
journey, following negotiations between the French and Syrian authorities.
The assurances of the latter were dependent on the vagaries of diplomatic
relations, in view of the fact that Syria was not bound by the Geneva
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.”89
Obviously the Court’s opinion on the “possibility” of going to Syria has much
to do with the availability of protection up to Convention standards, an aspect
to be discussed in paragraph 7.4.3 below. Although the consideration concerns
Article 5 ECHR, we can, arguably, assume that the “preparedness” or “incli-
nation” of the third state to take in the individual is a material factor for asses-
sing the effectiveness of the protection under Article 3 ECHR as well.
Human rights standards in the third state
[502] According to ExCom, the third state should treat the refugee in accor-
dance with “accepted international standards”.90 A previous ExCom
Conclusion spoke of “treatment in accordance with recognised basic human
standards”.91 This view has found support in scholarly writing.92 But what stan-
dards exactly would apply? May we assume that the Refugee Convention for-
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bids expulsion also in the case that the third state will not accord other
Convention benefits, such as the right to schooling, housing, welfare and so
on?93 Arguably, object and purpose of the Refugee Convention plead in favour
of this contention: the Preamble speaks of securing “the widest possible exer-
cise” of human rights by refugees.94 But it does not follow that a Contracting
state is liable for any possible violation of Refugee Convention rights by a
third state upon expulsion.95 Articles 33 RC prohibits expulsion to territories
where the “life and freedom”96 of the refugee are threatened, not where enjoy-
ment of some Convention benefit like the right of access to the labour market
is threatened. Moreover, the Refugee Convention provisions apply only if cer-
tain conditions are fulfilled – and most of them require the refugee’s presence
in the Contracting state (see paragraph 8.2.1). Thus, the Convention provisions
on the right to schooling, housing, welfare and so on entail requirements only
for acts and conduct by the contracting state itself.97 Liability of the Member
States for denial of Convention benefits is therefore limited to their own acts,
committed on their own territory.98
As to international human rights law, the prohibitions of refoulement of
Articles 7 CCPR, 3 CAT and 3 ECHR of course apply to expulsion to any
state. As discussed under number [16], other provisions (such as Articles 2, 5
or 6 ECHR) may also or do implicitly prohibit refoulement. But these implicit
prohibitions have not yet been substantiated; therefore, we cannot derive any
further conditions on expulsion to third states from them. 
In summary, international law does not require that the alien will be
treated in the third country in accordance with other human rights than
those addressed in the prohibitions of refoulement. A requirement of treat-
ment in accordance with other basic human rights is, however, implied by
the “right to asylum” of Article 18 Charter, to be discussed under number
[504] below. 
Close ties or previous presence 
[503] In state practice, some variants of the exception of the safe third coun-
try restrict application to aliens who travelled through, or had previously found
protection in the third state. According to ExCom Conclusion 15 (XXX) 1979, 
“Regard should be had to the concept that asylum should not be refused
solely on the grounds that it could be sought from another State. Where,
however, it appears that a person, before requesting asylum, already has a
connection or close links with another State, he may if it appears fair and
reasonable be called upon first to request asylum from that State.” 99
This text is almost identical to Article 1(3) of the Draft Convention on
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Territorial Asylum,100 a convention that was never adopted.101 It should be
observed that a previously established tie with the third state is not worded as
a hard condition (the Conclusion calls for mere “regard” to a “concept”).
Besides, the Conclusion dates back twenty-five years, and it is doubtful
whether the “concept” still prevails. Moreover, the Refugee Convention does
not provide for a solid basis for the condition that the refugee had previously
established ties with the third state. 
In this context, Article 31 RC has occasionally been mentioned (quoted
under number [546]).102 The provision defines as its personal scope unlawful-
ly present refugees who have come “directly” from the state where they fear
persecution. Most authors hold that the term “directly” should not be inter-
preted in a literal sense: the refugee who travelled without undue delay
through a country or countries where he could not get “effective protection”
has come “directly” in the sense of Article 31(1) RC.103 A refugee who has not
come “directly”, then, travelled through or established himself in states where
he got or could have got effective protection – safe third countries. 
It appears, then, that Article 31 RC draws a distinction between refugees to
whom (a form of the) exception of the safe third country applies, and those to
whom it does not. But as Zwaan points out, this distinction has only very limi-
ted consequences for the application of the exception of the safe third coun-
try.104 Article 31(1) prohibits imposition of penalties for illegal entry and the
first clause of Article 31(2) addresses unnecessary restrictions on the move-
ments of the mentioned category of persons. These clauses offer no clue for
assuming that the distinction between refugees who came “directly” and those
who did not, is relevant for the application of other Refugee Convention pro-
visions as well. In particular, a right of choice of the country of destination for
refugees cannot be based on the provision, as the provision does not address
that choice.105 Only the last clause of Article 31(2) RC, on the reasonable period
to obtain admission elsewhere, seems to have bearings on expulsion; this
requirement was discussed already above (number [500]). 
In summary, Article 31 RC does not require that the refugee has travelled
through or otherwise established ties with the third state. The prohibitions of
refoulement offer no clue for such a condition. 
Article 18 Charter
[504] A brief remark should be made on the implications of Article 18 Charter,
the right to asylum, for the application of the safe third country exception. We
saw in paragraph 2.3.5 that the right to “asylum” implies a claim to a form of
protection that should be both durable and “appropriate” in terms of secondary
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rights. The obligation to guarantee this right concerns refugees, and may con-
cern other persons in need of protection as well.
Thus, when an applicant is expelled to a third country, his right to asylum
should be guaranteed. This implies, first, that his right to a durable form of
protection should be guaranteed, a condition quite similar to the requirement
that he should have the prospect of a durable solution (discussed under num-
bers [496] and [497]). Second, it implies that he should have the prospect of
entitlement to an “appropriate” set of secondary rights. We observed above
that according to ExCom recommendations, the third country should treat the
refugee in accordance with basic human rights standards, but that this require-
ment cannot be based on the prohibitions of refoulement (numbers [502]).
Presumably, ExCom inferred the requirement from the “right to seek and
enjoy asylum” (which Member States are not bound to observe under interna-
tional law, cf. number [11]). Arguably, entitlement to treatment in accordance
with those “basic human rights” is implied by the right to asylum ex Article
18 Charter.
In summary, Article 18 Charter has one important implication for the
application of the exception of the safe third country next to the obligations
under international law: it requires that the right to an “appropriate” solution
is guaranteed in the third country. Arguably, a country offers “appropriate”
protection only if it treats applicants in accordance with “basic human rights
standards”. 
Conclusions
[505] The prohibitions of refoulement require effective protection from expul-
sion to a state where the alien fears persecution or serious harm. This protec-
tion can be offered in, basically, two ways. (1) The third state (or a subsequent
state whereto the alien will be expelled) permits the alien to stay, or otherwise
offers some guarantee to the effect that it will not expel the alien contrary to
the second state’s obligations under the prohibitions of refoulement (number
[496]). (2) If no such guarantee for the specific alien applies, he must have the
opportunity to invoke the effective protection of the prohibitions of refoule-
ment in the third state (number [497]). For the purposes of the application of
the safe third country exception, this requirement is met with only if it is esta-
blished that the merits of the claim will be examined by the third (or a subse-
quent) state. Further, this examination should be in accordance with the pro-
cedural guarantees implicit in these prohibitions: the third state must make a
meaningful assessment of the claim, and suspend expulsion of a person who
made an arguable claim until the claim has been considered to the merits
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(number [499]). Finally, the alien should have access to the third state in order
to be able to invoke the protection of the prohibitions of refoulement (numbers
[500] and [501]). 
The prohibitions of refoulement require that the alien will not suffer viola-
tion of the human rights addressed in those prohibitions in the third country
(number [494]). Article 18 Charter implies that the applicant should, more-
over, enjoy “appropriate protection” there, which arguably entails treatment in
accordance with basic human rights standards (number [504]). 
Article 31(2) and 32(3) RC require that states allow specific groups of
refugees a reasonable period to obtain admission to a state of their preference.
Due to their personal scope, the impact of the last two provisions on the actual
application of the safe third country exception is modest. The safe third coun-
try exception is applied to requests for asylum, and hence not relevant for law-
fully present recognised refugees who may be expelled (Article 32 RC – cf.
number [562]). Further, the exception is usually applied to third states where
the refugee was present before he came to the state where he requested asy-
lum, and hence not relevant for refugees who came “directly” from the state
where they feared persecution (number [503]). 
7.4.3 Assessment of the safety
7.4.3.1 The individual and the generic approach106
[506] A state can apply the exception of the safe third country in (basically)
two ways. Firstly, it can make an individual assessment of the foundedness of
every claim for protection. It then assesses whether or not the alien has well-
founded fear of being persecuted (or runs a real risk of being subjected to seri-
ous harm) in his country of origin. If there is no such fear or risk, the prohibi-
tions of refoulement do not apply and the second state can expel the alien to
the third or to the first state. But if it finds that there is a risk of treatment con-
trary to the prohibitions of refoulement upon removal to country of origin, it
will have to establish that the third state will offer the applicant for asylum the
protection he is entitled to (as discussed in the previous paragraph). 
As this approach entails full examination of the claim, states prefer a sec-
ond option: assessment of the safety of the third country according to some
generic definition. Then, no examination of fear or risk takes place. Instead,
the second state assumes that the third country will not expel the asylum see-
ker contrary to any of its (the expelling, second) state’s obligations under inter-
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national law. This assumption is usually based on ratification by the third state
of relevant instruments of international law. Removal to the third state does not
harm the protection seeker, as he can invoke the same treaty provisions as he
could in the state where he made his request for asylum, so the argument runs. 
Below, I will address at some length the validity of this generic approach,
as it is the basis of most variants of the exception of the safe third country in
European asylum law: the Dublin allocation system, the safe third country
concept and the safe third neighbouring country procedure. The generic
approach is less relevant when the country of first asylum concept or the
Member State of first asylum provision is applied. Then, assessment of the
safety by definition addresses the specific circumstances of the applicant. 
[507] In an extreme form, the “generic approach” is based on two tenets. First,
expulsion to a third country is in conformity with the prohibitions of refoule-
ment if the third state is formally bound to those prohibitions.107 Second, the
assumption of safety on this ground is absolute, not open to rebuttal. This vari-
ant has met with criticism.108 Noll points out that absolute trust based on mere
ratification of treaties leads to unreasonable results, referring to a Swedish
case on the expulsion of an Iraqi to Germany.109 The Iraqi feared that Germany
would expel him to Jordan, a country considered safe by Germany. Sweden on
the other hand considered Jordan unsafe as it has not acceded to the Refugee
Convention. Still, the Iraqi could be expelled to Germany, as this state was
party to the same instruments as Sweden, and therefore safe. Hence, reliance
on mere ratification of international law instruments may lead to the
unreasonable result that a country may be an unsafe third, but a safe fourth
country.
That ratification of the same treaties is not a sufficient basis for inter state
trust also follows from state practice as well as from views of treaty monitoring
bodies. In Adan and Aitsegur,110 the House of Lords addressed expulsions to
Germany and France (in this context the third states). In contrast to the United
Kingdom, Germany and France held the view that non-state actors cannot
commit persecution acts; victims of such could therefore not be recognised as
refugees by those states (see above, paragraph 5.4.2). The Lords ruled that
Adan and Aitsegur could therefore not be expelled to Germany and France; in
the circumstances of the case, these states were not safe third countries. 
In Korban v Sweden, on expulsion of an Iraqi by Sweden to Jordan (the
third state), the Committee against Torture “noted” that Jordan was party to
the Convention Against Torture; nevertheless, it considered Jordan unsafe (and
hence expulsion to Jordan contrary to Article 3 CAT).111 In T.I. v UK, the fact
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that Germany (the third country) was party to the European Convention of
Human Rights could “not affect” the responsibility of the UK under that
Convention, nor could it “rely automatically” on the Dublin Convention that
might, arguably, provide for some additional protection. The assessment of the
safety concerned both interpretation (once again, the non-state actors issue) as
well as the application (credibility issues, see number [511] below).112
[508] Thus, the mere fact that a third state has ratified relevant instruments of
international law does not allow for absolute trust that it is safe. More restric-
tive interpretation or improper application by the third state may render its
protection from refoulement ineffective. Does it follow that a state may apply
the exception of the safe third country only after an individual examination of
each and every case? It was observed above (number [495]), that in itself there
is no duty to examine the merits of a request for asylum. One could argue that
effective protection from indirect refoulement entails that the second state
should establish that the third country is safe for the particular applicant –
which amounts to a duty to perform an individual examination to the merits
(though not necessarily a complete examination, see below [511]). 
However, this conclusion would render the fact that the other state is party
to the same instruments of international law irrelevant. It would also imply
that all European law on the interpretation and application of international law
is completely irrelevant for Member State performance under those instru-
ments. This conclusion is unreasonable: if another Member State is bound by
European law to interpret or apply the Refugee Convention in a certain way,
there is no reason to doubt it will do so. 
7.4.3.2 The principle of inter-state trust as a rebuttable presumption
The concept
[509] Thus, absolute trust that a third state is safe cannot be based on mere
ratification of instruments of international law. But requiring examination of
each and every case is too strict: it renders all formal obligations nugatory.
With this in mind, a sort of intermediate position between the individual and
the generic assessment of the third country’s safety is defensible, as
Spijkerboer and Vermeulen argue.113 Upon an application for asylum, the
expelling state can refuse to examine the application to the merits of the claim
on the assumption that a specific third country is prima facie safe. It can
soundly base this prima facie trust on the fact that the other state ratified the
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instruments of international asylum law and on other factors, to be discussed
below. But this trust cannot be absolute, because state practice under those
instruments may diverge. Hence, the applicant must have the opportunity to
present counter evidence to the effect that the third country is not safe. If he
succeeds, the exception of the safe third country cannot apply (and the second
state could expel the alien only if examination of the claim shows that the alien
has no well-founded fear of persecution and runs no real risk of serious harm).
This approach, interstate trust as a rebuttable presumption, is in conformity
with the obligations from the refoulement prohibitions, as it demands and
allows for an individual assessment, if proper grounds are adduced that this is
necessary. At the same time, it allows for taking due account of the third state’s
being party to asylum law instruments. 
[510] To be sure, this approach does not entail that the burden of proving that
the third country is safe falls upon the applicant. The expelling state must
establish that the third state is safe; only when it has done so, can it rely on the
presumption of inter state trust, and the burden of proof that this trust is unjus-
tified shifts to the applicant. 
Why does the burden of proving that the third state is prima facie safe rest
upon the state, not the applicant? As observed above, if a state does not exa-
mine the merits of this claim, it must treat the applicant as if he is indeed a
refugee (and as if he indeed runs a real risk of suffering serious harm). Hence,
the state must act under the assumption that its obligations under international
law are involved by the expulsion. As any expulsion of an applicant for pro-
tection may “in any manner whatsoever” result in refoulement, expulsion is
prima facie in breach of the prohibitions of refoulement. It is therefore incum-
bent upon the state to rebut the assumption that expulsion amounts to refoule-
ment by establishing the safety of the third state. In other words, the burden of
proof that the prohibitions of refoulement do not prohibit expulsion of the
refugee in the relevant case is upon the state. 
T.I. v UK and Korban v Sweden
[511] Is this approach, the rebuttable assumption that the third state is safe
according to some generic definition, in conformity with relevant obligations
under international law? We saw above that the Refugee Convention does not
require that refugee status determination before expulsion to a safe third state
takes place; hence, it does not resist application of the principle of inter-state
trust. 
As to Article 3 ECHR, several authors hold that T.I. v UK implies an obli-
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gation to examine the merits of the claim. 114 Indeed, after having observed that
Germany’s ratification of the European Convention of Human Rights and the
Dublin Convention does not absolve the UK from its responsibilities under the
European Convention, the European Court of Human Rights considered the
“Alleged risk of ill treatment in Sri Lanka” (the heading above the paragraph
concerned). Only after it found that the presented materials gave rise to “con-
cerns as to the risk” of ill treatment upon return to Sri Lanka (the first state),
did the Court address the effectiveness of the protection from refoulement
offered by Germany (discussed above, under number [499]). This order of
examination, one may argue, implies that some examination of the merits is
required. Further, the assessment of the German procedural safeguards con-
cerned the circumstances of T.I.’s case: the allegation that Germany would
state undue requirements on credibility, and the alleged improbability that
Germany would offer protection, as T.I. feared ill treatment by non-state
agents. Hence, the assessment of the safety of the third state addresses the
issues identified by the examination of the individual case. 
Yet these observations do not entail that the Court’s reasoning is at odds
with the generic approach as advocated above. Importantly, the European
Court of Human Rights states that the UK cannot “rely automatically […] on
the arrangements made in the Dublin Convention” (emphasis added).115 The
UK can therefore rely on them to a certain extent – to the extent that its inter-
state trust in Germany is justified, I would say. T.I. however prima facie
rebutted this trust: the Court noted that the applicant provided strong evidence
before the Court, which had not been available to the German authorities when
they dismissed the application. T.I. further alleged, referring to German state
practice, that this evidence would not be granted due importance in the exami-
nation of his case upon removal. Therefore, the Court scrutinised the relevant
German procedural safeguards. The examination of “the concerns as to the
risk” of ill treatment upon removal to Sri Lanka served, arguably, to sort out
whether scrutiny of the German safeguards was worthwhile. It is by no means
evident that the “concerns as to the risk” were the only, or even the decisive
factor for the Court to embark upon an assessment of the procedural safe-
guards in Germany. 
[512] Hence, the Contracting states may rely to a certain extent on the fact that
the third country is bound by the same instruments of international law as it is
itself. Confirmation can, arguably, be found in Amuur v France (addressed
under number [501]). In this judgement, the European Court of Human Rights
took account of the fact that Syria, the state whereto France intended to expel
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a Somali, was party to the Refugee Convention.116 Ratification of the European
Convention of Human Rights also played a role in a decision by the European
Commission of Human Rights that a third country was safe.117 If the protection
seeker manages to prima facie rebut this trust in the third country, the Member
State must assess the safety of that state only if the protection seeker can show
there are “concerns as to the risk” of ill treatment in the country of origin.
Arguably, this standard is more lenient than the one applying to cases of direct
refoulement (i.e., “substantial grounds for the existence of a real risk”).118
Examination of the harm feared in the country of origin is required only as far
as necessary to be able to properly assess the safety of the third state. 
[513] Is the generic approach in the form advocated above also in conformity
with Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture? In both cases wherein the
Committee assessed the compatibility of expulsion to a third state with Article
3 CAT, it proceeded in two steps. First, it assessed the risk that the applicant
would be submitted to torture in his country of origin.119 If such substantial
grounds for assuming that risk exist, the risk on removal to that country of ori-
gin from the third state is assessed – the second step.120 It is not entirely clear
which standard of risk applies to expulsion by the third to the first state. In
Korban the Committee spoke of “substantial grounds for believing that” the
applicant “would be subjected to torture”, apparently a more lenient standard
than the usual “foreseeable, personal and real risk”, but in a later view, the
Committee applied as standard that it should concern a “third country where
it is foreseeable that he may subsequently be expelled”.121
We saw above that there is no such risk if the third state offers protection
from expulsion as meant in Article 3 CAT. In this context, relevant factors
appeared to be the third state’s being party to the Convention and, moreover,
the possibility of lodging a complaint against the third state with the
Committee against Torture.122 The Committee’s view therefore refers to the
principle of interstate trust (and being a party to the Convention as a basis for
it), but hardly allows for definite conclusions on its application. It shows that
the principle can indeed not be applied in an absolute manner - counter evi-
dence must be allowed. 
A notable difference between the approach by the Committee against Torture
and the European Court of Human Rights concerns the assessment of the risk to
torture or ill treatment in the first state. The Court, we saw above, proceeded to
assess the safety of the third state after it had concluded that there were mere
“concerns as to the risk” of ill treatment. The Committee on the other hand per-
forms a full examination of the danger of torture after indirect refoulement to the
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first state. Should we infer that Article 3 CAT indeed requires this full examina-
tion? I don’t think so. The Committee against Torture has not yet shed light on
the way the assessment of the safety of the third state relates to the danger of tor-
ture in the first one. It appears that if the expelling, second state does not per-
form an examination as to the merits of the claim but assumes that the danger
of torture exists, it complies with the requirements of the Article – provided that
it properly assesses the safety of the third state (i.e., sorts out whether or not
expulsion to the first by the third state can be “excluded”).
[514] In summary, it appears that the generic approach in a modified form is
compatible with relevant international law, and in particular with Articles 3
ECHR and 3 CAT as interpreted by the relevant treaty monitoring bodies. The
object of the trust, the conduct that the third state is assumed to perform, was
identified in paragraph 7.4.2. Thus, it must be established that the third state
will offer effective protection from refoulement (that is, to the full personal
scope of those prohibitions), either because it issued a residence permit of
some sort, or because it will examine the case in a proper procedure et cetera.
Here, we must address the basis of the trust. Which factors may duly serve to
assume a third state will act in accordance with the mentioned conditions?
And how weighty are those factors? For the firmer the trust is established, the
harder it will be to rebut it.
The basis of inter-state trust 
[515] When ratifying a treaty, states undertake to perform their obligations in
good faith. Hence, the fact that the third state is party to the relevant instru-
ments does provide a basis for trusting that it will act in accordance with the
conditions set out above. We saw above that both the European Court as well
as the Committee against Torture indeed considers ratification relevant fac-
tors. But obviously, the mere fact that a third state is party to the relevant
instruments, offers only a weak basis for trust, which can therefore easily be
rebutted. Stable state practice as to application of those instruments in con-
formity with the expelling state’s standards strengthens the basis of trust, and
harmonisation of domestic law implementing those instruments strengthens it
further. The possibilities for rebuttal of the trust commensurately decrease.
Can the principle of interstate trust apply if two states maintain diverging
interpretations of the same treaty? Hailbronner suggests so when he states that
negative decisions on applications by other (third) states will be recognised by
national courts only “if they can be reasonably assured that procedural and
substantive standards of national asylum law, even if they differ, fulfil mini-
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mum requirements under the Geneva Convention and general principles of
law”.123 As argued under numbers [133] and [134], the Refugee Convention
(interpreted in accordance with relevant rules in the Vienna Treaty
Convention) does indeed leave Contracting states a certain amount of discre-
tion in some respects (for instance, in the qualification of refugees as “lawful-
ly present”), but not in other respects – such as the qualification as a refugee.
The latter standards are minimum requirements only in the sense that the
Refugee Convention invites the Contracting states to apply an optimising
interpretation of the instrument, in excess of their obligations under it (cf.
number [223]). Thus, if domestic standards of the third country on implemen-
tation and application of Article 1 RC diverge from its one and true meaning,
negative decisions to those standards cannot be recognised by the domestic
courts of other states. 
[516] Another question is whether or not ratification of the same instruments is
mandatory. Can states base their trust on other factors as well, or should they
always examine the claim themselves if the third country is not formally bound
to the same obligations? Neither the decision of the European Court of Human
Rights nor the view of the CAT discussed above allows for a definite answer to
this question. But in the judgement Amuur v France (addressed already under
number [501] and [512]), the Court spoke of “protection comparable”, and
hence not (necessarily) identical to the protection expected in the expelling
state, party to the European Convention. Further, the fact that Syria (the third
state) was not a party to the Geneva Convention was relevant for the assessment
of the “possibility” of going there. But expulsion became “possible” after
“guarantees” by the Syrian authorities.124 It appears, then, that being a party to
the European Convention is not an absolute requirement for assuming a third
state offers protection that is effective for the purposes of the prohibition on
exposure to ill treatment abroad under Article 3: comparable obligations under
international law are a relevant factor for assessing the effectiveness of the pro-
tection. Holding otherwise would bar the application of the exception to safe
third countries that are not members of the Council of Europe. 
Arguably, the reasoning of the European Court as to the European
Convention of Human Rights applies to the other relevant instruments of inter-
national asylum law as well. 125 Thus, ratification by the third state of the
Refugee Convention, the Convention Against Torture and the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights is not an absolute requirement for assuming the third
state is safe; obligations under another - regional - instrument than the one
invoked may provide a basis for inter state trust. 
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Finally, could prohibitions of refoulement in readmission agreements provide
for a sufficient basis for inter-state trust? The matter is relevant in case the
Community or Member States conclude agreements on readmission of appli-
cants to third countries that are not bound by the Refugee Convention or the
other relevant human rights treaties. Arguably, in principle, refoulement clau-
ses in readmission agreements could offer protection “comparable” to the
Refugee Convention and other instruments of international asylum law. In
principle, for much depends on the content of such refoulement clauses as well
as on the possibility for the applicant to rely on them.126
[517] May a second state assume that a third country is safe, although it has
not assumed by treaty or agreement an obligation to provide for comparable
protection? Legomsky observes that influence of UNHCR on refugee issues
in such countries provides to a certain extent for guarantees.127 The German
Constitutional Court also ruled that in the absence of an obligation under the
Refugee Convention, co-operation with UNHCR allowed for the assumption
that the third state would offer effective protection as required by Article 33
RC.128 However, mere stable practice is subject to the receiving state’s discre-
tion. Arguably, the presence of UNHCR in, or co-operation with UNHCR by
the third state is hardly a factor to take into account, as the UNHCR’s role is
limited to “supervising” (cf. number [31]) – and therefore hardly affects the
power to expel. Hence, any presumption that a country not party to the
Refugee Convention or bound by a comparable obligation is safe, has quite a
weak basis, and is therefore more easily rebutted by the asylum seeker. Thus,
co-operation with UNHCR cannot substitute an obligation under international
law to comply with the prohibitions of refoulement.
Could the possibility to appeal to the other treaty monitoring bodies serve
as a basis for inter-state trust? 
As to Article 3 ECHR, the UK government stated in T.I. v UK that the
Convention system provides for the required procedural safeguards. 129 Indeed
Article 34 ECHR provides for the right to appeal against a violation of a
Convention right, and Article 39 of the Rules of Court enables the protection
seeker to request that the Court indicates an interim measure to the third coun-
try if it is a Contracting party: in this context, requiring the third country to
suspend expulsion during proceedings.130 Such a request is binding upon the
addressed state (so the Court ruled three years after T.I. v UK).131 This right of
appeal to the European Court of Human Rights therefore satisfies at least the
basic requirements for a judicial remedy to be effective, mentioned above.
Hence, if this argument of the UK government were accepted, each
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Contracting state would offer “effective procedural safeguards” by virtue of its
being party to the Convention. But the European Court of Human Rights did
not take this judicial process into account when assessing the safety of third
country in T.I. v UK. As Vermeulen points out, the approach proposed by the
UK government runs counter to the very enforcement system of the
Convention.132 It is on the Contracting states that the Convention puts the pri-
mary and unconditional responsibility to comply with their Convention obli-
gations; the Court’s supervision on its observance by the states is of a sub-
sidiary nature.133 Relying on eventual appeal to the Court for undoing the risk
of an expulsion possibly at variance with Article 3 ECHR would shift that
responsibility to the Court. Moreover, according to Article 34 ECHR the Court
has power, but no duty to carefully scrutinise each and every appeal – and
often it will not be able to do so due to its huge caseload.134
The Committee against Torture touched upon the matter in Korban v
Sweden, where it addressed the risk of expulsion by Jordan (the third state) to
Iraq (the state where Korban was in danger of being tortured). It “noted” in
this context that Jordan was a party to the Convention Against Torture, but that
the right to lodge individual complaints to the Committee did not apply.135 Did
the Committee imply that Jordan would have been safe if Korban could have
complained against Jordan? This is unlikely. Though the Committee itself con-
siders its views bind the Contracting states, it can not be unaware that this
view is not widely shared (cf. number [35]). Moreover, complaints to the
Committee address supervision over the application of the Convention by the
Member States, and hence do not substitute for that application. But maybe
the observation that Jordan did not accept the right to complain to the
Committee nevertheless addresses the basis for trust in Jordan in an oblique
way for, arguably, it differentiates the inter-state trust to which the ratification
of the Convention gives rise, because of apparent reluctance to attach conse-
quences as to protection for individuals. 
In summary, if the third state is not bound by the same treaty law as the 
second state, comparable obligations under international law may provide a
basis for inter-state trust. But mere state practice (thus, obligations being
absent) or co-operation with UNHCR does not provide for a basis. Nor does
the possibility to appeal to treaty monitoring bodies render the trust absolute.
The safe fourth country 
[518] We have to address one final issue. The third state may itself expel the
alien to another fourth state, which in turn may apply the exception, and so on.
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For example, Member States may under the Dublin Regulation expel asylum
seekers to the Member State “responsible” for “examining” the request, and
this (third) state may, in turn (as the Procedures Directive explicitly allows),
expel the asylum seeker to a (fourth) non-Member State, that again may apply
the exception and expel the alien to a fifth state, and so on. What implications
does such (possible) chain expulsion have for the assessment of the safety of
the third state by the second state? 
In principle, there is no reason why a state could not rely on the assump-
tion that the third state will duly establish the safety of the fourth country, if
this assumption is justified. We may distinguish between four types of situa-
tion, wherein the alien may seek to rebut the trust (in the expulsion procedure
in the second state). Firstly, he may challenge the safety of the third state
because of imminent chain expulsion to a fourth state that is considered safe
by the third, but unsafe by the second state. In this situation, the presumption
of trust is prima facie rebutted, and the second state can expel only if it has
established that the applicant will be offered sufficient opportunity by the third
state to rebut its presumption that the fourth state is safe. Secondly, the situa-
tion that both the third as well as the second state consider the fourth state safe.
Here, the inter-state trust concerns the assumption that the third state will pay
due regard to counter-evidence on the safety of the fourth state. Hence, it is
incumbent upon the applicant to show that the fourth state will not take into
account the counter-evidence he may produce there; if he can’t, there is no rea-
son that the second state should consider the safety of the fourth state itself.
Thirdly, the situation that the third state deems the fourth state safe, and the
second state has not established for itself the safety or otherwise of that state.
Here, the assumption of inter-state trust would be prima facie rebutted. As we
saw above, the prohibitions of refoulement prohibit expulsion to a state (here:
the fourth state) if its safety has not previously been established. Hence, the
fourth state ranks as unsafe unless established otherwise. Therefore, this situ-
ation is not different from the first. 
Fourthly and finally, the third state could expel the applicant to a fourth
state, but it is unclear to which fourth state. Here, two alternatives are pos-
sible. Either the second state manages to establish (on the basis of the third
state’s legislation on expulsion to third countries) that only expulsion to
fourth states that it deems safe itself is imminent. This alternative does not
differ from the second one; hence, expulsion to the third state is allowed
for. Or the second state does not manage to do so, with the result that it
remains unclear to which fourth states the alien may be expelled. For prac-
tical purposes, in this alternative the second state has not established the
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safety of the fourth state. Hence, the situation is the same as the third one,
and expulsion would be contrary to the obligations under the prohibitions
of refoulement.
7.4.4 Conclusions
[519] International law allows for expulsion of protection seekers to a third
country, if certain conditions are met. Most importantly, all prohibitions of
refoulement prohibit expulsion to a third country resulting in subsequent
expulsion to the country where the protection seeker runs a risk of being per-
secuted, ill-treated or tortured. This prohibition of indirect refoulement entails
that the third state must provide for effective protection from refoulement. This
requirement may be satisfied either because the third country provides for
safeguards for the particular applicant (for instance, it issued him a residence
permit), but also if examination of the merits of the application will take place
in the third state (or in a subsequent state). The prohibitions of refoulement
require that the examination be in accordance with some procedural safe-
guards: it must be rigorous and negative decisions should be open to appeal
that should have suspensive effect. They further imply that the alien has access
to the third state for the purpose of examination of the claim. The right to asy-
lum of Article 18 Charter requires that the alien will enjoy appropriate status
in the third state, and thus be treated in accordance with basic human rights
standards (see paragraph 7.4.2). 
The state contemplating expulsion to a third country does not have to deter-
mine refugee status or applicability of the prohibitions of refoulement in each
and every case. It can to a certain extent trust that the third country does 
satisfy the conditions listed above. This trust does not necessarily rest on the
third state’s being a party to all instruments of international law concerned.
The trust is justified if the third state has entered into comparable obligations.
The more indications that the expelling state has that a third state in general
abides with its own international law obligations, the firmer the trust is. But it
must always allow for counter evidence from the part of the protection seeker
(paragraph 7.4.3).
7.5 The exception of the safe third country in European law
Below, I will discuss how far the several modalities of the exception of the safe
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third country that figure in European asylum law meet the requirements iden-
tified in the previous paragraph. For each of these modalities, I discuss first
the requirements on the third country, and then the requirements on the assess-
ment of its safety. 
7.5.1 The Dublin Regulation and the Dublin Convention
Requirements on the third state
[520] The safety or otherwise of a (Member) state in the particular circum-
stances of an individual applicant’s case does not figure among the criteria for
determining responsibility under the Dublin Convention or the Dublin
Regulation. According to the Preamble to the Dublin Regulation, 
“The European Council […] agreed to work towards establishing a
Common European Asylum System, based on the full and inclusive appli-
cation of the [Refugee Convention], thus ensuring that nobody is sent back
to persecution, i.e. maintaining the principle of non-refoulement. In this
respect, and without affecting the responsibility criteria laid down in this
Regulation, Member States, all respecting the principle of non-refoule-
ment, are considered as safe countries for third-country nationals.”136
Hence, by Regulation, all Member States are considered to be “safe” for the
purpose of the prohibition of refoulement. Other aspects of safety are not
explicitly addressed. But we may observe that the responsible Member State
has the obligation to admit the applicant, and complete the examination of his
request for protection.137 This examination does not necessarily address the
qualification of the applicant for refugee or subsidiary protection status, for
any decision on the application constitutes “examination” for the purposes of
the Dublin Regulation.138 The examination may therefore address the decision
to expel the alien to a safe third country pursuant to Articles 26 or 27 PD.
The Dublin Convention does not contain a similar statement, but requires
that examination by the responsible Member State (in the terms of internatio-
nal asylum law, the “third country”) must be “in accordance with its national
laws and its international obligations”.139 As all states to which the Dublin
Convention applies are party to the relevant instruments of international asy-
lum law, the Dublin Convention requires observation of the prohibitions of
refoulement. Under the Dublin Regulation, the examination is “in accordance
with national law”;140 accordance with international law is not explicitly
required. That national law is, however, subject to relevant CEAS legislation
that requires such compliance. 
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[521] Under both instruments, derogation from the obligation to examine can
be made if the Member State can expel the applicant to a third country (not
being a Member State or Iceland or Norway or Switzerland). Both instruments
require that expulsion to third countries be in compliance with the Refugee
Convention.141 Where the states bound by the Dublin Regulation are con-
cerned, expulsion to third countries is further conditioned by the relevant
arrangements of the Procedures Directive (discussed below). 
Hence, the Dublin Convention and Regulation require observance of the
prohibition of refoulement, and secure admission in the receiving Member
State. The other international law requirements on the safety of the third coun-
try are not explicitly addressed (such as indirect refoulement and examination
standards).
The assessment of the safety
[522] Rebuttal of the presumption that the other Member State is safe is not
explicitly addressed in the Dublin Regulation. But expulsion to the responsi-
ble Member State is not obligatory; the Member State where the application
was lodged may examine the application itself (and then becomes “responsi-
ble” for the purposes of the Dublin Regulation).142 Any decision not to exam-
ine a claim on the grounds that another Member State is responsible is hence
also a decision not to take over this responsibility, which must be open to
appeal before a court or tribunal.143 The stating of conditions or requirements
for taking over responsibility because the otherwise responsible Member State
is not safe for the purposes of the safe third country exception is left to domes-
tic law.Domestic legislation requiring examination if another Member State is
unsafe for a particular applicant would not run counter to Preamble recital (2)
(quoted above under number [520]) that states that Member States are safe, as
that recital does not state that the presumption of safety cannot be rebutted. 
The Dublin Convention has often been criticised because the assumption
of safety of the third (member) state was based merely on the formal ground
of that state’s being party to relevant instruments of international law, where-
as performance under those instruments could (and did) significantly diverge
(cf. number [507]). Apart from the (conditioned) requirement to examine the
application, the Dublin Convention does not provide for additional guarantees
on the safety of third states. 
This is different from the Dublin Regulation. As far as the Common
European Asylum System requires performance in accordance with interna-
tional law, it does reinforce the assumption that the Member States are safe.
Obviously, as to issues that are not addressed or regulated at a level falling
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short of international law, the assumption of safety is open to rebuttal. Another
relevant guarantee absent under the Dublin Convention is to be found in the
Dublin Regulation itself: the opportunity to challenge the transfer decision,
and eventually to request its suspension during such appeal proceedings. 
7.5.2 The safe third country concept 
Requirements on the third country
[523] Article 27 PD addresses the application of “the safe third country con-
cept”.144 This “concept” may be applied 
“only where the competent authorities are satisfied that a person seeking
asylum145 will be treated in accordance with the following principles in the
third country concerned:
(a) life and liberty are not threatened on account of race, religion, natio-
nality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and
(b) the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with the Geneva
Convention is respected; and
(c) the prohibition on removal in breach of the right to freedom from tor-
ture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as laid down in interna-
tional law is respected; and
(d) the possibility exists to request refugee status and, if found to be a
refugee, to receive protection in accordance with the Geneva
Convention”.146
Thus, expulsion to the third country may not constitute direct refoulement in
breach of Article 33(1) RC (the requirement under (a)), nor indirect refoule-
ment contrary to the same provision or to the other prohibitions of refoulement
(requirements (b) and (c)).147 Somewhat surprisingly, it is not required that the
expulsion to the third state does not constitute direct refoulement contrary to
Articles 3 CAT, 7 CCPR or 3 ECHR. However, according to Article 27(2)(c)
Member States are obliged to lay down this requirement in domestic law (see
number [527]). The fourth requirement on “treatment” in the third country
concerns the possibility to request “refugee status” and “receive protection in
accordance with the” Refugee Convention. Read in conjunction with Article
27(1)(a) and (b) PD, this “protection” addresses the secondary rights laid
down in the Refugee Convention. 
Does the provision allow for expulsion to a third country that could in turn
expel the applicant to a subsequent, fourth state? Arguably, it does. The prohi-
bitions on indirect refoulement (Article 27(1)(b) and (c)) suppose so. Article
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27(1)(d) PD requires “the possibility to request refugee status”, not, the oppor-
tunity to request it: the third country should run examination procedures, but
it is not required that it should examine the refugee status of the applicant.148
Finally, a remark should be made on the requirement in the first clause of
Article 27(1) quoted above that (otherwise sufficient) protection in, not by the
third country is required.149 Should we assume that Article 27(1) PD allows for
application in the case that some third party could offer protection in the third
country? Article 27(3)(b) refers to the actor that will receive the applicant
upon expulsion in the third country as “the authorities of the third country”.
We saw above that the purpose of the latter provision is facilitating the appli-
cant’s access to “protection” in the third country as meant under Article
27(1)(d) PD. That “protection” is therefore protection by “the authorities of
the third country”, not by some third party. Arguably, protection “in” the third
country means protection by that country on its territory. 
[524] A further requirement follows from Article 27(4) that reads
“Where the third country does not permit the applicant for asylum in ques-
tion to enter its territory, Member States shall ensure that access to a pro-
cedure is given in accordance with the basic principles and guarantees
described in Chapter II”.
Thus, the applicant should be admitted to the third country. If not, “access to
a procedure” in accordance with Chapter II must be granted. As the
Procedures Directive procedures apply only at the border or in the territory of
the Member States150 (and most Chapter II provisions presuppose such 
presence, cf. par. 6.2.4), this requirement implies a duty to re-admit the appli-
cant for the purposes of examination. 
Further, Article 27(2) provides that
“[t]he application of the safe third country concept shall be subject to rules
laid down in national legislation, including […] rules requiring a connec-
tion between the person seeking asylum and the third country concerned
based on which it would be reasonable for that person to go to that coun-
try”.151
Finally, Article 27(3) states two safeguards:
“When implementing a decision solely based on this Article, Member
States shall:
(a) inform the applicant accordingly; and
(b) provide him/her with a document informing the authorities of the third
country, in the language of that country, that the application has not
been examined in substance”.
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As a motivated decision is required in all procedures wherein this provision
may be applied,152 the requirement “to inform the applicant accordingly”
specifically concerns the expulsion (“implementation of the decision”). The
second requirement appears to serve as the applicant’s access to determination
procedures in the receiving country (cf. Article 27(1)(d) PD).
[525] Article 27 PD explicitly addresses all requirements on the safety of the
third country set by international law, except for the procedural standard that
the third country should make a meaningful assessment of the claim.
Arguably, this requirement is implicit in the demand that in the third country,
the prohibitions of refoulement are to be “respected”.153 The requirement that
refugees could enjoy the secondary rights laid down in the Refugee
Convention (cf. number [504]) is in excess of international law standards, but
in compliance with Article 18 Charter. The requirement that the applicant have
a previous “connection” with the third country is also in excess of internatio-
nal standards. Finally, the condition that applicants whose access to the third
country is denied are taken back secures protection from “refugee in orbit”
situations (see numbers [478] and [518]). 
We should further observe that the future tense applied in Article 27(1)
first clause and the present tense under (a) to (d) focus on the availability of
protection in the present, after expulsion. Thus, an opportunity in the past to
get protection in the third country is not relevant for its application.154 In sum-
mary, the requirements on the safety of the third country are in line with rele-
vant international law as well with the Charter. 
The assessment of the safety
[526] On what grounds may the Member States assume that a third country
fulfils these requirements? Article 27 does not explicitly require that the third
country is party to relevant instruments of international law, in marked con-
trast to Article 35A(2)(a) and (c) PD (see number [532] below). Moreover,
Article 27(1) speaks of being “treated in accordance with the following prin-
ciples”, not of “observance” of “obligations” or provisions. Rather, the provi-
sion sets material standards: the prohibition of indirect refoulement should be
“respected”, life and liberty not “threatened”, and refugees need not be
“recognised”, but a person “found to be a refugee”155 should “receive protec-
tion in accordance with” the Refugee Convention. Maybe we can deduce that
stable practice of non-refoulement and of treatment in accordance with the
standards set in the Refugee Convention after “recognition” by UNHCR could
satisfy the requirement of Article 27(1)(d). 
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In summary, a third country cannot qualify as safe pursuant to Article 27 PD
because of mere ratification of relevant instruments of international law;
rather, it must meet material standards. In this respect, the provision requires
a relatively firm basis for the assumption of safety. As far as third countries
may be “safe” pursuant to those material standards although they did not
accede to the relevant instruments of international law, the presumption of safe
is prone to rebuttal (cf. number [516]). 
[527] According to the Preamble to the Procedures Directive, the safe third
country exception may apply only “where this particular applicant would be
safe in the third country concerned”.156 The possibility of rebuttal is addressed
in Article 27(2)(b) and (c):
“[t]he application of the safe third country concept shall be subject to rules
laid down in national legislation, including […]
(b) rules on the methodology by which the competent authorities satisfy
themselves that the safe third country concept may be applied to a parti-
cular country or to a particular applicant. Such methodology shall
include case by case consideration of the safety of the country for a par-
ticular applicant and/or national designation of countries considered as
being generally safe;
(c) rules, in accordance with international law, allowing an individual
examination of whether the third country concerned is safe for a parti-
cular applicant which, as a minimum, shall permit the applicant to chal-
lenge the application of the safe third country concept on the grounds
that he/she would be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.”
Article 27(2)(b) requires that the Member States adopt some “methodology”
for assessment of the safety of the third country. Against the background of
the legislative history, the provision implies that Member States may use lists
of states considered as safe, as well as do without lists and consider the safe-
ty in each particular case.157 The second phrase is somewhat ambiguous where
it speaks of “national designation of countries considered to be generally
safe”. Read in opposition to the option offered in the first half of the clause, it
means that in case of designation as a “generally safe” state, no “case by case”
assessment is required. But “generally” might also indicate that a country may
be designated as safe only “in general”, thus not for each and every particular
case – which implies that notwithstanding the designation, the assumption
should be open to rebuttal. 
Arguably, the second reading is to be preferred as it accommodates Article
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27(2)(c). This provision states that domestic rules must allow for individual
examination of the safety of the third country for any particular applicant if
international law requires it. It stipulates that at any rate domestic legislation
must allow for rebuttal of any assumption of safety as to the risk of subjection
to ill treatment as a result of expulsion.158 The phrase “as a minimum” seems
to acknowledge that international law (and hence Article 27(2)(c) PD) may
also require the possibility of such rebuttal as to other requirements on the
country’s safety. 
Article 38(3) PD provides that 
“Member States shall, where appropriate, provide for rules in accordance
with their international obligations dealing with: […] (c) the grounds of
challenge to a decision under Article 25(2)(c) in accordance with the
methodology applied under Article 27(2)(b) and (c).”.
The provision acknowledges that international asylum law requires that appli-
cation of the exception should be open to challenge on the grounds meant in
Article 27(2)(c) PD, but leaves once again the modalities to domestic law. 
[528] Thus, Article 27 PD appears to waver between the general and indivi-
dual approach to assessment of safety (cf. paragraph 7.4.3.1). We may observe
that Article 27(1) is couched in ambiguous terms. The competent authorities
must be satisfied that the applicant “will be treated” in accordance with the
discussed requirements, which phrase focuses on the predicament of the indi-
vidual. But on the other hand the requirements are stated in an abstract kind
of way. Thus, “the possibility to request refugee status” must exist, and it is
not, therefore, required that the specific applicant will have the opportunity to
request refugee status - for example, in case a previous application with the
third country failed, or if the applicant can be expelled to a fourth “safe” state. 
This ambiguity is reproduced in Article 27(2)(b), as we saw above. The
Directive requires that domestic law provides for rebuttal of the assumption of
safety for an individual applicant only where it comes to a risk of ill-treatment.
There is no reason why the assumptions on the other requirements should not be
open to rebuttal. In particular, there is no reasonable explanation why the assump-
tion that the applicant will be safe from persecution as required by Article 33 RC
would not be open to rebuttal on the same footing as safety from ill-treatment. As
observed, the phrase “as a minimum” applied in Article 27(2)(c) shows aware-
ness of, at least, the possibility that domestic law must offer the opportunity to
rebut assumptions on the other aspects of the safety of the third state as well. But
because of the absence of a requirement to offer this opportunity, the arrangement
does not secure observance of relevant standards of international law. 
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7.5.3 The country of first asylum concept
Requirements on the third country
[529] Article 26 PD addresses a particular variant of the third country excep-
tion, the “country of first asylum”.159 The exception may apply in two kinds of
cases:
“(a) [the applicant] has been recognised in that country as a refugee and 
he/she can still avail himself/herself of that protection, or
(b) [the applicant] enjoys otherwise sufficient protection in that country, 
including benefiting from the principle of non-refoulement, provided 
that he/she will be re-admitted to that country.”
What does the term “protection” entail? “That protection” (as meant under
(a)) is protection accorded to recognised refugees – arguably, protection pur-
suant to Articles 2 to 34 RC, including protection from expulsion.160 Article 26
under (b) speaks of “sufficient protection”, which implies that this protection
may fall short of the standard set under (a);161 but at any rate, it includes pro-
tection from refoulement. Hence, in the first asylum state the applicant should
be safe from indirect refoulement.
Remarkably, the Directive does not explicitly require that in the first coun-
try of asylum, the applicant’s life nor freedom is threatened on Convention
grounds, nor that he runs no real risk of ill-treatment there. A reading of “(suf-
ficient) protection” in accordance with relevant rules of international law, rele-
vant general principles of Community law and Article 19 Charter requires pro-
tection from direct refoulement. According to the last clause of Article 26,
Member States “may take into account the content of Article 27(1)” PD when
applying the “concept” (emphasis added). As Article 26 PD is a minimum
standard, the clause does not confer the competence to waive application of
the concept in particular cases; rather, the phrase should be read as an incen-
tive to apply the conditions of Article 27(1) to the safe country of origin excep-
tion (see number [674]).
Thus, Article 26 requires effective protection from indirect refoulement,
admission to the third state, and, arguably, implies protection from direct
refoulement. We should observe that the provision further requires explicitly
that the protection be still available (or can still be enjoyed). 
Assessment of the safety
[530] Article 26 PD does not explicitly address the way in which the safety
of the third country should be assessed. Ratification of relevant treaties by
the third country is not required, in contrast to the safe third neighbouring
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countries meant in Article 35A PD (see below, number [532]). Arguably, by
referring to recognition “in”, and not by, the first asylum country, the
Directive allows for application to states that did not ratify the Refugee
Convention, but that accord protection in accordance with that Convention
after “recognition” by UNHCR (see also number [523]). Unlike Article 27
(the safe third country exception), Article 26 does not explicitly address
whether rebuttal of the assumption that (otherwise sufficient) protection will
be available should be allowed . Arguably, it follows from the phrases “con-
sidered to be a first country of asylum for a particular applicant” and
“application of the concept to the particular circumstances of an applicant”
that a case by case examination is required,162 and hence rebuttal must be
allowed . 
7.5.4 Member States as countries of first asylum
[531] Not only third countries, but also Member States may be “countries of
first asylum”. Article 25(2)(a) PD implicitly states this where it allows for
declaring a request inadmissible if a person has been recognised as a refugee
in another Member State. 
As in Article 26 PD, the question of whether expulsion to this country of
first asylum may constitute direct refoulement is not addressed, and Article
25(2)(a) does not provide for rebuttal of the safety of the Member State for
the refugee-applicant. This is in line with the statement in the Dublin
Regulation that Member States are safe for the purposes of the prohibition
of refoulement (cf. number [520]); nevertheless, it is remarkable, as the
Spanish Protocol does allow this for applicants who are EU citizens (see
above number [453]). A reading of Article 25(2)(a) in accordance with the
prohibitions of refoulement and Articles 18 and 19 Charter requires that
Member States do not make use of their competence to deny examination of
the claim to such refugees. There is no provision on Member States as coun-
tries of first asylum for the category addressed in Article 26(b) PD, i.e. for
persons enjoying subsidiary forms of protection.163 But usually, the Member
State that offered “sufficient protection” will be responsible under the
Dublin Regulation.164 Obviously, the same holds true for the refugee recog-
nised by another Member State. For practical purposes, Article 25(2)(a) PD
will have meaning only in case a Member State does not meet some time-
limit set by the Dublin Regulation and is hence responsible for examining
the request itself.
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7.5.5 The safe third neighbouring country
Requirements on the third country
[532] Article 35A PD allows for expulsion of applicants who entered illegal-
ly without examination to the particular circumstances of the cases to a certain
type of third country. For the purpose of this procedure, a country is safe only
if 
“(a) it has ratified and observes the provisions of the Geneva Convention 
without any geographical limitations; and
(b) it has in place an asylum procedure prescribed by law; and
(c) it has ratified the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and it observes its provisions, 
including the standards relating to effective remedies […]”.165
Further, readmission to the third country is required.166 The provision hence
addresses most requirements set by international law on the safety of the third
country: the prohibition on indirect refoulement (pursuant to the Refugee
Convention and the European Convention of Human Rights), readmission,
access to protection through an asylum procedure, and remedies against fur-
ther refoulement by the third country must be effective for the purposes of the
ECHR. The requirement that the applicant’s life or freedom is not threatened
on Convention grounds (Article 33 RC) in the third country is not addressed,
but follows implicitly from Article 35A(4) PD (see below, number [534]). The
requirement to process the application in case the third country does not read-
mit the applicant provides for some protection from “refugee in orbit situa-
tions”. But it is not required that the third country will examine the refugee
status of the applicant (cf. number [523]). Imminent chain expulsion to a
fourth state therefore does not bar application of Article 35A PD. 
Assessment of the safety
[533] The assumption that the third country is safe is based on both formal and
material grounds: the country must have ratified both the Refugee Convention
and the European Convention, and it must observe its obligations under these
instruments. The organ deciding whether or not a third country meets these
requirements is the Council, acting on a proposal by the Commission and after
consultation with the European Parliament, and voting by qualified majority.167
Hence, Member States that consider that a third country does not meet the
requirements that are set out above can be overruled. Until adoption of a list
of third countries by the Council, individual Member States may apply the
Article 35A arrangement on the basis of domestic legislation to third coun-
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tries, subject to two conditions.168 First, the third country must be designated
as safe on the basis of the conditions laid down in Article 35A(2)(a), (b) and
(c); hence, the readmission requirement does not apply. Second, they may do
so only if relevant legislation that designates neighbouring countries as safe
was in force at the date of adoption of the Procedures Directive. 
[534] The most striking aspect of the arrangement is obviously that it allows
for expulsion without “examination of the asylum application and of the safe-
ty of the applicant in his/her particular circumstances”.169 The Procedures
Directive therefore does not require that the applicant could rebut the pre-
sumption of safety in his particular case. However, according to Article
35A(4) PD
“Member States concerned shall lay down in national law the modalities
for implementing the provisions of paragraph 1 and the consequences of
decisions pursuant to those provisions in accordance with the principle of
non-refoulement under the Geneva Convention including providing for
exceptions from the application of this Article for humanitarian or political
reasons or for reasons of public international law”. 
Thus, the arrangement of Article 35A(1) must be supplemented by an arrange-
ment in domestic legislation that should meet two conditions. First, the domes-
tic legislation must be “in accordance with” Article 33 RC. Second, it must
provide for “exceptions from the implementation” of Article 35A(1) for (inter
alia) “reasons of public international law”. As observed earlier, a proper rea-
ding of Article 33 RC and of other relevant public international law implies
that an individual examination should take place if the applicant manages to
prima facie rebut the assumption of safety. However, Article 35A does not
require that the applicant can “challenge the application of the safe third coun-
try concept on the grounds that he/she would be subjected to” ill treatment, or
treatment contrary to Article 33 RC, as Article 27(2)(c) PD does (cf, number
[527] above). We may further observe that Article 35A(4) seems able to
accommodate the German arrangement on safe neighbouring third countries,
which does not allow for rebuttal on grounds that lie within the scope of the
assessment of the safety by the competent authority.170 Thus, though allowing
for rebuttal in cases where the applicant risks capital punishment, or because
the third state’s performance under the relevant instruments of international
law has changed radically since the safety was assessed,171 divergent interpre-
tation or application of the Refugee Convention would not constitute a ground
for rebuttal 
In summary, Article 35A(4) acknowledges that international law may set
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obstacles to application of Article 35A(1), and requires that domestic law
should provide for proper arrangements. But it does not require that domestic
law should provide for the opportunity to challenge expulsion on the grounds
that the country is not safe in his particular circumstances. 
[535] Article 35A therefore allows for expulsion to a third country, not being
a Member State, without any examination of the claim. This denial of any indi-
vidual examination is denial of protection under the prohibitions of (direct as
well as indirect) refoulement, and hence at variance with international law. The
feature distinguishing applicants addressed by Article 35A from those
addressed by the other procedures is their (attempt at) illegal entry. We should
observe in this context that Article 31 RC explicitly acknowledges that illegal
entry from a third country may offer grounds for measures like detention, but
does not remove the “refugee” from the scope of protection of Article 33 RC.
Likewise, liability under Article 3 ECHR as well as the other prohibitions of
refoulement is not affected by illegal entry. The arrangement in Article 35A
therefore constitutes a gap in the protection system established by European
asylum law.
We should not, however, overestimate the size of this gap. First, applica-
tion of the arrangement is subject to territorial restrictions. The safe third
neighbouring country procedure can be applied only in Member States bordering
designated safe third countries, and only after entry from the third country,
hence not after Dublin transfers (see number [383]). Second, we should
observe that the arrangement applies only to applicants who entered or are
entering illegally. The procedure cannot apply to persons who instead report
themselves at the border to the competent authority. Although they are not
authorised to enter, their applications must then be processed in accordance
with the ‘normal procedure’, the ‘border procedure’ or the ‘special border pro-
cedure’ (see par. 6.2.3). These procedures would entitle them inter alia to an
individual examination of their claim, and the right to remain until a decision
has been reached. In such procedures, the competent authority may consider
expulsion to the same neighbouring non-Member State pursuant to Article 27
PD, but this arrangement allows for rebuttal of assumption of the safety on at
least certain grounds (number [527] above). 
Still, the opportunity to report to competent authorities before transgres-
sing the border may not be open to each and every refugee (or person other-
wise in need of international protection), for example, in cases where they had
had to take recourse to travel agents who brought them illegally into the
European Union. There is no justification under international law for applica-
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tion of the safe neighbouring third country procedure to such refugees or per-
sons otherwise in need of international protection.
7.5.6 Concluding remarks
[536] The way European asylum law reflects requirements of international
asylum law on the safety of the third country and on the application of the
exception are summarised in the following scheme:
Scheme 2 – The safe third country concept
1 Relevant requirements are not explicitly stated, but (partially) satisfied through other
European asylum law.
2 Article 16(1) DR.
3 Article 19(2)/20(1)(e) DR.
4 Required by Article 26(a), not by Article 26(b) PD
5 Only as to indirect refoulement (Article 27(2)(c) PD). 
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country
(Art. 27 PD)




As to the requirements on the safety of the third country, the several arrange-
ments do not diverge very much. As to the grounds for regarding a country as
safe, we should observe that Articles 26 and 27 PD both allow for expulsion
to third states that are not formally bound to any of the relevant instruments of
international law. As argued under number [516], the presumption of safety of
such countries would have a rather weak basis. 
Most interesting from the point of view of international law are the rules
on the possibility for rebuttal of the presumption of safety. We saw in para-
graph 7.4.3.1 that two extreme positions are possible: the individual and the
generic approach. In the individual approach, the safety of a state has to be
assessed for each applicant separately. According to the generic approach, a
country may be deemed safe on the basis of certain parameters. It was argued
that the generic approach is compatible with international law if the grounds
for assuming a third country is safe are sound, and if the presumption of safe-
ty can be challenged because of the particular circumstances of the applicant. 
[537] It appears that the Dublin Regulation relies on the “generic approach”:
Member States should be deemed to be safe, and hence no assessment of safe-
ty in the particular circumstances of the case is required. Obviously, as all
Member States are party to the relevant instruments of international law, and
as Community legislation binds them to observe certain minimum standards
when interpreting and applying those instruments, this presumption of safety
is justified to a considerable extent. As far as European asylum law does not
harmonise relevant asylum law, the presumption may further be justified by
the practice of the Member State concerned. Importantly, the Dublin
Regulation explicitly requires that applicants can challenge the decision to
expel them to another Member State. But the instrument does not address the
question of whether and if so, on what grounds derived from international asy-
lum law the decision to expel may be challenged, and hence leaves this matter
to domestic law. Thus, the Dublin Regulation allows for both the generic
approach as a rebuttable presumption, as well as for the generic approach in
absolute form, i.e. for domestic legislation prohibiting rebuttal of the pre-
sumption of safety of the other Member State.
The grounds for considering a state a country of first asylum are concerned
with a particular applicant’s ties with or position in that particular state.
Hence, in terms of the nature of the assessment, the individual approach
applies to the country of first asylum concept. But it does not follow that the
presumption that such a country of first asylum is safe (or that it effectively
provides for ‘asylum’) is open to rebuttal. Article 26 PD (non-Member States
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as countries of first asylum) implies the possibility of rebuttal; Article 25(2)(a)
(Member States as countries of first asylum) does not address the matter. 
Article 27 (non-Member States as safe third countries) requires that
domestic legislation offer the applicant the opportunity to rebut the assump-
tion that he will not as a consequence of the expulsion be subjected to ill treat-
ment. As to other aspects of the safety of the third country, Article 27 does not
make a choice between the generic in the absolute and the rebuttable form of
the generic approach. Rather, it leaves the choice to the Member States. The
Procedures Directive therefore allows Member States to exempt other aspects
of the third country’s safety from rebuttal. This would be contrary to interna-
tional law. In particular, there is no reasonable explanation why the presump-
tion that the third country complies with the prohibition on expulsion leading
to ill-treatment should be open to rebuttal, but the prohibition on expulsion ex
Article 33 RC should not. 
[538] Like the Dublin arrangement and the safe third country concept in
Article 27 (non-Member States as safe third countries), the safe third neigh-
bour country exception ex Article 35A PD leaves the possibility of rebuttal of
the presumption of safety on grounds derived from international law to
domestic legislation. It requires that relevant domestic legislation provides for
“exceptions from the application” of the arrangement “for reasons of public
international law”, but does not require that domestic law offers the opportu-
nity to challenge expulsion pursuant to Article 35A on the grounds that this
would entail direct or indirect refoulement. In theory, Member States could
apply the generic approach to neighbouring safe third countries as both an
absolute and a rebuttable presumption. In fact, the stipulation that “no, or no
full examination” of the application and the applicant’s safety “in his/her par-
ticular circumstances” need take place, and the exemption from any meaning-
ful safeguard, strongly suppose the generic approach in absolute form. 
We should observe that the generic assessment of safety of third countries
pursuant to Articles 27 and 35A fits in awkwardly with the Procedure
Directive’s requirements on remedies (cf. paragraph 6.3). According to Article
38(1) PD, the remedy against decisions based on these provisions must be
“effective”, that is, the appeal authority should perform an independent and
rigorous scrutiny of the individual’s claim (cf. number [412]). Hence, where
Articles 27 and 35A do not require an examination of individual circumstances
in the first instance, such examination must take place in appeal proceedings.
Where Article 35A allows for expulsion during the procedure at first instance,
the remedy against the decision to apply this procedure may require that expul-
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sion is suspended until the outcome of the appeal procedure. Obviously, all
these requirements apply only to applicants who raised “arguable claims” (or
the equivalent standard under Article 33 RC). But it can not be stated in the
abstract that a claim cannot be arguable because a person has entered the
European Union from safe third countries as meant in Article 27 or illegally
from safe third neighbouring countries as meant in Article 35A. Therefore,
national legislation should ensure that applications are at any rate not dismissed
on the basis of Article 25(2)(c) read in conjunction with 27 or Article 35A PD
if the applicant has an arguable claim under Article 3 ECHR or 33 RC. 
[539] On what grounds is the particularly strong presumption of safety of safe
third neighbouring countries’ meant in Article 35A PD based? Unlike other
third states as meant in Article 27 PD, the safe neighbouring third states must
have ratified both the Refugee Convention and the European Convention of
Human Rights. Further, they must be designated by the Council as “safe”. The
safe neighbouring third country arrangement therefore expresses the same
approach to testing the safety of the third country as the Dublin arrangements.
But Article 35A PD lacks an important safeguard, present in both the Dublin
Convention and the Dublin Regulation: the obligation of the “responsible”,
receiving state to examine the claim for protection (not to mention the safe-
guards provided for by other European asylum law in case of expulsion based
on the Dublin Regulation). European asylum law hence allows for expulsion
to a safe third neighbour country that will expel the refugee without any fur-
ther examination to a fourth country - or to the first, persecuting country.
Furthermore, unlike Article 35A, the Dublin Regulation does not propose
application of the presumption of safety in absolute form to Member States –
although the latter provide far more solid grounds for this presumption than a
third country meeting the criteria of Article 35A PD. And we should observe,
finally, that even the presumption that Member States are safe countries of ori-
gin is not absolute, pursuant to the Spanish Protocol (cf. number [462]). In
summary, the approach to assessment of safety of neighbouring third countries
pursuant to Article 35A is not only flawed from the point of view of interna-
tional law, it also lacks justification when placed in the context of other
European asylum law. 
[540] Finally, a remark should be made on how the various arrangements on
safe third countries fit in into the “right to asylum” as established in Article 18
Charter. This right entails a claim to a durable solution and to a status that is
‘appropriate’ (number [504]). 
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The Dublin Regulation “seeks to secure full observance of the right to asylum
guaranteed by Article 18” of the Charter.172 It does so by requiring that each
application that is lodged in the European Union be examined by one of the
Member States. Expulsion to another (responsible) Member State is without
prejudice to this statement. For such expulsion may qualify as application of
the exception of the safe third country from the perspective of international
asylum law. From the perspective of European asylum law it does not, as the
expulsion does not prejudge the applicant’s qualification for a CEAS protection
status. If the responsible Member State does not expel the applicant to a safe
non-Member State, it must determine whether the applicant qualifies for
refugee status according to Article 29 PD (cf. number [250]). If the alien does
qualify, he is entitled to refugee or subsidiary protection status and to the
secondary rights set out in Chapter VII pursuant to Article 13 or 18 QD. In
this, Article 3(1) DR read in conjunction with Articles 29 PD and 13 or 18 QD
does guarantee the right to asylum. 
Arguably, Article 18 Charter has some further consequences for applica-
tion of the safe third country exception. Articles 26, 27 and 35A PD all require
either a previously established protection, or asylum procedures and obser-
vance of the prohibition of refoulement in the receiving state; and all three pro-
visions require examination of the claim if the refugee is not admitted to the
third country. So far, they guarantee access to a durable solution. As observed
above, Article 27 and 35A do not require that it be established that the indi-
vidual refugee has the opportunity to request for and thus receive asylum in
the third state. Nevertheless, we may observe that the refugee’s right to asylum
is recognised, and the possibility of getting asylum functions as a condition on
expulsion. But a similar requirement also follows from the prohibitions of
refoulement and hence from Article 19(2) Charter. Hence, the requirement that
a durable solution be available need not be ascribed to Article 18 Charter.
However, Articles 26, 27 and 35A also require that the alien could invoke
“protection” in accordance with the Refugee Convention (Articles 26(a), 27
and 35A). It was argued that this “protection” entails entitlement to Refugee
Convention benefits (or “sufficient” benefits – see numbers [529], [504] and
[532]). Hence, the other requirement implied by Article 18 Charter is
addressed as well. But only partially, for Articles 27 and 35A PD allow for
expulsion to a third country that may in turn expel the applicant to a fourth
country. Hence, the prospect of a durable solution and appropriate status in the
third or a subsequent state is not stated as a condition on expulsion.
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NOTES
1 Preamble recital (22) PD. 
2 That is, apart from other concepts that come close to the safe third country exception: exclu-
sion from refugee status because a UN agency offers protection, or the person is treated by
the country where he resides as if he were one of its nationals (Article 12(1) QD, based
Articles 1D and 1E RC), and the concept of internal protection (Article 8 QD, see number
[344]). I leave them out of account here because they function in a different context: con-
sideration of these alternative sources of protection does not precede status determination,
but forms part of it. But we should observe that the conditions for application of the inter-
nal protection exception are very close to those for application of the exception of the safe
third country (see number [445] above).
3 The restriction of the scope of application of Articles 26 and 27 to non-Member States is
laid down in Article 25(2)(b) and (c) PD. 
4 Noll 2000, p. 184. 
5 See for the Dublin Convention and the other mentioned agreements numbers [43] and [203].
6 See number [265]. 
7 Article 1(b) DC. 
8 Article 3(1) jo 2(c) DR. 
9 See number [263] above. 
10 Preamble recital (5) DR. 
11 Preamble recital (1) DR, cf. Article 61(a) TEC, cf. number [253] above; the Preamble to the
Dublin Convention refers to the objective of an “area without internal frontiers in which the
free movement of persons shall, in particular, be ensured”. 
12 Explanatory memorandum to Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing the criteria
and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum
application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national,
COM(2001)447final, OJ [2001] C304E/192. 
13 Cf. Noll 2000, p. 186; Brandl 2004, p. 35. 
14 Preamble recital (4) DR.
15 Preamble recital (15) DR.
16 Preamble DC, second and fourth recital. 
17 Preamble recital (4) DR. The Dublin Convention should “avoid any situations arising, with
the result that applicants for asylum are left in doubt for too long as regards the likely out-
come of their applications” (fourth Preamble recital DC).
18 Preamble recital (8) DR. 
19 Cf. Article 4(1) DR. 
20 Articles 4(4) DR and 12 DC. 
21 Art. 4(5) DR.
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22 Article 5(1) DR. 
23 Cf. Article 4 DC. 
24 Cf. Preamble recital (6) DR. 
25 Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determin-
ing the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the
Member States by a third-country national (COM/2001/447 final), OJ [2001] C304E/192-
201, Commentary to Articles, p. 14. 
26 Article 9 DR, cf. Article 5 DC. 
27 Article 10(1) DR; cf. Article 6 DC, which doers not provide for cessation of responsibility
after 12 months of absence. 
28 Article 10(2) DR, which further specifies that if the applicant lived in several Member
States for more than five months, responsible is the state where he most recently did so. Cf.
Article 13 DC. 
29 Article 11 DR, cf. Article 7(1) DC.
30 Article 12 DR, cf. Article 7(2) DC.
31 Article 13 DR, cf. Article 8 DC.
32 Article 16(3) DR, cf. Article 10(3) DC. 
33 Article 16(2) DR, cf. Article 10(2) DC.
34 Cf. Article 3(4) DC. 
35 Cf. Article 9 DC.
36 Articles 4 till 8 DC, referred to in the preceding footnotes. 
37 Noll 2000, pp. 316-325. 
38 This objective is stated in Article 63(2)(b) TEC, and Preamble recital (20) TPD. 
39 Article 24 TPD.
40 Article 25(1) TPD. 
41 Article 25(1) TPD.
42 Article 26 TPD.
43 In principle, because a request for temporary protection is not an “application for asylum”
as meant in Article 2(d) DR if such protection can be applied for separately, and the appli-
cant explicitly requested for it (Article 2(c) DR; cf. number [263] above. 
44 Article 27(2)(a) PD. 
45 Articles 27(4) and 35A(6) PD. 
46 Articles 7 and 8 DR. Family members and relatives can be brought together on “humanitarian
grounds” only, if the persons concerned “consent” (Article 15(1) DR, see number [616]). 
47 The reader is referred to work in progress on readmission agreements, concluded by the
Community, by Nils Coleman. 
48 Commission Dublin Working Paper, pars. 14-20; cf. Noll 2000, pp. 194-5. 
49 Preamble recital (11) DR.
50 Articles 4 (5) and 16(1)(c), (d) and (e) DR, and 3(7) and 10(1) (1)(c), (d) and (e) DC.
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51 Article 17(2) DR.
52 Article 17(1) DR. 
53 Article 17(1) second clause DR.
54 Article 11(1) DC. 
55 Article 18(1) DR.
56 Article 18(6) DR. 
57 Article 18(7) DR. 
58 Article 13(4) DC. 
59 Article 19(3) and (4) DR. The time limit may be extended to twelve or eighteen months if
the applicant is hold in detention or absconded.
60 Article 13(5) DC. 
61 After three months of absence of the applicant, its obligation to take him back ceases –
Article 16(3) DR (cf. number [482]).
62 Article 20(1)(b) DR. 
63 Article 20(1)(d) DR.
64 Article 20(1)(c) and (2) DR. 
65 Article 13(1)(b) DC. 
66 Article 18(5) DR. 
67 Cf. Articles 10(1) and 17(3) DR. The lists of elements of proof and circumstantial evidence
announced in Article 18(3) DR are provided for in Annex II to the Dublin Application
Regulation. 
68 Annex II lists AI.1 second indent and BI.1 second indent DAR. 
69 Article 21(1) DR. 
70 Article 21(2) DR. 
71 Article 21(3) DR.
72 This is confirmed by a reading of Article 33 in conjunction with Article 32 RC, which pro-
hibits expulsion tout court of recognised lawfully present refugees.
73 That the protection of Article 33 RC is not limited to expulsion to the refugee’s country of
nationality (or of habitual residence) follows from the plural “territories”- Lauterpacht &
Bethlehem 2003, p. 122. 
74 As to Article 33 RC, this follows from the phrase “in any manner whatsoever” (cf. BVerfG
14 May 1996, BVerfGE 94, 49, at pp. 92f (Sichere Drittstaaten); Grahl-Madsen 1972, 
p. 228; Spijkerboer & Vermeulen 2005, pp. 92-94; Zwaan 2003, pp. 17-22); as to Article 3
ECHR, the European Court of Human Rights stated so (ECtHR 7 March 2000, Rep. 2000-
III (decision) (T.I. v. UK), under “The Law – Concerning Article 3 – The Court’s assessment
– 1. The responsibility of the United Kingdom”); as to Article 3 CAT, it follows from the
term “another state” (cf. General comment on the implementation of Article 3 of the
Convention in the context of Article 22, 21/11/97, CaT General comment 1, under 2); as to
Article 7 CCPR, the Human Rights Committee never explicitly addressed the matter, but
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arguably, the European Court’s reasoning in T.I. v. UK is equally applicable (and see Zwaan
2003, pp. 39-40).
75 See on the burden of proof for the application of the exception of the safe third country
under number [510].
76 Cf. Zwaan 2003, pp. 22; Goodwin-Gill 1998, p. 343; Boeles 1997, p. 69; Spijkerboer &
Vermeulen 1995, p. 284.
77 Spijkerboer & Vermeulen 1995, pp. 284-285.
78 ECtHR 7 March 2000, Rep. 2000-III (decision) (T.I. v. UK), under The position of the appli-
cant as a failed asylum seeker in Germany.
79 This concerned extradition of Jens Soering by the UK to the USA. Soering would be tried in
Virginia for murder and could be sentenced to death; his placement on “death row” would
constitute ill-treatment as prohibited by Article 3 ECHR. The UK government had certified
that it would request the court in Virginia not to impose the death penalty. The European Court
of Human Rights decided that it was not confident this “undertaking” would be “effective”,
as it had never been put to the test (ECtHR 7 July 1989, Ser. A vol. 161 (Soering v. United
Kingdom), par. 97). But apparently such an “undertaking” could, if it’s effectiveness had been
proved in the past, be a safeguard against the risk of ill treatment. Indeed in ECtHR (Grand
Chamber) 4 February 2005, Appl. No. 46827/99 and 46951/99 (Mamatkulov II ) (as well as
in Mamatkulov I, ECtHR (First Section) 6 February 2003, Appl. No. 46827/99 and 46951/99),
a material consideration that the expulsion from Turkey to Uzbekistan was not contrary to
Article 3 ECHR concerned “assurances” from the Uzbek to the Turkish government that the
expellees would not be tortured (Mamatkulov II, par. 76; Mamatkulov I, par. 75). 
80 See number [296].
81 Arguably, the Committee against Torture adopts a similar approach as to Article 3 CAT in
CaT 16 November 1998, CAT/C/21/D/88/1997 (Korban v. Sweden). In par. 6.5, the
Committee against Torture observed in its assessment of the risk of refoulement by a third
country that the marriage of the protection seeker to a national of the third country would
not guarantee a residence permit, thus implying that a residence permit because of the mar-
riage would have been relevant for assessing the risk. 
82 Why the burden of proof that the third state is safe rests on the second state, and not the
applicant, will be addressed below, in number [510]. 
83 Marx 1996, pp. 427-428. Spijkerboer & Vermeulen 1995, p. 289f, and Vermeulen & Zwaan
1997, p. 150 mention the same requirement, observing that it is also met with if a safe third
country arrangement employed by the receiving, third state secures that status determina-
tion will take place in the fourth (or a fifth, et cetera) state.
84 ExCom Conclusion No. 85 (XLIX), under (f).
85 In Article 14 UDHR the phrase has a different meaning - cf. number [11] above. 
86 ECtHR 7 March 2000, Rep. 2000-III (decision) (T.I. v. UK), under The position of the appli-
cant as a failed asylum seeker in Germany.
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87 Zwaan 2003, pp. 20-21. 
88 ECtHR 25 June 1996, Rep. 1996-III (Amuur v. France), par. 48. – The issue was not
addressed in T.I. v UK; the Dublin Convention secured T.I.’s access to the third state.
Likewise, in both cases on indirect refoulement thus far considered by the Committee
against Torture, the applicants did have access to a third state (Korban v. Sweden and CaT
11 November 2003, CAT/C/31/D/153/2000 (Z.T. v. Australia). In the latter case, the
Committee did not get to an assessment of the safety of the third state; see below number
[513]).
89 Amuur v. France, par. 48.
90 ExCom Conclusion No. 85 (XIXL) 1998 under (aa).
91 ExCom Conclusion No. 58 (XL) 1989, under (f) speaks of treatment “in accordance with
recognised basic human standards”; see Spijkerboer & Vermeulen 1995, pp. 230-1. 
92 Legomsky 2003, p. 60f; Spijkerboer & Vermeulen 1995, pp. 234-236.
93 Cf. Legomsky 2003, l.c..
94 Preamble RC, second indent.
95 That is, if the third state is a Contracting state; if not, it cannot violate the Convention.
96 The notion of “persecution” as applied in Article 1A(2) RC encompasses a broader range
of human rights violations than “life or freedom”, mentioned in Article 33(1) RC. A literal
reading therefore suggests that Article 33(1) has a narrower scope in this respect than
Article 1A(2) RC (cf. the US Supreme Court, 480 US 421(INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca)).
Lauterpacht and Bethlehem state that object and purpose as well as context suggest that the
threats which preclude refoulement and the threats meant in Article 1A(2) RC should be
equated, and the travaux préparatoires confirm this view. A more explicit equation is absent
in order to avoid the impression that the prohibition of refoulement is restricted to the coun-
try of origin (Lauterpacht & Bethlehem 2003, pp. 123-126). 
97 Spijkerboer & Vermeulen 1995, p. 285. 
98 It should be noted that even if this were different, it would be very hard to bar expulsion on
the basis of the Refugee Convention provisions on secondary rights, as most of them do not
set an absolute, but a relative standard, that is, require states to treat refugees as aliens gene-
rally, as nationals and so on (see number [542]). 
99 ExCom Conclusion No. 15 (XXX) 1979, h (iv).
100 Article1, Additional paragraph: “Asylum should not be refused by a Contracting state sole-
ly on the ground that it could be sought from another State. However, where it appears that
a person requesting asylum from a Contracting state already has a connection or close links
with another State, the Contracting state may, if it appears fair and reasonable, require him
first to request asylum from that State” (UN doc A/CONF.78/12, reproduced in Goodwin-
Gill 1996, p. 510; see on the failed Convention o.c., pp. 179f). 
101 The provision was considered at a UN Conference on Territorial Asylum by the Committee
of the Whole and transmitted to the Drafting Committee, but not adopted by the Conference
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as such – let alone by a plenary Conference of plenipotentiaries (Grahl-Madsen 1980, 
p. 61). 
102 See Zwaan 2003, pp. 22f for references. 
103 Cf. Zwaan 2003, pp. 22-29, with references to the travaux préparatoires; Goodwin-Gill
2003, pp. 194, 203f, 218, with ample references to state practice as well. 
104 Zwaan 2003, p. 28. 
105 Cf. Zwaan 2003, pp. 22-29, with references to the travaux préparatoires.
106 The labels of “generic” and “individual” approach are borrowed from Noll 2001a. 
107 The assumption that a third state is safe may further be founded on other factors than obli-
gations under international law. Those other factors will be discussed below (in paragraph
7.4.3).
108 E.g. in Noll 2001a p. 161f, Zwaan 2003, pp. 50-51, Terlouw 2000, pp. 12-13.
109 Noll 2000, pp. 499-500.
110 House of Lords 19 December 2000 (R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Dept., ex parte
Adan and Aitseguer), reproduced in IJRL Vol. 13 [2001], pp. 202-30. 
111 CaT 16 November 1998, CAT/C/21/D/88/1997 (Korban v. Sweden), pars. 6.5 and 7. 
112 ECtHR 7 March 2000, Rep. 2000-III (decision) (T.I. v. UK), under The Law, Concerning
Article 3 of the Convention, The Court’s assessment, 3. The position of the applicant as a
failed asylum seeker if returned to Germany.
113 See Spijkerboer & Vermeulen 1995, pp. 287ff. 
114 Noll 2001, pp. 161ff; Baudoin et al. 2001, p. 128; Zwaan 2003, pp. 50-51.
115 T.I. v. UK, The Court’s Assessment, 1. The responsibility of the United Kingdom, fourth par.,
second clause.
116 ECtHR 25 June 1996, Rep. 1996-III (Amuur v. France), par. 48. 
117 ECmHR 7 March 1991, Appl. No. 17518/90 (Gezici v. Switzerland); see Zwaan 2003, pp.
46-48 for further references to the case law of the Commission on the subject.
118 Zwaan 2003, p. 51 and cf. ECtHR (First Section) 6 February 2003, Appl. No. 46827/99 and
46951/99 (Mamatkulov I), where “even serious concerns” fall short of substantial grounds
of a real risk (par. 72). 
119 CaT 16 November 1998, CAT/C/21/D/88/1997 (Korban v. Sweden), par 6.4; CaT 11
November 2003, CAT/C/31/D/153/2000 (Z.T. v. Australia), par. 6.1. 
120 Korban v. Sweden, par. 6.5. In Z.T. v. Australia the Committee against Torture did not
address the safety of the third state: as Z.T. had not “presented sufficient evidence to con-
vince it [the Committee, HB] that he would face a personal risk of being subjected to tor-
ture in the event of his return to Algeria” (par. 6.4), the assessment had come to an end after
the first step. 
121 Cf. Korban v. Sweden, par. 6.5 and Z.T. v. Australia, par. 6.4.
122 Korban v. Sweden, par. 7: “Furthermore, the Committee notes that although Jordan is a
party to the Convention, it has not made the declaration under article 22. As a result, the
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author would not have the possibility of submitting a new communication to the Committee
if he was threatened with deportation from Jordan to Iraq.”
123 Hailbronner 2000, p. 383.
124 ECtHR 25 June 1996, Rep. 1996-III (Amuur v. France), par. 48, quoted under number [501].
125 Cf. Spijkerboer & Vermeulen 1995, pp. 287-288 with references.
126 Readmission agreements fall outside the scope of this study; the reader is referred to work
in progress on readmission agreements, concluded by the Community, by Nils Coleman.
127 Legomsky 2003, p. 76.
128 In BVerfG 14 May 1996, BverfGE 94, 49 (Sichere Drittstaaten), at p. 111 the German
Constitutional Court stated that Hungary could be considered a safe third country as far as
the requirement of access to an examination procedure was concerned. At the time,
Hungary’s obligations under the Refugee Convention were subject to the geographical limi-
tation (see number [13]), and hence persons fleeing events outside Europe had no access to
its refugee status determination procedure. But as Hungary had an “informal” understan-
ding with UNHCR that persons from outside Europe whose refugee status had been
assessed by UNHCR would get some sort of residence permit, it offered protection for the
full range of Convention refugees to whom Germany was bound to offer protection from
refoulement. Hence, reliance on UNHCR could according to the German Constitutional
Court take the place of ratification of the Refugee Convention. Incidentally, Hungary
revoked the territorial limitation in 1998. 
129 ECtHR 7 March 2000, Rep. 2000-III (decision) (T.I. v. UK), Concerning Article 3 of the
Convention – Submissions before the Court – The United Kingdom Government. In its deci-
sion of 7 March 1991, Appl. No. 17518/90 (Gezici v. Switzerland), the European
Commission of Human Rights indeed explicitly addressed the possibility of appeal to it in
both the third country as well in the first country.
130 Article 39(1): “The Chamber or, where appropriate, its President may, at the request of a
party or of any other person concerned, or of its own motion, indicate to the parties any
interim measure which it considers should be adopted in the interests of the parties or of
the proper conduct of the proceedings before it.”
131 ECtHR (First Section) 6 February 2003, Appl. No. 46827/99 and 46951/99 (Mamatkulov I),
par. 110, confirmed by the Grand Chamber ruling ECtHR 4 February 2005, Appl. No.
46827/99 and 46951/99 (Mamatkulov II), par. 129.
132 Vermeulen 2000, under (4).
133 ECtHR 7 December 1976, Ser. A vol. 24 (Handyside v. UK), par. 48; ECtHR 18 December
1996, Rep. 1996-VI (Aksoy v. Turkey), par. 51; see also Verdussen 2000, pp. 45-50.
134 Vermeulen 2000, under (4).
135 CaT 16 November 1998, CAT/C/21/D/88/1997 (Korban v. Sweden), par. 7; cf. Zwaan 2003,
p. 43.
136 Preamble recital (2) DR.
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137 Article 16(1) DR. 
138 Article 2(e) DR, see number [373].
139 Article 3(3) DC. 
140 Article 2(e) DR.
141 Articles 3(3) DR and 3(5) DC. 
142 Article 3(2) DR. 
143 Articles 19 and 20 DR. 
144 The “concept” referred to, is inadmissibility of an application (hence waiving assessment of
the merits of the claim) as the applicant can, in conformity with relevant rules of internatio-
nal law, be expelled to a safe third country (cf. Proposal PD, Comment on Article 21, p. 19). 
145 It may seem that this term implies a wider personal scope than “applicant” or “applicant for
asylum” as defined in Article 2(c) PD would have done (cf. number [262]), but it follows
from Article 27(4) PD that “applicant for asylum” is meant. 
146 Article 27(1) PD.
147 Oddly, whereas the provision meticulously makes mention of freedom from “cruel” treat-
ment (mentioned in Article 7 CCPR, see number [295] above), it does not speak of “inhu-
man or degrading punishment”. A reading in conjunction with Article 27(2)(c) PD arguably
implies that this is just an error. As the prohibition on expulsion ex Article 3 ECHR and
Article 7 CCPR does encompass inhuman or degrading punishment, the prohibition on
indirect refoulement, arguably, likewise encompasses it. As in practice the ill-treatment
risked in the third, or fourth country is not further defined, we may assume that Article
27(1)(c) addresses expulsion to a fourth country contrary to the prohibitions on inhuman or
degrading punishment as well.
148 The circumstance that the relevant Preamble recital (23) PD speaks of “protection in” the
third country does not lead to another conclusion. The term “protection” is sufficiently
broad to encompass protection from (indirect) refoulement. 
149 The phrasing can be traced back to the London Resolution on Host Third Countries, par.
2(c): “It must […] be the case that the applicant has already been granted protection in the
third country or has had the opportunity, at the border or within the territory of the third
country, to make contact with that country’s authorities and seek their protection […;
emphasis added, HB]”.  (Van Krieken 2000, p. 184). 
150 Article 3(1) PD. 
151 We may observe that it is not required that the relevant domestic rules should be “in accor-
dance with international law” as those meant under 27(2)(c) should be; and indeed, interna-
tional law does not require such a connection.
152 In the ‘normal procedure’ and the ‘normal border procedure’ pursuant to Article 8 PD, and
in the ‘special border procedure’ pursuant to Article 35(3) last clause (see par. 6.2.4). The
provision cannot be applied on the basis of assessment in the preliminary procedure – an
expulsion upon that procedure is based on the previous decision.
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153 Articled 27(1)(b) PD. 
154 This is in contrast to the Resolution on a Harmonized Approach to Questions concerning
Host Third Countries (London, 30 November and 1 December 1992, cf. number [44]):
“2.(c) […] the applicant […] has had an opportunity, either at the border or within the third
country, to make contact with that country’s authorities in order to seek their protection […;
emphasis added, HB]”. Some past opportunity obviously does not establish a presumption
that effective protection is available upon expulsion.
155 The Refugee Convention applies the term “recognition” (or “determination”) of refugee sta-
tus (as does Article 26 under (a) – see number [529] below). 
156 Preamble recital (23) PD – which statement is without prejudice to the “safe neighbouring
third country procedure”, cf. Preamble recital (24) PD. 
157 The Initiative of Austria (see number [361]) contained an Annex listing safe third countries.
Possibly, the obligation to “inform the Commission periodically of the countries to which
this concept is applied in accordance with the provisions of this Article” (Article 27(5) PD)
serves the purpose of a future common list of safe third countries. 
158 The provision does not specify whether the requirement concerns subjection to ill-treatment
in the third state, in a subsequent state, or both. A reading “in accordance with internatio-
nal law” (as explicitly required by Article 27(2(c)) implies both direct as well as indirect
refoulement are addressed. Further, Article 27(1) explicitly addresses only indirect refoule-
ment (as prohibited by the above-mentioned provisions). Read in conjunction, the absence
of such a specification in Article 27(2)(c) implies that all implications of the prohibitions
on ill-treatment abroad are addressed – both indirect as well as direct refoulement.
159 The Procedures Directive however conceives of it as two distinct “concepts”. Therefore, we
may not (relying on the term “only” in Article 27(1) PD, see number [523]) apply the con-
ditions laid down in Article 27 on the “safe third country concept” to application of the
“concept of first country asylum” (cf. the last clause of Article 26 PD: “In applying the con-
cept of first country of asylum to the particular circumstances of an applicant for asylum,
Member States may take into account the content of Article 27(1) [emphasis added, HB]”). 
160 Usually, recognition of refugee status implies a “status”, that is, lawful residence (cf.
Chapter 8.2.1).
161 It also seems to imply an amount of discretion inconsistent with international law, as pro-
tection is either available, or it is not, for the Member States do not enjoy a margin of appre-
ciation as to the refugee definition or the scope of the prohibitions of refoulement (see num-
bers [133] and [134]). 
162 Article 26 PD, first and last clause (emphasis added). 
163 Refugees who enjoy some alternative protection status are entitled to refugee status under
European asylum law, unless their status is equivalent to CEAS refugee status (cf. Article
13 QD and 25(2)(d) PD; see numbers [355] and [428] above). The Member State that issued
the status would be responsible for examination of the claim (Article 9(1) DR, see number
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[481]). Incidentally, the same applies to the Member State that recognised the refugees
addressed in Article 25(2)(a) PD. 
164 Article 9(1) DR. 
165 Article 35A(2) PD. 
166 Article 35A(6) PD. 
167 Article 35A(2)(d) jo (3) PD
168 Article 35A(7) PD.
169 Article 35A(1) PD. 
170 See Zwaan 2003, pp. 220f. 
171 Zwaan 2003, p. 227, with references to relevant German case-law and academic writing. 
172 Preamble recital (18) DR. 




In this Chapter I discuss the ‘secondary rights’ that are attached to the CEAS pro-
tection statuses. The term ‘secondary rights’ is not applied by European asylum
law; I subsume under this heading all claims apart from those concerned with
qualification for international protection or with procedures for such protection.
8.1 Introduction
[541] The present discussion of ‘secondary rights’ includes standards referred
to in European asylum law as the “conditions for residence”1 or the “content
of the status” of refugee and subsidiary protection,2 the standards for “recep-
tion” of asylum seekers (or applicants),3 and standards for “treatment” of tem-
porary protection beneficiaries.4 Moreover, the discussion includes rules con-
cerning family unity (for reasons to be set out below). As in the previous
Chapters, I focus on the systematic aspects of relevant legislation, and on their
relation with international law.
European asylum law attributes to each protection status its own set of secon-
dary rights. We saw in Chapter 5 that five CEAS protection statuses can be dis-
tinguished: refugee status, Article 14(6) refugee status (the status of persons
who qualify as a refugee, but may be expelled pursuant to Article 33(2) RC –
cf. numbers [341] and [342]), subsidiary protection status, applicant status
and, finally, temporary protection status. The sets of secondary rights attached
to these statuses are discussed in paragraphs 8.4 – 8.8. 
In paragraphs 8.2 and 8.3, I address relevant international law. The only
instrument of international law addressing in particular the secondary rights of
persons in need of protection is the Refugee Convention; no instrument speci-
fically applies to “subsidiary protection” or “temporary protection benefici-
aries” or “applicants”.5 Scope of application of Refugee Convention benefits
will be discussed in paragraph 8.2. 
As stated in paragraph 1.4, implementation and application of rules of
international law on family unity are informed by the predicament of persons
in need of protection. The relevant rules are discussed under paragraph 8.3.
Finally, conditions on restrictions on the freedom of movement are briefly
addressed. As the issue is primarily relevant for applicants, I discuss relevant
international law in that context (paragraph 8.7.2.1).
8.2 Refugee Convention Rights 
8.2.1 Introduction
[542] In Articles 2 to 34, the Refugee Convention sets out a variety of secon-
dary rights of refugees. It is obvious that the personal scope of these provi-
sions encompasses beneficiaries of Directive “refugee status” (cf. number
[274]). It is less obvious whether “applicants” or “temporary protection bene-
ficiaries” are entitled to those Convention benefits as well. Therefore, I will
discuss the scope of application of Refugee Convention benefits at some
length. 
The scope of beneficiaries of Refugee Convention benefits is conditioned in
three ways. To begin with, by means of qualifications of “refugees” in the rele-
vant provisions (such as “lawfully present” or “resident” refugees). These
qualifications are discussed in paragraph 8.2.2. 
Secondly, some benefits apply only to refugees whose refugee status has
been acknowledged or “recognised” by the host state, whereas other provi-
sions may be relied upon by refugees whose status has not yet been deter-
mined. The nature of refugee status determination will be discussed in para-
graph 8.2.3, the obligation to determine refugee status in paragraph 8.2.4. The
consequences of the findings on these issues for CEAS statuses will be
addressed in paragraphs 8.4 to 8.8. 
Thirdly, the benefits themselves are qualified in various ways. Thus, some
Convention provisions bestow “absolute” rights on refugees, that is, without
making a comparison with nationals or aliens. But in other respects, refugees
(however qualified) must be treated as nationals, as nationals of the state of
their habitual residence, as most favoured aliens, as favourably as possible or,
the weakest category, as aliens generally “in the same circumstances”. These
qualifications are not discussed separately, but in the context of the various
CEAS statuses in paragraphs 8.4 to 8.8.
8.2.2 Qualifications of refugees 
The incremental “system” of Refugee Convention benefits
[543] Articles 2 to 34 apply to refugees qualified in various ways – to
“refugees” tout court, to refugees “lawfully in the territory” of the state and so
on. These qualifications are not defined in the Convention. Most authors on
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the subject interpret these qualifications as elements of what Hathaway has
named an “incremental system”.6 The idea behind it is that the refugee has
stronger claims for protection when his ties with the host state are tighter.
Thus, all refugees are entitled to Convention benefits laid down in provisions
applying to refugees tout court. If the refugee’s presence is “lawful”, his
secondary rights are for that reason enhanced; on top of the benefits for
refugees tout court, come benefits applying to “lawfully present” refugees.
The same applies if he is “residing” or “lawfully residing”, and so on.
The label “system” is something of an overstatement, because the many
qualifications that occur in the Refugee Convention do not fit that closely (see
number [553]). But arguably, the notion of the “incremental system” may be
applied as the label for the above-mentioned objective underlying these quali-
fications, i.e. the balancing of the needs of the refugee and the interests of the
host state.7 Thus, the interpretation below is based on the premise that the vari-
ous qualifications express the idea that the refugee’s claims in or on the host
state increase when his ties with the host state tighten. 
[544] It appears that four main categories of refugees can be distinguished in
the Convention: refugees, refugees “lawfully on the territory” of a state, the
refugee’s country of “residence” and refugees “lawfully staying” (or “lawful-
ly resident”). As a sort of variant, the terms “habitual residence” and “domi-
cile” occur. I will discuss all these categories subsequently below. Besides, the
Refugee Convention employs yet some other qualifications or conditions for
enjoying Convention rights. For example, Article 17 exempts from certain
labour market restrictions the refugee 
“who fulfils one of the following conditions:
(a) He has completed three years’ residence in the country;
(b) He has a spouse possessing the nationality of the country of residence.
A refugee may not invoke the benefits of this provision if he has aban-
doned his spouse;
(c) He has one or more children possessing the nationality of the country
of residence.”
These qualifications do not pose particular problems, and will therefore not be
discussed. But we should observe that they do support the idea behind the
incremental system: the stronger the ties with the host state, the stronger the
claims for protection.
Refugees tout court
[545] A number of Refugee Convention provisions apply to refugees tout
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court or to refugees “in the territory” of the Contracting state (see the scheme
under number [569]).8 The context, that is, other Convention provisions that
require “lawful presence”, “residence” and so on, implies that states cannot
require lawful presence for enjoying this first set of Convention rights. The
implicit distinction between recognised and unrecognised refugees tout court
will be discussed in paragraph 8.3.2. 
Lawfully present refugees
[546] The term “lawfully in the territory” of a contracting state occurs in only
three provisions – Articles 18, 26 and 32 RC (on self-employment, freedom of
movement and expulsion). In its ordinary sense, the term “lawful” indicates
that the refugee’s presence is in conformity with the law of the state where he
is.9 Article 31 RC provides for some further guidance.10 According to its hea-
ding, the provision concerns “Refugees unlawfully in the country of refuge”.
It follows from a reading of Article 31(1) in conjunction with its heading that
a refugee’s presence is “unlawful” if he is present “without authorization”.
Arguably, it follows that the refugee is “lawfully present” if his presence is
“authorised” or “regularised” (the term applied in the second paragraph).11
[547] When is entry or presence “authorised” or (otherwise) “regularised”?
Most authors state that any title to remain on a temporary basis suffices for
lawful presence – for example, a visa, a work permit and so on,12 which is
indeed implied by the ordinary meaning of the terms “lawful” and “authorisa-
tion”. But often, refugees will not possess a permit for temporary sojourn
when applying for asylum. Are such refugees unlawfully, or lawfully present
during status determination, i.e. when their requests for residence permit are
being processed? According to Hathaway, 
“an individual who seeks recognition of refugee status in a state party to
the Convention, and who has provided authorities with the information that
will enable them to consider his or her entitlement to refugee status […]
has ceased to be irregularly present. Once having met the administrative
requirements established by the state to consider which persons who arrive
without authorisation should nonetheless be allowed to remain there as
refugees, the refugee is lawfully present in that country”.13
He supports this assertion by reference to a statement to that extent by Mr. Rain
of France registered in the travaux préparatoires to Article 26 RC.14 But it is
questionable whether this statement can sufficiently support the interpretation
Hathaway proposes. Apart from the caution due to any interpretation based on
the travaux to the Refugee Convention (see number [26] above), it deserves
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attention that Mr. Rain did not address the question of what meaning should be
attributed to the term “lawful” in the draft Refugee Convention text; rather, he
explained which categories of refugees would be regarded as “regularly admit-
ted” under French domestic law. The mentioned statement was not acclaimed
as the proper meaning of the term “lawful” in the Refugee Convention. 
[548] We saw above that to its ordinary meaning, “lawful” means in confor-
mity with the law, that is, with domestic law. Hence, a refugee can invoke
benefits for lawfully present refugees if his presence is in conformity with
domestic law. But this meaning in no way prescribes when presence is lawful.
The assumption that the filing of an application for asylum entails “regulari-
sation” entails assigning a special meaning to a treaty term. According to
Article 31(4) VTC, this may be done only when it established that the
Contracting states so intended.15 In the absence of a clear indication to that
extent, we must assume that the matter is left to domestic law. It follows that
if states deny the Refugee Convention benefits applying to a “refugee lawful-
ly in their territory” to a refugee who requested recognition of his refugee sta-
tus (in the terms of European asylum law, to an applicant), because under its
domestic law this applicant was not lawfully present, they do not act in breach
of their Convention obligations. Conversely, if the presence of a person who
seeks asylum (who requests recognition of his refugee status) is lawful under
domestic law, that person is entitled to the Convention benefits applying to
“lawfully” present refugees. 
Finally, as Vermeulen observes, Article 31(2) RC implies that if the refugee
is not admitted to a third country, the host state has no choice but to regularise
his presence.16 The status of unlawfully present refugee is therefore limited in
time. But the provision offers no clue for the time span during which this regu-
larisation should occur. 
In sum, a refugee is “lawfully” in a state if his presence is in conformity with
relevant domestic law. The refugee is “lawfully” in a state if his entry or pre-
sence has been “authorised”, or if his illegal entry or presence was “regu-
larised”. Any title to remain on a temporary (or permanent) basis makes pre-
sence “lawful” for Convention purposes. Contracting states have the duty to
render the refugee’s presence lawful if admission to a third country cannot be
secured. 
Residence tout court
[549] The qualification “residence” tout court appears only twice, in Articles
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12 (on personal status) and 25 RC (on administrative assistance). As the
Refugee Convention also employs the term “lawful residence” (see below), we
must assume that “residence” tout court covers unlawful residence as well. 
According to its ordinary meaning, residence implies either “the act or fact
of dwelling in a place for some time”, or “the act or fact of living or regular-
ly staying at or in some place for the discharge of a duty or the enjoyment of
a benefit”.17 If the first meaning applies, a refugee is resident after the lapse of
a certain amount of time; then, “residence” is merely a matter of fact. The 
second possibility entails that residence is a matter of intent: one is residing if
one settles down, will stay for a certain period of time. 
Does the first or the second meaning (or both) apply to “residence” tout
court? Article 17(2) RC (quoted above under number [544]) speaks of the
refugee who “has completed three years’ residence in the country”. Here, the
term “residence” obviously refers to a mere lapse of time. Arguably, the same
holds true for Article 6.18 This meaning moreover fits in well with the idea of
the incremental system: by the lapse of time, the refugee’s ties with the host
state are strengthened. The second meaning of the term “residence” that refers
to an intent of prolonged presence does not fit in so well with this idea. There
is no reason why mere intent of an unlawfully present refugee to stay in the
host state would accrue the obligations of that state. Moreover, it would not or
hardly be possible to distinguish the refugee with this intent from the refugee
without this intent. Yet the Refugee Convention appears to make the distinc-
tion between those simply present and resident refugees. 
Hence, we can assume that the term “residence” implies the lapse of a cer-
tain period of time, not the intent of prolonged sojourn. How much time should
lapse before we can speak of “residence” for the purposes of the Refugee
Convention? Paragraph 14 of the Schedule attached to the Refugee Convention
employs the term “residence” in contrast to “transit through” and “establish-
ment” in a state.19 This implies that “residence” sets in after an only brief peri-
od of time, and that permanent settlement is not required. Referring to state
practice, Grahl-Madsen defines temporary sojourn as the period of usually
three months during which an alien is authorised to be present on the basis of
a visa or, if no visa is required, without having to report to the aliens authori-
ties; this period ends almost universally after three months.20 European law also
defines short-term residence as three months.21 Arguably, presence continued
after the expiration of a period of three months would be “residence”. 
Lawful residence 
[550] The Convention further employs the qualification “lawfully residing”
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(Article 28) or “lawfully staying” (in seven provisions, see number [569]). The
French language version applies the term “résidant régulièrement” (or “qui rési-
dent regulièrement”) to both qualifications; arguably, they are synonymous.22
We saw above that the qualification “resident” tout court refers to a lapse
of time (of three months). There is no reason to suppose why this meaning
would not apply to the qualification “lawfully resident”. And according to
Hathaway, it follows from the travaux préparatoires that “it is the refugee’s de
facto circumstances which determine whether or not” the requirement of “law-
ful residence” is satisfied.23 Thus, the lawfully present refugee who has resided
for over three months in the host state is “lawfully staying” there for the pur-
poses of the Refugee Convention. 
Could the second literal meaning of “residence”, referring to intent of a
longer sojourn, also apply to “lawful presence”? We saw above that the intent
of the refugee is irrelevant, but this may be different for the intent of the host
state. If it explicitly allows the refugee to stay for a longer period, it establishes
a stronger tie with him than with refugees who are not officially allowed to
stay (not lawfully present), or merely allowed to stay for a short period of time
(lawfully present refugees). Hence, the meaning fits in well with the idea
underlying the incremental system. Arguably, if the host state issues a resi-
dence permit allowing the refugee to stay longer than three months, that
refugee is lawfully staying even if he has not yet sojourned for three months
in that state.24
Other qualifications
[551] Two more terms are applied in the Convention that seem to address the
length of sojourn. Article 14 (artistic rights) and the second and third para-
graphs of Article 16 (on access to courts) speak of “habitual residence” (“rési-
dence habituelle”), or some variant thereof; Article 12(1) (on legal status)
employs the term “domicile”. 
Some authors suggest that the term “habitual” implies a longer stay than
simple residence, employed in the Articles 12 and 25.25 It is difficult however
to assess the difference between simple and habitual residence, as residence
itself implies a sojourn “of some time”, i.e. habitual sojourn. We may further
observe that Article 14 and 16 explicitly address situations where more than
one state is involved.26 Arguably, the term “habitual residence” does not define
a more prolonged sojourn than simple residence, but defines which state must
fulfil the concerned obligation if the refugee has connections with two states.
For example, if a refugee has a residence permit from one state, his state of
lawful residence, but lives for a considerable time in another state, that second
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state may also be a state of residence. The term ‘habitual residence’ limits the
obligations laid down in Article 14 and 16 to the first state – quite in accor-
dance with the premise that the various qualifications serve to balance the
interests of the host state and the needs of the refugee. 
[552] The other term that seems to address the length of sojourn is “domicile”,
employed in Article 12(1), on personal status: 
“1.The personal status of a refugee shall be governed by the law of the
country of his domicile or, if he has no domicile, by the law of the coun-
try of his residence.
2. Rights previously acquired by a refugee and dependent on personal sta-
tus, more particularly rights attaching to marriage, shall be respected by
a Contracting State, subject to compliance, if this be necessary, with the
formalities required by the law of that State, provided that the right in
question is one which would have been recognized by the law of that
State had he not become a refugee.”
The ordinary meanings of the term ‘domicile’ are “1: dwelling place: place of
residence: home; 2a: a person’s fixed, permanent, and principal home for legal
purposes”.27 The principal, as well as the specialised, meaning of the French
“domicile” is supportive of the second meaning.28 If the first meaning applied,
the subsidiary reference to residence would be meaningless. 
The state of domicile is therefore the state where the refugee resides per-
manently; if he has no permanent residence anywhere, the law of the state of
simple residence applies (cf. the second part of Article 12(1) RC). The
Convention does not address the situation where the refugee has no place of
residence (yet); the issue is therefore left to the domestic law of the Member
States. It should be noted that refugees who have no state of domicile (and are
thus merely sojourning in a contracting State) are not bereft of any benefit due
to the use of the term “domicile” in Article 12 RC. This term does not set a
condition as to the degree of attachment with a state, for Article 12(1) does not
confer a right on refugees to make claims against the Contracting states.
Rather, it sorts out which legal regime applies as to the refugee’s personal sta-
tus. It is the second paragraph on the other hand that does confer an obliga-
tion, and it addresses “a Contracting state” - not even presence is required.
Conclusions
[553] The refugee’s entitlement to benefits accrues, as his bonds with the host
state become stronger. This incremental system consists of four main cate-
gories. The first concerns refugees tout court, refugees who are lawfully or
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unlawfully present in the territory of the states. For the second category, “law-
ful presence” is required. The requirement is satisfied if some title or formal
consent of presence has been issued. The third category addresses “resident”
refugees, that is refugees who have been present in the host state for over three
months. The fourth category concerns “lawfully staying” (or “lawfully resi-
dent”) refugees. It applies to refugees who are lawfully present and have been
present for over three months. It also applies to refugees who have not yet been
present for three months, but who have received a residence permit allowing
them to stay for a period of more than three months. “Habitual residence” and
“domicile” do not form separate categories, requiring a longer period of pre-
sence than mere “residence”. Rather, they serve to distinguish between seve-
ral states where the refugee may be resident. 
We may observe that the refugee who is merely resident is not lawfully
present, and vice versa. Hence, the “incremental system” is not fully incre-
mental, or not fully a system, because the one set of benefits is not encom-
passed by the next one. But we may also observe that the idea underlying this
system, the balancing of claims of refugees and interests of host states, does
serve to make sense of the various qualifications. 
8.2.3 The nature of refugee status determination
8.2.3.1 The declaratory and constitutivist views 
[554] Under European asylum law, a person who requests international pro-
tection under the Refugee Convention is an “applicant”, and becomes a
“refugee” only after his “recognition as a refugee” by a Member State.29
Accordingly, whereas the “reception conditions” of “applicants” are subject to
various restrictions as to their freedom of movement, access to the labour mar-
ket or social security system and so on, Directive refugee status beneficiaries
enjoy all Convention benefits (cf. paragraphs 8.4 and 8.7). Thus, the relevant
legislation interprets the term “refugee” in the Articles 2 to 34 RC as “recog-
nised refugee”, and treats recognition of refugee status as an act constitutory
for enjoying Convention benefits (below: the “constitutivist view” on refugee
status determination).
According to many authors, the constitutivist view is at odds with the
Refugee Convention, because a person is a refugee as soon as he fulfils the
requirements of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention.30 In this second view
(below: the “declaratory view”), recognition may eventually take place, but is
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not mandatory for entitlement to Convention benefits. As the UNHCR
Handbook puts it: 
“[a] person is a refugee within the meaning of the 1951 Convention as soon
as he fulfils the criteria contained in the definition. This would necessarily
occur prior to the time at which his refugee status is formally determined.
Recognition of his refugee status does not therefore make him a refugee
but declares him to be one. He does not become a refugee because of
recognition, but is recognized because he is a refugee”.31
If status determination is indeed purely a declaratory act, a person is entitled
to Convention benefits from the very moment he fulfils the criteria of the
refugee definition – not only after “recognition”, but already when he is an
“applicant” or “temporary protection beneficiary”. 
[555] Below, I will at some length address the question which of these views
applies to which Convention provisions. Before entering this discussion, we
should acknowledge that the issue is not self-evident. On the one hand the
Refugee Convention does not explicitly require status determination for
entitlement to its benefits. On the other hand, the Refugee Convention does,
in several places, explicitly refer to status determination, so apparently
assumes that recognition takes place (see number [556]). Both views are per-
fectly capable of accommodating these facts. This is so, because they
approach refugee status from different angles. 
In the declaratory view, being a refugee is primarily a matter of fact. It is
the Refugee Convention itself that attaches legal consequences to this factual
situation: entitlement to the benefits mentioned in its Articles 2 to 34. Indeed
the benefits must be sought from, or be granted by the Contracting states. But
recognition is not mandatory: recognition upon application for refugee status
is merely a formal acknowledgement by the state that the factual situation
meant in Article 1 RC has come into being. As recognition has no legal con-
sequences for refugee status, there was no need to address status determina-
tion in the Refugee Convention. States may perform status determination, or
do without. The allusions to recognition and status determination are not at
odds with this view. The Convention presupposes the existence of status deter-
mination and recognition, as the states will presumably be eager to sort out
refugees from those applicants to whom they do not owe protection. 
In the constitutivist view, being a refugee is a matter of law, not of fact.
Refugee status is a legal category, the designation of a legal relation between the
refugee and the state from which he has requested protection. It is to this legal
relation that Convention benefits are attached. This relationship is established by
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recognition by the Contracting state. Before recognition, i.e. before this relation
is established, a person requesting protection as a refugee is an alien claiming
preferential treatment. This alien may indeed fulfil the requirements of Article 1
RC; in a sense, therefore, recognition is indeed declaratory – declaratory of the
fulfilment of the criteria of the refugee definition. But this does not render recog-
nition as an additional requirement one should expect to be mentioned in the
Convention, for a person becomes a refugee only after the relation between him
and the state has been established – i.e. after determination of refugee status. 
In order to sort out whether recognition is required for the entitlement to
Convention benefits or not, I will first discuss the text, then object and pur-
pose of the Refugee Convention as a whole. As we will see, object and pur-
pose of individual provisions leads to the conclusion that some provisions pre-
suppose that status determination has taken place, whereas other provisions
necessarily apply to unrecognised refugees too. 
8.2.3.2 The Refugee Convention text 
[556] Article 1, headed “Definition of the term “refugee”, states (as far as rele-
vant here) that 
“for the purposes of the present Convention, the term “refugee” shall apply
to any person who owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted is out-
side the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country”. 
Thus, for the purposes of Articles 2 to 34 RC, “the term refugee shall apply”
to anyone who fulfils the requirements of Article 1A(2). No mention is made
of recognition or status determination. Hence, the provision favours the
declaratory view, but on closer scrutiny, Article 1 is ambiguous on the matter,
for Article 1A(1) states that 
“[d]ecisions of non-eligibility taken by the International Refugee
Organization during the period of its activities32 shall not prevent the status
of refugee being accorded to persons who fulfil the conditions of para-
graph 2 of this section”. 
It appears, than, that “the status of refugee” is “accorded”, not simply
incurred. Moreover, Article 1C states that
“This Convention shall cease to apply to any person falling under the terms
of section A if:
(1) He has voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country of
his nationality; or
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(2) Having lost his nationality, he has voluntarily re-acquired it, or
(3) He has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the
country of his new nationality; or
(4) He has voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or
outside which he remained owing to fear of persecution; or
(5) He can no longer, because the circumstances in connexion with which
he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to
refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationali-
ty; […]
(6) Being a person who has no nationality he is, because of the circum-
stances in connexion with which he has been recognized as a refugee
have ceased to exist, able to return to the country of his former habitu-
al residence; […]”.
The term “shall cease to apply” seems supportive of the declaratory view: it
conveys that refugee status ends automatically if a certain factual situation sets
in. However, if being a refugee in the sense of Article 1A(2) were purely
declaratory, Article 1C(5) and (6) would be superfluous. For then, it would be
a matter of course that the Convention would cease to apply to any person who
ceases to fulfil one or more requirements mentioned in Article 1A(2). As it is,
Article 1C(5) and (6) speak of recognition. Moreover, all sub-paragraphs of
Article 1C presuppose, that one continues to be a “refugee”, although Article
1A(2) does not apply any more (in the period between the moment some
requirement of Article 1A(2) is not fulfilled any more, and the moment the
recognised refugee can no longer continue to refuse to avail himself of the pro-
tection of his country of origin). The paragraphs (1) to (4) of Article 1C all
mention circumstances wherein Article 1A(2) does not apply any more.
Arguably, they therefore necessarily address “recognised refugees”, though
without stating so explicitly. 
One more Convention provision explicitly refers to some sort of formal
acknowledgement of refugee status.33 Article 9, on “Provisional measures”,
states that
“[n]othing in this Convention shall prevent a Contracting State, in time of
war or other grave and exceptional circumstances, from taking provisio-
nally measures which it considers to be essential to the national security
in the case of a particular person, pending a determination by the
Contracting State that that person is in fact a refugee and that the con-
tinuance of such measures is necessary in his case in the interests of
national security”.
Apparently, it needs “determination” for a person to be “in fact” a refugee.
458 Chapter 8
[557] Obviously, then, the Refugee Convention presupposes that status deter-
mination or recognition of refugee status takes place or may take place. Can
we conclude on this basis that recognition is constitutivist in nature? It does
not follow from the quoted references that such status determination or recog-
nition is mandatory for enjoying Convention benefits. Article 1A(1) speaks of
according “refugee status”, not of according Convention rights.34 Article 1C
supposes that recognition takes place, but it does not follow that only after
recognition a person to whom Article 1A(2) applies is entitled to enjoy the
benefits of the Refugee Convention. As to Article 9, the provision rather
endorses the declaratory view. For if a person whose refugee status has not
been determined were not a refugee in the sense of Articles 2 to 34 RC, the
Refugee Convention would not curtail the competence of the Contracting
states to take any measure towards him, neither in peace nor in war time. As it
is, it follows from Article 9 that the Convention prevents the Contracting states
from “taking provisionally measures” if there is no “war or other grave and
exceptional circumstances”. Hence, in normal circumstances a person whose
refugee status is being determined falls within the scope of the Refugee
Convention. In sum, the Convention text supposes that status determination or
recognition does take place, but also, that unrecognised refugees are entitled
to (some or all) Refugee Convention benefits. 
8.2.3.3 Object and purpose laid down in the Preamble
[558] The purpose and object as laid down in the Preamble to the Refugee
Convention further reinforce the declaratory view. According to the first con-
sideration, 
“the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights […] have affirmed the principle that human beings shall
enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination”
Usually, persons can take resort to the country of their nationality (or
habitual residence) for protection of these rights, but this is not so with
refugees. Indeed the words “without discrimination”, given emphasis by
their position at the end of the first consideration, prepare for the focusing
of this general attachment to human rights protection to refugees in par-
ticular:
“the United Nations has, on various occasions, manifested its profound
concern for refugees and endeavoured to assure refugees the widest possi-
ble exercise of these fundamental rights and freedoms”.
459Secondary rights
The following consideration connects this concern for the exercise of funda-
mental human rights by refugees with Convention benefits: 
“it is desirable to revise and consolidate previous international agreements
relating to the status of refugees and to extend the scope of and protection
accorded by such instruments by means of a new agreement.”
Together, these considerations indicate protection of fundamental human
rights of refugees as the primary objective of the Convention. The declaratory
view fits in better with this objective, as it secures more protection from the
moment of application than does the constitutivist view. 
The final consideration shifts attention to the needs of the Contracting states: 
“CONSIDERING that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy bur-
dens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of
which the United Nations has recognized the international scope and
nature cannot therefore be achieved without international co-operation
[…]”.
Thus, more equal division of the burden, in order to avoid that these become
“unduly heavy” for certain states, is another purpose of the instrument. Due to
its international scope, the issue must be solved by international co-operation.
Discretion on behalf of the states as to the moment they offer Convention pro-
tection is less compatible with this purpose than the declaratory view. 
So, the text of the Refugee Convention assumes that recognition of refugee
status does or may occur; Articles 1A(2) and 9 imply that the Convention does
at least partially apply to refugees whose status has not yet been determined.
Object and purpose of the Refugee Convention as laid down in the preamble
is further supportive of a declaratory understanding of refugee recognition.
Should we conclude that recognition is therefore immaterial for entitlement to
Convention benefits? Object and purpose of individual Convention provisions
offers a more mixed picture. 
8.2.3.4 Object and purpose of individual provisions
Article 33 RC
[559] Article 33(1) RC prohibits states “to expel or return (“refouler”) a
refugee […] to the frontiers of territories” where he fears persecution. There
are two sound reasons to assume that the term “refugee” is applied here in the
declaratory sense. Firstly, if the provision did not apply to unrecognised
refugees, the Refugee Convention would allow the Contracting states to expel
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refugees to any state if, and as long as, they do not determine their status.
Enjoying Convention protection would then be totally at the discretion of the
states. This consequence is incompatible with both purposes of the Refugee
Convention identified above, protection of human rights and spreading the
burden of asylum. Secondly, the term “refouler” makes explicit that the prohi-
bition of Article 33(1) applies to requests for protection made at the borders
of the Contracting states,35 that is, to persons whose refugee status has not been
determined. 
Article 32 RC
[560] A reading to object and purpose of Article 33(1) RC hence once more
confirms the declaratory reading of the term “refugee”. But the matter is dif-
ferent for some other Refugee Convention provisions, most conspicuously,
Article 32 RC. It runs as follows:
“1.The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their terri-
tory save on grounds of national security or public order.
2. The expulsion of such a refugee shall be only in pursuance of a decision
reached in accordance with due process of law. Except where com-
pelling reasons of national security otherwise require, the refugee shall
be allowed to submit evidence to clear himself, and to appeal to and be
represented for the purpose before a competent authority or a person or
persons specially designated by the competent authority.
3. The Contracting States shall allow such a refugee a reasonable period
within which to seek legal admission into another country. The
Contracting States reserve the right to apply during that period such
internal measures as they may deem necessary.”
Like Article 33, Article 32 addresses expulsion, but it offers stronger protec-
tion in three respects. First, it prohibits expulsion tout court, whereas Article
33 RC only prohibits refoulement to the state where the refugee fears persecu-
tion, and hence allows for expulsion to safe third countries. Secondly, Article
32(2) offers some procedural guarantees, which are altogether absent in
Article 33. And thirdly, the refugee who poses a threat to national security or
public order must, if expelled, be allowed the opportunity to seek admission
elsewhere (Article 32(3)) – a clause absent in Article 33 RC. Entitled to this
stronger protection are refugees “lawfully in [the] territory” of the Contracting
state – as opposed to the “refugee” tout court in Article 33 RC. 
[561] Does Article 32 apply to unrecognised refugees? This reading leads to
unreasonable results. To begin with, it would mean that Article 33 has very little
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meaning next to Article 32. Article 33 would apply only to refugees who enter
“unlawfully” (without authorisation, see number [546]), and then only from
the moment they request asylum until the moment their presence is authorised.
Moreover, as Goodwin-Gill points out, “in principle there appears to be no
reason why the temporarily present refugee should not be subject to the same
regime of deportation as applies to aliens generally”, given that Article 33 RC
applies in any event.36 Finally, it would mean that refugees can in fact choose
their host state: the exception of the safe third country could not be applied to
any alien whose presence is “authorised”, as Article 32 bars expulsion to any
state. This outcome would contradict state practice. 
One could argue that the lawfulness of the refugee’s presence ends at the
moment when the state dismisses the application for asylum on the ground
that the exception of the safe third country applies. Thus, if a states decides to
expel the applicant (the refugee whose status has not been determined) to a
safe third state, the refugee is because of that decision no longer “lawfully” in
the state, and accordingly Article 32 does not apply to him. But this approach
would deprive the guarantees of Article 32 of all meaning.37 For instance, if a
state concludes that a lawfully present refugee poses a threat to its national
security and issues an expulsion order, the lawfulness of the refugee’s presence
ends. But we must assume that the refugee is nevertheless still “lawfully” 
present for the purposes of Article 32, if, for example, the requirement that he
should be allowed a “reasonable period” to obtain admission elsewhere
(Article 32(3) RC) is to have any meaning. 
Goodwin-Gill therefore proposes reading the provision as applying to
“lawfully staying (or resident) refugees”, a reading that accommodates state
practice restricting the benefits of the provision to refugees to whom “asylum”
has been granted.38 Although providing for an attractive solution, this reading
must arguably be dismissed. Given the carefully carved out system of qualifi-
cations in the Refugee Convention,39 we cannot just substitute the qualification
“lawfully” by “lawfully staying”. Further, we saw above that a refugee is, in
principle, “lawfully staying” after a lawful presence of more than three
months. A refugee may thus very well be “lawfully staying” before a decision
has been taken whether or not asylum will be granted to him – or rather,
whether he will be expelled to a third state. Thus, reading “lawfully” as if it
said “lawfully staying” does not solve the question. 
[562] It follows that the lawfulness of the refugee’s presence cannot account
for the stronger protection Article 32 RC accords to him, than Article 33
accords to the refugee tout court. The alternative reading is assuming that the
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beneficiaries of Article 32, the lawfully present refugees, are recognised law-
fully present refugees. Then, Article 33 RC would have substantial meaning
next to Article 32: it would cover both unrecognised refugees (such as appli-
cants and temporary protection beneficiaries) as well as recognised refugees
who are not lawfully present.40 As a consequence, Article 32 would not inter-
fere with the application of the safe third country concept. This reading is also
compatible with the state practice mentioned above – the status of lawfully
present recognised refugees is “asylum”. 
The question remains then, whether the recognition requirement implicit in
Article 32 is implied by the term “lawful” or by the term “refugee”. In its ordi-
nary sense, “lawful” means “in conformity with the law”, which does not
entail recognition. And a special meaning like “lawful because of status deter-
mination” may be given to a treaty term only if it is established the Contracting
states intended it (cf. Article 31(4) VTC, quoted under number [22]). The
other instances where the term “lawful” occurs in the Refugee Convention do
not imply this special meaning. The term “refugee” as defined in Article 1 RC,
on the other hand, may very well imply recognition. We saw above that in
Article 1A(1) and, more importantly, 1C RC “refugee” means recognised
refugee. 
Other provisions
[563] It appears, that Article 32 applies only to recognised refugees, and
Article 33 to unrecognised refugees as well. Hence, we can not decide that sta-
tus determination is in general declaratory or constitutivist in nature. Rather,
we will have to sort out for each Convention benefit separately which of the
two views applies. 
I think that there is good reason to assume that the term “refugee” means
“recognised refugee” in other provisions (than Articles 1C and 32 RC) as well.
To begin with, Article 34 states that
“[t]he Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation
and naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to
expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the
charges and costs of such proceedings”.
It is most unlikely the Contracting states have the obligation to facilitate natu-
ralisation “as far as possible” of refugees whose status has yet to be deter-
mined, i.e. to naturalise applicants. 
According to Article 28 RC,
“[t]he Contracting States shall issue to refugees lawfully staying in their
territory travel documents for the purpose of travel outside their territory
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[…], and the provisions of the Schedule to this Convention shall apply with
respect to such documents. The Contracting States may issue such a travel
document to any other refugee in their territory […]”.
The issue of a travel document in accordance with the Schedule, a refugee
passport, very much amounts to formal recognition of refugee status.
Moreover, the issue of the refugee passport entails obligations for other
Contracting states vis-à-vis the document holder: they must accord the rights
the holder is entitled to as a “refugee”.41 If one assumes that unrecognised
refugees can invoke Article 28, a Contracting state would have to impose obli-
gations on other states towards persons who are not refugees. This would be
an unreasonable result. Moreover, such consequences would be contrary to the
objective of preventing the refugee “problem from becoming a cause of ten-
sion between States”.42 Hence, we should assume that Article 28 applies to
recognised refugees only. 
Article 5, finally, states that 
“[n]othing in this Convention shall be deemed to impair any rights and
benefits granted by a Contracting State to refugees apart from this
Convention”. 
Read in conjunction with Article 7(1), stating that 
“[e]xcept where this Convention contains more favourable provisions, a
Contracting State shall accord to refugees the same treatment as is accor-
ded to aliens generally”, 
it appears that Article 5 addresses benefits accorded to refugees in that parti-
cular capacity, i.e. to recognised refugees.
[564] Do other provisions yield indications that the declaratory view applies?
Several authors have convincingly argued that Article 31 RC addresses “pre-
sumptive” (unrecognised) refugees.43 We saw above (number [546]) that this
provision prohibits the imposition of penalties upon refugees who entered or
are present illegally – that is, of refugees whose refugee status has not yet been
determined. 
Other Convention provisions than those discussed above do not yield par-
ticularly strong indications that the term refugee is applied in either the
declaratory or the constitutivist sense. Arguably, in the absence of such indi-
cations we may assume that the term is applied in the declaratory sense. A
reading of the relevant provisions in conjunction with Article 1A(2) RC sug-
gests so. Besides, object and purpose as laid down in the Preamble call for an
extensive reading of the scope (see number [558] above). 
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8.2.3.5 Concluding remarks
[565] Two views on the legal character of refugee status determination are pos-
sible. According to the declaratory view, any person fulfilling the require-
ments of Article 1 RC is entitled to Convention benefits, regardless of his sta-
tus having been determined or not. According to the constitutivist view, states
are obliged to accord Convention benefits only after status determination. 
Articles 1A(2) and Article 9 RC imply a declaratory understanding of the
term refugee, and this declaratory view is further endorsed by object and pur-
pose of the Refugee Convention as laid down in its Preamble. It does not fol-
low from either of the mentioned provisions that the declaratory view neces-
sarily applies to all Convention benefits. Article 1C and Article 9 suppose
recognition and status determination does take place, and the former provision
does attach legal consequences to it. We further saw that the Articles 1C, 5, 28,
32 and 34 RC, read in context and in the light of their object and purpose, all
presuppose status determination. A reading of Article 33 to object and purpose
implies that the provision applies to unrecognised refugees; the same holds
true for Article 31. Other provisions do not yield indications that the constitu-
tivist view applies. A reading in conjunction with Articles 1A(2) and 9 RC,
and in the light of object and purpose of the Refugee Convention as laid down
in the Preamble suggests that those other provisions apply the term refugee in
the declaratory sense.
[566] The conclusion that the term refugee means a “person fulfilling the
requirement of Article 1 RC” in some, and a “person recognised as fulfilling the
requirements of Article 1 RC” in other provisions may raise two objections.
First, one may feel that it is unreasonable to read two different meanings into one
term. Second, one may argue that recognition amounts to an additional require-
ment that cannot apply, as the Refugee Convention does not state it explicitly. 
Arguably, these objections are not conclusive. We should note that in other
instances, Convention provisions imply requirements on enjoying benefits too.
Thus, According to Article 22(1),
“[t]he Contracting states shall accord to refugees the same treatment as is
accorded to nationals with respect to elementary education”.
Obviously, it would be unreasonable to state that, say, the Netherlands has the
obligation to provide refugees world wide with elementary education on the
same footing as they accord to their nationals. It appears that Article 22
implicitly requires presence. Put otherwise, the term refugee here has the
meaning “refugee in the territory of the Contracting state” - a meaning the
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term “refugee” obviously does not have in, for example, Article 30,44 and a
condition that is explicitly stated in, for example, Article 27 RC.45 The lack of
an explicit reference to the requirement of the refugee’s being present or not
should not be regarded as a flaw in the text of the Convention. Rather, the
requirement follows from a reading to object and purpose. 
That both views may apply to one and the same issue, the entitlement of a
“refugee” to Convention benefits, may further appear less of an anomaly if we
draw into account a similar distinction, that applies in the law on the recogni-
tion of states.46 In the past, the question of whether recognition of states is
declaratory or constitutivist in nature has been the subject of scholarly debate.
The former view holds that entities fulfilling certain requirements – control
over a certain territory and so on – are states, and the recognition by other
states is hence merely a declaratory act. Constitutivists held that only by
recognition by other states could an entity enter the international community
of states. The latter view has been abandoned, as it cannot explain why the
existence of some states is acknowledged, and legal consequences attached to
it, by states that do not recognise them formally (for example, Arab states
invoking United Nations declarations against the “entity” Israel). But the now
generally accepted declaratory view does not entail that the recognition of
states is without legal consequences. As doctrine holds it, unrecognised states
do enjoy certain rights – for example, the states that did not recognise them
cannot invade them at will. But recognition is a condition for other aspects of
acting as a state – for example, the establishment of formal diplomatic rela-
tions. So, recognition of states is declaratory of statehood, and hence not
mandatory for enjoying the rights that international law attaches to de facto
statehood. But to a certain extent recognition is also constitutivist – as far as
rights are concerned the other states can grant them at their sovereign will. 
In summary, both the constitutivist understanding of the term refugee and the
declaratory view are quite well compatible with the Refugee Convention. Nor
should their simultaneous applicability to the issue of entitlement to conven-
tion benefits raise difficulties. Finally, the dual understanding of the term
refugee is compatible with the finding that the text of the Refugee Convention
implies both a declaratory as well as constitutivist reading of the term.
8.2.4 The obligation to determine refugee status
[567] Do the states party to the Refugee Convention have an obligation to
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determine whether or not an applicant for refugee protection is in fact a
refugee? The Refugee Convention does not explicitly require that states per-
form status determination upon appeal to the Refugee Convention.47 But the
absence of an explicit obligation is not necessarily the end of the matter. Just
as the Convention implicitly requires recognition for entitlement to certain
Convention benefits, it may implicitly require states to perform status deter-
mination.48
The Articles 1C and 9 RC explicitly suppose that states do perform a deter-
mination of refugee status (see number [556] above). It does not follow that
they therefore must perform this determination. Meijers however points out
that the obligation to carry out status determination follows from the obliga-
tion to perform treaty obligations “in good faith”, as well as from the object
and purpose of the Refugee Convention.49 Refugee protection would not be
effective unless refugee status determination took place, as far as the
Convention benefits are concerned that apply to recognised refugees only. If
states could at will refuse to determine refugee status of applicants, they could
at will deny them the issue of the refugee passport and hence the possibility
of going abroad (Article 28), as well as the security that Article 32 offers. This
would render these provisions quite meaningless for the protection of refugee
rights, which would be at variance with the object and purpose as laid down
in the Preamble (see number [558]). In summary, object and purpose and the
obligation to perform treaty obligations in good faith imply an obligation to
determine refugee status.
[568] Accepting that states do in principle have the obligation to perform sta-
tus determination, the question remains of when precisely a state is in breach
of this obligation. In general, one may state that if the status determination
takes “unreasonably” long, the state acts in breach of its obligation to perform
its duties under the Refugee Convention. But the Refugee Convention does not
offer clear clues as to how long status determination may take. Article 9
speaks of provisional measures concerning a person “pending a determination
by the Contracting State that that person is in fact a refugee and that the con-
tinuance of such measures is necessary in his case in the interests of national
security”. Arguably, the condition that the necessity of “continuance” be deter-
mined, that is, the condition that this necessity be re-assessed during the sta-
tus determination, suggests that this status determination may take up a con-
siderable amount of time. Likewise, the grant of temporary protection in
answer to a request for refugee recognition is not necessarily in breach of the
obligation to perform status determination. If a state is unable to properly
467Secondary rights
process the request for refugee status, postponement of the determination is
not in breach of its obligation to perform its duties in good faith. This would
be different if the temporary protection were granted on the mere grounds that
numbers of applicants rise, or that the causes for flight are presumably of a
temporary nature. 
Arguably, though, the Refugee Convention does indicate a time limit.
According to Article 7(2), 
“[a]fter a period of three years’ residence, all refugees shall enjoy exemp-
tion from legislative reciprocity in the territory of the Contracting States”. 
In this sense, after three years’ residence the refugee cannot be treated any
more as a national of a foreign state. Article 17(2) exempts from labour mar-
ket restrictions any refugee who “has completed three years’ residence in the
country” – next to refugees with family ties with the host state (see number
[544] above). It appears, then, that after three years’ residence the refugee
enters the final stage of the incremental system of Convention benefits. It
would be at variance with this structure underlying the Convention that the
refugee, who definitely settled down in the host state, still lacked the protec-
tion of Articles 28 and 32. Hence, it appears that after three years’ (simple)
residence refugees are entitled to the full scope of Convention benefits,
including those applying to recognised refugees only included.50
8.2.5 Conclusions
[569] The Articles 2 to 34 RC underlie a system of balancing the claims and
needs of refugees and the interests of the host state. This system makes use of
three variables. 
Firstly, the explicit qualifications of refugees. It appears that four main
categories can be distinguished: present, lawfully present, resident and lawful-
ly resident refugees. Together, these categories constitute an incremental sys-
tem; for example, resident refugees are also entitled to benefits conferred to
refugees tout court. A refugee is “lawfully” present for the purposes of the
Convention if his presence is in conformity with domestic alien’s law. Any title
for presence may do – a visa, a temporary working permit, or permission to
stay pending the outcome of asylum proceedings. A refugee is resident if he
outstayed the period of temporary sojourn – for practical purposes, after three
months. And a refugee is lawfully resident (lawfully staying) if he is lawfully
present and has stayed for over three months, or if he is authorised to stay for
more than three months. The terms “habitual residence” and “domicile” do not
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define lawfulness or length of sojourn, but rather serve to distinguish between
several states with which the refugee may have ties.
A second variable concerns the distinction between recognised and
unrecognised refugees. Articles 1C, 28, 32, 34 and 5 apply to recognised
refugees only; the remaining benefits apply to unrecognised refugees as well.
States have an obligation to perform status determination, but there is no strict
time limit for doing so – except that after three years’ residence, any refugee
is entitled to benefits applying to recognised refugees as well. 
The third variable concerns the qualifications of the various benefits,
which will be addressed where necessary in the discussion of the secondary
rights attached to the European protection statuses below (paragraphs 8.4-8.8). 
These results are summarised in the scheme below: 
Scheme 3 - The incremental system of Refugee Convention benefits
In bold: recognition required
In italics: application restricted to states of “habitual residence” or “domicile” 
8.3 International law on family unity
Asylum and family unity
[570] In this paragraph, I address international law on family unity of persons
in need of protection. No instrument of international law imposes obligations
on the Member States as regards maintenance or restoration of the family ties
of persons in need of protection in that particular capacity. The provision coming
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Qualification of benefit Õ No comparison Nationals Most favoured As favourable as Aliens 
Qualification of refugee      aliens  possible, or as generally
aliens generally
Simple presence 3, 5, 27, 30, 2, 4, 20, 13, 22(2)
31, 33, 34 22(1), 29     
Simple residence 25 12, 14,
16(2)-(3),
17(2)
Lawful presence 32 18 26
Lawful stay/residence 28(1) 23, 24 15, 17(1) 19, 21
Õ
closest to it is the appeal to the Contracting parties to the Refugee Convention
to ensure maintenance of family unity, made in the Final Act of the United
Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and
Stateless Persons.51 But this appeal is only a “recommendation”, thus not an
obligation, and hence needs to not be addressed here. 
Articles 17 and 23 CCPR as well as Article 8 ECHR address respect for
family life at large; that is, they apply to persons in need of international pro-
tection as well as to others. Implementation and application of these treaty
obligations is informed by the particular position of persons in need of inter-
national protection, and will therefore be discussed here (cf. number [18]). As
Articles 17 and 23 CCPR have only limited impact next to the well-established
obligations for the Member States under Article 8 ECHR, I will address the
former two provisions where they are particularly relevant, for claims to main-
tenance of family unity of applicants (see number [617]). In the present para-
graph, I address the implications of Article 8 ECHR as interpreted by the
European Court of Human Rights, as far as is relevant for rules of European
asylum law on family unity. 
The right to respect for family life
[571] Article 8 ECHR runs as follows: 
“1 Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
2 There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary
in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safe-
ty or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of dis-
order or crime, or for the protection of health”. 
State obligations concerning the family life of aliens arise in principle only if one
of the aliens has “lived” or “resided”52 or has achieved “settled status”53 in the state
concerned. The European Court of Human Rights has not defined in the abstract
when a status must be considered as “settled”, but it appears that the degree of per-
manence of residence is a material factor (see further number [582] below).54
Article 8 ECHR requires “respect” only for relationships that qualify as
“family life”. Family life encompasses first and foremost the relationships of
the “core family”- those between adult partners, and between parents and
minor children. As to partners, the relationship arising from a “lawful and 
genuine marriage” qualifies as family life, also if the spouses have not coha-
bited but “genuinely wished to cohabit and lead a normal family life”.55 Non-
marital relationships may also qualify as family life, certain conditions ful-
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filled; the relevant factors include “whether the couple live together, the length
of their relationship and whether they have demonstrated their commitment to
each other by having children together or by any other means”.56 As to the rela-
tionship between parents and children, from the moment of the child’s birth
“there exists between him and his parents a bond amounting to “family life”,
even if the parents are not then living together”, although subsequent events
may exceptionally break this bond.57
As far as migration law matters are concerned, the Contracting states’ obli-
gations as regards respect for ‘family life’ are “normally limited to the core
family”.58 Relationships with relatives other than partners or minor children
(such as the relationship between minors and their grandparents, or between
adult brothers and sisters) can qualify as family life only in case of “further
elements of dependency involving more than the normal emotional ties”.59
Positive and negative obligations
[572] Article 8 ECHR hence imposes a duty to “respect” the “family life” that
exists between an alien with, in principle, settled status and (roughly speaking)
his partner or child or, if he is a minor, his parent. This duty may involve two
kinds of obligations. First, the Contracting states have the negative obligation
to abstain from “arbitrary interference by the public authorities”.60 Thus,
expulsion of an alien leading to separation from his child residing in a con-
tracting state would be “interference” with the family life between the parent
and child, and be consistent with Article 8 ECHR only if the conditions set out
in Article 8(2) ECHR are met. Secondly, “there may in addition be positive
obligations inherent in an effective “respect” for family life” as meant in
Article 8(1) ECHR.61 These positive obligations may imply a duty to authorise
entry and residence of a family member of the alien onto the territory of the
Contracting state.62
The dividing line between (and hence the scope of) positive and negative
obligations under Article 8 ECHR is particularly unclear, and aliens law make
no exception. In Gül, the Court itself observed that “the boundaries between
the State’s positive and negative obligations under [Article 8] do not lend
themselves to precise definition.”63 A request for a residence permit by family
members who are present on the territory of a Contracting state may address
the positive obligation under Article 8 ECHR; a request for such a permit for
a family member who has not yet entered the contracting state may address the
negative one.64 So, we cannot equate the positive obligation under Article 8
ECHR with the obligation to admit an alien previously not authorised to
reside, and the negative obligation to allow further presence. Maybe the dis-
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tinction rather addresses the opposition between an obligation not to disrupt
existing family life and the obligation to facilitate (re-)establishing family
life.65 Moreover, the distinction between the positive and negative obligation
may in itself bear few legal consequences. The European Court of Human
Rights stated in Gül that the “principles” that apply to the positive and the
negative obligation are “similar”: 
“In both contexts regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be
struck between the competing interests of the individual and of the com-
munity as a whole; and in both contexts the state enjoys a certain margin
of appreciation”.66
Judge Martens observed in his dissenting opinion to this judgement that for
several purposes
“it makes no material difference whether a positive or a negative obligation
is at stake. The present doctrine notably implies that the distinction
between the two types of obligation has no bearing on either the burden of
proof or the standards for assessing whether a fair balance has been
struck”.67
Still, there is a noticeable difference in outcome in cases brought before the
Strasbourg Court addressing the positive and the negative obligations.
Whereas it has found a breach of the negative obligation in numerous cases, a
breach of the positive one has been accepted in only one case up till now.68 A
possible explanation for the Court’s relatively reserved approach in immigra-
tion matters could be the nature of the interests involved.69 We saw that a “fair
balance must always be struck” between the interests of the state and those of
the individual. One of the interests whereon a Contracting state may rely in
this context is its “economic well-being”, which includes regulation of the
labour market70- a matter where the state undoubtedly has a quite wide margin
of appreciation. In expulsion cases, states cannot invoke that well-being, and
their margin is correspondingly narrower. But another possible explanation for
the variance in the margin of appreciation in family reunification cases may
be the involvement, or not, of ‘core obligations’. According to Van Walsum,
where the core obligation under Article 8 ECHR to allow for the normal
development of family life between (in particular) parents and children is
involved, the European Court leaves the states a very small margin of appre-
ciation.71
The particular position of persons in need of protection
[573] However all this may be, for the present purpose it is sufficient to
observe that both in admission as well as in expulsion cases a “fair balance”
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must be struck between the interests of the alien and those of the state. And it
is in this context that the particular predicament of persons in need of protec-
tion has implications for application of Article 8 ECHR. 
First, in admission as well as in expulsion cases, an important question
appears to be whether family life could also be established in the alien’s coun-
try of origin (rather than in the Member State), or whether “major obstacles”
stand in the way.72 Obviously, the country of origin of a person in need of inter-
national protection cannot constitute an alternative for enjoying family life. In
the case of Sen, the Court concluded that 
“En ne laissant aux […] requérants que le choix d’abandonner la situation
qu’ils avaient acquise aux Pays-Bas ou de renoncer à la compagnie de leur
fille aînée, l’Etat défendeur a omis de ménager un juste équilibre entre les
intérêts des requérants, d’une part, et son propre intérêt à contrôler l’immi-
gration, de l’autre […]”.73
This holds true a fortiori in cases where a state refuses the entry of a family
member of, say, a refugee from the country where the refugee has a well-
founded fear of being persecuted. The European Court of Human Rights has
already made this clear in Gül.74 It does not follow that the right to respect for
their family life of persons in need of protection is absolute: reunification or
maintenance of family unity requested by a refugee may be denied for the rea-
sons set out in Article 8(2) ECHR, the prevention of disorder and crime and
so on. But we may assume that in cases of appeal to Article 8 ECHR where
persons in need of international protection are involved, states do not enjoy a
wide margin of appreciation. 
Second, in cases of first admission of children, the circumstance that the par-
ent “voluntarily” left the child in the country of origin occasionally figures as an
important factor.75 Obviously, this factor can, in principle, not be relied upon by
the Member Sates in cases where the parent left the child in the country where
he had a well-founded fear of persecution or ran a real risk of ill treatment.
[574] In summary, Article 8 ECHR may apply if the applicant “lives” or
“resides” or has “settled status” in a Member State. “Family life” includes
“genuine” marital as well as (certain conditions fulfilled) non-marital relation-
ships, and the relation between parents and minor children. Respect for fami-
ly life may warrant an obligation to abstain from expulsion of family members
or to authorise their entry. In both cases, a fair balance must be struck between
the state’s and the applicant’s interests. In general, important factors in this
balancing are the possibility of enjoying family life in the alien’s country of
origin, and, in cases of reunification of children with parents, the circumstance
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that the parents left the child voluntarily. Appeals to the obligation to admit
family members could in general only rarely be successful, due to the wide
margin of appreciation Member States enjoy in immigration matters. In con-
trast, neither of the two mentioned factors can be invoked by the state in cases
of persons in need of international protection who appeal to respect for their




[575] The relation between Directive “refugee status” and entitlement to
Refugee Convention benefits is quite straightforward. Qualification for
“refugee status” pursuant to Article 13 QD entails by definition “recognition
as a refugee”.76 As this status entitles the beneficiary to a residence permit of
three years,77 these refugees are “resident” and “lawfully staying” for the pur-
poses of the Refugee Convention.78 Hence, Directive refugees are entitled to
all Convention benefits. 
Most benefits to which refugee status gives entitlement are laid down in
Chapter VII QD and Articles 20 to 34 QD. The Family Reunification Directive
confers claims as to family reunification (see further under 8.4.4). The legal
basis for both sets of rules is Article 63(3)(a) TEC;79 the relevant provisions
must therefore be compatible with “international agreements” such as the
Refugee Convention and Article 8 ECHR (cf. number [128]). According to
Article 20(1) QD, “this Chapter shall be without prejudice to the rights laid
down in the Geneva Convention”. As its provisions set minimum standards,
they are by definition “without prejudice” to the Member States’ obligations
under international asylum law (see number [258]). We should read the state-
ment as a confirmation that interpretation and application of the relevant
Directive provisions should be “compatible” with the Refugee Convention. 
As to the personal scope of Chapter VII, all benefits (but one)80 laid down
in it apply to “beneficiaries of refugee status”, or some variant thereof,81 so
avoiding implications for unrecognised refugees.82
As observed under number [266], the Qualification Directive does not
define in general its territorial scope. Nor do Articles 20 – 34 QD explicitly
state such a limitation. But in several instances, it appears that limitation to the
territory of the Member States is presupposed.83 In particular, the Preamble
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defines as the main objective ensuring “that a minimum level of benefits is
available for these persons in all Member States” (emphasis added).84
Furthermore, a reading in conformity with the Refugee Convention implies
that the Member States may limit entitlement to the benefits laid down in
Chapter VII to persons within their territory, where relevant Convention pro-
visions contain a similar limitation. And the Directive seeks to establish
“approximation of rules on […] the content of refugee […] status”.85 Hence,
only where it can be established that the Member States did hitherto entitle
refugees abroad to benefits comparable to those laid down in the Directive,
may it be reasonably assumed that it applies to refugees outside the territory
of the Member States as well. 
8.4.2 Refugee Convention benefits
[576] Refugee status beneficiaries (persons to whom refugee status must be
granted according to Article 13 QD) are entitled to residence permits, which
are valid for “at least” three years, and “renewable”.86 The issue of a permit for
permanent residence (i.e. of undefined duration) is not required, but implicitly
assumed by Article 3(1) FRD, that addresses (inter alia) refugees as persons
who have “reasonable prospects of obtaining the right of permanent residence”. 
The grant of a residence permit to a refugee status beneficiary implies a
right to remain. For the permit renders the refugee “lawfully present”, and the
refugee status entails that he is recognised – the requirements for enjoying the
benefits of Article 32 RC, protection from expulsion (see number [562]).
Arguably, this right to remain is indirectly addressed by Article 21(1) QD that
states that 
“Member States shall respect the principle of non-refoulement in accor-
dance with their international obligations.”
Thus, refugee status beneficiaries are in principle entitled to a residence per-
mit, and hence in principle to the right to remain. In principle, for there are
two exceptions.
First, pursuant to Article 21(3) read in conjunction with (2) QD the permit
can be revoked or refused in case the grounds for making exception to the pro-
hibition of refoulement ex Article 33(2) RC apply.87 If the permit is withdrawn
for this reason, the refugee ceases to be lawfully present, and therefore the pro-
tection of Article 32 RC would cease to apply. 
Second, according to Article 24(1) QD the permit must be issued “unless
compelling reasons of national security or public order otherwise require
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[…]”. This phrase arguably refers to Article 32(1) RC, which states that law-
fully present recognised refugees may not be expelled, hence must be allowed
to remain, “save on grounds of national security or public order”.88 Hence, the
residence permit may also be refused on the grounds mentioned in Article
32(1) RC, which is in accordance with the Refugee Convention – cf. number
[561]. The refugee whom a residence permit is denied on this second ground
may be entitled under the Qualification Directive to a special set of secondary
rights – see below, paragraph 8.5.2.
[577] Other Refugee Convention benefits addressed by the Qualification
Directive are those concerning travel documents,89 employment,90 education,91
welfare,92 health care,93 accommodation94 and freedom of movement.95 Most of
the relevant Refugee Convention provisions do not state “absolute”, but “rela-
tive” rights: they entitle refugees to treatment as accorded to nationals of the
host state or some other group of reference. We may observe that where the
Refugee Convention provisions require treatment “not less favourable than
aliens generally”, their counterparts in the Qualification Directive require
treatment “as third country nationals legally resident,”96 and hence not the
(eventually) more favourable treatment as nationals of other Member States.
This reading of the mentioned Refugee Convention term seems correct, for
treatment “as aliens generally” as meant in the Refugee Convention does not
imply the most favourable treatment enjoyed by aliens on the basis of recipro-
city, or accorded to specific groups of aliens by domestic law.97 This follows
from a reading in conjunction with the term “the most favourable treatment
accorded to nationals of a foreign country in the same circumstances”, applied
in Article 17 RC, on employment (quoted under number [544]). 
Article 26 QD speaks of the right “to engage in employed or self-employed
activities subject to rules generally applicable to the profession and to the pub-
lic service”, and is the counterpart to Article 17 RC as well as to Articles 18
and 19 RC as far as self-employed activities are concerned. The phrase “rules
generally applicable” render the Convention expression “in the same circum-
stances”;98 the requirement of treatment “as most favoured aliens”, in fact as
nationals of other Member States, is hence not addressed. 
As to the substantial scope of Qualification Directive benefits, we may
observe that Articles 27 and 31 QD require “access to” education and accom-
modation instead of the indeterminate “treatment as regards to” these issues,
as required by Articles 22 and 21 RC. According to Preamble recital (31) QD, 
“This Directive does not apply to financial benefits from the Member
States which are granted to promote education and training.”
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The latter benefits, though clearly within the scope of Article 22 RC, are hence
outside the scope of Article 27 QD. 
[578] A number of Refugee Convention benefits are not addressed in the
Qualification Directive, such as the provisions on non-discrimination, free-
dom of religion, juridical status, administrative assistance and fiscal charges.99
Maybe the subsidiarity principle precluded “guidance” on their “application”;
maybe such guidance was felt to be unnecessary as general principles of
Community law offer comparable protection (see, however, number [593]). 
A few Qualification Directive benefits have no counterparts in the Refugee
Convention: those on information on the status, on access to integration facili-
ties and on assistance to repatriation.100 Further, the Qualification Directive
requires that when implementing Chapter VII QD, the Member States “take
into account the specific situation” of inter alia (unaccompanied) minors,
women and persons who suffered torture or rape.101 This obligation is further
elaborated in Article 29(3) QD, stipulating that “adequate health care” be pro-
vided to refugee status beneficiaries with special needs, and in Article 30 QD,
addressing unaccompanied minors in particular. Member States must provide
such minors with a guardian, place them with “adult relatives”, foster families
or in “suitable accommodation”, and endeavour to trace their family.102
8.4.3 Family unity
Introduction
[579] Two sets of rules address residence and secondary rights of family mem-
bers of refugees. The Qualification Directive addresses the maintenance of the
family unity of the Directive refugee, and establishes a dependant status for
family members of the refugee status beneficiary. The Family Reunification
Directive addresses admission of family members of refugees. 
It appears from the Preambles to the respective Directives that these arrange-
ments serve (at least partially) different purposes. The primary aim of the Family
Reunification Directive is securing respect for Article 8 ECHR.103 The
Qualification Directive does not make mention of Article 8 ECHR, or of respect
for family life. Its Preamble to the Qualification Directive speaks of “the right to
asylum of applicants and their accompanying family members”, and states that
“Family members, merely due to their relation to the refugee, will normal-
ly be vulnerable to acts of persecution in such a manner that could be the
basis for refugee status”.104
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Thus, the Qualification Directive addresses family members of refugees as
persons in need of protection, which is remarkable as the Qualification
Directive addresses family members who do not qualify for refugee status
themselves.105 As we will see, this approach is reflected in the conditions on
entitlement to secondary rights for family members. 
Below, I will first describe both arrangements, and then assess their
“compatibility” with Article 8 ECHR, and with each other. 
The Qualification Directive
[580] Pursuant to Article 23(2) QD, family members of Directive refugee sta-
tus beneficiaries “are entitled to claim the benefits referred to in Articles 24
to 34” QD.106 Thus, family members are entitled to almost the same set of
benefits as refugees, including inter alia the right to a residence permit.107 In
fact, the provision establishes a dependant status for relatives of refugees.
To which relatives of the refugee must this status be granted? To begin
with, the relative must qualify as “family member” of the refugee. The scope
of “family members” is restricted by Article 2(h) QD to members of the “core
family”: the refugee’s spouse and his (unmarried) minor children108 and, if
domestic aliens law treats “unmarried couples” in a way comparable to mar-
ried ones, the refugee’s “partner in a stable relationship”.109 It is further
required that “the family already existed in the country of origin”.110 Thus,
only family ties predating the refugee’s entry to the European Union count.
Finally, the family members must be “present in the same Member State in
relation to the application for international protection”.111 Thus, spouses, part-
ners or children who arrive after the status has been granted do not qualify as
“family members” for the purposes of the Qualification Directive. But it is not
required that they arrived together with the Directive refugee. If they arrive
before the issue of the status, they would therefore be family members for the
purposes of the Qualification Directive. 112
The Qualification Directive also mentions three grounds of exclusion from
the dependant status. First, the family member has no claim to the status if he
“is or would be excluded from refugee status […] pursuant to Chapter III
[…]”,113 that is, if Article 1F RC does or would apply.114 Second, Member
States “may” refuse, reduce or withdraw benefits “for reasons of national
security or public order” – that is, when refugees may be expelled according
to Article 32(1) RC (see above, number [576]).115 Hence, the grounds of exclu-
sion from the dependant status are tailored to the grounds for exclusion from
refugee status and the right to a residence permit of the refugee status benefi-
ciary.116 Third, the obligation to grant the dependant status applies only “as far
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as it is compatible with the personal legal status of the family member”.117
Arguably, such incompatibility occurs if the family member already enjoys a
more favourable status.118
Finally, the Qualification Directive states that the family members should
not “individually qualify” for refugee status.119 Arguably, this is not a condi-
tion, but rather a procedural rule: it imposes an order of application. If a fam-
ily member of a refugee status beneficiary applies for refugee status, Member
States cannot qualify him as family member and then dismiss the claim as
inadmissible because he has “equivalent protection” to refugee status.120
Further procedures on the grant or withdrawal of these secondary rights to the
family member are left to domestic law.121
The Qualification Directive does not address cessation of the dependant
status. Obviously, the dependant status ceases if the refugee status of the fami-
ly member ceases. Arguably, the same holds true when the refugee dies or
moves to another state – then, the dependant status holders are no longer
“present in the same Member State” and hence no longer family members for
the purposes of Article 2(h) QD. The same reasoning applies when the minor
child of a refugee becomes of age (cf. number [588]).
[581] Hence, Member States must grant the dependant status to members of
the core family of the refugee if that family already existed in the country of
origin, if they are present in relation to his application for refugee status and
if the grounds meant in Article 1F and 33(2) RC do not apply. They “may”122
extend the group of beneficiaries to “other close relatives who were together
as part of the family” with the refugee in the country of origin, and who were
“wholly or mainly dependant” on the refugee status beneficiary.123 The depen-
dant status entitles the family member (or dependant relative) to almost the
same benefits as the Directive refugee. 
The Qualification Directive contains yet another obligation on “main-
taining family unity” next to the obligation to grant the dependant status.
Article 23(1) QD requires that “Member States shall ensure that family unity
can be maintained”.124 What could be the meaning of this “benefit”125 next to
the obligation discussed above? There is one important benefit that the
refugee’s “family members” cannot claim: Article 21 QD, the protection from
refoulement.126 We saw above that for refugee status beneficiaries, this provi-
sion functions as an implicit claim to a right to remain (see above number
[576]). Arguably, Article 23(1) QD requires that persons who qualify for the
dependant status are not separated from the refugee status beneficiary by
expulsion (but they could be expelled if one of the grounds meant in Articles
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32(1) or 33(2) RC applies – for then, they are no longer entitled to the depen-
dant status). 
The Family Reunification Directive
[582] The Family Reunification Directive addresses “conditions for the exer-
cise of the right to family reunification by third country nationals residing
lawfully in the territory of the Member States”.127 “Family reunification” is
defined as 
“the entry into and residence in a Member State by family members of a
third country national residing lawfully in that Member State in order to
preserve the family unit, whether the family relationship arose before or
after the resident’s entry”.128
Those family members may have “whatever status”,129 i.e., they may have no
title for residence at all. Thus, in the terms of the relevant Strasbourg case-law
on Article 8 ECHR, the Directive addresses “admission”, and might concern
both the negative as well as the positive obligation under Article 8 ECHR (cf.
number [572]).
Most provisions of the Family Reunification Directive (Articles 1-8 and 13
–18 FRD) address requests for family reunification by any alien, refugees
included (below referred to as the “general rules”). According to Preamble
recital (8) FRD,
“Special attention should be paid to the situation of refugees on account of
the reasons which obliged them to flee their country and prevent them from
leading a normal family life there. More favourable conditions should there-
fore be laid down for the exercise of their right to family reunification”. 
Accordingly, Articles 9 to 12 FRD address “Family reunification of refugees”
in particular. 
[583] The alien lawfully residing in a Member State (the “sponsor”) must have
a residence permit valid for one year or more, and have a view to a permanent
residence status.130 Refugees are explicitly included in the personal scope of
the Family Reunification Directive.131 The instrument defines refugees as per-
sons enjoying refugee status within the meaning of the Refugee Convention.132
The scope of “recognised refugees” is therefore broader than the scope of per-
sons enjoying refugee status pursuant to the Qualification Directive: it applies
to Qualification Directive refugee status beneficiaries, but also to persons who
are “recognised” as Convention refugees on other grounds than those men-
tioned in the Qualification Directive.
The Member States must (other conditions fulfilled) reunite the sponsor
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with his spouse and the minor children of the sponsor and spouse.133 Entry of
adopted children of the sponsor or the spouse must be authorised only when
the sponsor or spouse has custody and the child is dependant upon him or her;
the same conditions apply to other children of the spouse.134 The age of major-
ity relevant for these provisions is set by national legislation.135 As to refugees,
the Directive states in addition the obligation to reunite unaccompanied minor
refugees under eighteen with “first degree relatives in ascending line”, his 
parents.136
The Member States “may”137 authorise entry and residence of a slightly
broader scope of relatives of refugees. If the recognised refugee is a minor,
reunification may take place with his legal guardian “or any other member of
the family”.138 If the refugee is an adult, Member States may reunite him or her
with an unmarried partner, if they have a “duly attested long-term relation-
ship” or a “registered partnership”.139 Further, reunification with an adult
refugee may take place with the parents of the refugee or his or her spouse or
unmarried partner, if those parents are dependent on them, as well as with
adult children of the refugee or of his or her spouse or unmarried partner, if
those children “are objectively unable to provide for their own needs on
account of their state of health”.140
[584] The Member States “may reject” applications for family reunification
with family members relatives who present a threat to public order, national
security or public health. 141 We may observe that the latter ground does not 
figure as a ground for refusal of a residence permit under Article 23 read in
conjunction with 24 QD (see paragraph 6.4). Member States may withdraw or
refuse to renew the family member’s residence permit on the same grounds,
but then Member States must consider 
“the severity or type of offence against public policy or public security
committed by the family member, or the dangers that are emanating from
such a person”.142
Both in case of rejection of a first application as well in cases of withdrawal
or refusal of renewal, Member States must
“take due account of the nature and solidity of the person’s family relation-
ships and the duration of his residence in the Member State and of the exis-
tence of family, cultural and social ties with his/her country of origin”.143
Further, if the request for family reunification is lodged within three months
of the granting of refuge status, Member States cannot require that the
refugee has sufficient accommodation, insurance and regular resources, but
after three months they can.144 “Without prejudice to international obliga-
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tions”, these requirements may moreover be applied when reunification is
possible in a third country.145 Indeed, if the refugee has no fear of being per-
secuted in or of indirect refoulement from that third country, there are no
“major obstacles” due to his particular predicament that block family life
there. 
[585] The Family Reunification Directive also addresses secondary rights of
family members. Family members who qualify for reunification under the
Family Reunification Directive are entitled to a residence permit valid for at
least one year, and renewable; after five years, the family member is entitled
to an autonomous residence permit.146 They are further entitled “in the same
way as the sponsor” to access to education and vocational training, and to
(self)employment.147 But domestic law may restrict access to (self-)employ-
ment for any category of family members for one year, and for certain cate-
gories also thereafter. 148
Finally, the Directive addresses procedural issues. Member States may
reject an application, withdraw a residence permit or refuse to renew it in case
of fraud, end of the relationship (before the family member is entitled to
autonomous status) and change of circumstances.149 It is left to domestic law
whether the request should be submitted by the sponsor or by the family mem-
ber.150 In principle, the application must be submitted and examined when the
family members are still outside the territory of the Member State.151 Any
application must be accompanied by documentary evidence of the family rela-
tionship, but in cases of refugees, “other evidence […] of the existence of such
a relationship” must be taken into account, “to be assessed in accordance with
national law”.152 Eventually, interviews may be carried out.153
A decision must be taken within nine months of application; this time limit
may be extended only in “exceptional circumstances”.154 Decisions must be in
writing, and state the reasons for rejection.155 Negative decisions should be
open to a “legal challenge”.156
Assessment
[586] When comparing this arrangement with relevant obligations under
Article 8 ECHR, we may observe that the Family Reunification Directive
recognises the right to family reunification with spouses and with minor chil-
dren arising from that relationship, as required by Article 8 ECHR. The 
condition that minor children from an earlier marriage of the spouse are
dependant upon that spouse does not run counter to Article 8 ECHR; the pos-
sibility of such children staying with the ex-partner of the spouse is a materi-
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al consideration for the European Court of Human Rights.157 We saw that
Article 8 ECHR does not, “in principle”, require reunification with other rela-
tives than those belonging to the core family, but that a situation of dependency
might imply otherwise (see number [571]). In the absence of more specific
guidelines, it is not surprising that the Directive only states that reunification
“may” take place in a number of such situations. We may finally observe that
the Family Reunification Directive does not codify the case law on non-mari-
tal relationships that qualify as family life under Article 8 ECHR, but leaves
the matter to the Member States. The Qualification Directive secures obser-
vance of Article 8 ECHR for a smaller scope of family members than the
Family Reunification Directive, which raises the question of how the two
instruments relate (see number [589] below).
[587] The circumstances that warrant special conditions for family reunifica-
tion of refugees are the impossibility of leading a normal family life in their
country of origin. This circumstance is relevant also for the balancing of the
interest in family life to the legitimate interests of the state, referred to in
Article 8(2) ECHR, such as public order. Although this circumstance is not
mentioned in either Article 6 or Article 17 FRD, it should arguably be taken
into account when balancing interests in case of refusal or withdrawal. The
same holds true for application of the competence to exclude family members
from Qualification Directive benefits (Article 23(3) and (4) QD, see number
[580] above).
The same consideration applies to refusal of family reunification in case
the recognised refugee can not afford sufficient reception conditions (Article
12(1) FRD). Although the time span that lapsed between the issue of the resi-
dence permit to the sponsor and the request for family reunification is a mate-
rial factor for the application of Article 8 ECHR, the limit of three months set
in Article 12(1) FRD seems unduly strict.158 This holds true especially when it
comes to the possibility of the refugee obtaining the requisite means of sub-
sistence and suitable accommodation. Finally, we may observe that that
Member States may confine the special standards for refugees set out in
Articles 10, 11 and 12 FRD to relationships that predate their entry.159 But the
circumstances that warrant special treatment of request for family reunifica-
tion with refugees could equally apply to later relationships. In summary, the
Family Reunification Directive fails to fully grasp the content and extent of
the way that factors relevant for application of Article 8 ECHR are informed
by the refugee’s particular circumstances. 
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[588] When comparing the arrangements on family unity for refugees laid
down in the Qualification and the Family Reunification Directive, the scope
of the latter appears to be wider than that of the former in several respects. To
begin with, the Family Reunification Directive addresses next to the mainte-
nance of family ties (i.e. rules on withdrawal or refusal of renewal of residence
permits of family members), first and foremost obligations on the admission
of family members. Secondly, the Family Reunification Directive imposes
obligations on the family unity of any recognised Convention refugee, the
Qualification Directive addresses only Directive refugees. Thirdly, for the pur-
poses of the Family Reunification Directive more relationships qualify as
“family life” than under the Qualification Directive. Fourthly, the Family
Reunification Directive states some procedural guarantees, which matter is
left unregulated by the Qualification Directive. Fifthly, the Family
Reunification Directive entitles family members to an autonomous residence
permit after five years’ residence. 
The Qualification Directive offers more protection in two respects: it entitles
the family member to more secondary rights, and the grounds for refusal and
withdrawal are stricter. 
[589] The differences noted above beg the question of whether or when family
members of refugees can invoke the instruments. To begin with, could family
members within the scope of the Family Reunification Directive invoke bene-
fits of the Qualification Directive? They are not entitled to the dependant sta-
tus established by Article 23(2) QD, as they cannot qualify as a “family mem-
ber” for the purposes of the Qualification Directive: they are not present in the
Member State “in relation to the application for international protection” (cf.
number [580] above). But arguably, they could invoke Article 23(1) QD, that
requires that “Member States shall ensure that family unity can be maintained”.
As the term “family” is not defined in the Qualification Directive, the provi-
sion can apply also to relatives who do not qualify as “family members” pur-
suant to Article 2(h) QD.
In which circumstances could Article 23(1) QD be relevant? We may
observe that children born in wedlock and adopted children from a previous
relationship of the refugee or his spouse are “family members” for the purpo-
ses of the family Reunification Directive,160 but not for those of the
Qualification Directive.161 Thus, also if such children accompanied the refugee
when he lodged his application (were “present in relation to the application”),
they are not entitled to the dependant status. Article 23(2) Qualification
Directive hence allows for their expulsion. But the same Member State would
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have the obligation to (re)admit them upon request for family reunification.
Arguably, Article 23(1) QD prohibits expulsion in such cases (cf. number
[581]).162
Further, we saw above that the application for reunification must be sub-
mitted and examined when the family members are still outside the territory
of the Member State, but “in appropriate circumstances” Member States may
deal with requests concerning family members already present.163 Arguably,
Article 23(1) QD requires that in case the request for family reunification is
lodged while the family member is already present in the refugee’s host state,
it should make use of the competence. 
8.4.4 Concluding remarks
[590] Refugee status beneficiaries are entitled to all benefits laid down in
Articles 2 to 34 RC. The Qualification Directive addresses a number of those
benefits, and prescribes implementation in a way that seems compatible with
the Refugee Convention. One Qualification Directive provision however sug-
gests application running counter to the Refugee Convention. According to
Article 20(6), 
“Within the limits set out by the Geneva Convention, Member States may
reduce the benefits of this Chapter, granted to a refugee whose refugee sta-
tus has been obtained on the basis of activities engaged in for the sole or
main purpose of creating the necessary conditions for being recognised as
a refugee”. 
But “reduction” of benefits on the mentioned ground cannot take place “with-
in the limits set out by” the Refugee Convention.164 Once a refugee sur place
(cf. number [335]) has been recognised and is lawfully staying, he is entitled
to all Refugee Convention benefits. Reduction of benefits pursuant to this pro-
vision is therefore not compatible with the Refugee Convention. But apart
from Article 20(6) QD, Chapter VII QD faithfully implements the Refugee
Convention provisions on secondary rights, and adds a few obligations on
treatment of refugee status beneficiaries.
[591] The predicament of refugees informs application of the right to respect
for their family life ex Article 8 ECHR, as fear of persecution constitutes an
obstacle to leading a normal family life in their country of origin, and risk of
indirect refoulement constitutes an obstacle to leading a family life in a third
country (par. 8.3). The Family Reunification Directive therefore contains
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“more favourable conditions” for family reunification by refugees (number
[582]). In particular, it states that Member States should not require that the
refugee has sufficient accommodation, sickness insurance and sufficient
income (number [584]). But Member States are not required to apply this
lenient standard to applications for reunification that are lodged more than
three months after the refugee status was granted, or if the family ties date
from after his entry into the host state. However, in both situations the
refugee’s fear of being persecuted is an obstacle to leading a family life in the
country of origin (or in an unsafe third country), that warrants application of
“more favourable conditions”. 
We further noted some differences in personal scope and content between
the arrangements on family life in the Qualification and in the Family
Reunification Directive (see number [588]). A legal or policy justification for
these divergences is hard to imagine. The definition of family members in the
Qualification Directive owes its present scope to the suggestion of some
Member States to “align [it] with the one in the Draft [Receptions Standards
Directive]”165 which eventually happened,166 but apparently without taking any
notice of the scope of family members with whom refugees should be reunited
according to the (earlier adopted) Family Reunification Directive. 
8.5 Alternative refugee statuses
In the previous paragraph, I discussed the benefits to which “refugee status
beneficiaries” are entitled. It concerned persons to whom according to
Article 13 QD “refugee status” must be granted. Next to these “refugee sta-
tus beneficiaries”, we can distinguish yet two other categories of refugees in
European asylum law: Convention refugees who are, under the Qualification
Directive, not entitled to the same benefits as “refugee status beneficiaries”,
but to separate sets of secondary rights. I will discuss these two other “sta-
tuses” below. 
8.5.1 Article 14(6) QD refugee status
[592] We have already encountered the first of these two categories in para-
graph 5.6.2, where it was labelled the “Article 14(6) QD status”. We saw that
a person who fulfils the requirements of Article 1 RC as interpreted by the
Qualification Directive (“who qualifies as a refugee in accordance with
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Chapters III and IV”) is entitled to “refugee status”, pursuant to Article 13 QD.
There is one exception: the “refugee status” meant in Article 13 QD may be
revoked or refused to a person to whom Article 14(4) QD applies, that is, to
whom the exceptions to the prohibition of refoulement ex Article 33(2) RC
apply.167 This person is therefore not a “refugee status beneficiary” as meant in
Article 13 QD, but he is a “refugee” for the purpose of the Refugee
Convention. If it has been established that he qualifies as refugee, he is, more-
over, a “recognised refugee” for the purposes of the Refugee Convention.168
As Article 33(2) RC applies, this person can be expelled in accordance
with the Refugee Convention. But the other prohibitions of refoulement may
block expulsion. Then, the Convention refugee is present on the territory of
the Member State, hence entitled (under international law) to all Refugee
Convention provisions that apply to unrecognised refugees tout court169 or,
after three months presence, to resident refugees tout court.170 But this
Convention refugee is not a Directive “refugee status beneficiary” (as meant
in Article 13 QD); therefore, he cannot claim the benefits set out in Chapter
VII which apply to Directive refugees – see number [575]). 
[593] Apparently in order to secure that this category of Convention refugees
is treated in accordance with the Refugee Convention, Article 14(6) QD esta-
blishes a “status” for them, that is, stipulates that these Convention refugees
are indeed entitled to certain Refugee Convention benefits, namely to 
“rights set out in or similar to those set out in Articles 3, 4, 16, 22, 31 and
32 and 33 RC”. 
Bearing in mind that Directive refugee status does not address all Convention
benefits explicitly, it is not surprising that Article 14(6) QD does not mention
all the relevant Convention benefits (cf. number [569]). We may observe that
Articles 3 and 4 RC, on non-discrimination and religion, are not addressed in
Chapter VII QD. In this respect, the legal position of refugees meant in Article
14(6) QD is therefore, surprisingly, stronger than that of Directive refugee sta-
tus beneficiaries. Further, Article 14(6) QD mentions Article 32 RC as well, a
provision that applies only to recognised lawfully present refugees (Article
[562]). The Qualification Directive does not imply that the concerned refugees
are “lawfully present” (although it does not prohibit Member States from
granting a permit to them). Arguably, this reference should be read as a con-
firmation that the requirements of Article 32(2) RC apply to the withdrawal of
the refugee status of these refugees, where appropriate.171 Article 33 RC has
little practical meaning for refugees who may be expelled pursuant to Article
33(2) RC.172 In practice, then, the right to access to education (Article 22 RC)
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and the restrictions on penalties for illegal entry and on detention set out in
Article 31 RC, seem most meaningful. 
Finally, we should address the question of whether this category of
refugees could rely on the prohibition of refoulement laid down in Article
21(1) QD (see number [576]). The provision forms part of Chapter VII, hea-
ded “Content of international protection”; the latter term refers to “refugee
(and subsidiary) protection”, that is (as far as is relevant here), “recognition as
a refugee”.173 It would follow that the unrecognised refugees addressed by
Article 14(6) QD fall out of the scope of the Chapter, and hence of Article 21
QD. But Article 21(2) QD implies that unrecognised refugees do fall within its
scope, where it states that “[w]here not prohibited by the international obliga-
tions mentioned in paragraph 1, Member States may refoule a refugee,
whether formally recognised or not […; emphasis added, HB].” Protection of
the refugees addressed by Article 14(6) QD from refoulement would further
serve the purpose of the Qualification Directive to “ensure that a minimum
level of benefits is available for [persons genuinely in need of international
protection.”174 Arguably, Article 21(1) QD therefore applies to the Convention
refugees meant in Article 14(6) QD. 
8.5.2 Article 24(1) QD refugee status
[594] The second category of Convention refugees who are not entitled to all
benefits discussed in paragraph 8.4.2, but who are entitled to certain benefits
under the Qualification Directive, is the product of the grounds for refusal of a
residence permit stated in Article 24(1) QD. We saw above (number [576]) that
Article 24(1) entitles Directive refugees (“refugee status beneficiaries” as meant
in Article 13 QD) to a residence permit. We further saw that there are two excep-
tions, or grounds for refusal of the permit. First, pursuant to Article 21(3) read
in conjunction with 2 QD, the permit may be refused to Directive refugees to
whom Article 33(2) RC applies. If these grounds apply, the Directive refugee
status could be revoked or refused as well, and the Convention refugee is enti-
tled to the Article 14(6) QD refugee status, discussed in the previous paragraph.
The second grounds for refusal of the permit are stated in Article 24(1) QD,
and concern “compelling reasons of national security or public order”. These
grounds refer to the grounds for expulsion stated in Article 32(1) RC (see
number [576]). Arguably, the scope of these “compelling grounds” is wider
than the scope of Article 33(2) RC, which applies when there are “reasonable
grounds to consider [the refugee] as a danger to the security of the country in
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which he is” and when a refugee “having been convicted by a final judgement
of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that
country”. The grounds for expulsion meant in Article 33(2) RC are hence
instances of the grounds mentioned in Article 32 RC, which encompasses yet
other cases.175 It appears that the Qualification Directive legislator holds the
same view, as Article 24(1) QD states that those compelling reasons apply
“without prejudice to Article 21(3)”. 176
[595] Hence, there is a category of refugees whose residence permit may be
revoked for a “compelling reason”, but who are not a danger to the security or
community of the host state (as meant in Article 33(2) RC) – here referred to
as “Article 24(1) QD refugees”. These refugees are still refugee status benefi-
ciaries: they are entitled to Directive “refugee status” pursuant to Article 13
QD, as the grounds of refusal ex Article 33(2) RC (Article 14(4) QD) do not
apply. As unlawfully present Convention refugees, they could be expelled to a
third country, but expulsion to their country of origin is prohibited by Article
33 RC (as they do not pose a “danger” as meant in Article 33(2) RC). It would
appear that if they are not expelled, they would be entitled to the same
Qualification Directive benefits as refugees who are in possession of a resi-
dence permit. For the relevant Directive provisions apply to “refugee status
beneficiaries” (cf. number [575]). According to the Preamble, the prior issue
of the permit may be required with regard to access to employment, social
welfare, health care and access to integration facilities.177 But if the prior issue
of the permit were to function as a condition for entitlement to Qualification
Directive benefits, it should have been laid down in the provisions of the
instrument, not in a Preamble consideration.178
Hence, refugees to whom a residence permit may be refused for “com-
pelling reasons of national security or public order”, are entitled to the bene-
fits laid down in Articles 24 to 34 QD. Their status differs from the ‘ordinary’
Directive refugee status as discussed in paragraph 8.4.2 in the following
respects. To begin with, we observed that Article 24(1) QD refugees can be
expelled to a safe third country (number [576]). Further, as they do not pos-
sess a residence permit, they have no claims to family reunification pursuant
to the Family Reunification Directive: only “lawfully residing” third country
nationals do (cf. number [583]). Finally, the benefits of Article 23 QD (depen-
dant status for the Directive refugee’s family members who are present in the
host Member State) may be refused “for reasons of national security or public
order”. Arguably, this exclusion ground is worded sufficiently broadly to apply
not only in case the family member threatens the national security or public
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order, but also if the refugee does. Hence, the refugee status beneficiaries to
whom no residence permit is issued for the “compelling reasons” meant in
Article 24 QD, are entitled to yet another set of benefits, and hence in fact con-
stitute another CEAS protection status. 
8.6 Subsidiary protection status
Subsidiary protection and refugee protection
[596] According to Article 2(e) QD, subsidiary protection status beneficiaries
do not, by definition, qualify as refugees, and hence fall out of the scope of
the Refugee Convention (cf. numbers [275] and [354]). The Qualification
Directive does not state a clear alternative standard for the secondary rights of
subsidiary protection beneficiaries laid down in Chapter VII. The status
should be “appropriate” and the secondary rights should ensure availability of
“a minimum level of benefits”, and cater for “approximation of rules”,179
which suggests that they are inspired by state practice. But in fact, the secon-
dary rights of subsidiary protection status beneficiaries appear to be mostly
inspired by those of refugee status beneficiaries, and hence partially by the
Refugee Convention. 
Indeed in general, Chapter VII provisions “shall apply both to refugees and
persons eligible for subsidiary protection unless otherwise indicated”.180
Without distinction apply Articles 21(1) (on non-refoulement), 22 (on infor-
mation), 27 (on access to education), 30 (on unaccompanied minors), 31 (on
access to accommodation), 32 (on freedom of movement within the Member
State) and 34 (on repatriation). The remaining provisions of Chapter VII
define a lower level of benefits for subsidiary protection status beneficiaries. 
[597] Why would a lower standard for subsidiary protection beneficiaries be
“appropriate”? For some benefits, an explanation may be that the Community
legislator holds that the need for subsidiary protection is less durable than the
need for refugee protection. Article 24(2) QD states that subsidiary protection
status beneficiaries are entitled to (renewable) residence permits with a vali-
dity of only one year (not three years as for refugees), “unless compelling rea-
sons of national security or public order otherwise require”.181 And where
Member States must provide integration programmes for refugees, subsidiary
protection status beneficiaries must be granted access to those programs only
“where it is considered appropriate by Member States.”182
Does it indeed follow from the criteria for qualification that the need for
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subsidiary protection is inherently less durable than the need for refugee pro-
tection? Arguably, there is no reason for holding so where protection from
death penalty or ill-treatment (Article 15(a) and (b) QD) is concerned. Maybe
the idea that subsidiary protection is less durable than refugee protection is
prompted by the type of serious harm meant in Article 15(c) QD – threat to
life or person due to indiscriminate violence in case of (civil) war. This type
of harm addresses situations that are, to a fair extent, similar to situations
where temporary protection would be offered (cf. number [306]). We should
observe that the predecessor of Article 15(c) QD also turns up in the explana-
tion in the Comments on Articles of why travel documents must be issued to
subsidiary protection status beneficiaries only if they are unable to obtain a
national passport from their consular authorities183 (a condition that does not
apply to refugees): 
“Beneficiaries of subsidiary protection may be in a position to apply for
and to receive a travel document from the consular authorities of their
country of origin or ordinary residence (e.g. when these authorities are able
to continue their work even if in the country they represent there is a situ-
ation of widespread generalised and indiscriminate violence arising from
armed conflict) [emphasis added, HB]”.184
Consequently, proper functioning of consular authorities is connected to the
situation of indiscriminate violence arising from armed conflict, i.e. Article
15(c).185
Arguably, for some other provisions the reason for introduction of a lower
standard for subsidiary protection benefits has to do with (societal) costs.
Thus, whereas refugees are entitled to “the necessary social assistance as pro-
vided to nationals”, 
“Member States may limit social assistance granted to beneficiaries of sub-
sidiary protection status to core benefits which will then be provided at the
same levels and under the same eligibility conditions as nationals”.186
Likewise, health care may be limited to “core benefits”.187 Conditions on
access to employment related education for subsidiary protection status bene-
ficiaries are “to be decided by the Member States”.188 As to access to employ-
ment, Article 26(3) QD states that
“Member States shall authorise beneficiaries of subsidiary protection sta-
tus to engage in employed or self-employed activities subject to rules gene-
rally applicable to the profession and to the public service immediately
after the subsidiary protection status has been granted. The situation of the
labour market in the Member States may be taken into account, including
for possible prioritisation of access to employment for a limited period of
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time to be determined in accordance with national law. Member States
shall ensure that the beneficiary of subsidiary protection status has access
to a post for which the beneficiary has received an offer in accordance with
national rules on prioritisation in the labour market”.
The first clause is identical to Article 26(1) QD, on access to employment for
refugees. But it appears from the second clause that other groups may be
granted priority over subsidiary protection beneficiaries. 
Family unity
[598] Societal costs may also explain why the Qualification Directive has less
favourable rules for family members of subsidiary protection, than for those
of refugee status beneficiaries. The definition of family members of sub-
sidiary protection status beneficiaries and the grounds for termination of
entitlement to benefits of such a family member are the same as apply to
refugee status.189 Like family members of refugee status beneficiaries, those of
subsidiary protection status beneficiaries are entitled to claim the benefits of
Articles 24 to 34 QD.190 But Member States “may define the conditions appli-
cable to such benefits”; “[i]n these cases, Member States shall ensure that any
benefits provided guarantee an adequate standard of living”.191 So after all, the
“claim” to the benefits attached to the dependant status of family members of
subsidiary protection beneficiaries may be subject to any requirement that the
Member States think fit - as long as the standard of living remains “ade-
quate”.192
Subsidiary protection beneficiaries are explicitly excluded from the
scope of the Family Reunification Directive.193 The rationale behind this dif-
ference in treatment of refugees and subsidiary protection beneficiaries is, it
seems, that refugees are considered to “have reasonable prospects of obtai-
ning the right of permanent residence”, and subsidiary protection benefici-
aries have not.194 It appears from the case-law of the European Court of
Human Right on Article 8 ECHR that possession of a temporal rather than a
permanent residence permit is a material, though not a decisive, factor when
considering a request for family reunification.195 Hence, subsidiary protec-
tion beneficiaries may certainly be entitled to family reunification pursuant
to Article 8 ECHR. European asylum law leaves the matter entirely to
domestic legislation. 
Concluding remarks
[599] The Qualification Directive bestows upon subsidiary protection benefi-
ciaries a number of secondary rights that seem inspired by the Refugee
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Convention. The level of benefits is lower than of those attached to Directive
refugee status, presumably in order to limit societal costs of reception and
because subsidiary protection is conceived of as inherently less durable than
refugee protection. Arguably, the latter contention may be true only as to sub-
sidiary protection from indiscriminate violence as meant in Article 15(c) QD.
The difference in treatment is particularly conspicuous where it comes to fam-
ily members. The “conditions” for entitlement to secondary rights of family
members of subsidiary protection beneficiaries are not defined. The Family
Reunification Directive does not secure a right to family reunification of such
beneficiaries. In summary, the “content” of subsidiary protection status is far
from equivalent to that of Directive refugee status. 
8.7 Applicant status
[600] The discussion of secondary rights of applicants involves several instru-
ments. Benefits for applicants are laid down mainly in the Reception
Standards Directive, and a few in the Procedures Directive; further the alloca-
tion criteria laid down in the Dublin Regulation may function in claims for
preservation of family unity. 
The personal scope of “applicants for asylum” was discussed under num-
ber [262]. The status ends when a final decision on the application has been
taken which is no longer subject to appeal. The Reception Standards Directive
benefits apply to applicants only “as long as they are allowed to remain on the
territory as asylum seekers”.196 Pursuant to Article 6(1) PD, applicants are
allowed to remain during examination at first instance (hence not when the
safe third neighbouring country exception applies, see number [405]), unless
they are extradited (see number [393]). The Procedures Directive leaves the
right to remain during appeal proceedings and after a decision not to re-open
a case after (implicit) withdrawal, to domestic legislation (see numbers [425]
and [402]). It appears that if the applicant is allowed to remain pursuant to
domestic law (or to a decision by the appeal authority), he remains (or is
again) entitled to Reception Standards Directive benefits. 
8.7.1 Entitlement to Refugee Convention benefits
[601] Are applicants entitled to Refugee Convention benefits? Applicant sta-
tus applies to persons who requested protection from a Member State under
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the Refugee Convention,197 hence to persons who state that they are
Convention refugees. If it turns out that the application is well-founded, the
Directive refugee status must be granted to him (Article 13 QD, see number
[274]). The alien becomes a recognised refugee for the purposes of the
Refugee Convention by the grant of this status. We saw above that many
Refugee Convention provisions apply not only to recognised, but also to
unrecognised refugees. Hence, before the grant of the Directive refugee status,
although still being an applicant, the alien was already entitled to the benefits
laid down in those provisions. In order to comply with its obligations under the
Refugee Convention, the Member State should therefore have treated this
alien when he was an applicant as a (unrecognised) refugee. As the Member
States do not know beforehand which applicants will turn out to be refugees
and which won’t, they must treat all applicants in accordance with relevant
Refugee Convention standards. In other words, applicants are entitled to
Refugee Convention benefits that apply to refugees tout court.
Certain conditions fulfilled, applicants can also claim Refugee Convention
benefits that apply to unrecognised lawfully present, lawfully staying and
residing refugees. We saw above (number [548]) that a refugee is “lawfully
present” for the purposes of the Refugee Convention when his presence is
“authorised”, that is, when he received a title for presence in accordance with
the law. If the refugee enters on a valid visa or some other title for presence in
accordance with the Member State’s domestic law, he is “lawfully present” for
the purposes of the refugee Convention. 
Often however, applicants do not possess such a title. Does European asy-
lum law provide such applicants with a claim that their presence is “autho-
rised”? The fact that an applicant is allowed to stay during asylum proceedings
does not render his presence lawful. According to Article 6(1) of the
Procedures Directive (cf. number [392]), applicants are “allowed to remain in
the Member State, for the sole purpose of the procedure” until a decision at
first instance is taken, but “[t]his right to remain shall not constitute a resi-
dence permit”. The provision serves to secure that applicants are treated in
accordance with (inter alia) Article 33 RC, that applies to refugees who are
not lawfully present. Hence, observance of this prohibition of refoulement
does not, in itself, imply that the refugee’s presence is “authorised”, or “law-
ful” for the purposes of the Refugee Convention. 
Arguably however, it follows from Article 6(1) of the Reception Standards
Directive that a certain category of applicants is lawfully present. The provi-
sion requires that “within three days after an application is lodged with the
competent authority”, applicants receive a document “certifying his or her sta-
494 Chapter 8
tus as an asylum seeker or testifying that he or she is allowed to stay in the ter-
ritory of the Member State”. The right to obtain this document is subject to
three exceptions, that apply when applications are examined in “a procedure
to decide on the right of the applicant legally to enter the territory of a Member
State”, applications examined at the border and applicants in detention.198
Thus, the document is denied to applicants who are not lawfully present.
Arguably, the issue of the document that testifies that the applicant’s stay is
allowed, amounts to “regularisation”. Hence, applicants who possess this
document are “lawfully present” for the purposes of the Refugee Convention,
and entitled to the Convention benefits that apply to unrecognised “lawfully
present” refugees. After three months of lawful presence, they are also entitled
to benefits that apply to unrecognised “lawfully staying” refugees. All appli-
cants (lawfully present or not) can after three months presence claim the
Convention benefits for “residing” refugees. 
[602] It therefore follows from a reading in accordance with international law
that applicants are entitled to certain Refugee Convention benefits. Does
European asylum law acknowledge this entitlement?
The Treaty on European Community at least allows for, and arguably even
suggests that the conclusion that the Refugee Convention applies to appli-
cants, thus acknowledges the refugee status of applicants. As “reception con-
ditions of asylum seekers” are mentioned under 63(1) TEC, they are an aspect
of “asylum” and must be “in accordance with” the Refugee Convention and
other relevant treaties. It should be noted that the reception conditions could
also have been placed under Article 63(2) TEC, in which case accordance with
the Refugee Convention would not have been explicitly required. 
Secondary European asylum law is ambiguous on the matter. On the one
hand, Preamble recital (14) of the Qualification Directive states clearly that
“[t]he recognition of refugee status is a declaratory act”. It follows from
Article 21(2) read in conjunction with (1) QD that the exceptions to the pro-
hibition of refoulement of Article 33(2) RC apply to “a refugee, whether for-
mally recognised or not”. The provision presupposes that the prohibition of
refoulement itself (Article 33(1) RC) applies to unrecognised refugees. Article
14 QD also expresses a declaratory understanding of refugee status determi-
nation. Pursuant to Article 14(5), persons who qualify for Directive refugee
status pursuant to Article 13 QD (i.e. persons who fulfil the refugee defini-
tion) may be denied the status (that is, “recognition as a refugee”). But accor-
ding to Article 14(6) QD, these “persons” or unrecognised refugees are 
entitled to certain Refugee Convention benefits.199 Likewise, the Procedures
495Secondary rights
Directive in several instances explicitly states that the protection from refoule-
ment ex Article 33 RC applies to applicants200 - quite in conformity with
Article 21 QD. All this implies a declaratory understanding of recognition of
refugee status, which entails that applicants are entitled to relevant Refugee
Convention benefits. 
But on the other hand, the Reception Standards Directive contains no allu-
sions or references to the same extent. In particular, no reference to the Refugee
Convention is made in this instrument. The Preamble states that the Directive 
“respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in
particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In
particular, this Directive seeks to ensure full respect for human dignity and
to promote the application of Articles 1 and 18 of the said Charter.”201
But the “right to asylum” addresses the right to “international protection”, not
necessarily entitlement to Convention benefits (number [149] above). 
Thus, whereas European asylum law acknowledges the declaratory nature
of recognition of refugee status and in particular explicitly acknowledges the
applicability of the prohibition of refoulement to all unrecognised refugees,
applicants included, it does not explicitly acknowledge that applicants for asy-
lum are entitled to other Refugee Convention benefits as well. In itself, this
does not affect the conformity with the Refugee Convention. What matters is
the level of protection that the instruments require. 
8.7.2 Reception standards
8.7.2.1 (Un)lawful presence, illegal entry and the freedom of 
movement
Under the Refugee Convention as well as under the Reception Standards
Directive the issues of “lawful presence”, illegal entry and leave to enter,
detention and freedom of movement are closely connected. They are therefore
addressed together. I will first discuss relevant international law and then the
relevant provisions of European asylum law on these matters. 
International law 
[603] Article 31 RC (quoted under number [546]) addresses two forms of
restrictions on the freedom of movement, which apply to two different cate-
gories of “unlawfully present” refugees. First, refugees who came “directly”
from a country where they feared persecution, and who did, further, report
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“without delay” to the authorities and can show “good cause” for their illegal
entry. These refugees may not be penalised (for example, by detention) for
their illegal entry or presence (Article 31(1) RC), but their freedom of move-
ment may be restricted if “necessary” (Article 31(2) RC). Second, it follows
from Article 31(1) RC that the Contracting states may impose penalties, such
as detention, for illegal entry on refugees who do not fulfil one of the above-
mentioned requirements (unlawfully present refugees who did not come
directly from a persecution state, or refugees who do come from such a state,
but did not report themselves or could not show good cause for their illegal
entry). Goodwin-Gill argues that a reading in conformity with relevant inter-
national law implies that detention should not be arbitrary; a reading of the
provision to object and purpose and in the light of relevant international law
would imply, that detention should be “reasonable” and “proportional” to cer-
tain aims.202 An ExCom Conclusion from 1986 contends that 
“in view of the hardship which it involves, detention should normally be
avoided. If necessary, detention may be resorted to only on grounds pre-
scribed by law to verify identity; to determine the elements on which the
claim to refugee status or asylum is based; to deal with cases where
refugees or asylum-seekers have destroyed their travel and/or identity
documents or have used fraudulent documents in order to mislead the
authorities of the State in which they intend to claim asylum; or to protect
national security or public order.”203
It seems that this view is confirmed by some domestic case law.204
Once the refugee’s presence is “regularised”, no restrictions on the freedom
of movement are allowed. For according to Article 26 RC, “lawfully present”
refugees enjoy freedom of movement, subject to the regulations that apply to
aliens generally.205
[604] Further conditions on detention of applicants follow from international
human rights law. Article 5(1)(f) ECHR allows for detention only (as far as
relevant for the present purposes) 
“if the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an
unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is
being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.” 
The European Court of Human Rights has observed that deprivation of liber-
ty in the context of asylum procedures is in accordance with Article 5 ECHR
only under certain conditions: it “should not be prolonged excessively”, and
“must not deprive the asylum-seeker of the right to gain effective access to the
procedure for determining refugee status”.206
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European law
[605] According to Article 7(3) RSD,
“When it proves necessary, for example for legal reasons or reasons of pub-
lic order, Member States may confine an applicant to a particular place in
accordance with their national law.”
This “confinement” can amount to detention, according to the definition of
“detention” by the same Directive as 
“confinement of an asylum seeker by a Member State within a particular
place, where the applicant is deprived of his or her freedom of movement.”
Thus, “confinement” pursuant to Article 7(3) RSD may fall within the scope
of Article 5 ECHR.207
How does this confinement or detention compare to the Refugee
Convention? In general, a refugee must “conform to [the] laws and regulations
[of his host state] as well as to measures taken for the maintenance of public
order”.208 But Article 7(3) RSD presupposes national law that applies specifi-
cally to applicants. Pursuant to Article 26 RC, unrecognised “lawfully present”
refugees (including lawfully present applicants) enjoy freedom of movement,
subject only to regulations “generally applicable in the same circumstances”.
Arguably, confinement that specifically applies to applicants would be at vari-
ance with this provision. Hence, it follows from a reading of Article 7 RSD in
accordance with the Refugee Convention that lawfully present applicants may
not be subjected to this confinement. 
As far as the “legal reasons” in Article 7(3) RSD concern illegal entry,
the confinement must comply with Article 31 RC – it must be reasonable
and proportionate to the aims pursued (see number [603]). Another restric-
tion on national law allowing for such confinement follows from Article 17
PD:
“Member States shall not hold a person in detention for the sole reason that
he/she is an applicant for asylum”,
which would indeed amount to “arbitrary detention”, prohibited by 5 ECHR.
[606] Article 7 RSD also addresses some less drastic restrictions on the free-
dom of movement:
1. Asylum seekers may move freely within the territory of the host
Member State or within an area assigned to them by that Member State.
The assigned area shall not affect the unalienable sphere of private life
and shall allow sufficient scope for guaranteeing access to all benefits
under this Directive. 
2. Member States may decide on the residence of the asylum seeker for
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reasons of public interest, public order or, when necessary, for the swift
processing and effective monitoring of his or her application.” 
The provision addresses “asylum seekers” in general, and hence includes both
lawfully and unlawfully present refugees. It follows from Article 26 RC (see
the previous number) that Member States may restrict the freedom of move-
ment of “lawfully present” applicants to “an area assigned to them”, or decide
on their place of residence only if their regulations generally do so. 
The Refugee Convention does not resist application of these restrictions on
the freedom of movement of unlawfully present refugees. But application to
refugees who came directly from a persecution state (and presented themselves
without delay to the authorities of the host state, and showed a good cause for
their illegal entry) is allowed only if “necessary” the (Article 31(2) RC).
According to Article 7(5) RSD, 
“Member States shall provide for the possibility of granting applicants
temporary permission to leave the place of residence mentioned in para-
graphs 2 and 4 and/or the assigned area mentioned in paragraph 1.”
Does the provision secure that the decision on residence ex Article 7(2) does
not constitute “deprivation of liberty”? In Amuur, the Court indicated that both
the length of confinement and the degree of restriction of the freedom of
movement were relevant factors for deciding thereupon.209 Article 7(5) RSD
does not state when or how often permission to leave “the place of residence”
must be granted. Arguably, whether “confinement” as meant in Article 7(3)
RSD amounts to “deprivation of liberty” for the purposes of Article 5 ECHR
cannot therefore be stated in the abstract, but only on the basis of implemen-
tation. 
8.7.2.2 Other reception standards
Material reception conditions
[607] The Reception Standards Directive draws a distinction between ‘resi-
dence conditions’ at large, i.e. “the full set of measures that Member States
grant to asylum seekers in accordance with this Directive”210 and the sub-cate-
gory of “material reception conditions”.
Material reception conditions are “the reception conditions that include
housing, food and clothing, provided in kind, or as financial allowances or in
vouchers, and a daily expenses allowance.”211 These material reception condi-
tions must be “available to applicants when they make their application for
asylum.”212 Provision of the material reception conditions may be made “sub-
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ject to actual residence by the applicants in a specific place, to be determined
by the Member States”.213
Material reception conditions must meet a material standard. They must
“ensure a standard of living adequate for the health of applicants and capable
of ensuring their subsistence”.214 Member States may choose to provide them 
“in kind, or in the form of financial allowances or vouchers or in a combi-
nation of these provisions. Where Member States provide material recep-
tion conditions in the form of financial allowances or vouchers, the amount
thereof shall be determined in accordance with the principles set out in this
Article”215
- that is, be capable of ensuring the applicants’ subsistence. 
One of the material conditions, housing, is addressed in more detail. If it is
provided in kind,
“it should take one or a combination of the following forms: 
(a) premises used for the purpose of housing applicants during the exami-
nation of an application for asylum lodged at the border; 
(b) accommodation centres which guarantee an adequate standard of living; 
(c) private houses, flats, hotels or other premises adapted for housing appli-
cants.”
When making such provision of housing in kind, the applicants’ family life
must be protected; in particular, minors should be placed with relatives.216
Transfer to other housing should occur only “when necessary”.217
Accommodation personnel must be adequately trained and be bound by “the
confidentiality principle as defined in the national law”.218 But exceptionally,
Member States may “for a reasonable period which shall be as short as possi-
ble” set other modalities for housing that “shall cover in any case basic
needs”.219
Do these material reception conditions fall within the scope of Refugee
Convention benefits? They address subject matter covered by Articles 21 and
23 RC, on housing and public relief. These Refugee Convention provisions
apply only to “lawfully staying” refugees – applicants could hence claim their
benefits only after three months’ presence. Further, Articles 21, 23 and 24 RC
do not impose the obligation to provide refugees with housing or assistance or
health care; rather, they require that lawfully staying refugees have access to
those benefits on equal footing with nationals or aliens generally.
For the most part, hence, the material reception conditions fall outside the
scope of these Refugee Convention benefits; conversely, the Reception
Standards Directive does not, in general, address these benefits. Only appli-
cants who are lawfully staying for over three months could claim that the
500 Chapter 8
Directive be applied in accordance with the Refugee Convention. For practi-
cal purposes, they could claim that the assistance that is provided to them is
on an equal footing with public welfare afforded to nationals, and access to
housing under the same conditions as apply to aliens generally.220
Non-material reception conditions
[608] As to the non-material reception conditions, “documentation” and “free-
dom of movement” (Articles 6 and 7 RSD) were discussed above (paragraph
8.7.1 and 8.7.2.1). The Reception Standards Directive addresses some other
conditions, which concern subject matter covered by the Refugee Convention.
Article 10(1) RSD provides that minor (children of) asylum seekers have
“access to the education system under similar conditions as nationals”
(emphasis added); this education may moreover be offered at “accommoda-
tion centres”. In both respects, the provision suggests a lower standard than
Article 22(1) RC, which requires “the same treatment as nationals” (emphasis
added) for refugees in terms of primary education.221 According to Article
10(2) RSD,
“Access to the education system shall not be postponed for more than three
months from the date the application for asylum was lodged by the minor or
the minor’s parents. This period may be extended to one year where specific
education is provided in order to facilitate access to the education system.”
Does the first clause of this provision entail that minors can be excluded from
any education for three months?222 A reading in conjunction with Article 10(1)
and the second clause of Article 10(2) RSD and in accordance with the
Refugee Convention rather implies that Member States may provide for a
three months’ period of “specific education” in order to facilitate access to the
regular system. 
[609] On employment, Article 11 states:
“1.Member States shall determine a period of time, starting from the date
on which an application for asylum was lodged, during which an appli-
cant shall not have access to the labour market. 
2. If a decision at first instance has not been taken within one year of the
presentation of an application for asylum and this delay cannot be
attributed to the applicant, Member States shall decide the conditions
for granting access to the labour market for the applicant.”
Thus, only after one year, must some access to the labour market be granted.
But according to Article 17(1) RC, after three months lawful presence,
refugees are entitled to engage in wage earning employment. Article 11(1)
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RSD should be implemented accordingly.223 Article 11(4) RSD allows the
Member States to cede priority to nationals of other Member States or EEA-
states. Doing so would run counter to Article 17(1) RC, requiring the “most
favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country in the same
circumstances” (cf. number [577]). According to Article 18 RC, any lawfully
present refugee is entitled to self-employment on an equal footing with aliens
generally. 
The Reception Standards Directive further requires the Member States to
provide for health care, including “at least emergency care and essential treat-
ment of illness”, as well as “necessary medical or other assistance to appli-
cants who have special needs”, such as victims of “torture, rape or other seri-
ous acts of violence”.224
As to persons with special needs, such as (unaccompanied) minors and vic-
tims of torture, their “specific situation” must be taken into account when
implementing the Directive.225 The “best interests of the child shall be a pri-
mary consideration”.226 The rules on treatment of unaccompanied minor appli-
cants are almost identical to those applying to unaccompanied minor refugee
or subsidiary protection status beneficiaries.227
8.7.2.3 Reduction of benefits and procedures
[610] In order to “restrict” the “possibility of abuse of the reception system”,228
a Member State “may” reduce or withdraw “reception conditions” (apparent-
ly, both material and non-material ones) for applicants in a limited number of
cases.229 They may do so inter alia when the applicant abandons the place of
residence without permission, when the applicant does not comply with his
reporting duties, in case of a subsequent application or when the application
was not made as soon as possible.230 Hathaway observes that the Refugee
Convention does not provide for a justification for denying Refugee
Convention rights on these grounds.231
The grounds for reduction or withdrawal of benefits are also grounds for a
negative decision on an application for asylum,232 which would, as far as
entitlement to reception conditions is concerned, amount to the same thing. In
case of a negative decision, an applicant need no longer be allowed to remain
on the territory, and therefore entitlement to benefits in the Reception
Standards Directive would end.233
The Reception Standards Directive contains a few rules on procedures con-
cerning the grant and withdrawal of applicant status benefits. The decision
502 Chapter 8
that the applicant is entitled to the material reception conditions only if he
resides at some particular place must be taken “individually”;234 decisions on
temporary permission to leave assigned “areas” or “places of residence” must
be taken “individually, impartially and objectively”.235 The same standard
applies to decisions on reduction and withdrawal of Reception Standards
Directive benefits.236 This standard is the same that applies to decisions on
applications for asylum (or subsidiary protection).237 As to the authorities
involved in supplying the secondary rights, persons working in accommoda-
tion centres and those working with unaccompanied minors “shall be ade-
quately trained and shall be bound by the confidentiality principle as defined
in the national law in relation to any information they obtain in the course of
their work”.238
Negative decisions on the grant of an applicant‘s secondary rights must, at
least in last instance, be open to “appeal or review before a judicial body”.
Further rules on these procedures are to be laid down in national law.
As to applicants held in detention, Article 17(2) PD provides that “Member
States shall ensure that there is the possibility of speedy judicial review.” The
provision serves to secure accordance with Article 5(4) ECHR, which requires
that
“[e]veryone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be
entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall
be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is
not lawful”. 
The European Court of Human Rights has elaborated on the requirements that
apply to this review.239
8.7.3 Family unity
[611] Family members of applicants are entitled to Reception Standards
Directive benefits on the same footing as applicants “if they are covered by
such application for asylum according to the national law”.240 The Reception
Standards Directive hence leaves it to the discretion of the Member States to
establish a dependant applicant status or not. 
The Directive contains no obligation for the Member States to secure that
applicants are not separated from their family members.241 But the criteria on
determining responsibility concerning family unity in the Dublin Regulation
do to a certain extent secure maintenance of family unity, and may even serve
to bring about family reunification for applicants. 
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The Dublin criteria that are relevant for family unity are laid down in Articles
6 to 8, 14 and 15 DR. As we saw in chapter 7.2.1, the criteria apply in the order
in which they appear in the regulation. The rules apply only if the family ties
existed already in the country of origin.242
When the applicant is an unaccompanied minor, the responsibility falls
upon the Member State where the father, mother or guardian is “legally pre-
sent”.243 The term “legally present” (or “legal”) is not defined in the
Regulation; I assume it concerns any status, including applicant status. When
the applicant is an adult,244 the responsibility lies  with the Member State
where the spouse or unmarried partner, or a minor child is recognised as a
refugee.245 If these grounds are not applicable, the Member State where the
spouse, unmarried partner or minor child has lodged an application on which
no first decision has yet been taken is responsible.246 These provisions thus
function as grounds for family reunification. 
If these criteria do not apply, application of Articles 9 to 13 DR (responsi-
bility because of involvement in the alien’s entry into the European Union, see
number [481]) could lead to separation of spouses, unmarried partners or their
minor children who entered the European Union (practically) at the same
time.247 Article 14 DR however ensures that in such a case, one Member State
is responsible. This provision secures maintenance of family unity if family
members arrive together, but several Member States would be responsible (for
instance, because the applicants possess visas issued by different Member
States), and it provides for family reunification if such family members
arrived in different Member States. 
[616] Most interesting, finally, is Article 15 of the Dublin Regulation. Any
Member State is competent, regardless of responsibility pursuant to the
Regulation, to reunite “family members” (spouse and minor children) as well
as “other dependent relatives, on humanitarian grounds based in particular on
family or cultural considerations”. The provision is of interest in two kinds of
situation. First, if relatives qualify as “family members” in the sense of the
Dublin Regulation, but the above-mentioned criteria do not apply to them.
This is the case if pursuant to the Dublin criteria one Member State is respon-
sible for an applicant, whose family member has been granted subsidiary pro-
tection status by another Member State. Second, if “relatives” do not qualify
as “family members” (and accordingly, the mentioned criteria do not apply).
The term “relatives” is not defined in the Dublin Regulation.
The Dublin Regulation recommends application of the competence ex
Article 15 DR in two instances. First, Member States “shall if possible”
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reunite minor unaccompanied asylum seekers with relatives in another
Member State, when the relatives can take care of them.248 Secondly, when the
dependence is due to “pregnancy or a new-born child, serious illness, severe
handicap or old age”, the Member States “shall normally bring together” the
asylum seeker and the relative.249 This provision applies both when the asylum
seeker is dependent upon the relative, as well as when the relative is dependent
upon the applicant.250 But for reasons to be discussed under number [653],
Article 15 DR does not provide aliens with a claim to maintenance of family
unity or family reunification.
[617] Could applicants successfully invoke rules of international law on fami-
ly unity? We saw that for application of Article 8 ECHR, “settled status” in the
host state is required; there is no reason to assume “applicant status” would
qualify as a “settled status”.251
It appears however that the right to family life ex Article 17(1) (“[n]o one
shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his […] family
[…]”) read in conjunction with Article 23 CCPR (“[t]he family is the natural
and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society
and the State”), as read by the Human Rights Committee, is more lenient in
this respect. In Bakhtiyari,252 the Committee addressed the imminent expulsion
of spouse and children of Mr. Bakhtiyari, whose application was still being
examined and who could not be expelled during that examination. The
Committee observed that 
“[t]aking into account the specific circumstances of the case, the
Committee takes the view that removing Mrs Bakhtiyari and her children
without awaiting the final determination of Mr Bakhtiyari’s proceedings
would constitute arbitrary interference in the family of the authors, in vio-
lation of articles [17(1) and 23(1) CCPR]”.253
Hence, Article 17 read in conjunction with 23 CCPR does not require that
“settled status” was acquired. When considering whether the decision on
expulsion of the applicant’s family members would amount to “arbitrary inter-
ference” with the mentioned provisions, the Committee took into account fac-
tors that also figure in the context of decisions under Article 8 ECHR, in par-
ticular the absence of proper justification for the interference by the state.254
The Committee’s views offer, as far as I know, no grounds for stating that the
same reasoning applies to reunification of applicants with family members. 
Article 17 read in conjunction with 23 CCPR might be especially rele-
vant especially in cases where the Dublin allocation rules do not resist sepa-
ration of family members. For example, where family members could be
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separated from a spouse or parent (or minor) whose application has been
rejected at first instance, and this decision is subject to appeal that has sus-
pensive effect – the type of case under scrutiny in Bakhtiyari. In such a case,
the concerned Member State would be competent to assume responsibility
on the basis of Article 3(2) or 15 DR. Arguably, it would have to make use
of this competence in order to comply with Article 17 read in conjunction
with 23 CCPR 
8.7.4 Concluding remarks
[618] According to the Preamble to the Reception Standards Directive, its pro-
visions should, first, “normally suffice to ensure [applicants] a dignified stan-
dard of living”, and second, ensure that they enjoy “comparable living condi-
tions in all Member States.”255 The “dignified standard of living” addresses the
“right to human dignity” laid down in Article 1 of the Charter, for which pro-
vision the Directive seeks to ensure “full respect”.256 Handoll however doubts
whether the standards laid down in the Reception Standards Directive will
indeed “normally suffice” to secure this dignity.257
“Comparable living conditions”, that is the “harmonisation of conditions
for the reception of asylum seekers” are desirable in order to “limit the secon-
dary movements of asylum seekers influenced by the variety of conditions for
their reception”.258 But in several respects, the Directive hardly provides “com-
mon minimum conditions”.259 Thus, the personal scope of application of the
Directive may diverge considerably among Member States: in some Member
States, applicants for subsidiary protection are not entitled to the Directive’s
benefits, and each Member State may decide for itself whether the instrument
applies to family members of the applicant (cf. numbers [263] and [611]).
Further, certain conditions for enjoying a number of secondary rights, such as
access to the labour market, are left to the Member States.260 The choice left to
the Member States between providing material reception conditions in kind, or
in the form of financial allowances or of vouchers (number [607]) allows for
more disharmony.
[619] Are the CEAS rules on secondary rights for applicants in accordance with
relevant international law? As to the Refugee Convention, we saw that Article
63 TEC and secondary Community asylum law reflect in several instances the
declaratory understanding of refugee status determination (par. 8.7.1).
Applicants who are formally allowed to stay during asylum procedures are
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entitled to the Refugee Convention benefits for lawfully present (and after
three months, lawfully staying) refugees. 
The Reception Standards Directive however does not, in general terms,
confirm this view. The Directive’s provisions on treatment of applicants
address the subject matter of a number of Refugee Convention benefits, but
the rules on secondary rights of applicant status beneficiaries do not fully
secure treatment up to the standards set by international asylum law. A num-
ber of Refugee Convention benefits are not addressed. The rules on the free-
dom of movement of applicants in the Procedures and Reception Standards
Directive require that applicants are detained only if necessary, and not for the
sole reason that they are applicants. In this, they secure accordance with
Articles 31 RC and 5 ECHR. The rules on “confinement” and detention do not
make provision for the entitlement of “lawfully present” refugees to freedom
of movement pursuant to Article 26 RC (cf. par. 8.7.2.1). The standards on
access to education are, read in context, arguably up to the standards set by
Article 22 RC (cf. number [618]). Article 11 RSD, finally, allows for restric-
tions on the access to the labour market that are at odds with the Refugee
Convention (number [609]). 
Hence, the standards of treatment prescribed by Reception Standards
Directive provisions deviates in certain respects quite substantially from their
counterparts in the Refugee Convention. The Refugee Convention may have
served as a source of inspiration for the range of secondary rights of appli-
cants, but it did not leave a strong imprint on the content of those entitlements. 
The Dublin Regulation criteria for allocation serve as a means of securing
the family unity of applicants, but not for each and every case. Arguably,
applicants cannot successfully invoke protection of family unity under Article
8 ECHR. On the other hand, expulsion of an alien, whose application was
turned down which resulted in the separation of his family members whose
applications were still being examined might be arbitrary interference with his
family life, prohibited by Articles 17 and 23 CCPR.
8.8 Temporary protection
8.8.1 Temporary protection and Convention refugee status
[620] We saw above that in order to comply with their obligations under the
Refugee Convention, Member States must treat applicants as (unrecognised)
refugees (number [601]). On the same grounds, aliens to whom temporary
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protection status is granted upon an application for asylum (for refugee status)
should be treated as unrecognised refugees.261 Therefore, from the moment
refugees apply for asylum or temporary protection, all benefits that address
unrecognised refugees tout court apply. Temporary protection beneficiaries
must be provided with “residence permits for the entire duration of the protec-
tion”, that is, (at least) one year,262 which confirm the lawfulness of their pre-
sence. Upon issue of this permit, the beneficiary is “lawfully staying” for the
purposes of the Refugee Convention.
Thus, the Refugee Convention entitles temporary protection beneficiaries
to all benefits applying to unrecognised lawfully staying refugees. European
asylum law however is decidedly ambiguous on this entitlement. As discussed
in Chapter 3.3.4, pursuant to Article 63(2)(a) TEC temporary protection
applies to “displaced persons and refugees”. Thus, the provision explicitly
states that temporary protection beneficiaries do fall within the scope of the
Refugee Convention. But unlike Article 63(1) TEC, it does not explicitly
require that standards on these refugees be “in accordance with” the Refugee
Convention. 
The temporary Protection Directive expresses the declaratory reading of
refugee status where it states that temporary protection applies to persons who
“may fall within the scope of Article 1A” RC,263 that is to unrecognised
refugees. Likewise, by defining “refugees” as “third country nationals or
stateless persons within the meaning of Article 1A of the Geneva
Convention”264 the Temporary Protection Directive embraces the declaratory
reading of the term “refugee”. But then it defines “displaced persons” as third
country nationals who (inter alia) “may fall within the scope of Article 1A of
the Geneva Convention”.265 So apparently, we must distinguish between per-
sons who may fall within, and those who are within the scope of Article 1A
RC – which reflects the distinction between the constitutivist and the declara-
tory understanding of the recognition of refugee status (cf. number [554]). The
Preamble further states that “temporary protection should be compatible with
the Member States’ obligations as regards refugees”.266 Does it mean to say
that temporary protection beneficiaries are entitled to relevant Convention
benefits? Maybe to a very limited extent only, for it continues: 
“[i]n particular, [temporary protection] must not prejudge the recognition
of refugee status pursuant to the [Refugee Convention]”.267
Even more in particular, Article 3(2) TPD states that 
“Member States shall apply temporary protection with due respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms and their obligations regarding
non-refoulement”. 
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So, the Directive does not explicitly require that temporary protection is
applied with “due respect” for the Refugee Convention. In other words, it does
not state expressis verbis that temporary protection status entails entitlement
to relevant Refugee Convention benefits. 
As observed, the conformity of temporary protection with the Refugee
Convention as regards applicants is not affected by the absence of such
acknowledgement. Rather, the level of protection secured by the Temporary
Protection Directive matters.
8.8.2 Temporary protection status benefits
[621] Temporary protection status is of limited duration: the status applies for
one year, unless the Council decides to end it earlier, and may be extended to
two or, exceptionally, three years.268 Its beneficiaries must be provided with
“residence permits for the entire duration” of the temporary protection.269
Treatment of the beneficiaries must “not be less favourable” than the treat-
ment set out in the Temporary Protection Directive.270 Temporary protection
beneficiaries are excluded from the scope of the Residence Standards
Directive.271
Most Temporary Protection Directive provisions on secondary rights
address subject matter covered by the Refugee Convention. Protection from
refoulement is not stipulated, but implied by the requirement to “apply tempo-
rary protection with due respect for […] obligations regarding non-refoule-
ment” in general,272 and to issue “residence permits for the entire duration of
temporary protection” in particular.273 Minor temporary protection beneficiaries
are to have “access to the education system under the same conditions as
nationals” - a standard almost identical to the one applying to refugee status
beneficiaries and up to the standard set by Article 22(1) RC.274 Further,
Member States “may allow” adults access to the education system;275 treatment
on the same conditions as apply to aliens generally, stipulated by Article 22(2)
RC, is hence not required. 
Member States must authorise temporary protection beneficiaries to
engage in employed and self-employed activities, “subject to rules applicable
to the profession”.276 The right of lawfully staying refugees to (self-)employ-
ment (Articles 17-18 RC) is hence recognised in much the same terms as is
applicable to refugee status beneficiaries.277 But priority over temporary pro-
tection beneficiaries may be given to EU or EEA nationals or legally resident
third country nationals as to access to the labour market, which does not apply
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to refugee status beneficiaries.278 Ceding priority to such non-nationals would
not constitute “most favoured treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign
country”, required by Article 17 RC. 
As to housing, “access to suitable accommodation or, if necessary, the
means to obtain housing” must be secured.279 This obligation arguably
exceeds the one set by Article 21 RC (that, with regard to housing, merely
requires treatment as aliens generally). Welfare and medical care must be pro-
vided at a level defined as “necessary”,280 not, as Articles 23 RC does, as for
“nationals”. 
The Temporary Protection Directive, finally, contains a number of provi-
sions not explicitly covered by the Refugee Convention: the right to the issue
of a permit, and to information on the status.281 Persons with special needs
must be provided “necessary medical or other assistance”.282 The Directive
contains an arrangement on guardianship over, and housing for, unaccompa-
nied minor temporary protection beneficiaries quite like those applying to
unaccompanied minor refugee and applicant status beneficiaries.283
8.8.3 Family unity
[622] Temporary protection beneficiaries cannot rely on the Family
Reunification Directive,284 but the Temporary Protection Directive itself sets
rules for reunification of relatives of temporary protection beneficiaries, both
out- and inside the European Union.285 Member States must allow for reunifi-
cation with unmarried minor children and with spouses or unmarried partners
“in a stable relationship”, where the aliens legislation or practice of the con-
cerned Member State treats unmarried partners comparably to married cou-
ples.286 Further, reunification “may” take place with “other close relatives”, if
they were dependent upon the temporary protection beneficiary when the
events leading to the mass influx arose. Member States then must take into
account “the extreme hardship which” those other close relatives “would face
if the reunification did not take place.”287
The Directive sets three more conditions on claims for family reunifica-
tion. In order to qualify as a “family member” it is required that, first, the
family ties existed already in the country of origin, and, second, that these ties
were disrupted due to circumstances surrounding the mass influx.288 Third, the
relatives must either be temporary beneficiaries themselves (if already present
in the European Union) or they must be “in need of protection” (if still outside
the EU).289
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[623] Could temporary protection beneficiaries rely on Article 8 ECHR for
the purpose of family reunification? In Gül, the European Court of Human
Rights suggested that the temporary rather than permanent right of abode in
the host country was a relevant, though not decisive factor for considering that
refusal of family reunion was not in breach of Article 8 ECHR.290 In case of
temporary protection beneficiaries, the violence in the country of origin pro-
vides for major obstacles to leading a normal family life there. Bearing in
mind that temporary protection may last up to three years, and that during this
period the alien might qualify for a more durable right to remain, we may
assume that temporary protection beneficiaries could successfully invoke the
right to family life. 
Assuming so, we should address the question of how far the Temporary
Protection Directive secures the right to family reunification ex Article 8
ECHR of temporary protection beneficiaries. The limitation of the obligation
to reunite family members to members of the core family is not at variance
with Article 8 ECHR, as we saw above. But the requirement that the circum-
stances surrounding the mass influx caused the separation of family members,
and moreover that the relative is in need of protection may, under certain cir-
cumstances, be unduly strict. In family reunification cases, a most relevant
issue is whether or not “major obstacles” stand in the way of leading a normal
family life in the country of origin, and the alien’s need for (temporary) pro-
tection entails that his country of origin does not pose an alternative place for
leading family life (see number [573]). This, however, is not different in the
case that the family member is not in need of protection, as Article 15(1) TPD
requires. Further, the fact that an applicant for reunification voluntarily left his
family members is a material (yet not decisive) factor. But also if the separa-
tion of the temporary protection beneficiary was not due to violence in the
country of origin (or other circumstances surrounding the mass influx), the
separation may not have been voluntary – which Article 15(1) TPD fails to
appreciate. 
On the other hand, we may observe that once the conditions for reunifica-
tion (addressed under the previous number) are met, reunification is obligato-
ry. These conditions do not address or leave room for interests of the Member
States, such as control of immigration. The arrangement therefore leaves the
Member States no margin for balancing the interests of the temporary protec-
tion beneficiary with their own – which Article 8 ECHR does allow for (cf.
number [573]). Article 15 TPD therefore secures to a considerable extent the
right to family reunification. Indeed, its standards may exceed the Member
States’ obligations under Article 8 ECHR.
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8.8.4 Concluding remarks
[624] European asylum law is ambiguous on the refugee status of temporary
protection beneficiaries. Whereas Article 63(2) TEC explicitly acknowledges
that these persons may be “refugees”, the Temporary Protection Directive does
not confirm that its beneficiaries are entitled to all Refugee Convention bene-
fits applying to unrecognised refugees. 
As to the individual benefits, only the right to education for minors is
couched in terms comparable to those employed in the Refugee Convention:
access under the same conditions “as nationals” is stipulated. Other provisions
do not define the benefit by reference to “nationals” or some other group as
the Refugee Convention does. Still, by requiring that temporary protection
beneficiaries have access to the labour market, the Directive treats them as
lawfully staying refugees. Although the Temporary Protection Directive does
not secure that temporary protection beneficiaries enjoy all relevant Refugee
Convention benefits, the content of temporary protection seems to be mod-
elled to a considerable extent on the Refugee Convention. The arrangement on
family reunification exceeds in certain respects (but not for all situations) the
requirements of Article 8 ECHR. 
8.9 Assessment
[625] The instrument of international asylum law that is most relevant for sec-
ondary rights of persons in need of protection is the Refugee Convention.
Some of its benefits apply only to recognised refugees, most of them, however,
apply to unrecognised refugees as well (see paragraph 8.2.5). Persons who ful-
fil the requirements of Article 1 RC and who applied for refugee status but
received applicant or temporary protection status, are “applicants” or “tempo-
rary protection status beneficiaries” in the terms of European asylum law. But
for the purposes of the Refugee Convention, they are (unrecognised)
“refugees”; depending on the circumstances, they may further qualify as “law-
fully present”, “residing” or “lawfully staying” refugees. In order to comply
with their obligations under the refugee convention as regards such unrecog-
nised refugees, the Member States should treat applicants and temporary pro-
tection beneficiaries in accordance with the relevant convention provisions. 
European asylum law is decidedly ambiguous about this matter. Arguably,
Article 63(1) TEC suggests that the Refugee Convention is relevant for recep-
tion standards of applicants; and Article 63(2) TEC expresses the view that
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temporary protection beneficiaries may be (unrecognised) refugees (numbers
[602] and [620]). The Preambles to the Qualification Directive and the
Temporary Protection Directive confirm this declaratory understanding of the
term refugee in several instances. The European asylum legislation consistent-
ly requires that unrecognised refugees are protected from refoulement, in
accordance with Article 33 RC. But in other respects the legislation explicitly
allows for treatment of temporary protection beneficiaries, and far more so of
applicants, that fall short of the standards set by the Refugee Convention. In
which respects European asylum law on secondary rights secures conformity
with the Refugee Convention and other relevant international law, and in
which respects it does not, was addressed above (numbers [576]-[577], [606]-
[609] and [621]).
[626] In Chapter 5.8, it was observed that under secondary European asylum
law refugee status enjoys a primary position over subsidiary protection and
applicant status, that applicant and subsidiary protection status may concur,
and that temporary protection status may concur with the other three statuses.
In terms of secondary rights, the refugee status occupies a prime position over
all other statuses. The less durable nature of applicant and temporary protec-
tion statuses may serve as an explanation for the lower standard for secondary
rights as compared to refugee status. The secondary rights of subsidiary pro-
tection beneficiaries are to a certain extent similar to those of refugees, but in
a number of important respects they are less favourable (such as the duration
of the residence permits, the rules on family reunification and benefits of
family members, cf. numbers [596], [597] and [598]). These lower standards
are not contrary to international law, as no instrument sets conditions on the
secondary rights of persons who do not qualify for refugee status. But are
these differences also justified from the point of view of the Common
European Asylum System? Assuming that European asylum law establishes a
status for refugees that is “appropriate” to serve their needs, we should con-
sider why the lesser secondary rights for subsidiary protection beneficiaries
provide them with an “appropriate” status as well.291 Subsidiary protection dif-
fers from refugee protection mainly in two respects: Convention grounds for
the risk of harm are absent, and it may apply in case of indiscriminate violence
as defined in Article 15(c) QD (see number [597]). Absence of Convention
grounds for risk of harm cannot justify lesser secondary rights. Arguably, the
lower standards for subsidiary protection beneficiaries are justified only by
the (allegedly) less durable nature of the risk in case of indiscriminate vio-
lence. The principle that the beneficiary’s claims to the host state grow
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stronger if his ties with it are tighter also lies at the basis of the “system” of
allocation of Refugee Convention benefits (see number [543]). If this con-
tention is true, it once more underlines the importance of Article 15(c) QD for
the scope of subsidiary protection, and reinforces the finding that its personal
scope differs from the scope of the other sub-paragraphs of Article 15 QD. 
[627] When overseeing the rules on family reunification in European asylum
law, the absence of rules for subsidiary protection beneficiaries catches the
eye. These status holders cannot invoke the Family Reunification Directive,
nor is reunification of family members requesting asylum in the European
Union with subsidiary status holders required (though Member States may
request transfer of such family members under Article 15 DR, cf. number
[616]). It was observed that refusal of family reunification of subsidiary pro-
tection beneficiaries may be in breach of Article 8 ECHR (number [598]).
Here, we should address the question of whether the difference in treatment is
justified from the point of view of the Common European Asylum System.
Arguably, the only feasible justification for the difference in treatment of
refugees and subsidiary protection beneficiaries is that refugees are consi-
dered to “have reasonable prospects of obtaining the right of permanent resi-
dence”,292 and subsidiary protection beneficiaries are not. European asylum
law rules on issue and renewal of residence permits for both categories do not
draw such a distinction (Article 24 QD, cf. number [576] above), but we saw
above that this view also explains other differences as regards the scope of
secondary rights. However, it fails to explain why European asylum does
secure the rights to family reunification of temporary protection beneficiaries,
who by definition have less prospects to durable residence than subsidiary
protection beneficiaries. 
[628] The family reunification rules for temporary protection are remarkable
for yet another reason: they are in one respect more favourable than the rules
that apply to refugees. In the case that a refugee submits the application for
family reunification more than three months after refugee status was granted,
the Member State may state the condition that he disposes of “normal” accom-
modation, sickness insurance and a stable income (other than social assis-
tance; see number [584]). This condition cannot be applied to requests by tem-
porary protection beneficiaries.293
This difference can obviously not be explained by the grounds for offering
protection – a temporary protection beneficiary is a person who “may” be a
refugee (see number [620]). Could the particular requirements on reunifica-
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tion for temporary protection beneficiaries explain this difference? Article 15
TPD requires that the family member is “in need of protection”, but the same
holds true “normally” for the refugee’s family members, so the Qualification
Directive states.294 The provision further requires that the family ties were dis-
rupted because of the circumstances surrounding the mass influx (see number
[622]). A similar consideration will often if not normally hold true for the
refugee, who had to leave his family in order to escape persecution. Possibly,
the “three months rule” in the Family Reunification Directive is the expression
of the supposition that if indeed persecution was the cause for the separation
of the refugee from his family, he would have requested reunification within
three months. Thus read, European asylum law accords the refugee the same
favourable treatment as the temporary protection beneficiary, but only during
the three months after the grant of refugee status. But then the question
remains why the “three months rule” does not apply to temporary protection
beneficiaries. 
[629] The CEAS is consistent where it limits obligatory reunification with only
core family members (parents and minor children), but not in its elaboration
of this obligation. The definition of unmarried partner in the Family
Reunification Directive is different from those in the Temporary Protection
Directive and in the Dublin Regulation (cf. numbers [583], [622] and [615]).
Moreover, where the Family Reunification Directive leaves the Member States
complete discretion as to grant the right to reunification with unmarried part-
ners, the latter two instruments require reunification if domestic aliens law or
practice in general treats unmarried partners comparably to married couples.
Even the definitions of minor children diverge. The Family Reunification
Directive and the Temporary Protection Directive require reunification of the
refugee or temporary protection beneficiary with both his or her own minor
children as well as those of the spouse, whereas the Dublin Regulation
arrangement is restricted to children of the “couples” of the asylum seeker and
the spouse or unmarried partner.295 For reunification with relatives other than
core family members, all three arrangements require some sort of humani-
tarian need, but the definition of this need varies widely. Article 15(1) DR
speaks of mere dependence, elaborating upon this dependence in Article 15(2)
DR. For reunification of adult refugees with their parents, next to dependence
absence of “proper family support” is required (number [583]) – apparently,
one can enjoy proper support from one relative and still depend on another
one. Reunification of temporary protection beneficiaries with relatives is indi-
cated only when the latter “would face extreme hardship” if it did not take
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place (number [622]); dependence is therefore not required. Finally, the
detailed arrangement for proof of family ties for the application of the Dublin
criteria is striking (cf. number [492]), whereas the Family Reunification
Directive only gives quite loose rules (number [585]). Possibly, the Dublin
rules will have harmonising effect on the latter in practice.
[630] Could the “right to asylum” ex Article 18 Charter be of any relevance
for the CEAS protection statuses? This right entails a claim to durable protec-
tion and appropriate secondary rights, which the Member States should “guar-
antee”, with “due respect for the [Refugee Convention]” (cf. paragraph 2.3.5).
Arguably, when the refugee is within the European Union and the exception
of the safe third country is not applied (cf. number [540]), there is no other
way of complying with the obligation to “guarantee the right to asylum” but
by granting “an appropriate status”.296 Article 63 TEC as well as the legislation
implies that the Member States may grant to Convention refugees next to
refugee status, applicant status or temporary protection status. If we accept
that the latter two statuses are statuses as meant by “asylum” in Article 18, the
only added value of Article 18 would be a claim to be recognised as an asy-
lum seeker, for the obligation to “guarantee” this status “with due respect for”
the Refugee Convention is also implied by Articles 63(1) TEC. 
Arguably, however, the right to asylum may have further implications. If
the right to asylum implies a claim to a durable solution, the temporary nature
of temporary protection and asylum seeker statuses are exceptions to this
right. These statuses may be regarded as “appropriate” because of the circum-
stances involved – the need to properly examine the claim for asylum, or the
impossibility of doing so due to the great number of applications in the case
of a mass influx. But if examination takes too long, or the circumstances may
not otherwise justify postponement of the offer of a durable solution, asylum
seeker or temporary protection status is at variance with the obligation to
guarantee the right to the appropriate, more durable refugee or subsidiary pro-
tection status. As a matter of practice, it may be argued that the right to asy-
lum implies a temporal limit to asylum seeker or subsidiary protection status
for Convention refugees. As argued in paragraph 8.2.4, the Refugee
Convention requires that refugee status should be determined ultimately three
years after the application. Accordingly, temporary protection is limited to
three years. Arguably, the same limit applies to examination of the application
for asylum, although no instrument of European asylum law states this. 
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NOTES
1 Article 63(3)(a) TEC.
2 Cf. Article 1 QD. 
3 Articles 63(1)(b) TEC and 1 RSD. 
4 Cf. Article 8(2) TPD. 
5 This is not to say that the latter two categories are not entitled to Refugee Convention bene-
fits; see below number [601] and [620]. 
6 Hathaway 2003, p. 2.
7 The objective of striking this balance also finds expression in the preamble to the instru-
ment – see number [558]. 
8 Most provisions applying to refugees tout court imply the requirement of presence; cf.
Grahl-Madsen 1972, p. 359, and cf. number [566] below. 
9 According to Merriam-Webster’s dictionary, “lawful” means “being in harmony with the law”;
the French equivalent “régulier”, according to Larousse, “conformément à la règle, à la loi”.
10 Article 31 RC: “1. The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their ille-
gal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or
freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory with-
out authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and
show good cause for their illegal entry or presence. 2. The Contracting States shall not apply
to the movements of such refugees restrictions other than those, which are necessary, and
such restrictions shall only be applied until their status in the country is regularized or they
obtain admission into another country. The Contracting States shall allow such refugees a
reasonable period and all the necessary facilities to obtain admission into another country”.
11 The French “régularisé” connects the act of regularisation tightly to the term “régulier”, the
equivalent of “lawful” in the English language version. We can safely conclude that regulari-
sation thus means, “making lawful”. Unwillingness to coin an awkward term may serve to
explain why the English text applies “regularisation”, which, in its ordinary sense, is indeed
very close to “making lawful” (cf. Merriam-Webster’s: “regularisation - to make regular by
conformance to law, rules, or custom”). Cf. Grahl-Madsen 1972, pp. 344 and 359f.
12 Grahl-Madsen 1972, pp. 372 and 344-389; Goodwin-Gill 1996, pp. 307-308; Steenbergen
et al. 1999, pp. 152-153.
13 Hathaway 2003, p. 11.
14 Hathaway 2003, p. 11n; it concerns UN Doc. E/AC.32/SR.15, p. 20.
15 Cf. number [26].
16 Vermeulen 1997, p. 30f. 
17 Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary, under 1a and 1b. 
18 Article 6 RC: “For the purposes of this Convention, the term “in the same circumstances”
implies that any requirements (including requirements as to length and conditions of
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sojourn or residence) which the particular individual would have to fulfil for the enjoyment
of the right in question, if he were not a refugee, must be fulfilled by him, with the excep-
tion of requirements which by their nature a refugee is incapable of fulfilling”; cf. Grahl-
Madsen 1963, Comment on Article 6 under (3).
19 Par. 14 of the Schedule: “Subject only to the terms of par. 13, the provisions of this Schedule
in no way affect the laws and regulations governing the conditions of admission to, transit
through, residence and establishment in, and departure from, the territories of the
Contracting States”.
20 Grahl-Madsen 1972, pp. 353-4. Cf. also Hathaway 2003, p. 5; Steenbergen et al. 1999,
p.158.
21 Cf. Article 62(2)(b) TEC. 
22 The term “lawful residence” also occurs in the English language version of the Schedule
attached to the Convention to which Article 28(1) refers, without any indication to a difference
in meaning – cf. Schedule pars. 6(1), 6(3) and 11.
23 Hathaway 2003, p. 5.
24 Grahl-Madsen 1972, p. 354. 
25 Steenbergen 1999, pp. 152-153 and Hathaway 2003, p. 3. 
26 Article 14 RC states that “a refugee shall be accorded in the country in which he has his
habitual residence the same protection as is accorded to nationals of that country. In the
territory of any other Contracting State, he shall be accorded the same protection as is
accorded in that territory to nationals of the country in which he has his habitual resi-
dence”; Article 16 RC states: “2. A refugee shall enjoy in the Contracting State in which he
has his habitual residence the same treatment as a national in matters pertaining to access
to the Courts, including legal assistance and exemption from cautio judicatum solvi. 3. A
refugee shall be accorded in the matters referred to in paragraph 2 in countries other than
that in which he has his habitual residence the treatment granted to a national of the coun-
try of his habitual residence.”
27 Oxford English Dictionary.
28 Grand Larousse: “Lieu ou une personne habite ou est censée habiter en permanence ou de
façon habituelle (…) spéc. Domicile légal, ou simplem. domicile, lieu unique où la loi pré-
sume qu’une personne se trouve pour l’exercise de ses droits et l’accomplissement de ses
droits”. 
29 Cf. Articles 13 and 2 (d) QD and 2(c) read in conjunction with (b) PD. 
30 E.g. Grahl-Madsen 1967, par. 340-341, Spijkerboer & Vermeulen 1995, p. 214; Hathaway
2003, pp. 3-4. 
31 UNHCR Handbook, par. 28.
32 That is, before the entry into force of the Refugee Convention (cf. Goodwin-Gill 1996, p. 6). 
33 One may feel that Article 31 RC, where it addresses “regularization” of refugees, also has
bearings on recognition. But as argued under number [546], it follows from the context that
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“regularization” rather addresses the qualification “lawful”; and the terms “lawful” and
“recognised” are not synonymous (see number [561] below). 
34 Article 7(1) and (3) RC also speak of “according” treatment and (Refugee Convention)
rights and benefits to refugees. 
35 Cf. Noll 2000 pp. 423-431 for a thorough discussion. 
36 Goodwin-Gill 1996, p. 308.
37 Cf. Grahl-Madsen 1972, p. 367. 
38 Goodwin-Gill 1996, p. 308.
39 It follows from the drafting history that the term “lawfully in their territory” was delibe-
rately chosen; it replaces the term “authorized to reside regularly”, equivalent to lawfully
staying in the original proposal (cf. Grahl-Madsen 1963, Comment to Article 32 under (1)). 
40 For instance, refugees who did not comply with some requirement under domestic law, such
as timely renewal of the residence permit (cf. Grahl-Madsen 1972, p. 367).
41 Grahl-Madsen 1963, Commentary on Article 28; Steenbergen et al. 1999, p. 158.
42 Cf. Preamble RC, fifth recital.
43 Vermeulen 1997a, pp. 29-34, Lauterpacht & Bethlehem 2003, p. 116.
44 Article 30(2) RC: “A Contracting State shall give sympathetic consideration to the appli-
cation of refugees for permission to transfer assets wherever they may be and which are
necessary for their resettlement in another country to which they have been admitted”; cf.
Grahl-Madsen 1963, Commentary to Article 30, under (3). 
45 Article 27 RC: “The Contracting states shall issue identity papers to any refugee in their
territory […]”. 
46 Chen 1951, pp. 13-78; Crawford 1979, pp. 10-24; Brownlie 1998, pp. 85-90. 
47 See Zwaan 2003, p. 14-17; Spijkerboer & Vermeulen 1995, pp. 275-276; Hailbronner 1992,
p. 925.
48 Vermeulen observes that Article 31(2) RC implies an obligation to “regularise” the
refugee’s status in case the unlawfully present refuge cannot obtain admission to another
country, and suggests that this regularisation implies determination of refugee status
(Vermeulen 1997, p. 30). But arguably, regularisation means “making lawful”, which will
often but does not necessarily imply determination of refugee status – the Contracting state
could also issue (for example) temporary protection status (see Zwaan 2003, p. 28; Grahl-
Madsen 1972, pp. 364-5; and cf. number [562] above). 
49 Meijers 1990, p. 433.
50 See Grahl-Madsen 1972, pp. 441-443 who states the same on somewhat different premises. 
51 Recommendation B to the Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on
the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons: “The Conference […] B. […] RECOMMENDS
Governments to take the necessary measures for the protection of the refugee’s family espe-
cially with a view to: (1) Ensuring that the unity of the refugee’s family is maintained parti-
cularly in cases where the head of the family has fulfilled the necessary conditions for admis-
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sion to a particular country, (2) The protection of refugees who are minors, in particular unac-
companied children and girls, with special reference to guardianship and adoption.” 
52 Cf. ECtHR 18 February 1991, Ser. A vol. 193 (Moustaquim), par. 36.
53 Cf. ECtHR 28 May 1985, Ser. A vol. 94 (Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali), par. 68. 
54 Cf. ECtHR 19 February 1996, Rep. 1996-I (Gül), par. 41. 
55 ECtHR 28 May 1985, Ser. A vol. 94 (Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali), pars. 62-63. 
56 ECtHR 22 April 1997, Rep. 1997-II (X Y and Z v. UK), par. 36. 
57 ECtHR 21 June 1988, Ser. A vol. 138 (Berrehab), par. 21.
58 ECtHR 9 October 2003, Appl. No. 48321/99 (Slivenko), pars. 94 and 97. 
59 ECtHR 3 July 2001, Appl. No. 47390/99 (decision) (Javeed v. The Netherlands), under “The
Law”; ECtHR 13 February 2001, Appl. No. 47160/99 (Ezzoudhi v. France), par. 34 (“l’exis-
tence d’éléments supplémentaires de dépendance”). Cf. Van Asperen & Van Duijvendijk-
Brand 2002, pp. 68-70.
60 ECtHR 28 May 1985, Ser. A vol. 94 (Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali), par. 67; Gül, par. 38.
61 ECtHR 28 May 1985, Ser. A vol. 94 (Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali), par. 67; Gül, par. 38.
62 ECtHR 21 December 2001, Appl. No. 31465/96 (Sen), par. 32.
63 Gül, par. 38.
64 In most cases on first admission, the Court investigated compliance with the positive obli-
gation (Abdulaziz, Ahmut (ECtHR 28 November 1996, Rep. 1996-VI), Sen), but in Gül, the
Court qualified the refusal to admit as an “interference” (par. 34), so apparently the nega-
tive obligation was involved. Cf. Steenbergen 1999, pp. 7-75. 
65 Boeles 2003, p. 641. 
66 Gül, par. 38.
67 Gül, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Martens, approved by Judge Russo, under 9.
68 I.e. Sen. And possibly the finding of a breach in Sen is due to the very particular circum-
stances of the case – cf. ACVZ 2004, pp. 26-7.
69 Van Walsum 2003b, p. 125.
70 Berrehab, par. 26. 
71 Van Walsum 2003a, pp. 519-20.
72 In Sen par. 40 the Court spoke of “un obstacle majeur”, in Boultif, par. 48 of (mere?) “dif-
ficulties the spouse [of the alien who is to be expelled] is likely to encounter in the country
of origin”. 
73 Sen, par. 41 (“By leaving the applicants no choice but the one between abandoning the situ-
ation they had established in the Netherlands, and renouncing the company of their eldest
daughter, the defendant State failed to strike a fair balance between the interests of the
applicants on the one hand and its own interest in controlling immigration on the other” –
my translation, HB).
74 This case concerned a Turk who had obtained a residence permit on humanitarian grounds
from Switzerland. The Swiss authorities refused permission for his son Ersin to join him.
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The Court stated that it had to determine “to what extent it is true that Ersin’s move to
Switzerland would be the only way for Mr Gül to develop family with his son” (par. 39), and
considered in this context that Gül “was unable to prove to the Swiss authorities – who
refused to grant him political refugee status – that he personally had been a victim of per-
secution in his home country. In any event, whatever the applicant’s initial reasons for
applying for political asylum, the visits he has made to his son in recent years show that
they are no longer valid” (par. 41). Hence, refugee status would have been relevant for
determining whether Gül could enjoy family life in Turkey. 
75 Cf. Gül, par. 41 ( “By leaving Turkey […] Mr. Gül caused the separation from his son”; I.M.
v The Netherlands (“[The applicant] decided voluntarily to leave [the child] who was 20
months old at the time and completely dependant on others”); cf. Van Walsum in her anno-
tation in this decision (van Walsum 2003, p. 131). 
76 Article 2(d) QD: “‘refugee status’means the recognition by a Member State of a third coun-
try national or a stateless person as a refugee”. 
77 Article 24(1) QD.
78 Cf. number [569].
79 Cf. the Preamble QD, “Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,
and in particular point […] 3(a) of Article 63 thereof”, and see number [201] above. 
80 Namely Article 21 QD, on protection from refoulement, explicitly addresses “unrecognised”
next to “recognised” refugees (see number [393]). – We may observe that Article 33(1) QD,
on “access to integration facilities” addresses “refugees” (not refugee “status beneficiaries”
or the like). Bearing in mind that Member States may deny access to subsidiary protection
status beneficiaries pursuant to Article 33(2) QD (see below under [597]), and even to
refugee status beneficiaries prior to the issue of a residence permit (Preamble recital (30)
QD, cited below in footnote 82), it is very unlikely that applicants for asylum or temporary
protection beneficiaries are included in the personal scope. Arguably, we should read the
term “refugees” in Article 33(1) QD as referring to “refugee status beneficiaries”. 
81 Article 22 QD applies to “persons being recognised as being in need of international pro-
tection”, Articles 27 and 30 QD to minors whom refugee status has been granted. 
82 According to Preamble recital (30) QD however, “Within the limits set out by international
obligations, Member States may lay down that the granting of benefits with regard to access
to employment, social welfare, health care and access to integration facilities requires the
prior issue of a residence permit.”
83 Article 32 QD addresses “Freedom of movement within the Member State”; Articles 31 and
32 QD define the benefits by reference to third country nationals “legally resident in their
territories”. 
84 Preamble recital (6) QD.
85 Preamble recital (7) QD. 
86 Article 24(1) QD. 
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87 Article 21 QD: “2. Where not prohibited by the international obligations mentioned in para-
graph 1, Member States may refoule a refugee, whether formally recognised or not, when:
(a) there are reasonable grounds for considering him or her as a danger to the security of
the Member State in which he or she is present; or (b) he or she, having been convicted by
a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of
that Member State. 3. Member States may revoke, end or refuse to renew or to grant the
residence permit of (or to) a refugee to whom paragraph 2 applies”. Article 21(2)(a) QD
deviates from the text of Article 33(2) RC (and Article 14(4)(a) QD, cf. number [342])
where it speaks of “considering” instead of “regarding” the refugee as a danger. There is no
reason to suppose a difference in scope was intended. It may be observed that in the Dutch
language version of the Directive, the wording of Articles 21(2)(a) and (b) and 14(4)(a) and
(b) QD differs so much that their common origin from Article 33(2) RC is obscured. - The
implications of Article 21 QD for unrecognised refugees, hence for Convention refugees
whom the member status did not grant refugee status as meant in Article 13 QD, is dis-
cussed under numbers [593] and [595] (and cf. number [393]).
88 Article 24 QD is stricter than Article 32(1) RC, as it requires “compelling grounds” for
exemption from the right to remain. The phrase “where compelling reasons of national
security otherwise require” figures in Article 32(2) RC, addressing however not the excep-
tion to the right to remain, but the exception to challenge the decision to expel.
89 Article 25 QD, cf. Article 28 RC. 
90 Article 26 QD, cf. Articles 17, 18, 19 and 24 RC. 
91 Article 27 QD, cf. Article 22 RC. 
92 Article 28 QD, cf. Article 23 RC.
93 Article 29 QD, cf. Article 24(1)(b) RC. Pursuant to Preamble recital (35) QD, “health care”
encompasses both physical and mental care. 
94 Article 31 QD, cf. Article 21 RC. 
95 Article 32 QD, cf. Article 26 RC. 
96 Cf. Articles 27(2), 31 and 32 QD and 22(2), 21 and 26 RC. 
97 Grahl-Madsen 1963, Commentary on Article 7 under (2). 
98 Cf. Article 6 RC: “For the purposes of this Convention, the term “in the same circum-
stances” implies that any requirements (including requirements as to length and conditions
of sojourn or residence) which the particular individual would have to fulfil for the enjoy-
ment of the right in question, if he were not a refugee, must be fulfilled by him, with the
exception of requirements which by their nature a refugee is incapable of fulfilling”. 
99 Articles 3, 4, 12-16, 25 and 29 RC.
100 Articles 22, 33 and 34 QD.
101 Article 20(3) QD. 
102 The provision implements Recommendation B under (2) of the Final Act to the Refugee
Convention, quoted above in footnote 50. 
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103 Cf. number [254].
104 Preamble recitals (10) and (27) QD. 
105 Article 23(2) QD, and see the following number.
106 Article 23(2) QD. 
107 The only benefits not mentioned are “protection from refoulement” and the right to infor-
mation on the status (Articles 21 and 22 QD).
108 Minor children qualify as family member “regardless of whether they were born in or out
of wedlock or adopted as defined under the national law” (Article 2(h), second indent QD).
109 Article 2(h), second indent QD.
110 Article 2(h) first clause QD.
111 Article 2(h) first clause QD.
112 Article 14 DR ensures that (certain conditions fulfilled, see number [611]), one single
Member State is responsible for examining asylum requests of the members of one family.
Application of the provision results in reunification of family members who arrived later or
in other Member States. Such family members would be “present in relation to the applica-
tion” of the Directive refugee as meant in Article 2(h) QD.
113 Article 23(3) QD states that “Paragraphs 1 and 2 are not applicable where he is or would
be excluded […].” As far as the family has no claim, this exclusion ground is obligatory, but
the provision does not preclude Member States from granting this family member a depen-
dant status on the basis of domestic law – unlike Article 12 QD in Chapter III, that excludes
persons to whom 1F RC applies from “being a refugee” (cf. number [337]). 
114 The other grounds for exclusion mentioned in Chapter III, cessation and exclusion because
Articles 1C, 1D or 1E RC applies, have no relevance for the family member. 
115 Article 23(4) QD; cf. Article 14(4) QD. 
116 The Qualification Directive does not refer to the exceptions from the prohibition of refoule-
ment in Article 33(2) RC, which do serve as grounds for exclusion from refugee status and
from the refugee’s right to remain and to a residence permit (see number [576] above). But
arguably, the “reasons” mentioned in Article 32(1) RC fully encompass the exceptions of
Article 33(2) RC (cf. number [594] below). 
117 Article 23(2) QD. 
118 A predecessor to the quoted phrase run as follows: “[…] unless such family members
already enjoy more favourable benefits pursuant to other provisions of Community law”
(Council doc. 5813/03, Asile 7 of 5 February 2003, Article 21A). 
119 Article 23(2) QD.
120 Article 25(2)(d) PD; cf. number [428]. 
121 Article 23(4) QD.
122 The implications of the term “may” are discussed under number [674].
123 Article 23(5) QD.
124 Article 23(1) QD. 
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125 Cf. Article 23(4) QD. 
126 As Article 23(2) refers to Articles 24 to 34 QSD, not to Article 21 QD. 
127 Article 1 FRD. 
128 Article 2(d) FRD. 
129 Article 3(1) FRD. 
130 Article 3(1) and 9(1) FRD. According to Article 8(1) FRD Member States may set the addi-
tional condition that the sponsor has stayed in their territory for a certain time span (with
the maximum of two years), but this requirement can not apply to refugees (Article 12(2)
FRD). 
131 Cf. Article 9 FRD.
132 Article 2(b) FRD.
133 Article 4(1)(a)-(c) FRD.
134 Article 4(1)(b)-(d) FRD. 
135 Article 4(1), second paragraph FRD. The last clause of the same provision holds that
Member States may require that children older than 12 years meet integration conditions,
but this does not apply to children of refugees pursuant to Article 10(1) FRD.
136 Article 10(3)(a) FRD; unlike in case of other minor sponsors, these “first degree relatives”
need not be dependant upon him. 
137 The implications of the term “may” are discussed under number [674].
138 Article 10(3)(b) FRD. 
139 Article 4(3) FRD.
140 Article 4(2) FRD.
141 Article 4(4) and 6(1) FRD.
142 Article 6(2) FRD.
143 Article 17 FRD.
144 Article 12(1) read in conjunction with 7 FRD.
145 Article 12(1) second clause FRD. 
146 Article 13(2) and 15(1) FRD; according to the latter provision, the issue of the autonomous resi-
dence permit may be limited to spouses or unmarried partners in case of broken relationships. 
147 Article 14(1) FRD. 
148 Article 14(2) and (3) FRD. 
149 Article 16(1) – (3) FRD. 
150 Article 5(1) FRD.
151 Article 4(3) FRD. According to the same provision, “in appropriate circumstances”,
Member States may deal with requests concerning family members already present. 
152 Article 11(1) FRD; the provision adds that “A decision rejecting an application may not be
based solely on the fact that documentary evidence is lacking”. 
153 Article 5(2) FRD. 
154 Article 5(4) FRD.
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155 Ibid. 
156 Article 18 FRD. 
157 In ECtHR 13 May 2003, Appl. No. 53102/99 (decision) (Chandra v. The Netherlands), the
Court observes that “It has not been argued that these children could not stay with their
father [in the country of origin Indonesia]”. 
158 In Chandra v. The Netherlands and ECtHR 25 March 2003, Appl. No. 41226/98 (decision)
(I.M. v. The Netherlands), the European Court of Human Rights mentioned the lapse of four
years in the first, and six and a half years in the latter case as a material consideration for
finding that Article 8 ECHR had not been violated. 
159 Article 9(2) FRD. 
160 Article 4 FRD, see number [583] above. 
161 Article 2(h) second indent QD speaks of “children of the couple”, and does not refer to
adopted children; cf. number [580]. 
162 Article 23(1) QD speaks of “family unity”. The term “family” is not defined in the
Qualification Directive. The provision therefore may apply to relatives who do not qualify
as “family members” pursuant to Article 2(h) QD as well. 
163 Article 4(3) FRD. 
164 Cf. Hathaway 2003, p. 12. 
165 Cf. Council doc. 9038/02 Asile 2002/25 of 17 June 2002, p. 4n; Article 2(j) of the subse-
quent Draft Qualification Directive, Council doc. 10956/02, Asile 2002/36 of 9 July 2002
p. 4 contained (with slight differences) the text of Article 2(h) QD as adopted. 
166 Cf. Article 2(d) RSD. 
167 Article 14(5) read in conjunction with 14(4) QD, cf. number [342]. 
168 The Article 14(6) QD status applies to “persons” whose Directive refugee status is revoked,
ended or not renewed pursuant to Article 14(4) QD. By virtue of the (terminated) status,
these refugees have been formally recognised. The Article 14(6) QD status may further
apply when Member States, pursuant to Article 14(5) QD, “decide not to grant status to a
refugee, where such a decision has not yet been taken”. This second category therefore con-
cerns persons whom the Member States have sorted out are “refugees”, hence fulfil the
requirements of Article 1 RC. Preamble recital (23) QD to the Qualification Directive states
that “As referred to in Article 14, ‘status’ can also include refugee status”. The statement is
somewhat confusing as Article 14 addresses, according to its heading, “refugee status”.
Arguably, we should read the quoted Preamble recital as stating that the decision ex Article
14(5) QD to “not grant status to a refugee” encompasses next to the decision not to grant
“refugee status” for the purposes of the Directive, a negation of recognition of refugee sta-
tus in the sense of the Refugee Convention.
169 Articles 3, 5, 13, 27, 4, 20, 22, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34 RC.
170 Articles 12, 14, 16(2) and (3) and 25 RC. – There are no Refugee Convention benefits
applying to recognised refugees tout court.
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171 See on these requirements paragraph 6.5.1. 
172 Cf. Article 21(2) QD, number [576] above. 
173 Article 2(a) read in conjunction with (d) QD. 
174 Preamble recital (6) QD. 
175 Cf. Grahl-Madsen 1963, Commentary on Article 33 RC under (8) as to “national security”,
and on Article 32 under (6) as to public order, and Steenbergen et al. 1999, p. 164.
176 Article 24(1) QD, that is in the English and French language versions – the Dutch and
German ones do not contain the reference to Article 21(3) QD! This omission is of little
practical importance, as Article 21(3) QD may serve as grounds for termination of a permit
on its own terms 
177 Preamble recital (30) QD. 
178 Perhaps we should read the Preamble consideration otherwise: does it observe that when a
refugee has not (yet) received a residence permit, he is not “lawfully” present for the pur-
pose of Articles 17 and 24 RC, that address employment, social welfare and health care
Indeed, the refugees who are excluded under Article 24 QD are not (necessarily) lawfully
present and therefore not (necessarily) entitled to the Refugee Convention benefits for law-
fully present refugees. But that circumstance does not detract from their entitlement to rele-
vant Qualification Directive benefits. 
179 Preamble recitals (5), (6) and (7) QD.
180 Article 20(2) QD. 
181 The latter ground for exception is stricter than and hence has little meaning next the
grounds for exclusion or cessation of subsidiary protection status laid down in Articles
17(1) and (3) QD (cf. number [339] above). 
182 Article 33(2) QD. 
183 Article 25(2) QD. 
184 Comments on Articles, p. 31.
185 This connection is an odd one, as the possibility of getting documents from consular
authorities depends on the identity of the agent of serious harm rather than on the type of
serious harm. 
186 Preamble recital (34) QD explains that “The possibility of limiting the benefits for benefici-
aries of subsidiary protection status to core benefits is to be understood in the sense that
this notion covers at least minimum income support, assistance in case of illness, pregnan-
cy and parental assistance, in so far as they are granted to nationals according to the legis-
lation of the Member State concerned.”
187 Article 29(2) QD.
188 Article 26(4) QD. 
189 Articles 2(h) and 23(3) QD. 
190 Article 23(2) first clause QD. 
191 Article 23(2) second and third paragraphs QD. 
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192 It follows from the Preamble that they should also be “fair in comparison to those enjoyed
by beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status” - Preamble recital (29) QD. 
193 Article 3(2) FRD.
194 Cf. Article 3(1) FRD; see number [583] above. 
195 ECtHR 19 February 1996, Rep. 1996-I (Gül), par. 41. 
196 Article 3(1) RSD. 
197 Cf. Articles 2(b) and (c) RSD and 2(b) and (c) PD. 
198 Article 6(2) RSD. We may observe that the first category of applicants could not be “law-
fully present” for the purposes of the Refugee Convention, but this does not necessarily
hold true for the other two categories. An applicant whose application is examined at the
border may possess a valid visa, and the same may hold true for the applicant in detention. 
199 See on the arrangement further paragraph 8.5.1.
200 Cf. Articles 6(1), 20(2), 26(b), 27(1)(b) PD. 
201 Preamble recital (5) RSD.
202 Goodwin-Gill 2003, pp. 221f.
203 ExCom Conclusion No. 44 (XXXVII) of 13 October 1986, Detention of Refugees and
Asylum Seekers, under (b).
204 Goodwin-Gill 2003, pp. 229-230. 
205 Article 31(2) RC states in accordance with this provision that the restrictions on the free-
dom of movement may apply only until the refugee’s presence is authorised. 
206 ECtHR 25 June 1996, Rep. 1996-III (Amuur v. France), par. 43.
207 In Amuur v. France (par. 48) the European Court of Human Right decided that “confine-
ment” of applicants at the international zone at an airport by precluding them form enter-
ing the state amounted to deprivation of liberty and hence fell within the scope of the pro-
vision (in spite of the possibility to leave the state voluntarily). 
208 Article 2 RC. 
209 Amuur v. France, par. 45. 
210 Article 2(i) RSD.
211 Article 2(j) RSD. 
212 Article 13(1) RSD. But Member States may make the provision of “material reception con-
ditions” and “health care” subject to the condition that applicant cannot sustain a sufficient
standard of living on his own means (Article 13(3) RSD). 
213 Article 7(4) RSD.
214 Article 13(2) RSD. The provision makes this standard dependant on the circumstances:
“Member States shall ensure that that standard of living is met in the specific situation of
persons who have special needs, in accordance with Article 17, as well as in relation to the
situation of persons who are in detention.”
215 Article 13(5) RSD. 
216 Article 14(2)(a) and (3) RSD. 
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217 Article 14(4) RSD. 
218 Article 14(6) RSD. 
219 Article 14(8) RSD; they may do so “when an initial assessment of the specific needs of
the applicant is required, material reception conditions, as provided for in this Article,
are not available in a certain geographical area, housing capacities normally available
are temporarily exhausted, or the asylum seeker is in detention or confined to border
posts.”
220 Articles 21 and 23 RC.
221 Hathaway 2003, p. 12. 
222 Hathaway 2003, l.c.
223 Whether Article 11 RSD sets a minimum standard is discussed under number [673]. 
224 Articles 15 and 20 RSD. 
225 Article 17(1) RSD.
226 Article 18(1) RSD.
227 Article 19 RSD; cf. Article 30 QD.
228 Preamble recital (12) RSD.
229 Article 16(1) RSD.
230 Article 16(1)(a) and (2) RSD; further, they may do so “where an applicant has concealed
financial resources and therefore unduly benefited from material reception conditions,” or
in case of “serious breaches of the rules of the accommodation centre or to seriously vio-
lent behaviour” (Article 16(1)(b) and (3) RSD). 
231 Hathaway 2003, pp. 12-13. 
232 Cf. Articles 20 and 23(4)(i) PD, cf. number [429].
233 Cf. Article 3 RSD read in conjunction with 6(1) PD. 
234 Article 7(4) RSD.
235 Article 7(5) RSD.
236 Article 16(4) RSD.
237 Articles 3A(1) and 7(2)(a) PD; cf. number [390]. 
238 Articles 14(5) and 19(4) RSD.
239 Cf. ECtHR 5 February 2002, Rep. 2002-I (Čonka), pars. 44-46, and ECtHR 9 January 2003,
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In Chapters 6 and 8, the rules of the Procedures Directive and other asylum
legislation on remedies before domestic courts from negative decisions upon
applications for asylum, and from denial of certain secondary rights were dis-
cussed. In this Chapter, I will address other issues of judicial protection within
the Community legal order. In paragraph 9.1, the general set-up of the
Community system of judicial review is addressed, in particular the rules on
access to the Court of Justice. In paragraph 9.2, I will address the question
how domestic courts can or must give effect to Community law. In paragraph
9.3, I discuss the scope of acts that may be reviewed for their accordance with
international asylum law by the Court of Justice. The consequences of rulings
on interpretation and application of international asylum law by the latter
Court for review of compatibility with international law by domestic courts is
the subject of paragraph 9.4. In paragraph 9.5, I discuss the consequences of
European asylum law and, in particular, of the judicial competencies of Court
of Justice for the individual’s access to the European Court of Human Rights. 
9.1 Judicial protection of Community rights
9.1.1 The principle of effective protection
[631] The Community system of judicial protection is based on the principle that
all “individuals are entitled to effective judicial protection of the rights they derive
from the Community legal order”.1 This right is a general principle of
Community law, also enshrined in the Articles 6 and 13 of the European
Convention of Human Rights.2 Redress in individual cases is provided for by a
two-prong system. First, on the basis of Articles 230 and 232 TEC individuals can
appeal directly to the Court of Justice or the Court of First Instance against cer-
tain types of decisions by Community institutions, or against their failure to act.
Second, the legality of other acts within the scope of Community law can be chal-
lenged before domestic courts, which then function as the local branches of the
Community judiciary.3 Domestic courts are obliged to apply Community law, and
hence to protect the rights to which individuals are entitled. Further, if in domes-
tic proceedings questions arise on the interpretation or validity of Community
law, domestic courts can or must refer those issues for preliminary ruling to the
Court of Justice, pursuant to Article 234 TEC. By these two procedures
“the Treaty established a complete system of legal remedies and proce-
dures to design to permit the Court of Justice to review the legality of
measures adopted by the institutions. Natural and legal persons are thus
protected against the application of measures against them which they can-
not contest directly before the court by reason of the special conditions of
admissibility laid down in the second paragraph of Article 173 [now 230,
HB] of the Treaty.”4
Direct appeal to the Court of Justice and remedies before domestic courts
hence function as communicating vessels. If direct appeal to the Luxembourg
Courts is barred by admissibility requirements, domestic courts must offer
access. If appropriate, domestic courts must turn to the Court of Justice for
guidance pursuant to Article 234 TEC. In this way, both effective judicial pro-
tection and supervision by the Court of Justice is secured. 
Whether persons in need of protection can lodge direct appeals concerning
European asylum law to the Court of Justice will be discussed in paragraph
9.1.2. If it turns out that such direct appeal is not possible, the requirements of
Community law on appeals to domestic courts (the alternative branch of the
judicial system) will be addressed in paragraph 9.1.3. The supervision over
European asylum law by the Court of Justice pursuant to Article 234 (read in
conjunction with 68) TEC is discussed later, in paragraph 9.3.
9.1.2 Direct appeal to the Court of Justice 
[632] Review of legality of acts by Community institutions entails review of
compliance of secondary Community law with primary Community law,
including international asylum law that works within the Community legal
order.5 The review of legality by the Court of Justice pursuant to Article 230
TEC is in several ways limited.6 To begin with, the provision allows for appeal
to the Court of Justice only against acts of the Community institutions, not
against acts of (organs of) the Member States. Further, an individual has stand-
ing only if, first, the act of the Community institution is a “decision addressed
to” him; or second, if the act is a regulation that is of “direct and individual
concern” to him – in fact, a decision dressed in the form of a regulation.
Could acts of Community institutions in the realm of asylum law qualify as
“decisions” for the purposes of Article 230 TEC? Under European asylum law,
decisions that are “addressed” to individual persons in need of protection (such
as decisions on an application for asylum, or the grant or refusal of secondary
rights) are taken by organs of the Member States. Neither the Treaty, nor
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European asylum law empowers a Community institution to take decisions that
address specific individuals in need of protection. Thus, persons in need of pro-
tection cannot lodge direct appeal to the Court of Justice on this footing. 
The second type of acts that are open to direct appeal to the Court of
Justice concerns regulations that are “of direct and individual concern” to an
individual. A person is “directly concerned” for the purposes of Article 230
TEC only if the regulation does not leave the national authorities any discre-
tion in its application.7 In Plaumann, the Court ruled that the a person is not
“individually” concerned, if “the measure applies to objectively determined
situations and produces legal effects with regards to categories of persons
described in a generalised and abstract manner”.8 Even if it is possible to
determine the number or even identity of the persons affected by a measure,
such persons are not necessarily individually concerned.9 Obviously, no piece
of legislation10 in the realm of asylum could possibly pass this test. As to the
Dublin Regulation, Articles 3(2) and 15 in particular, leave the Member States
the power to decide on any application for asylum, even if another Member
State is “responsible” for doing so according to the Dublin criteria.
[633] The same reasoning applies to the “decisions” that Community institu-
tions are competent to take on the basis of European asylum legislation. It con-
cerns the lists of safe third neighbour countries (Article 35A PD, see number
[533]) and of safe third countries of origin (Article 30 PD, see number [446]);
and the Council “acts” that should provide for guidance that Member States
should take into account when assessing whether an international organisation
controls a state (Article 7(3) QD; see number [316]). The adoption of such a
list is not a decision that is “addressed” to particular persons. Again, the lega-
lity of such acts can be challenged. For if a Member State refuses protection
to an individual because he comes from a country that occurs on the “mini-
mum common list” of safe countries of origin, the alien can challenge that
decision before a domestic court. If the applicant alleges that the list is not in
accordance with the Refugee Convention because his country of origin is very
unsafe, the domestic court can refer a preliminary question on the validity of
the list to the Court of Justice. The same reasoning applies to the list of safe
third countries and the Council acts on actors of protection.
[634] Article 232 TEC allows individuals to appeal to the Court for failure to
act by Community institutions.11 For persons in need of protection, this course
of action could be relevant in case of failure to establish temporary protection.
The Council introduces temporary protection upon a proposal by the
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Commission. Could an applicant appeal on this basis against the Commission
because it does not lodge a proposal for protection that would apply to him, or
against the Council because it does not adopt a proposal by the Commission
that applies to him? 
The appeal would be inadmissible, if only because for individuals the right
to appeal ex Article 232 TEC is restricted in the same way as the right to chal-
lenge the legality under Article 230 TEC.12 Temporary protection can be
installed in case of a “mass influx”, that is, in terms of the Plaumann formu-
la, for “categories of persons described in a generalised and abstract manner”,
not for specific individuals. 
[635] Finally, we should address the question of whether legal persons, such
as organisations for the protection of the interests of refugees, could appeal on
the basis of Article 230 or 232 TEC. If domestic procedural law denies such
organisations access to domestic courts, they should have access to the other
branch of the Community judiciary system, so one may argue. However, the
requirement of “direct and individual concern” applies to such organisations
as well; their appeals are inadmissible if the decision (or regulation) concerns
general interests of the represented individuals, and those individuals do not
have standing individually.13 Hence, such organisations have standing only if
the refugees they represent do. 
In summary, none of the instruments of European asylum law are open to
direct appeal before the Court of Justice. We should observe that this does not
in itself affect the effectiveness of the judicial protection of the individual’s
rights under European asylum law. It only follows that persons in need of pro-
tection should turn to the other branch of the Community judiciary system, the
domestic courts, which could bring the question on the validity of the
Community measure before the Court of Justice.14 The narrow scope of Article
230 TEC is therefore not an obstacle to the review of legality of Community
legislation. 
9.1.3 Requirements on remedies in domestic courts 
[636] As individuals cannot approach the Luxembourg Courts directly in case
of infringement of their asylum rights, domestic law must provide for reme-
dies and procedures which ensure protection of those rights. Community law
requirements on those domestic procedures result from application of two
conflicting principles. 
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On one hand, Article 10 TEC imposes the obligation on domestic courts 
to ensure effective judicial protection of the rights to which individuals are
entitled under Community law,15 which implies strict requirements of
Community law on domestic procedures. But the subsidiarity principle points
in the opposite direction. According to this principle (as laid down in Article
5 TEC, quoted under number [56]), in areas outside its exclusive competence,
such as domestic procedural law, the Community should not to take action if
the objectives of Community law can be sufficiently achieved by the Member
States themselves. In the area of domestic procedural law, the subsidiarity
principle takes the shape of the principle of “procedural autonomy”: it is the
domestic legal system that shapes judicial protection to individuals against
infringement of their rights under Community law.
As a consequence, the case law of the Court of Justice on domestic proce-
dures offers a mixed picture. In some cases, it relies heavily on the effective-
ness principle, and has even demanded that remedies hitherto unknown under
domestic procedural law were established.16 In other cases, the procedural
autonomy of the Member States was stressed.17
But this autonomy is not unfettered, as it is always subject to two condi-
tions.18 First, domestic remedies for enforcement of rights pursuant to domes-
tic law must apply without discrimination to enforcement of rights under
Community law (the principle of non-discrimination or equivalence). Second,
domestic procedural rules should not make the exercise of rights derived from
Community law impossible in practice (the principle of effectiveness stricto
sensu). 
[637] The Court offered a model for balancing the involved principles in Van
Schijndel and subsequent case law.19 According to these cases, the principle of
procedural autonomy applies prima facie, but it is qualified by the principles
of equivalence and practical effectiveness under a two-step test. Thus, a rule
of domestic procedural law barring application of a rule of Community law in
a specific case must be set aside only when it does not pass this test. In the
first step of the test, the domestic court must apply the equivalence principle.
It entails that the court has to apply the rule of Community law invoked in the
case at hand, if it would have to apply an equivalent rule of domestic law. If it
does not have to apply the rule, it must proceed to the second step. Here it
must balance the restriction imposed on the enforcement of the Community
right invoked with the purpose and role of the domestic rule barring its appli-
cation.
The result of this test obviously depends on the rules of domestic and
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Community law involved. Van Schijndel concerned a rule of Dutch law that
forbade the national court from raising issues of law on its own motion, except
for rules of public interest. The Court of Justice ruled that the interests which
this domestic rule sought to protect (such as the interests of the defence and
protection from delays) justified the limitation on the application of
Community competition law in the concerned case. In other cases, it seems
that the nature of the Community right involved decided in favour of the effec-
tiveness principle. 
[638] What implications does the Court’s case law on domestic procedural law
entail for enforcement of European asylum law? First and foremost, that
Community law does have consequences and sets requirements on domestic
asylum proceedings pursuant to the principle of effectiveness - thus apart from
the rules on asylum procedures laid down in Community legislation. If in a
specific case Community legislation on asylum procedures does not apply,
domestic rules that bar application of European asylum law must be tested
against the effectiveness principle. Hence, in states where the Procedures
Directive does not apply to procedures for the granting of subsidiary protec-
tion status (cf. number [262]), applicants for that status can claim “effective
judicial protection” of their right to subsidiary protection status ex Article 18
QD (cf. number [275]). Likewise, although European asylum law does not
state procedural rules on the issue of the dependant statuses for family mem-
bers of refugee or subsidiary protection status beneficiaries, these family
members may rely on the principle when their applications are turned down
(cf. number [580]). 
However, the very nature of the test described above stands in the way of
formulating a general set of procedural standards. Because of the balancing
test through which the effectiveness principle is applied, the outcome depends
on the purpose of the domestic rule on the one hand, and on the nature of the
involved rule of Community law on the other. 
Does the competence of the Community to adopt legislation on procedures
pursuant to Article 63(1)(d) TEC influence the effectiveness test that the Court
applies? Obviously, legislation within the scope of the Directive on procedures
is subject to a far more penetrating review by the Court. Such legislation must
comply with the Directive, and it must be in accordance with relevant interna-
tional asylum law (cf. Article 63(1) TEC). Issues not addressed by the latter
Directive still lie within the scope of the Member States’ competences. This is
underlined by the characterisation of Community legislation pursuant to
Article 63(1)(d) TEC as minimum standards. Within that scope the Member
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States still enjoy procedural autonomy – conditioned by the principles of non-
discrimination and effectiveness. 
9.1.4 Concluding remarks
[639] Community law requires an effective judicial protection of the rights
which individuals derive from Community law, either by direct appeal to the
Luxembourg Courts, or from domestic courts. The admissibility criteria of
Articles 230 and 232 TEC bar direct appeal to the Luxembourg Courts where
European asylum law is concerned. Hence, judicial protection must be sought
form domestic courts. 
Domestic procedural law applies to such proceedings, but is conditioned
by the principle of equivalence between domestic and Community law, and the
principle of effectiveness. The obligation to provide for an effective remedy
applies not only to the subject matter explicitly addressed in secondary legis-
lation on asylum. Hence, in states where the Procedures Directive does not
apply to procedures for the granting of subsidiary protection status, applicants
for that status can claim “effective judicial protection” of their right to sub-
sidiary protection status ex Article 18 QD; family members of refugee or sub-
sidiary protection status beneficiaries to whom a derivative status is denied
may do the same. 
9.2 Direct and indirect effect of European law on asylum 
The effect of Community law 
[640] Article 10 TEC requires that the legislator, executive and judiciary of the
Member States apply Community law; moreover, any rule of Community law
is superior to any rule of domestic law (number [56]). It follows that domes-
tic authorities, including courts, have the obligation to give effect, if possible,
to Community law and to cede precedence to Community law if domestic law
is not in conformity with it. 
European asylum law can have effect in the domestic legal orders of the
Member States in two ways.20 First, it can have a “direct effect”. If a provision
of Community law has direct effect, individuals can invoke it before domestic
courts. Second, by virtue of the principle of “conciliatory (or consistent) inter-
pretation”,21 domestic courts must apply domestic law in accordance with
Community law. The rule of Community law then has effect as it steers the
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application of the rule of domestic law. But it is the latter that is applied, not
the rule of Community law. Therefore, this way of giving effect to Community
law has been labelled “indirect effect”.22
Below, I will discuss indirect effect of asylum law in paragraph 9.2.1, and
direct effect in paragraph 9.2.2. The effect of directives during the period for
transposition is addressed in paragraph 9.2.3. The findings are summarised in
paragraph 9.2.4, where the order of precedence between indirect and direct
effect is addressed. 
9.2.1 Indirect effect
[641] According to the principle of conciliatory interpretation, domestic
courts must as far as possible read domestic law in accordance with
Community law. Conciliatory interpretation concerns in particular
Community directives, but may apply to Treaty provisions as well.23 The obli-
gation applies to directives that were correctly implemented, as well as to
incorrectly implemented ones, and to domestic law from before as well as
from after the Community measure.24 Indirect effect or conciliatory interpre-
tation is not restricted to a specific type of rules of Community law. In parti-
cular, domestic courts must also read domestic law in accordance with
Community law that lacks direct effect.25
Thus, all rules of European asylum law are capable of having an indirect
effect. But it does not follow that they have an indirect effect in each and every
case. In Von Colson, the Court of Justice stated that domestic courts had to
interpret domestic law in conformity with a directive “in so far as it is given
discretion to do so under national law.”26 In later judgements, it spoke of an
obligation to do so “as far as possible”.27 According to Jans et al., this phrase
refers to the constraints that domestic constitutional law may impose: exten-
sive interpretation by courts may run down, or come close to, legislative acti-
vity which domestic constitutional law may forbid.28 Prinssen however points
out that the phrase “as far as possible” is far less explicit than the one applied
in Von Colson; in particular, it leaves uncertain whether the limits to the “pos-
sibility” to apply the principle of conciliatory interpretation are set by domes-
tic law (as Jans et al. suggest) or by Community law.29
As to Community law, the Court of Justice has indicated that the obligation
to give indirect effect to Community law is restricted “in particular by the prin-
ciples of legal certainty and non-retroactivity”.30 Most authors hold that at any
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rate contra legem application of domestic law is not required and that concili-
atory interpretation of a directive that has not yet been implemented may not
result in imposing obligations upon individuals.31 All case law on these con-
straints however concern criminal law, and it is unclear whether it applies at
all, or in the same way in other realms of law.32
[642] Are these restraints to conciliatory interpretation relevant for European
asylum law? The rules on qualification for protection do not imply obligations
for the applicant, so the indirect effect of those rules would not adversely
affect his legal certainty. The same holds true for most rules on procedures and
secondary rights. But conditions for the grant of those secondary rights as well
as some procedural rules do imply obligations for the alien. For example, “the
obligations of the applicants for asylum” laid down in Article 9A PD require
that he co-operates with and, if ordered to, reports to the competent authori-
ties.33 Failure to do so may lead to a negative decision.34 Arguably, conciliato-
ry interpretation of domestic law with these provisions to the effect, that an
application is dismissed because of failure to comply with reporting duties
would be at variance with the Community principle of legal certainty. 
As far as domestic law informs the limits to conciliatory interpretation,
its relevance for European asylum law cannot be definitely addressed here.
But situations wherein conciliatory interpretation of European rules on
examination would lead to contra legem reading of domestic law are harder
to imagine. For domestic law will not usually prohibit the executive from
granting asylum statuses, but rather state on which conditions the status
must be granted. Arguably, at any rate, the rules on qualification can always
be given indirect effect. The matter may be different where domestic law
does not provide a proper basis for the issue of secondary rights. In such a
case, the direct effect of the concerned provisions of Community law
becomes most relevant.
9.2.2 Direct effect
A rule of Community law that has a direct effect can be applied by domestic
courts to cases before them, and hence be relied upon by individuals. In the
case that a rule that has a direct effect conflicts with a rule of domestic law, it
has precedence pursuant to the principle of supremacy of Community law: the
domestic rule cannot apply. Criteria of Community law (not domestic law)
decide whether a Community rule has direct effect or not. In paragraph 9.2.2.1
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I address these criteria, in paragraphs 9.2.2.2-4 I discuss direct effect of
European asylum law. 
9.2.2.1 The conditions for direct effect 
[643] A provision of Community law is directly effective if a court can apply
it to a case before it without transgressing the boundaries of its judicial posi-
tion:35
“provided and in so far as a provision of Community law is sufficiently
operational in itself to be applied by a court, it has direct effect. The clari-
ty, precision, unconditional nature, completeness or perfection of the rule
and its lack of dependence on discretionary implementing measures are in
that respect merely aspects of one and the same characteristic feature
which that rule must exhibit, namely it must be capable of being applied by
a court to a specific case”.36
But if and insofar as a rule leaves the Member States discretion, and thus real
choices for observing their obligations under Community law, it lacks direct
effect.
The classical test developed by the Court of Justice for determining
whether or not a provision has direct effect consists of two cumulative crite-
ria: the provision must be “sufficiently precise” and it must be “unconditio-
nal”.37 The precision requirement concerns the wording of the provision.38 This
condition is fulfilled if the wording is unequivocal. But ambiguous or vague
wording does not necessarily bar a provision from being directly effective, for
the ambiguity may be solved by interpretation. If however it turns out that the
wording hides discretion for the Member States, the provision is not directly
effective.
As to the second requirement, a provision is unconditional if no reservation
has been made for implementation, which leaves discretion. The fact that it is
subject to conditions – a transposition term, factual conditions, and reserva-
tions – is not decisive, for once the condition is fulfilled, the provision may be
directly effective. 
Further, provisions that allow (some) discretion do not necessarily block
direct effect. If a directive contains a primary norm that is sufficiently precise
and unconditional, but states some proviso that allows the Member States to
depart from it in certain cases, the primary norm has direct effect if the appli-
cation of the proviso is amenable to review by the courts.39 If a directive leaves
the Member States some discretion, it may nevertheless have direct effect if it
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is possible to deduce some minimal standard from it.40 Finally, if a provision
that leaves discretion to Member States is the sole obstacle to direct effect, the
directive may nevertheless become directly effective in Member States that
make full use of that discretion.41
[644] Provisions that leave Member States discretion do not, in principle, have
a direct effect. In principle, for such a provision may very well at the same
time set a definite boundary to the exercise of that discretion: 
“[…] where the Community authorities have, by directive, imposed on
Member States the obligation to pursue a particular course of conduct, the
useful effect of such an act would be weakened if individuals were preven-
ted from relying on it before their national courts, and if the latter were pre-
vented from taking it into consideration as an element of Community law
in order to rule whether the national legislature, in exercising the choice
open to it as to the form and methods for implementation, has kept within
the limits of its discretion set out in the directive”.42
In this type of situation, the domestic court is in fact required to check whether
the national legislator or executive remained within the boundaries of
Community law when exercising his competence. It follows that the same
directive provision can have direct effect in one situation, but lacks it in another,
for if the Member State remained within the boundaries of discretion con-
ferred on it, there is no place for the court to intervene. Then, the individual
cannot successfully invoke the provision. But if the state transgressed that
boundary, the court can intervene and apply the rule of Community law – or,
put differently, give direct effect to it.
[645] The examination of whether a rule of Community law has direct effect
or not is to a large extent conditioned by the type of instrument involved, that
is (for present purposes) the Treaty on European Community, a regulation, or
a directive. 
When addressing the direct effects of Treaty provisions, the Court of
Justice in principle applies the precision and clarity test.43 Regulations are,
according to Article 249 TEC, “directly applicable” in the Member States: no
transposition is needed (or even allowed, see number [58]). Consequently,
there are no obstacles for a domestic court to the application of their provi-
sions, i.e. no obstacles to their direct effect. Still, 
“although, by virtue of the very nature of regulations and of their function
in the system of sources of Community law, the provisions of those regu-
lations generally have immediate effect in the national legal systems with-
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out its being necessary for the national authorities to adopt measures of
application, some of their provisions may none the less necessitate, for
their implementation, the adoption of measures of application by the
Member States.”44
Regulation provisions are therefore in principle directly effective, but doubts
may not be suitable for application by courts in cases where a provision expli-
citly leaves the Member States discretion. Then, the test of precision and clari-
ty must be applied to sort out whether or not it has direct effect.45
Most complicated is the determination of direct effect of directive provi-
sions. Directives are addressed to the Member States, leaving them “the choice
of form and methods” to achieve the result proscribed (Article 249 TEC). As
directives call for implementing measures by the Member States, they are
designed to apply indirectly. Still, their provisions can have direct effect, if cer-
tain conditions are fulfilled. 
To begin with, expiration of the transposition term. Directives leave
Member States a certain time span to adopt or change legislation. Directive
provisions cannot be invoked before the expiration of that time span (see, how-
ever, par. 9.2.3). If the implementation is correct, there is no room for direct
effect – the individual relies on the domestic rule implementing the directive,
interpreted if necessary in accordance with the directive.46 But if a provision
has been implemented incompletely or incorrectly, or has not been implemen-
ted at all, individuals can invoke it against domestic legislation – provided that
the provision fulfils the requirements of sufficient precision and clarity. In
those circumstances, the provision can be invoked against both later legisla-
tion, i.e. legislation intended to implement the provision, and against anterior
domestic legislation. Conversely, if a directive has not been implemented, it
cannot impose obligations upon individuals.47 Thus, state organs cannot rely
on the direct effect of obligations of applicants in the asylum procedure (cf.
number [642] above). 
9.2.2.2 Article 63 TEC
[646] Does Article 63 TEC have direct effect? The provision requires adoption
of “standards”, and hence implementation, which includes the exercise of dis-
cretion.48 Thus, the provision is not unconditional. This, however, does not pre-
clude the possibility that elements of the provision may have a direct effect: if
it is possible to isolate a rule of sufficient precision and clarity from a provi-
sion otherwise leaving discretion, this rule has direct effect.49 Arguably, the
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reference to international asylum law in Article 63(1) satisfies these condi-
tions. The requirement of “accordance” is clear and unconditional. The same
holds true for the requirement of compatibility with international agreements
in the second final clause of Article 63. Hence, individuals can rely in court
on the requirement of accordance and compatibility with international law. 
9.2.2.3 Secondary law
The question of the direct effect of secondary law on asylum will in practice
come up in two kinds of situation. First, in the case of a negative decision on
an application for protection. In such cases, applicants may challenge such
decisions relying on rules on qualification, allocation and on other grounds for
refusal, as well as on procedural safeguards. Second, the issue may come up
when secondary rights attached to CEAS statuses are denied.
Qualification 
[647] As to rules on qualification, provisions on temporary protection in the
Temporary Protection Directive cannot have a direct effect as they require
implementation by a Council decision (see number [276]). The matter is dif-
ferent for qualification for refugee and subsidiary protection status. Articles
13 and 18 QD state that “Member States shall grant refugee status (subsidiary
protection status) to any third country national or stateless person who quali-
fies as a refugee (eligible for subsidiary protection) in accordance with
Chapters II and III PD (II and IV)”. In Chapters II to IV, elements of the defi-
nitions of refugee and person eligible for subsidiary protection are elaborated.
It appears, that a person who fulfils those elements and qualifies as a refugee
(or is eligible for subsidiary protection) in accordance with the Directive, has
an unconditioned claim to refugee status (subsidiary protection). 
At first sight, this conclusion is astonishing, because other European asy-
lum legislation explicitly allows for negative decisions on requests for asylum,
not addressed in Chapters II-IV of the Qualification Directive: the safe third
country exception and other grounds for refusal (see number [373]). We
should observe, however, that the scope of obligations under Articles 13 and
18 QD is restricted by Article 1 QD: both provisions can only set “standards
for the qualification of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees
or as persons who otherwise need international protection”.50 Hence, if quali-
fication takes place, third country nationals can rely on Articles 13 and 18 QD,
but these provisions do not and cannot address the question when qualification
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(must) take place – in the terms of Article 29(1) PD, when the Member States
must address the question of whether the application is well-founded by virtue
of the Qualification Directive. For requests for protection pursuant to the
Refugee Convention, and partially for requests for subsidiary protection, the
latter issue is addressed by Article 3(1) DR read in conjunction with 29(1) PD
(see below number [650]). 
[648] Thus, when a Member State decides upon examination that an applica-
tion for refugee or subsidiary protection is unfounded, the applicant can rely
on Articles 13 and 18 QD, and invoke his right to refugee or subsidiary pro-
tection status if he qualifies for it “in accordance with” Chapters II to IV QD.
For our purposes, direct effect of provisions on qualification is relevant in
cases where they set standards that require observance of international asylum
law, or even exceed the standards of international asylum law. Of particular
interest in this respect are the provisions on actors of persecution, on the
Convention grounds “particular social group”, and on serious harm in case of
indiscriminate violence (Articles 6, 10(1)(d) and 15(c) QD - see numbers
[313], [327]-[328] and [305]). These provisions are, arguably, all worded in
sufficiently precise and unconditional terms to have a direct effect. Thus, if an
application is turned down as unfounded because some non-state actor com-
mitted the persecutory behaviour and no agent was able or willing to provide
for protection, the applicant may rely on Article 6 read in conjunction with 13
or 18 against that negative decision. 
[649] Other provisions are couched in vague terms that leave some discretion,
but also sets limits to it that, arguably, have a direct effect (cf. number [644]).
Thus, Article 5 QD does not give a precise and unconditional rule for when
the need for protection arises sur place, but legislation that denies for practi-
cal purposes the possibility would be at variance with, especially, Article 5(2)
last clause QD, which states that well-founded fear may “in particular” be
based upon activities engaged in by the applicant since he left the country of
origin if those activities “constitute the expression and continuation of convic-
tions or orientations held in the country of origin.” The same reasoning applies
for the indications of when “protection” from persecution or serious harm is
“generally” provided, stated in Article 7(2) QD (see numbers [314] and [315]),
and the circumstances to which the Member States must “have regard” accor-
ding to Article 8(2) and 11(2) QD when deciding on the availability of an
internal protection alternative or on cessation of refugee status (cf. numbers
[322] and [346]). 
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Examination
[650] Most important among the rules on decision-making is the right to
examination of the application on its merits pursuant to Articles 3(1) DR read
in conjunction with 23(1) read in conjunction with 29(1) PD. As a regulation
provision, Article 3(1) DR is “directly applicable”. It states in clear and uncon-
ditional terms that each application must be “examined”. The term “examina-
tion” however is vague: any decision on the application is an “examination”;
moreover, the obligation does not apply in case the Member State expels the
applicant to a third country (Article 3(3) DR; cf. number [521]). The obligation
to examine is further defined in the Procedures Directive. Article 23(1) PD
states in precise and unconditional wording that “Member States shall process
applications for asylum in an examination procedure in accordance with” the
requirements set out in Chapter II; according to Article 29(1), “Member sates
may only consider an application for asylum as unfounded if the determining
authority has established that the applicant has not qualified for refugee status
by virtue of [the Qualification Directive].” We saw in paragraph 6.2.2 that the
obligations to perform the examination and to address qualification for refugee
status are subject to a number of exceptions. But if application of these excep-
tions is amenable to judicial review, they do not affect the direct effect of
Articles 3(1) DR, 23(1) and 29(1) PD (cf. number [643]).
[651] Among the exceptions to the obligation to examine whether the applica-
tion for asylum is well-founded, are the variants of the safe third country
exception discussed in Chapter 7. To begin with, the exception that applies in
the case that another Member State is responsible for the examination.51 The
Dublin Regulation determines in great detail and with precision when this
ground for refusal applies (see par. 7.2.1). The relevant regulation provisions,
the criteria for holding the other state responsible and the time-limits (see
numbers [481] and [490]) do not require further measures of implementation
that would block their “immediate effect”. Hence, application of the exception
is amenable to judicial review. 
As to the other exceptions to the obligation to examine the foundedness of
applications for refugee status, a third country is safe for the purposes of
Article 27 of the Procedures Directive “only” when applicants are treated there
in accordance with the requirements set out under (1) (a) to (d). It is not
required that it has been established that the country meets those requirements,
but rather that “the competent authorities are satisfied” that it does. The latter
phrase, arguably, entails discretion for those competent authorities, which is
however limited by the mentioned requirements. Application is therefore
545Judicial supervision 
amenable to judicial review, which is confirmed by Article 27(2) and 38(3) PD
(see number [527]). Application of the safe third country concept is subject to
rules of domestic law (Article 27(2) PD first clause). Thus, Member States
enjoy a certain amount of discretion in the matter. But this discretion is sub-
ject to the conditions set out in Article 27(2) under (a), (b) and (c) PD. In par-
ticular the condition that this domestic law must permit the applicant to chal-
lenge the safety of the third country on the ground that he will be subjected to
ill-treatment there sets a boundary that is subject to judicial review.
The same issue arises for rebuttal of the presumption of safety of third
neighbouring countries for the purpose of Article 35A PD (cf. paragraph
7.5.5). Article 35A(4) PD leaves the issue of “exceptions” to the application
to domestic law, but requires that those “exceptions” are informed by “public
international law” (the prohibitions of refoulement) and address “humanitari-
an and political reasons”. Domestic law that does not provide for these excep-
tions in a meaningful kind of way would exceed the boundaries of discretion.
In this, the exception is amenable to judicial review.
As to the country of first asylum exception (par. 7.5.3), Article 26 under
(a) PD as well as its third paragraph is quite precise and unconditional. The
concept of “sufficient protection” in Article 26(b) seems to leave a certain
amount of discretion, especially when read in conjunction with the last clause
of the provision. But the provision requires that the protection includes “bene-
fiting from the principle of non-refoulement”, which limit to Member State
discretion is open to judicial review (cf. number [643]).
Two grounds of refusal on which the Directive elaborates were addressed
in Chapter 6: subsequent applications and the safe country of origin issue. In
this context, the standards for rebuttal of the presumption that no new facts
arose or were presented, or that the country of origin is stated in Articles
30B(1) as well as 33(4) PD in precise and unconditional terms safe (numbers
[456] and [436]), are relevant, which makes the provisions amenable to judi-
cial review.
[652] In summary, Article 3(1) DR read in conjunction with 23(1) PD read in
conjunction with 29(1) PD states in precise and unconditional terms that
Member States must examine the foundedness of applications for refugee sta-
tus. The multiple exceptions to this obligation are all amenable to judicial
review, and therefore do not affect the direct effect of the mentioned provi-
sions. We should observe that, read in conjunction with Article 13 QD, these
provisions bestow an obligation to grant refugee status to any alien that applies
for it within the European Union, to whom the mentioned exceptions do not
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apply and who qualifies in accordance with chapters II and III QD. The same
applies for claims to subsidiary protection status under Article 18 QD in states
that run a combined procedure, hence where the Procedures Directive applies
to any application for subsidiary protection status (number [263]). States that
run separate procedures enjoy discretion as to the examination or not of appli-
cations for subsidiary protection.
[653] Finally, we should address the question of whether an applicant could
claim that a Member State examines his application on the basis of Articles
3(2) or 15 DR. According to Article 3(2) DR, a Member State is competent to
examine an application although another Member State is “responsible”
according to the Dublin criteria. This competence is of particular interest in a
case where expulsion to the responsible Member State would amount to indi-
rect refoulement. As observed under number [520], European asylum law does
not state criteria for deciding that another Member State is not safe for a par-
ticular applicant; the matter is therefore left to domestic law. In Member States
that make use of this discretion and provide for domestic law that sets out
when other Member States are unsafe for the purposes for the exception of the
safe third country, the provision would gain direct effect (cf. number [643]). 
Pursuant to Article 15(1) DR, a Member State “may bring together” rela-
tives, that is, accept a relative of an alien present on its territory, “even” if it is
not responsible for that relative and he did not lodge an application with it.
Article 15(2) DR states when Member States “shall normally bring together”
relatives, for example, if one of the relatives is dependent upon the other
because of pregnancy or serious illness (see number [616]). Is this provision
directly effective, so that relatives in these situations can claim reunion?
According to Article 15(1) DR, the Member State that brings the relatives
together examines the application for which it is not responsible “at the request
of another Member State” (the responsible one or, eventually, a non-responsi-
ble State where the relative is present). Hence, the obligation to “normally”
bring together relatives is subject to the requirement that a Member State
requests so. The elaboration in the Dublin Application Regulation addresses the
treatment of such a request as a purely inter state affair.52 The requirement that
the persons concerned must give their “consent” for a transfer merely affirms
this.53 It follows that the applicant cannot require the transfer itself; he can
merely require the Member State to make a request for transfer. 
Procedural safeguards
[654] Article 23(1) PD requires that examination procedures are “in accor-
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dance with the basic principles and guarantees set out in Chapter II”. This
obligation is, just like the obligation to perform an examination of the merits,
subject to a limited number of exceptions: it does not apply to the special pro-
cedures meant in Article 24 PD – the preliminary, the special border and the
safe neighbouring third country procedures (see number [372]). But again,
application of these exceptions is amenable to judicial review; they therefore
do not block direct effect of Article 23(1) PD. Further, a number of proce-
dural safeguards apply in the special procedures as well (see paragraph
6.2.4.3).
The safeguards that are most relevant for the compatibility of asylum pro-
cedures with relevant international asylum law are those laid down in Article
9 (on information on the procedure, services of an interpreter, and timely
notice of the decision), 10 (on the personal interview) and 13 PD (on legal
assistance; see paragraph 6.2.4.2). Articles 9 and 13(1) PD raise no particular
questions: they are worded in sufficiently precise and unconditional terms.
The same applies to the right to a hearing laid down in Article 10(1) PD. This
right is subject to exceptions, but these address quite specific situations (see
number [399]), amenable to judicial review. Moreover, certain exceptions may
be applied only on the condition that the absence of a personal interview “shall
not adversely affect” the examination (Article 10(5) PD; cf. number [400]).
Arguably, this limit is open to judicial review as well. The same holds true for
the further requirements on the personal interview that are laid down in Article
12(1) and (2) PD (cf. number [397]). 
Likewise, Article 38(1) PD states in precise and unconditional terms that
applicants are entitled to an effective remedy. Article 38(3) leaves the Member
States some discretion as to the organisation of judicial scrutiny of the right to
remain during appeal proceedings, but read in conjunction with Article 38(1)
PD, the provision also limits this discretion: some provision for suspensive
effect must be made that should be effective. This limit is, arguably, directly
effective.
Secondary rights
[655] Most provisions on secondary rights of refugee status beneficiaries in
the Qualification Directive state are worded in sufficiently precise and uncon-
ditional terms to have direct effect: Articles 21 (on refoulement), 22 (on infor-
mation), 23(2) (on treatment of family members), 24(1) (on residence per-
mits), 25(1) (on travel documents), 26(1) and (2) (on employment and related
training), 27(1) (on education), 28(1) (on social welfare), 29(1) (on health
care), 31 (on accommodation) and 32 (on freedom of movement) QD (see
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numbers [576] and [577]). In particular, the definition of standards of treat-
ment by reference to “nationals” and so on do not preclude direct effect, as
they do not entail discretion on behalf of the Member States. These standards
allow for differentiation among Member States, but at the same time fix the
level of treatment for the individual Member States. 
[656] A number of secondary rights for subsidiary protection beneficiaries are
likewise formulated in precise and unconditional terms: Article 21, 22(2),
27(2), 31 and 32 QD (on refoulement, residence permits, education, accom-
modation and freedom of movement; cf. number [596]). Most provisions how-
ever leave the Member States a certain amount of discretion, which in turn is
subject to certain conditions. Thus, Member States may define “conditions”
that apply to benefits for their family members, but the benefits should still
guarantee an adequate standard of living (Article 23(2) QD). They may make
access to employment subject to “prioritisation”, but only under certain con-
ditions (Article 26(3) QD, cf. number [597]). Welfare and health care may be
restricted to “core benefits” (Articles 28(2) and 29(2) QD). The Preamble
clarifies that the status should be “appropriate”, and that 
“The possibility of limiting the benefits for beneficiaries of subsidiary pro-
tection status to core benefits is to be understood in the sense that this
notion covers at least minimum income support, assistance in case of ill-
ness, pregnancy and parental assistance, in so far as they are granted to
nationals according to the legislation of the Member State concerned”. 54
It follows that Member States do enjoy a certain amount of discretion as
regards the grant of these benefits, but this discretion is subject to certain 
limits, which are amenable to judicial review (cf. number [597]). 
[657] The same approach prevails in the Reception Standard Directive. The
instrument requires that the issue of documentation, the granting of freedom
of movement and access to schooling, housing and health care (Articles
7(1), 10(1), 13(1), 14 and 15 RSD; see par. 8.7.2). All these benefits are sub-
ject to exceptions or conditions that bestow a certain amount of discretion
on the Member States, or they are worded in vague terms that imply a cer-
tain amount of discretion. But the restrictions on these conditions may have
a direct effect. Thus, documentation may be refused, but only when the
applicant is in detention, the application is examined in a border procedure
or in “specific cases”.55 Applicants could hence rely on the provision against
domestic legislation allowing for refusal of documentation on a regular
basis. The freedom of movement may be restricted, but only for specific pur-
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poses.56 Minor applicants have access to schooling under “similar”, not iden-
tical conditions as nationals: a vague term that implies some, but not unfet-
tered discretion.57 Likewise, Member States are left the choice to provide
housing, food, clothing and health care in kind or in the form of allowances.
But those reception conditions must be made “available”, “ensure a standard
of living adequate for the health of applicants”, and be “capable of ensuring
their subsistence”.58
[658] All secondary rights attached to temporary protection status are obvi-
ously conditioned by the establishment of temporary protection. Once this
condition is fulfilled, the relevant provisions may have a direct effect. The pro-
visions that address the granting of residence permits and of documentation,
access to schooling and family reunification (Articles 8, 9, 14 and 15(2) and
(3) TPD; see numbers [621]-[622]) are stated in sufficiently precise and
unconditional terms to have a direct effect. The provisions on access to
employment, accommodation, welfare and medical care (Articles 12 and 13
TPD, see number [621]) require the issue of benefits, but state them in vague
terms or allow for conditions that convey a certain amount of discretion whose
limits may, again, have a direct effect. Thus, temporary protection benefi-
ciaries must be given access to employment, but this access may be made sub-
ject to prioritisation of only certain groups of persons.59 Accommodation must
be “suitable”, “necessary assistance” must be issued in terms of welfare and
subsistence.60
9.2.2.4 Conclusions
[659] Most remarkable from the point of view of international law is the right
to have one’s application for asylum examined on the merits as laid down in
Articles 3(1) DR read in conjunction with 23(1) read in conjunction with
29(1) PD read in conjunction with 13 and 18 QD. This rule is subject to a con-
siderable, yet limited number of exceptions for specific kinds of cases. As
these exceptions are amenable to judicial review, they do not detract from the
direct effect of the mentioned provisions. Thus, European asylum law confers
a subjective right to asylum that can be enforced before the authorities of the
Member States.
Application of the exceptions to this right - the exception of the safe third
country, the exception of the subsequent application - is subject to conditions
that likewise have a direct effect. In particular, provisions that explicitly leave
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the Member States considerable discretion (Articles 27(2) and 35A(4) PD)
make this discretion subject to conditions that may be relied on by the indivi-
dual. Most of the safeguards on procedures that are relevant for observance of
international law are fully or partially directly effective. As to provisions on
secondary rights, those applying to refugee status beneficiaries are in general
quite precise and unconditional, whereas those applying to subsidiary protec-
tion and applicant status beneficiaries usually leave a certain, but restricted
amount of discretion.
9.2.3 Obligations during the transposition period
[660] All Community directives on asylum law granted the Member States a
period for implementation (see number [62]). The obligation for the Member
States to comply with the directive applies only after the expiry of that period.61
Before, the directive provisions do not yet have legal effect for asylum pro-
ceedings. 
There are three exceptions. First, this may be different when a Member
State adopted implementation legislation before the end of that term. The
intention of that Member State to perform the obligation to transpose the
Community measure (that appears from the (premature) legislation) triggers
the obligation to read the implementation measure in accordance with
Community law.62 Second, in the absence of such premature transposition,
Community law does not prevent domestic courts from applying the principle
of conciliatory interpretation voluntarily. Third, directives may require absten-
tion from taking certain measures during the transposition period. In Inter-
Environnement Wallonnie, the Court of Justice stated that 
“Although the Member States are not obliged to adopt those [implementa-
tion] measures before the end of the period prescribed for transposition, it
follows from the second paragraph of Article 5 [old, now 10 TEC, HB] in
conjunction with the third paragraph of Article 189 [old, now 249 TEC,
HB] of the Treaty and from the directive itself that during that period they
must refrain from taking any measures liable seriously to compromise the
result prescribed”.63
This obligation apparently is restricted to abstention – there is no obligation to
adapt legislation in anticipation of the expiration term, much as that legisla-
tion may diverge from the directive. Further, merely endangering the result is
not enough; the directive will have this special sort of direct effect only if the
domestic rule “seriously” compromises the result. 
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Arguably, this obligation applies at any rate to Articles 35(2), 30A(2) and
35A(7) PD. The provisions allow for legislation that falls short of the stan-
dards that generally apply to border procedures, to the national designation of
safe countries of origin, or that allows for expulsion to safe neighbouring third
countries without previous examination of the claim, if that legislation was in
force at the time of adoption of the Procedures Directive (cf. numbers [382],
[452] and [533]). Introduction of domestic standards that lower the level of
protection below the level that generally applies according to the Procedures
Directive during the implementation period would be at odds with these clauses.
Arguably, a difference with Inter-Environnement Wallonie is that these clauses
prohibit all legislation that lowers the standards in the mentioned respects, not
merely legislation that is “liable seriously to compromise the result pre-
scribed”. 
[662] Finally, before the expiration of the transposition term, directive provi-
sions that address the interpretation of international law may have legal effect
within the domestic legal systems as means of interpretation of international
law. We saw in paragraph 1.4.2.1 that state practice informs the interpretation
of international treaty law. Technically speaking, the directives on asylum are
acts of the Council, not acts of the Member States in their capacity as states
party to the Refugee Convention or other relevant treaties. But when the
Member States ratified the Treaty of Amsterdam (Article 63 TEC), they
empowered the Council to adopt rules on the interpretation of Article 1 RC
that would bind them when they apply the Refugee Convention, i.e. when they
act in their capacity as states party to the Refugee Convention. Therefore, the
Qualification Directive provisions on the interpretation of the refugee defini-
tion may safely be qualified as an expression of the Member States’ (not only
the Council’s) minimum interpretation of Article 1 RC. 
Further, the directives that address international law should alternatively be
accepted as means of interpretation of international law because they are
“relevant rules of international law” for the purposes of Article 31 VTC. We
saw in paragraph 1.5.2 that Community law cannot and may not be classified
as “international law” as regards its legal effects within the European Union.
But from the external perspective of international law, the Treaty on European
Community and acts based on this Treaty are “international law”. For the
Member States in their capacity as states party to the Refugee Convention,
thus when the Member States adopt this external perspective, the
Qualification Directive and other secondary Community law on the interpre-
tation of international law therefore qualify as relevant international law. 
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9.2.4 Concluding remarks
[663] Domestic courts must “as far as possible” interpret domestic law in
accordance with Community law (“indirect effect” or “conciliatory inter-
pretation”). All provisions of Community law, including those that lack
direct effect, may be given such indirect effect. Meanwhile, there are limits
to the obligation to give indirect effect to Community law. First, the consti-
tutional position of the judiciary under domestic law may prohibit extensive
interpretation of domestic law. Second, general principles of Community
law may resist conciliatory interpretation, in particular, the principles of
legal certainty and non-retroactivity. For European asylum law, these
restraints are relevant for obligations of applicants during the asylum pro-
cedures and for conditions on the grant of secondary rights, but not for
rules on qualification.
Further, domestic courts can apply provisions that have “direct effect”.
Provisions have direct effect when they are unconditional and sufficiently
clear. In cases where provisions leave Member States discretion but also set
limits to it, observance of those limits is subject to judicial review. A consid-
erable number of provisions of European asylum law have direct effect or set
limits that are subject to judicial review (see paragraph 9.2.2). 
Does Community law establish an order of precedence between these two
ways of giving effect to Community law? According to Prinssen, the case law
of the Court of Justice does not show an unambiguous preference for either
way.64 Most commentators appear to hold the view that indirect effect is pre-
ferable, because of its conciliatory effect and because it suits better the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity, whereas both methods are in principle equally capable of
securing the full effect of Community law within the domestic legal order.65
Only where the limits to conciliatory interpretation come into play (set by the
position of the judiciary and the principle of legal certainty), is giving direct
effect the preferable or even only viable way.66
In principle, directives can be relied on only after the expiry of their 
period for transposition (or after a transposition measure was adopted, if this
happened before the end of that term). But during this period, Member States
may not take measures that “seriously compromise” the result 
envisaged with the directive, and they have to comply with the standstill
clauses. Moreover, during this period directives that address the interpreta-
tion of international treaty law have legal effect outside the realm of
Community law: as means of interpretation of the Member States’ obliga-
tions under international law.
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9.3 Adjudication of asylum law by the Court of Justice
Acts by Community institutions as well as acts by Member States (acting as the
executive branch of the Community) must be in accordance with international
asylum law (cf. paragraph 2.2.2.3). The review of this compliance rests ulti-
mately with the Court of Justice, through the preliminary rulings procedure
(see paragraph 9.3.1).67 This review may concern the validity of secondary
Community law because of conflicts with superior Community law, in parti-
cular, with superior rules that require accordance with international law on asy-
lum (discussed in paragraph 9.3.2). This review by the Court of Justice further
addresses the interpretation of primary and secondary Community law on asy-
lum. In Chapters 5 to 8, a number of important issues as regards interpretation
and application of international asylum law were identified. In paragraph 9.3.3
I will discuss whether these issues fall within the scope of review of the Court
of Justice. Subsequently, I will address the question of which national courts
are competent to refer preliminary questions (paragraph 9.3.4), and in what
types of cases they have an obligation to ask questions (paragraph 9.3.5).
9.3.1 Preliminary rulings 
[664] Whereas it is up to the domestic courts of the Member States to ensure
the legal protection of individuals that Community law entitles them to, the
unity of Community law is guaranteed by the supervision of the Luxembourg
courts. According to Article 68 read in conjunction with 234 TEC, domestic
courts facing questions on Community law pursuant to Title IV TEC can refer
the question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. The ruling of the
Luxembourg court on the issue is “preliminary”, as it does not decide on the
case itself. The Court will only answer the question of Community law, and
the referring court applies the Community rule to the case, guided by the pre-
liminary ruling on the matter.68
Article 234 TEC regulates the preliminary rulings procedure as it general-
ly applies; Article 68 TEC introduces a number of particularities in references
to the Court of Justice for matters concerning Title IV TEC. Two issues in par-
ticular are relevant for European asylum law. First, the scope of national courts
that can refer questions to the Court of Justice is restricted in comparison to
the general regime established by Article 234 TEC (see further paragraph
9.3.4). Second, Article 68(3) introduces an advisory procedure that does not
apply to other Titles of the Treaty: Member States, the Council and the
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Commission can ask the Court to give a ruling on the interpretation of Title
IV and of measures based on it. So far, no such ruling has been requested . In
other respects, the usual regime established by Article 234 TEC applies. 
[665] Under the regime of Article 234 (read in conjunction with Article 68(1))
TEC, references to the Luxembourg courts for preliminary rulings can be
made on three types of subject-matter: interpretation of the Treaty on
European Community, the interpretation of acts of Community institutions,
and the validity of such acts.69 In all three types of cases, the Court of Justice
can be asked to rule on issues relevant for international asylum law.
For the first type of issue, Article 63(1) and the second last clause of
Article 63 TEC set international asylum law as a direct standard for measures
pursuant to Article 63(1), (3) and (4), as well as for domestic law within their
scope (number [146]). After the entry into force of the Constitution, the
Charter will rank as primary law (number [166]). 
Secondly, domestic courts may refer questions on the interpretation of acts
of Community institutions, such as regulations and directives. Questions
under this heading may concern the content of provisions of Community asy-
lum legislation, and the scope of that legislation. 
Thirdly, a question may concern the validity of acts of Community institu-
tions. This possibility for domestic courts to submit the validity of Community
legislation for review to the Luxembourg Courts is the counterpart to the pos-
sibility to challenge the validity of decisions under Article 230 TEC (see num-
ber [637]). One of the grounds for appeal under Article 230 TEC, which is also
relevant for action under Article 234 TEC ,70 is “infringement of the Treaty or
of any rule of law relating to its application”. 
9.3.2 Review of validity of Community legislation on asylum
Minimum standards and accordance with international law
[666] The review of validity of acts of the Community institutions (directives,
regulations, or the lists of safe third neighbouring countries or safe third coun-
tries of origin) addresses (inter alia) “infringement of the Treaty or of any 
ruling relating to its application”. That includes review of accordance with the
Refugee Convention and other relevant treaties (Article 63(1) TEC; or of com-
pliance with relevant general principles of Community law – see number [118]
above). In chapters 5 to 8, we concluded that several provisions are not up to
the standards set by relevant international law: they prescribe treatment of
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applicants or other CEAS status beneficiaries that falls short of, or deviates
from treatment prescribed by international law. Should we conclude that these
rules are therefore invalid? 
Most rules of secondary law on asylum are minimum standards (see num-
ber [256]). Minimum standards should allow the Member States to adopt or
maintain domestic law that deviates in favour of the applicant. If the
Community standards do so, no conflict with international law can occur. For
instance, Article 10(1) RSD requires that applicants, including (unrecognised)
Convention refugees, must have access to schooling under “similar” condi-
tions as nationals. This standard falls short of Article 22(1) RC that requires
the same treatment as nationals (see number [608]). But Article 4 RSD expli-
citly allows Member States to adopt or maintain a “more favourable” standard,
thus to give applicants the same treatment as nationals in terms of access to
schooling. Therefore, we cannot conclude that this standard is at variance with
international law.
[667] It follows that insofar as European asylum law provisions state “mini-
mum standards”, they cannot be invalid because of lack of accordance with
international asylum law. The question of validity can come up only for provi-
sions that do not state minimum standards (see number [224]). Thus, a provi-
sion of Community law that sets a standard that falls short of international law,
and moreover precludes Member States from adopting a more favourable one
(that would be in accordance with international law) would not be in accor-
dance with international law and therefore invalid. 
The precise grounds for invalidity depends on the legal basis of the rele-
vant provision. The rules on qualification, procedures and secondary rights
must be minimum standards according to Article 63(1), (2) and (3)(a) TEC. A
provision on that subject matter that does not set a minimum standard is
invalid because of infringement of the Treaty requirement that it should set a
minimum standard. But the question of whether or not it does set a minimum
standard depends on the question of whether or not it allows the Member
States to adopt more favourable rules that are in accordance with international
law standards. Hence, the validity of such a provision is affected by the
requirement of accordance with international law in an indirect way. Rules on
allocation of applicants based on Article 63(1)(a) TEC (the Dublin Regulation
and related instruments) do not have to set minimum standards (number
[215]). A rule on that subject matter may nevertheless set a minimum standard
(when it allows Member States to adopt more favourable standards); then, it
cannot be invalid because of lack of accordance with international law. But if
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it does not set a minimum standard, and requires Member State conduct at
variance with international law, it would be invalid because of breach of
Article 63(1) first clause TEC. 
In summary, the question of which provisions of the Community legislation on
asylum are invalid because of lack of accordance with international law
depends, directly or indirectly, on the question of which provisions do not state
minimum standards. Below, I will discuss the provisions of European asylum
law that in their wording seem not to state minimum standards. It will appear
that some indeed do not, whereas others, despite their wording, allow for more
favourable domestic standards. As to the rules that do not state minimum stan-
dards, I will subsequently address the question of whether they impose a rule
that prohibits the Member States from performing their obligations under
international law. For if a Community “maximum standard” does not address
international law, or prohibits standards that international law also prohibits, it
is in accordance with international law.
Obligatory cessation of and exclusion from protection statuses
[668] A few provisions on qualification seem not to state minimum norms: those
that require cessation or exclusion. Article 11 QD states grounds when a person
“ceases to be a refugee” (which are based on Article 1C RC, see number [346]),
and Article 12 QD when a person “is excluded from being a refugee” (based on
Article 1D, 1E and 1F RC, see numbers [344] and [337]). Cessation and exclu-
sion are hence obligatory. We should observe that these provisions exclude the
relevant categories of persons not only from the scope of Article 13 QD, from
Directive refugee status, but from “being a refugee”. It seems that the provisions
state an obligation to exclude aliens also from the grant of refugee status accor-
ding to standards in domestic law, that exceed the minimum standards set by the
Qualification Directive. Could these provisions nevertheless be interpreted as if
they allowed for more favourable domestic standards, and were hence in accor-
dance with their minimum standard character? 
[669] According to Articles 1D, 1E and 1F RC, the Refugee Convention “shall
not apply to” persons within their scope, who are therefore not “refugees” in
the sense of this instrument. In other words, refusal or withdrawal of refugee
status to or from these persons is a declaratory act (cf. paragraph 8.2.3). If a
Member State decides not to apply, say, Article 1D and “recognises”
Palestinians who qualify under Article 1A(2) RC, but to whom the Refugee
Convention does not apply according to Article 1D RC, that State does so in
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excess of its obligations under the Convention, in fact on discretionary
grounds.71 Such domestic legislation falls outside the scope of the
Qualification Directive, and is therefore not affected by Article 12(1)(a) QD.72
The same reasoning applies to Article 12(1)(b) and (2) QD (concerning
Articles 1E and 1F RC).73
Their validity would be affected however, if the Qualification Directive did
set rules on the interpretation of Articles 1D to 1F RC that were overly wide.
If the Directive stated rules on exclusion or cessation that apply also to per-
sons who fall outside the scope of Article 1D, 1E or 1F RC (and qualify for
refugee status under Article 1A(2) RC), Article 12 QD would require exclu-
sion of persons who do qualify as a refugee under Article 1 RC. The discus-
sion of Article 12 QD however did not reveal such overly wide clauses.
As to Article 11 QD, the matter is different. Article 1C RC arguably sug-
gests that aliens continue to be “refugees” in the sense of the Convention until
their status (the recognition of their refugee status) has been withdrawn; put
otherwise, withdrawal or cessation of refugee status on the basis of Article 1C
is a constitutivist, not a declaratory act. Obligatory cessation of refugee status
would therefore be at variance with the minimum norm character of Article 11
QD. However, despite the wording of Article 11 QD, cessation is not obligato-
ry. For according to Article 36 PD, the Member States “may”, not must, start
withdrawal procedures in case they have reasons to reconsider the validity of
the refugee status (see number [468]). 
In summary, both Articles 11 and 12 QD do not affect the competence of
the Member States to adopt or maintain more favourable domestic standards
that are in accordance with their obligations under international law. 
[670] Articles 16 and 17 QD state, in obligatory terms, cessation and exclu-
sion from subsidiary protection for certain categories of aliens (number [339]
and [346]). These categories include persons who fall within the scope of
Article 3 ECHR, 7 CCPR or 3 CAT. Are Articles 16 and 17 QD therefore rules
that prohibit the Member States from offering protection in accordance with
their obligations under the prohibitions of refoulement, and therefore invalid? 
Obligatory exclusion from subsidiary protection status does not imply an
obligation to expel. European asylum law simply does not address what should
happen to persons who are excluded from those statuses. Hence, the obliga-
tion to exclude persons from subsidiary protection status does not infringe on
the prohibitions of refoulement. Incidentally, Articles 16 and 17 QD do not
prohibit the Member States from grant persons excluded from subsidiary pro-
tection (or whose status has ceased) a status on discretionary grounds. 
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Obligatory denial of examination 
[671] As to the rules on procedures, two arrangements seem to impose obliga-
tions that are detrimental to the applicant’s procedural rights. First, Articles
19(2) and 20(1)(e) DR seem to prohibit domestic law that attaches suspensive
effect to appeal against the decision not to examine a claim for protection on
grounds laid down in the Dublin Regulation (cf. number [425]). It was
observed that such a reading would run counter to the subsidiarity principle.
Moreover, we should bear in mind that these regulation provisions are, as all
rules on procedures for the granting of protection, minimum standards (cf.
number [187]). A rule of domestic law stating that appeal against any negative
decision on a request for asylum has suspensive effect would be in favour of
the applicant. And such a rule could not undermine the coherence of
Community law: Article 38(3)(b) PD explicitly allows for this rule (cf. num-
ber [425]). Hence, Article 19(2) and 20(1) DR read in their context do allow
for domestic legislation attaching suspensive affect to appeals against refusal
of asylum because another Member State has accepted its responsibility.
[672] Second, according to Article 30B(2) PD, Member States must issue a
negative decision on an application by a national from a safe third country of
origin figuring on the “minimum common list” if the applicant has not
rebutted the presumption of safety (cf. number [446]). Is this rule a minimum
standard? We observed that the Member States are free to set standards for
rebuttal in accordance with their international legal obligations (number
[459]). We further saw that in cases where the presumption of safety is not jus-
tified, the Member States can request removal of the concerned country from
the list; this request suspends the obligation to consider that country as ‘safe’
for the purposes of Article 30B PD (number [459]). In so far, it is possible to
read the provision as a minimum standard in the sense that it allows for
domestic standards that deviate from the Procedures Directive in favour of the
applicant. But one may hold that this arrangement is not a minimum standard,
as offering some difficult escape route is not the same as allowing for more
favourable standards (cf. number [460]). And it is unclear whether a Member
State can continue to request removal of a country from the list (and so sus-
pend the obligation to consider it as safe) if the Council has, on a previous
request, decided not to remove it. One could state that subsequent requests for
removal undermine the coherence of European asylum law, and are therefore
not allowed for (see number [257]). Therefore, there are good reasons to state
that the safe third country exception as laid down in Articles 30 and 30B PD
do not set a minimum standard. 
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Whether these doubts on the validity of these provisions will indeed lead to legal
problems depends on the states that occur on the “minimum common list”. As
far as the arrangement does no more than require that the good human rights
record of, say, Canada be taken into account when applications by Canadian
nationals are examined, there is little chance of collision with international law. 
Obligatory denial of secondary rights
[673] Article 11(1) RSD requires that “Member States shall determine a period
of time, starting from the date on which an application for asylum was lodged,
during which an applicant shall not have access to the labour market” (cf.
number [609]). This rule requires denial of access to the labour market during
a period to be determined by the Member States. Therefore, it is not a mini-
mum standard and in principle invalid. 
But the rule is not at variance with international law. Relevant provisions
in this respect are Articles 17 and 18 RC that require access to the labour mar-
ket for “lawfully staying refugees”, i.e. refugees who are lawfully present for
more than three months (number [550]; as observed in paragraph 8.7.1, appli-
cants must be treated in accordance with those provisions). And Article 11(1)
RSD does not prohibit the Member States from granting access after three
months of lawful presence. Denial of access to the labour market after three
months would therefore affect the validity of the domestic measure, denial
before that period cannot be challenged on the basis of international law. 
[674] Further, a number of provisions “allow” Member States to grant certain
benefits, or to grant them to certain categories of beneficiaries. For example,
Article 14(2) RSD states that Member States “may allow” adults access to the
education system, and Article 12 TPD even states that Member States shall
authorise access to the labour market “for a period not exceeding that of tem-
porary protection”, thus implying a limit to granting such access..74 Read a
contrario, the Member States “may” not grant other benefits nor grant them
to other categories of beneficiaries. If read so, these rules prohibit the grant of
certain secondary rights. 
But arguably, it follows from Article 63 TEC that we should not read these
provisions as if they conferred a competence to grant certain benefits. All
rules on secondary rights are based on Article 63(1)(b) or (3)(a) TEC and are,
therefore, “minimum standards”. Not only does the “minimum” character call
for an interpretation that allows Member States to exceed those standards, the
qualification as “standards” implies that the relevant rules of Community law
address the exercise of competencies that the Member States already had
560 Chapter 9
before the adoption of the relevant directives. Thus, rules that “allow” Member
States to grant certain secondary rights do not confer a competence to do so. 
What other legal meaning could they have? Arguably, they serve to inspire
Member States to grant those benefits, in excess of the minimum standards
they must observe. Handoll suggests that provisions that “allow” Member
States to grant secondary rights serve the purpose of ensuring that granting
those benefits can not be considered as encouraging secondary movements,
and thus not as countering the aim of the Directive.75
Concluding remarks
[675] Only rules that prohibit Member States from setting standards that are
more favourable for persons in need of protection, i.e. rules that do not set
minimum standards, could be invalid for lack of accordance with internatio-
nal asylum law. Most rules on qualification, procedures and secondary rights
are minimum standards, or appear to set minimum standards. An exception is
Article 11(1) RSD, on denial of access to the labour market for applicants. But
the rule does not prohibit Member States from complying with relevant inter-
national asylum law. Possibly, another exception is the obligatory assumption
of unfoundedness of applications by persons from safe countries of origin ex
Article 30B PD. Here, the “maximum standard” nature may lead to collision
with international law standards, but whether it will do so in practice depends
on the ‘safety’ of the countries that occur on the list. 
9.3.3 Review of Member State acts 
Introduction
[676] According to Article 234 read in conjunction with 68 TEC, domestic
courts can ask preliminary questions on the interpretation of the Treaty. This
includes questions on the requirement of accordance with the Refugee
Convention and other relevant treaty law (see paragraphs 2.2.2.1 and 2.3).
Thus, the Court of Justice is competent to rule on the interpretation of inter-
national asylum law. But the scope of review by the Court of Justice is limi-
ted: it is restricted to acts that fall within the scope of Community law (num-
ber [136]). Thus, not each and every Member State act in the realm of asylum
is open to review by the Luxembourg Court, only acts that implement or apply
directives and regulations on asylum. Therefore, the Court of Justice’s compe-
tence to interpret international asylum law is restricted to subject matter that
falls within the scope of the Community legislation on asylum.
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In order to properly assess the role of the Court of Justice as interpreter of
international asylum law, we should distinguish between three kinds of situa-
tion. First, European asylum law states in clear terms a rule that is in accor-
dance with international asylum law. In this situation, there is no need to ask
the Court of Justice to rule on the interpretation of international asylum law.
For example, Article 27 QD requires that refugee status beneficiaries have
“full access” to primary education “under the same conditions as nationals”.
As far as recognised refugees are concerned, this standard secures full compli-
ance with the relevant standard in the Refugee Convention, Article 22(1) (see
number [577]). The Member States must comply with Article 27 QD, and
where they do, they also comply with Article 22(1) RC (as far as Directive
refugees are concerned). And if some measure of domestic law does not com-
ply with Article 27 QD, it is sufficient to establish so – the interpretation of
Article 22 RC is not needed. 
Second, a provision of Community law states in clear terms a rule that is at
variance with international asylum law. For example, Article 7 QD states that
“parties or organisations, including international organisation” can offer pro-
tection from persecution or serious harm. For the purposes of Article 1 RC,
neither parties nor organisations can offer protection (number [316]). As the
matter is explicitly addressed, it falls within the scope of Community law: a
rule of domestic law that designates parties or organisations as actors of pro-
tection implements Article 7 QD. A domestic court that is faced with a rejec-
tion of an application on these grounds can therefore turn to the Court of
Justice for a ruling on the accordance of this measure with international asy-
lum law. 
Third, an issue of international asylum is not explicitly addressed in
Community law at all, or addressed in an unclear manner. For example, Article
9(3) QD (as well as Article 10(2) QD) states that a person has a well-founded
fear of persecution only if there is a connection between the act of persecution
and a Convention ground (number [330]). It would follow that a person does
not qualify as a Directive refugee if only a link between the absence of protec-
tion from persecution and the Convention ground can be established. But this
link would be sufficient to qualify as a refugee pursuant to Article 1 RC. In
this, Article 9(3) QD would not be up to the standards of international law.
Could the Court of Justice be approached to rule on the matter? 
In this situation, the scope of the provision must be assessed in order to
decide whether it addresses the “causal nexus” as such. If so, the link between
protection and Convention ground falls within its scope, and can be ruled on
by the Court of Justice. But it may also turn out that Article 9(3) QD addres-
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ses only the causal nexus between persecution acts and Convention grounds,
and leaves other instances of the nexus to domestic law. Then, the matter falls
outside the scope of Community law and hence outside the scope of review of
the Court of Justice. 
[677] How to delimit this scope? In paragraph 2.2.2.3, we saw that, apart from
the text of the contested rule, the degree of harmonisation that the measure
seeks to establish is a most relevant factor. If a measure is designed to esta-
blish only an initial or modest degree of harmonisation, matters that are not
addressed fall outside its scope (number [115]). As all Directives on asylum
set “minimum standards”, it is by no means self-evident that they address their
object (qualification for protection, asylum procedures and so on) in a com-
prehensive way. Thus, as a minimum standard, Article 9 QD may leave aspects
of the causal nexus that it does not explicitly addresses to domestic law.
However, minimum standards are not necessarily intended to establish a low
level of harmonisation (number [214]). What level of harmonisation is aimed
at must be assessed for each instrument separately. Further, the context of a
provision may call for an extensive interpretation. Thus, although Article 9(3)
QD does not explicitly say so, interpretation of the provision in its context
reveals that it does address the topic of causal nexus comprehensively (see
number [680]). 
In Chapters 5 to 8, a number of provisions whose compatibility with inter-
national asylum law raises some issue were identified. Below, I will address
the most pertinent issues concerning qualification, procedures, the third coun-
try exception and secondary rights, focusing on secondary Community law
that is unclear (the third kind of situation mentioned above). 
Qualification
[678] As far as rules on qualification for refugee and subsidiary protection sta-
tus are concerned, we may observe that, in general, the Qualification Directive
sets minimum standards, which calls for a restrictive interpretation of its scope
(see number [115]). However, the instrument is intended to establish “common
criteria for the identification of persons genuinely in need of international pro-
tection”.76 It follows from the term “common” that a considerable, though not
comprehensive degree of harmonisation is aimed at (see paragraph 4.6). 
The scope of international law on qualification for protection addressed by
the instrument is limited to a considerable extent by Articles 13 and 18 QD.
For the definitions of “refugees” and “persons eligible for subsidiary protec-
tion” in Articles 2(c) and (e) QD quite comprehensively reproduce Article 1
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RC and the personal scope of persons entitled to protection from refoulement
are based on Article 3 ECHR.77 But it does not follow that each question on
qualification for protection under these instruments of international law falls
within the scope of the Directive, as it establishes obligations for the Member
States for a far smaller group of persons. The Qualification Directive requires
the issue of a residence permit and so on only78 for “beneficiaries of refugee
(and subsidiary protection) status” (see numbers [576] and [596]). According
to Articles 13 and 18 QD, these statuses must be granted only to persons who
qualify as a refugee (as meant in Article 2(c) QD) in accordance with Chapter
II and III (or to persons eligible for subsidiary protection as meant in Article
2(e) QD, in accordance with Chapters II and IV). The instrument therefore
does not state obligations to persons who qualify as a refugee (or who are eli-
gible for subsidiary protection) in accordance with other rules than those set
out in Chapters II-IV. Those other rules hence fall outside the scope of the
Qualification Directive, and (unless addressed by other European legislation)
outside the scope of Community law.
A number of issues, relevant for qualification as a refugee or as a person
in need of protection pursuant to Articles 1 RC or Article 3 ECHR (or
Articles 3 CAT or 7 CCPR) are not addressed at all in Chapters II, III and
IV of the Qualification Directive. The standard of proof implied by the
“well-founded fear” criterion, and “humanitarian cases” within the ambit of
the prohibition of refoulement ex Article 3 ECHR provide examples. Hence,
if a Member State refuses a residence permit or is willing to expel a person
whose expulsion is prohibited by Article 3 ECHR on “humanitarian
grounds” (cf. number [297]), the accordance of these acts with internation-
al law cannot be reviewed by the Court of Justice. For as protection of
“humanitarian” cases is not addressed in Chapters II or IV, the applicant falls
also outside the scope of “subsidiary protection”, and (no other Directive
being relevant) outside the scope of Community law. The standard of proof
implied by well-founded fear would have been amenable for review by the
Court of Justice if the Qualification Directive had stated a standard, as its
Proposal did (see number [278]). In the absence of such a provision, the mat-
ter is left to domestic law.
[679] A number of issues are addressed in Chapters II to IV, but not compre-
hensively, not in accordance with international asylum law, or in an unclear
manner. In some cases, the text of the provision clearly indicates that it does
not intend to provide a comprehensive arrangement. For example, Article
10(1) QD, on “Reasons for persecution” (the Convention grounds), numbers
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“elements” that Member States “shall take into account when assessing the
reasons for persecution” (cf. number [325]). Arguably, it follows from this
wording that aspects of the Convention grounds that are not mentioned in the
list fall outside the scope of the provision, and hence outside the scope of
review by the Court of Justice.
In other cases, the text of provisions on qualification is unclear about their
scope. Thus, Article 6 QD leaves some uncertainty on the question of whether
or not third parties may count as actors of persecution or serious harm if there
is neither a state nor a de facto authority (number [313]). The phrase “actors
of persecution or serious harm shall include” in Article 6 QD (emphasis
added) may serve as an indication that the provision is not meant to settle the
issue of actors of harm completely. However, the heading to the provision
(“Acts of persecution and serious harm”) as well as the Preamble recital that
explicitly states that “[i]n particular, it is necessary to introduce common con-
cepts of […] sources of harm and protection” suggest otherwise.79 Object and
purpose of Article 6, hence indicate that the issue was not left to the Member
States. The Court of Justice can, therefore, be approached for clarification of
the scope of Article 6(c) QD. 
The same reasoning applies to the contradictory rules on protection needs
arising sur place (see number [335]). Article 5(2) QD suggests that the fear of
persecution or risk of harm should be due to convictions held in the country
of origin. Article 4(3)(d) (and Article 20) QD on the other hand suggest that
fear or risk could also be based on activities that the applicant engaged in after
departure from the country of origin, which is in accordance with internatio-
nal law. As Article 5 QD, according to its heading, addresses the issue of
“international protection needs arising sur place”, and as the Preamble states
that it is “in particular […] necessary to introduce common concepts of ” this
matter,80 the issue was not left to domestic legislation. 
The flawed arrangement on “internal protection” in Article 8 QD can be
subjected to the same interpretation. As this provision is headed “Internal pro-
tection”, and as the Preamble states that “[i]n particular, it is necessary to
introduce common concepts of […] internal protection”,81 it is apparently
intended to address “internal protection” comprehensively.
[680] Finally, the causal nexus between the act of persecution and a
Convention ground, required for qualification as a refugee by Article 9(3) and
10(2) QD (cf. numbers [330]-[333]), is somewhat intricate. Does a domestic
rule on the nexus between failure of protection and a Convention ground fall
within or outside the scope of the Directive? The headings to Articles 9 and 10
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QD read “acts of persecution” and “reasons of persecution”. They do not,
therefore, suggest that the provisions are intended to address the causal nexus
in a comprehensive way (in contrast to the headings to Articles 5 and 6 QD).
Nor does the Preamble state that it is necessary to address this matter “in par-
ticular”. All this suggests that other aspects of the causal nexus than the one
addressed by Articles 9(3) and 10(2) QD fall outside the scope of Community
law, and are left to domestic law.
The text of Article 9(3) QD, however, strongly suggests otherwise where it
states that the requirement of a connection between the Convention ground
and the persecution act is “in accordance with Article 2(c)”, that is with the
refugee definition. We may safely assume that according to the Qualification
Directive legislator, all provisions on qualification in Chapters II and III are
“in accordance with Article 2(c)”, at least in the sense that they are not at vari-
ance with it, but no other provision explicitly states this to be the case.
Arguably, the explicit reference to the refugee definition in Article 9(3) QD
serves to make clear that the requirement of a link between a persecution act
and a Convention ground is implied by the refugee definition itself, or, put
another way, the proper meaning of the term “for reasons of ”.82 This textual
argument, backed up by the objective to set “common standards” on qualifi-
cation, arguably defeats the a contrario reasoning set out above. Hence,
Article 9(3) QD addresses the causal nexus as such, and the Court of Justice
is competent to rule on the matter. 
Procedures
[681] The material scope of the Procedures Directive is not clear, as the instru-
ment gives two general indications that contradict each other. On the one hand,
the instrument sets minimum standards, and aims at no more than establishing
a “minimum framework” for procedures.83 It would follow that issues that are
not explicitly addressed by the instrument fall outside the scope of
Community law. On this basis one could argue that where the Directive allows
for exceptions to the right to a personal interview (cf. number [399]), the mat-
ter falls outside the scope of Community law, regardless of the compatibility
with international law of those exceptions. On the other hand, the Procedures
Directive sets general standards on asylum procedures that may imply a wider
scope. Thus, decision making in most procedures in the first instance should
be “individual, objective and impartial” (Articles 3A(1), 7(2) PD), and “com-
plete and adequate” (Article 23(2) QD); the remedy offered in appeal must be
“effective” (Article 38(1) PD). Could we assume that the restrictions to indi-
vidual access to procedures (cf. number [394]) fall within the scope of
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Community law, as they affect the individual, objective, impartial, complete
and/or adequate nature of the decision-making? 
For the rules on organisation that apply to procedures at first instance, this
ambiguity is partially solved by the context and object and purpose of the rele-
vant provisions. The Preamble states that “the organisation of the processing
of applications for asylum is left to the discretion of Member States”.84
Aspects of the organisation of procedures not addressed by the Directive, such
as the time frame for decision-making, therefore fall outside the scope of
Community law. The Preamble further holds that 
“every applicant should, subject to certain exceptions, have an effective
access to procedures, the opportunity to co-operate and properly commu-
nicate with the competent authorities so as to present the relevant facts of
his/her case and sufficient procedural guarantees to pursue his/her case at
and throughout all stages of the procedure”.85
Thus, the rules on procedural safeguards serve to secure “effective access” and
to provide for “sufficient procedural guarantees” – but these are “subject to
certain exceptions”. Bearing in mind that the Directive provides merely for a
“minimum framework”, it seems that those “exceptions” fall outside the scope
of the instrument. 
[682] For appeal procedures, the scope of review by the Court of Justice is
considerably broader than the material scope of the various provisions on
appeal (Articles 38 PD, 19 and 20 DR and 28 TPD), due to the working of the
general principle of Community law that everyone whose rights under
Community law are affected is entitled to an effective remedy (number [421]).
As this principle is informed by relevant international law, notably by Article
13 ECHR, it entails that the appeal authority may suspend expulsion in case
of an arguable claim, and that they may address matters of fact in addition to
matters of law. Secondary law cannot influence the scope or content of this
hierarchically superior principle of Community law. The preamble to the
Procedures Directive acknowledges that Article 38(1) does not confer, but
rather confirms this right to an effective remedy.86
It follows that domestic law on suspensive effect and on the scope of judi-
cial review falls within the scope of Community law. This conclusion is not
at odds with Article 38(3)(a) and (b) PD: this provision only leaves the
modalities for organising the right to remain during appeal proceedings to
domestic law. For practical purposes, it leaves them the choice between pro-
viding that an appeal has suspensive effect, or that such effect may be
requested. 
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[683] The Procedures Directive stipulates that applications by nationals from
third countries that are designated as “safe countries of origin” by the Council
are rejected, unless the applicant manages to rebut the assumption of safety
(Articles 30 read in conjunction with 30B PD; see par. 6.4.5). We saw that appli-
cation of this presumption of safety is in accordance with international law only
if it does not result in a heightened standard of proof of the applicant’s fear of
being persecuted (or risk of serious harm), and that the standard suggested in
Article 30B(1) PD, “serious grounds”, is quite unclear in this respect (number
[456]). Could the Court of Justice rule on a question concerning a domestic law
provision that, relying on the term “serious” in the English language version,
raises the standard of proof for the applicant beyond the level that usually
applies to refugees or subsidiary protection beneficiaries? As the standard is
explicitly addressed in Article 30B(1) PD, the Court of Justice can indeed rule
on it (the second type of case addressed in the introduction, see number [676]). 
A similar issue arises over the standard that applies to subsequent applica-
tions addressed in the ‘preliminary procedure’. Pursuant to Article 33(4) PD,
a subsequent application can be considered as unfounded if there are no new
facts that “significantly add to the likelihood of ” qualification for refugee or
subsidiary protection status (cf. number [438]). Again, as this standard is
explicitly stated, the Court of Justice can test domestic law that applies it to the
Refugee convention and other relevant treaty law.
The third country exception
[684] The rules on application of the safe third country exception laid down in
Articles 27 and 35A PD address the requirements of international law on
rebuttal of the assumption of safety only partially. Article 27(2) PD states that 
“[t]he application of the safe third country concept shall be subject to rules
laid down in national legislation, including: [...] (c) rules, in accordance
with international law, allowing an individual examination of whether the
third country concerned is safe for a particular applicant which, as a mini-
mum, shall permit the applicant to challenge the application of the safe
third country concept on the grounds that he/she would be subjected to tor-
ture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
Hence, it is not explicitly required that domestic law allows for rebuttal of the
presumption that the third country is safe for the purposes of Article 33 RC.
Could the Court of Justice rule on domestic law that does not allow rebuttal on
this ground? Article 27(2)(c) PD explicitly states that the domestic rules on
rebuttal must be “in accordance with international law”. Does it follow that this
term was intended to bring these rules of national law within the scope of
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Community law? The term “as a minimum” suggests otherwise, and so does the
set-up of the provision: instead of providing for rules on the rebuttal, it explicit-
ly leaves the matter to domestic legislation, stating a minimum standard only
where expulsion contrary to Articles 3 ECHR, 3 CAT and 7 CCPR is concerned. 
Even more explicitly, Article 35A(4) PD leaves it to domestic law to pro-
vide for exceptions from the application of the ‘safe neighbouring third coun-
try procedure’ “for reasons of public international law” (see number [534]).
Arguably, a Member State that applies the exception without providing these
exceptions would contravene the Directive, but the Court of Justice would not
be competent to rule on the particular “reasons of public international law”
that should be addressed in the national rule. 
[685] The Dublin Regulation is based on the presumption that the Member
States are safe third countries, and does not state grounds for rebuttal of this
presumption (number [522]). Article 3(2) DR allows Member States where an
application is lodged to examine the claim for protection on its merits,
although another Member State is safe. Member States may make use of this
competence in case the responsible Member State is unsafe for the purposes
of the safe third country exception – and they should do so in order to act in
accordance with the refugee Convention and other relevant treaties. Does
domestic law on the application of the competence ex Article 3(2) DR (or the
absence of such domestic law) fall within the scope of Community law?
Arguably, it does not. Article 3(2) DR does not confer the right to examine
requests for protection to Member States; rather, it confirms this sovereign
right. For the right to grant asylum or to examine requests for it has not been
transferred to the Community (only competence to set standards on the exer-
cise of this right, i.e. competence to abridge it was transferred). Accordingly,
Article 3(2) DR does not bring the matter within the scope of Community law.
Nor do other rules of European asylum law set standards for the assessment of
the safety of the Member States, so in marked contrast to the other safe third
country arrangements. Hence, the matter is left to domestic law, and not
amenable to review by the Court of Justice. 
Secondary rights
[686] The Directives on Qualification and Reception Standards set minimum
standards and aim at establishing a minimum level of secondary rights (see
number [260]). The harmonisation ambitions are therefore modest. The
Temporary Protection Directive also sets minimum standards; its Preamble
does not further define the level of harmonisation.
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Refugee, applicant and temporary protection beneficiaries are, under interna-
tional law, entitled to a number of Convention benefits that are not addressed
in the Directives on Qualification, Reception Standards and Temporary
Protection (see number [625]). Bearing in mind the modest harmonisation
ambitions in this field, the benefits that are not addressed arguably fall outside
the scope of Community law. 
[687] Finally, we should address the Family Reunification Directive. Its
Preamble states that refugees merit “special attention” “on account of the rea-
sons that obliged them to flee their country of origin and prevent them from
leading a normal family life there”, and are therefore entitled to “more
favourable conditions […] for their right to family reunification”.87 Articles 10
to 12 FRD, indeed, state such more favourable standards. From the perspective
of international law, the arrangement shows two major flaws (cf. number
[587]). To begin with, Article 9(2) FRD allows Member States to restrict the
more favourable treatment to family ties that predate the flight, whereas the
fear for persecution also provides for a major obstacle to lead family life in the
refugee’s country of origin if the family ties were engaged in after the flight.
Further, Article 12(1) third clause FRD allows Member States to require that
the refugee applying for family reunification can provide for “normal” accom-
modation, sickness insurance and stable income for the reunited family, if the
application was lodged over three months after the refugee was granted his
status. Could the Court of Justice rule on the compatibility with Article 8
ECHR of a national rule that implements both grounds for rejection? 
Arguably, it follows from the quoted Preamble recital that the arrangement on
refugees merely serves to state “more favourable conditions” than usually apply to
applicants for reunification, not to address the refugee’s claims under Article 8
ECHR comprehensively. Types of cases for which the Directive does not state
more favourable conditions hence fall outside the scope of its minimum standards.
Conclusions
[688] The Court of Justice is competent to interpret international asylum law,
but its review is restricted to Member State acts that fall within the scope of
Community law. Aspects of international asylum law fall within this scope if
they are explicitly addressed by a rule of secondary Community law. Some
provisions of Community law set clear standards that are compatible with (or
even exceed) the standards of international law. In such cases, there is no need
for the Court of Justice to address the interpretation of international law.
Compliance with these provisions of secondary Community law entails com-
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pliance with international law. This applies to a number of secondary rights for
Directive refugees (such as Article 27 QD). 
Other provisions of Community law explicitly set clear standards too, but
standards that are not compatible with international asylum law. Examples are
the rules on actors of protection and on internal protection, laid down in
Articles 7 and 8 QD. The Court of Justice is competent to rule on the accor-
dance of these rules with international law. 
Again, other provisions of secondary Community law also explicitly address
some aspect of international asylum law, but do so only partially or in an unclear
manner. Here, the scope of the rule of Community law must be interpreted on
the basis of its context and purpose. In some cases, it follows that such provi-
sions serve to address the relevant aspect of international law comprehensively.
Accordingly, issues that are not explicitly addressed by the text of the provision
also fall within the scope of Community law, and thus within the scope of review
of the Court of Justice. This applies to the rules on refugees sur place, actors of
harm, the causal nexus, suspensive effect of appeal, and the standards for rebut-
tal that may apply to subsequent applications and the exception of the safe coun-
try of origin (Articles 5, 6, 9(3) and 10(2) QD, 38, 33(4) and 30B(1) PD). 
In other cases, however, it follows from context and purpose that the rele-
vant rule of Community law is intended to address the subject matter only par-
tially. Then, aspects of that subject matter that are not explicitly addressed fall
outside the scope of the rule of Community law, and therefore outside the
scope of review by the Court of Justice. Examples are the rules on the
Convention grounds, exceptions to procedural safeguards, aspects of the stan-
dards for rebuttal of the safe third country exceptions, and exceptions to the
more favourable treatment of applications for family reunification by refugees
(Articles 10(2) QD, 27(2) and 35A(4) PD, 3(2) DR and 9(2) and 12(1) FRD). 
Finally, some aspects of international asylum law are not addressed at all
by secondary Community law. Obviously, they fall outside the scope of
Community law. Examples are rules on “humanitarian” cases under Article 3
ECHR, the standard of proof implied by “well-founded fear”, and numerous
Refugee Convention benefits. 
9.3.4 The implications of Article 68 TEC
9.3.4.1 Introduction 
[689] In the previous paragraph, we saw that the Court of Justice is competent
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to issue rulings on a considerable part of international law, but that it will be
able to do so only when domestic courts refer questions to it. Which courts are
competent to refer? It is in this respect that Article 68(1) TEC derogates from
Article 234 TEC. The Constitution for Europe does not contain a counterpart
to Article 68 TEC. Hence, Article 369 CfE, the successor to Article 234 TEC,
will apply to asylum issues as well.88
Pursuant to Article 234 TEC, “any” court or tribunal “may” refer questions
to the Court of Justice, “if it considers that a decision on the question is neces-
sary to enable it to give judgement”. Courts “against whose decisions there is
no judicial remedy under national law” must refer such questions. Hence,
courts of first instance may, and upper courts must refer. Both enjoy power of
“appraisal”, that is, they enjoy “discretion [….] to ascertain whether a decision
on a question of Community law is necessary to enable them to give judge-
ment”.89
Article 68(1) states that where a question 
“is raised in a case pending before a court or a tribunal of a Member State
against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that
court or tribunal shall, if it considers that a decision on the question is
necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give
a ruling thereon.”
Hence, “upper” courts “shall” refer questions on Title IV, when they consider
it “necessary” – they have the duty to refer, and have power of appraisal, just
as they do under Article 234 TEC. 90 But in contrast to Article 234 TEC, Article
68(1) denies courts of first instance the competence to refer questions on Title
IV before the Court of Justice for preliminary ruling. Questions by lower
courts on asylum issues will be declared inadmissible.91
The exclusion of courts of first instance in Article 68(1) was presumably
prompted by the desire to protect the Luxembourg Courts from an overload of
preliminary questions.92 We may observe that this exclusion could have
adverse effects on the unity of Community law in the field of asylum, as it will
take more time before questions on interpretation are referred to the Court
than if courts of first instance had the competence to do so. Arguably, the
exclusion also adversely affects the efficiency of asylum procedures, for as De
Zwaan and Bultema observe, it provokes continuation of proceedings for the
sole purpose of a reference to the Luxembourg courts.93
However this adapted preliminary ruling proceeding may work out, we are
concerned with the consequences for judicial protection of persons within the
scope of international asylum law. In this respect, the lack of power of courts
of first instance to refer questions raises two issues. Firstly, how does Article
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68 TEC affect their powers in adjudicating compatibility with international
asylum law? And secondly, which courts whose decisions are not subject to
review under domestic law?
9.3.4.2 Courts of first instance and interpretation 
[690] The competence of domestic courts of first instance to interpret
Community law is not affected by their lack of power to refer to the Court of
Justice. The only limitation Article 234 (read in conjunction with 68) TEC sets
to their ability to adjudicate is the prohibition to declare Community measures
invalid (see number [691]).
Hence, under the regime of Article 234 read in conjunction with 68 TEC
courts of first instance can apply Community measures without turning to the
Court of Justice for clarification, as long as they have no doubts on its validi-
ty. The lack of competence to refer to the Court of Justice therefore has no
consequences for protection under international law if a case concerns only
interpretation of the Treaty or interpretation of Community legislation. If a
lower court deems a Member State act within the scope of Community law to
be incompatible with international asylum law binding the Community and
can solve the case by interpretation of the Treaty or the Community act in
accordance with international asylum law, there is no problem. 
9.3.4.3 Courts of first instance and invalid Community acts
[691] In paragraph 9.3.1, it was argued that only a few rules of the present
body of European asylum law are invalid. This may be different for future
European asylum law. Therefore, I will discuss the consequences of Article 68
TEC for courts of first instance that face questions on the validity of
Community law on asylum. 
If a lower domestic court has serious doubts on the validity of (present or
future) Community legislation on asylum, it would find itself in a difficult
position. Only the Court of Justice is competent to declare an act of a
Community institution (such as a Directive) invalid.94 Hence, when a court of
first instance deems a Community measure invalid for violation of primary
Community law, it must assume that the measure is valid and apply it. But
when it does apply the measure, it violates the rule of primary Community law
according to which the measure is invalid. Since Article 68(1) TEC bars refe-
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rence to the Court for solving these conflicting obligations, how is this pro-
blem to be solved? 
One solution would be the assumption that courts of first instance are com-
petent to refer questions in the exceptional case of doubts on the validity of
Community measures on asylum. But such a competence is at odds with
Article 68(1) TEC, and the Court of Justice is unwilling to bridge gaps in the
Community legal protection system by reading Treaty provisions contra
legem.95 It is also unlikely that the Court of Justice would depart from the rea-
ding that Article 234 TEC prohibits lower courts to declare Community mea-
sures invalid. The reasons for denying domestic courts the competence to
declare Community legislation invalid apply to asylum legislation as fully as
to any other kind of Community acts: uniform application of Community law
and the Court being in the best position to decide on the validity of
Community acts.96
[692] I can think of three alternative solutions for this deadlock. The first solu-
tion endeavours to fit in with the Community system of judicial protection:
extensive application of the rules for granting interim relief during prelimi-
nary ruling proceedings. 
The Court of Justice ruled in Atlanta that a domestic court could suspend
implementation of Community law, if four conditions are met:
“- that court entertains serious doubts as to the validity of the Community
act and, if the validity of the contested act is not already in issue before
the Court of Justice, itself refers the question to the Court of Justice; 
- there is urgency, in that the interim relief is necessary to avoid serious
and irreparable damage being caused to the party seeking the relief;
- the national court takes due account of the Community interest; and 
- in its assessment of all those conditions, the national court respects any
decisions of the Court of Justice or the Court of First Instance ruling on
the lawfulness of the Community act or on an application for interim
measures seeking similar interim relief at Community level.”97
The only condition that poses problems is the first one, reference to Court of
Justice. This condition firmly links suspension of the Community measure to
the actual reference to the Court of Justice, a condition that courts of first
instance cannot meet as they cannot refer the matter themselves. The condi-
tion is obviously of crucial importance for securing the Court’s prerogative
under Article 234 TEC to rule on the validity of Community measures and
hence for the uniform application of Community law. 
When considering this condition, we should bear in mind that the grant of
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interim relief is based on the principle that every individual is entitled to effec-
tive protection of the rights Community law entitles him to (cf. number [631]).
As Community law provides for assessment of validity of Community mea-
sures by the Court of Justice, irreparable harm during such assessment must
be precluded by the grant of interim measures. Article 242 TEC explicitly
empowers the Luxembourg courts to provide for interim relief in case of
actions based on Article 230 TEC. As the Court pointed out in Atlanta, the
“coherence of the system of interim legal protection therefore requires that
national courts should also be able” to grant the same relief.98 Thus, the Court
applies competencies attributed to it by the Treaty for direct appeal procee-
dings (Articles 230 and 242 TEC) in a corresponding manner to the other
branch of Community legal protection, notwithstanding the fact the grant of
interim relief by a domestic court indisputably endangers uniform application
of Community law, albeit temporarily. 
I think that the same reasoning applies to the preliminary ruling procee-
dings as modified by Article 68(1) TEC. As we saw above, the masters of the
Treaty presumably decided to limit access to the Luxembourg courts in this
way in order to protect them from being overburdened, and not in order to
downgrade effective protection. The Court of Justice can assess legislation
pursuant to Title IV on its validity; hence, persons affected by that legislation
are entitled to interim relief in accordance with the Community principle of
effective protection. And according to the Atlanta conditions quoted above,
the lower court can suspend the measure if questions on its validity have been
referred to the Court of Justice. 
Thus, in order to fill a gap in the Community judicial protection system,
we have to assume that the court of first instance is competent to suspend
allegedly invalid Community legislation. The link between the grant of inter-
im measures by the court of first instance and the reference to a preliminary
ruling is secured in asylum proceedings, albeit in an indirect way. For in asy-
lum procedures, one of the parties is the determining authority or some other
agency of the Member State, to whom Article 10 TEC applies (cf. number
[56]). If a court of first instance suspends a Community measure, this agency
has the duty under Article 10 TEC to make sure that this unlawful situation
ends. The agency therefore has the obligation to appeal against the decision by
the court of first instance to suspend implementation of the Community act
until the case is brought before the court that is competent to refer the matter
to the Court of Justice. 
In this way, respect for primary Community law would be secured by the
interim suspension, and the unity of Community law as well as the Court’s
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exclusive power of assessing validity of Community acts would ultimately be
respected too. This solution further fits in well with the system of effective judi-
cial protection of Community law. Still, the link between the suspension and the
reference to the Court is indirect, and hence somewhat weak. In other words, it
secures judicial protection to the detriment of the unity of Community law. 
[693] The second solution would be as follows: we would assume that the
Community principle of effective judicial protection requires that domestic
procedural law provide for a special remedy that applies in case a lower court
has doubts on the validity of a Community measure on asylum. The rule of
domestic law would entail that the lower court has the competence to refer,
pending its decision on the appeal, the questions on the validity of the
Community measure to the court whose decisions are not open to review. This
court could either decide that there are no doubts about the validity of the
Community measure; then, the court of first instance must apply the measure
to the case before it. If the higher court shares the doubts on the validity, it
refers the matter to the Court of Justice (and grants interim relief for the appli-
cant, in accordance with the Atlanta conditions). 
In this way, the direct link between the grant of interim relief and reference
to the Court would be secured, but at the expense of the procedural autonomy
of the Member States. Although the principle of effective judicial protection
of Community rights may under certain circumstances imply an obligation to
provide for remedies hitherto unknown under domestic procedural law (see
number [636]), this solution may seem too radical.
[694] The third solution would circumvent the question of validity, by applica-
tion of Article 307 TEC. We saw in paragraph 2.1 that domestic courts are com-
petent to declare Community measures incompatible with international obliga-
tions resting on the Member States, and for that reason not apply the Community
measure. Neither Article 234 nor 68(1) TEC affects this competence. These pro-
visions address only the competence to judge on compatibility of Community
measures with international asylum law binding the Community, not interna-
tional law binding the Member States (though they are identical). 
Obviously, a decision by the lower court not to apply the Community mea-
sure pursuant to Article 307 TEC would impair the uniform application of
Community law. Again, appeal by the state, obligatory under Article 10 TEC,
would bring the issue eventually to the upper court, which could refer the
question of compatibility of the Community measure with international asy-
lum law to the Court of Justice. 
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9.3.4.4 Courts whose decisions are not subject to review
[695] One final issue remains to be settled. Which courts cannot refer to the
Luxembourg Courts? Article 68 TEC speaks of courts “against whose deci-
sions there is no judicial remedy under national law”. This definition is iden-
tical to the one in the third paragraph of Article 234 TEC. Hence, the case law
on Article 234 TEC applies. 
There are two views on the matter. According to the “abstract theory”, only
such courts whose decisions are never subject to review are courts in the sense
of Article 234(3). According to the “concrete” theory, the applicable criterion
is whether the involved decision is open to review. The Court of Justice has not
yet ruled on the issue. But according to many commentators, the Court’s deci-
sion in Costa v E.N.E.L. offers grounds to assume it adheres to the “concrete”
theory.99 For in that case, the Court qualified the referring Italian court as a
court whose decisions are not subject to review, although the decisions of this
court were open to appeal in other types of cases. The concrete theory is more
attractive for the purposes of Article 68 as it renders more courts competent to
pose preliminary questions on asylum law and therefore reduces the number of
cases wherein the problems addressed in the previous paragraph could arise. 
9.3.4.5 Conclusions
[696] Pursuant to Article 68 TEC, only courts whose decisions are not subject
to review under domestic law can refer preliminary questions. The inability of
lower courts to state preliminary questions does not affect their competence to
interpret European asylum. But the arrangement raises problems in cases
where lower courts consider a piece of Community legislation invalid, as a
domestic court can suspend its application only while referring the matter to
the Court of Justice. Several solutions for this deadlock were suggested (see
numbers [691]-[694]). A court whose decisions are in general open to review
under domestic law may nevertheless refer questions if they arise in a case that
is not open to further domestic review.
9.3.5 Exceptions to the obligation to refer
[697] In paragraph 9.3.3, a number of issues concerning international asylum
law that falls within the scope of Community law were identified. On these
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issues, the Court of Justice can rule. Article 234 read in conjunction with
Article 68 provides that where a question of interpretation is raised before a
court whose decisions are not open to review under national law, that court
must bring the matter before the Court of Justice (cf. par. 9.3.1). But will these
courts actually do so? The obligation to refer is subject to three exceptions that
may be relevant for the number of cases on asylum that will be brought before
the Court of Justice.100
To begin with, the obligation does not apply when the Court of Justice has
already interpreted the Community provision involved (the “acte éclairée”
doctrine).101 As yet, the Court has not ruled on any provision of European asy-
lum law.
Second, the domestic court has no obligation to refer a question that is
raised before it 
“if that question is not relevant, that is to say, if the answer to that question,
regardless of what it may be, can in no way affect the outcome of the case”.102
If domestic law exceeds the level of protection prescribed by a minimum stan-
dard of European asylum law, then there is in principle no need to state a pre-
liminary question. For regardless of the accordance of the rule of European
asylum law with international asylum law, the domestic court would apply the
domestic rule.
[698] The accordance of the rule of European asylum law with international law
would be relevant in a case where domestic law does not prescribe a higher level
of protection: the correct interpretation of the rule of Community law might then
be decisive for the outcome of the case. If the interpretation is disputed, the
domestic court must refer questions on the contested rule of Community law to
the Court of Justice, unless it is confident that the answer is clear (that it is an
“acte clair”). The domestic court may consider so only if “the correct applica-
tion of Community law [is] so obvious as to leave no room for any reasonable
doubt”.103 Before the domestic court comes to the conclusion that there is no
room for such doubt, it “must be convinced that the matter is equally obvious to
the courts of the other Member States and to the Court of Justice”, compare “the
different language versions” of the provision and, if these are “entirely in accord
with each other”, it should be borne in mind that “Community law uses termi-
nology that is peculiar to it”, its own “legal concepts”; 
“Finally, every provision of Community law must be placed in its context
and interpreted in the light of the provisions of Community law as a whole,
regard being had to the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution at the
date on which the provision in question is to be applied”.104
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Arguably, on many of the issues discussed in paragraph 9.3.3, there is suffi-
cient room for “any reasonable doubt” to trigger the obligation to refer ques-
tions in case they are relevant for the outcome of domestic proceedings. This
is all the more true in cases where the interpretation of the relevant rules of
international asylum law varies among Member States. 
Yet domestic courts whose rulings are not subject to review under the
domestic legal system may not be readily inclined to refer questions concer-
ning accordance with international asylum law. Hitherto, these courts were the
supreme authorities on the interpretation and application within their Member
States of the Refugee convention, the Convention Against Torture and the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Hence, on many issues addressed by
European asylum law they (may) have already established an interpretation in
accordance with international law. If the rule of European asylum law reflects
or even exceeds the previously applying standard, there will not be much room
for doubt. The fact that the domestic law of other Member States prescribes
some higher level of protection is not necessarily due to a diverging reading of
obligations under the relevant instruments of international asylum law. Rather,
the courts that can refer may see those diverging standards as domestic ones
that exceed the obligations under international law, which are allowed for by
the minimum standards of European asylum law, but outside the scope of the
latter . And the special regard that must be had to the concepts and other fea-
tures that are particular to Community law may not be that persuasive as
regards the concepts applied in, say, the Refugee Convention. Arguably,
domestic courts may be more readily inclined to state preliminary questions
on interpretation issues they have not yet addressed. 
9.3.6 Conclusions
[699] The Court of Justice is competent to rule on the validity of secondary
Community law, and on the interpretation of primary and secondary
Community law on asylum (see further par. 9.3.1). European minimum stan-
dards on asylum can be invalid because of conflicts with international asylum
law only if they prohibit Member States from adopting or maintaining domes-
tic law that exceeds Community law to the advantage of the alien (see para-
graph 9.3.2). Arguably, only Article 30B PD may do so under certain specific
circumstances. The Court of Justice’s competence to rule on the interpretation
of international asylum law on the other hand is quite considerable (see para-
graph 9.3.3). 
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Whether or not the Court of Justice will have much opportunity to address
interpretation of international asylum law remains to be seen, for two reasons.
First, courts whose decisions are subject to review under national law cannot
pose preliminary questions (at least not on issues of interpretation; see further
par. 9.3.4.2). Second, the courts that can refer questions may see no reason to
do so if domestic law prescribes standards of treatment that exceed those in
European law. In states where Community rules reflect or exceed the reading
of those standards of international law in domestic law, courts may not be
inclined to decide that there is room for sufficient doubt on the reading of
European law to refer questions to the Court of Justice (see paragraph 9.3.5).
9.4 The Luxembourg Courts and domestic courts
Introduction
[700] Insofar as domestic courts form part of the Community judiciary, they
must comply with rulings by the Court of Justice, including those on interpre-
tation of international asylum law. However, we saw in Chapter 2.1 that the
Member States’ obligations under the instruments of international asylum law
remain unaffected by Community law on the same subject matter. In their
capacity as courts of States party to the relevant instruments of international
law, the domestic courts of the Member States can and must secure observance
of those instruments. What are the consequences of the competence of the
Court of Justice to interpret international asylum law for domestic courts in
the latter capacity? 
Obviously, there is no competition between domestic courts and the Court
of Justice where the latter is not competent. This holds true not only if an act
falls outside the scope of Community law, but also when it comes to the vali-
dity of the Treaty. This issue will be discussed briefly below. More important
for the present study are other acts within the scope of Community law, which
fall within the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction. The consequences that domes-
tic courts may or must attach to rulings by the Court of Justice for their own
testing against international asylum law will be discussed below. 
Accordance of the Treaty on European Community with international law
[701] Notably absent from the scope of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice
is the validity of the Treaty or other provisions ranking as primary Community
law.105 Therefore, the Luxembourg organs cannot rule upon the compatibility
of provisions of the Treaty with international asylum law.106 Consequently, the
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competence of the domestic courts of the Member States to rule on the vali-
dity of primary Community law is not affected.107
Could the compatibility of primary Community law with international asy-
lum law be questioned with any chance of success? Doubts have been cast on
the Spanish Protocol on the grant of asylum to Community citizens. But its
Sole Article may be read and applied in a manner consistent with internatio-
nal asylum law (see number [462]). 
Hailbronner mentions the differentiation between refugee status addressed
in Article 63(1), and temporary protection in Article 63(2)(a) TEC.108 We saw
in Chapter 8.2 that the granting of temporary protection status upon a request
for recognition as a refugee does in itself not infringement on the Refugee
Convention (cf. number [620]).109 The differentiation is therefore not incom-
patible with international asylum law. The same reasoning applies mutatis
mutandis to differentiation between standards for the reception of “applicants”
and residence conditions of “refugees”.110
Accordance of Member State acts with international asylum law
[702] Preliminary rulings by the Court of Justice may address the compatibi-
lity of domestic law with international asylum law. Could the Court’s interpre-
tation of international asylum law conflict with interpretation by domestic
courts? Two situations should be distinguished. Firstly, interpretations of inter-
national asylum law by the Court of Justice that exceed, and secondly, inter-
pretations that fall short of readings by domestic courts. 
In the first situation, the Court of Justice imposes on the Member State an
obligation towards persons who invoke international asylum law, in excess of
that Member States’ obligations under the relevant instrument of internatio-
nal law (as interpreted by that Member State). Here, a conflict is not possible
for obviously, such a ruling by the Court of Justice has no adverse effect upon
the protection under international asylum law. One could of course argue that
such an interpretation infringes on the Member State’s sovereignty. For exam-
ple, if pursuant to a preliminary ruling on the Qualification Directive a
Member State must recognise an alien as a refugee, although he does not ful-
fil the requirements of Article 1 RC according to that Member State’s own
reading of the Refugee Convention, the sovereign right of that state to con-
trol the presence of aliens is infringed upon. However, there is no conflict in
the proper sense on the interpretation of the Refugee Convention, as the lat-
ter instrument does not prohibit a broader scope of application than the
refugee definition requires (see number [223]). The “infringement” would
rather be due to an (allegedly) erroneous reading of the scope of Community
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competence by the Court. Under Article 63(1)(c), the Community is compe-
tent only on the qualification of refugees as meant in the Refugee
Convention, not to grant refugee protection to persons outside the scope of
the Convention, so one might argue. 
[703] Conflicts may occur in the second situation, when rulings by the Court
of Justice prescribe treatment that falls short of the standard set by internatio-
nal law. In general, conflicts are unlikely under present European asylum law,
as most of it leaves Member States the competence to grant protection in excess
to its standards. Let us assume for example that the Court of Justice is asked a
preliminary question on the accordance of Article 9(3) QD with the Refugee
Convention, and that it rules that it follows from Article 1 RC that a person with
a well-founded fear of persecution cannot qualify for refugee status if a causal
nexus between the persecution act and a Convention ground is absent (cf. num-
ber [680]). This reading would not render the true meaning of Article 1 RC. But
as Article 9(3) RC sets a minimum standard, the provision (as interpreted by the
Court of Justice) does not affect the domestic court’s competence to give a
more favourable ruling. A domestic court would hence be free to rule that a per-
son may also qualify for refugee status if a connection between the absence of
protection and a Convention ground has been established. 
Still, in such circumstances the ruling by the Court of Justice might have a
detrimental effect on the protection of Refugee Convention rights. A domestic
court confronted with this issue may very well be tempted to rely on the inter-
pretation by the Court of Justice. Then, the domestic court would be neglec-
ting the fact that obligations under international law that rest on the Member
State (in their capacity as States party to the Refugee Convention), remain
unaffected by European asylum law. Put otherwise, the domestic courts must
establish the true meaning of the Refugee Convention autonomously from the
interpretation of this instrument by the Court of Justice. 
[704] The matter is different when the Community law obligation is not a
minimum standard, and the Court of Justice upholds it. We saw that Article
30B PD may impose an obligation to act contrary to international asylum law,
and future asylum legislation might bind the Member States to take negative
decisions on requests for asylum (number [672]). If the Court of Justice ruled
that this obligation is in accordance with international law whereas a domes-
tic court assumed otherwise, that domestic court would indeed face conflict-
ing obligations. We saw in Chapter 2.1 that according to Article 307 TEC,
Community law cedes precedence to international law in case of a conflict.
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However, it is questionable whether Article 307 applies to Community acts
based on Article 63(1) TEC.
In Lévy, the Court of Justice ruled that the obligation to apply Community
law is suspended only if a conflicting rule of national law is “necessary” to
ensure the Member State performs its obligations under the anterior interna-
tional agreement, and that it is up to the domestic court to decide which obli-
gations that agreement imposes on that state.111 Hins commented that Article
307 TEC does not apply in case of a conflict with the European Convention of
Human Rights. He argued that the Luxembourg Courts test Community law to
the European Convention of Human Rights, and if they conclude that the rule
of Community law does not conflict with the Convention, Article 307 TEC
cannot apply.112 Lawson and Besselink argue that the Court of Justice does not
“apply” the Convention in the proper sense, but rather tests Community law to
general principles of Community law that are inspired by them; hence, it nei-
ther will nor can conclude that Community law does not conflict with the
European Convention of Human Rights.113
This reasoning is most convincing as far as general principles inspired by
European Convention provisions are concerned. But does it also apply to the
direct test against international asylum law pursuant to Article 63(1) TEC?
Testing whether a rule of Community law is “in accordance with” a rule of rele-
vant international law very much amounts to “application” (cf. number [132]). 
It would follow that Article 307 TEC never applies to Community law
based on Article 63(1) TEC. Article 63(1) TEC states that all Community law
based on it must be in accordance with international treaty law. If a rule of
Community law is “in accordance with” international treaty law, a conflicting
rule of national law cannot be “necessary” (in the terms of Lévy) to ensure the
Member State’s performance under the Refugee Convention. Then, there is no
justification for the Member States suspending their obligations under
Community law as required by Article 307 TEC. And if a rule of Community
law is not in accordance with international law, it is invalid. Then, Member
States have no need to invoke Article 307 TEC. 
If all this is true, Community law based on Article 63(1) TEC that requires
negative decisions on applications could lead to treaty conflicts that are
insoluble under international treaty law (see par. 2.1.5). For Member States
could then face an obligation under Community law to issue a negative deci-
sion, and an obligation under international law to take a positive one, and
Article 307 TEC would not apply. It follows from Article 30(4)(b) read in con-
junction with (5) of the Vienna Treaty Convention that the Member States are
then responsible both under Community law and under international law. 
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Conclusions
[705] Rulings by the Court of Justice on the interpretation of international asy-
lum law can in theory conflict with the reading of those obligations by domes-
tic courts. Under present European asylum law, such conflicts are unlikely.
Conflicts do not occur when rulings by the Court of Justice prescribe treatment
that exceeds the standards set by international law, and rulings that require
denial of protection are unlikely, as those rulings address minimum standards. 
If, nevertheless, European asylum law based on Article 63(1) TEC leads to
conflicts, Article 307 TEC may not serve as a means for solving them. If rules of
European asylum law that deny protection are “in accordance with” internation-
al asylum law, international law is not “affected” by European law. If the domes-
tic court holds that such rules of Community law are in breach of international
law, it faces a conflict for which international treaty law offers no solution. 
For the present, however, it is most unlikely that rulings by the Court of
Justice would adversely affect the legal position of applicants and other status
beneficiaries under international asylum law. Adverse effects on that legal
position may rather be due to unwillingness of domestic courts to address the
compatibility of rules of European asylum law with international law, once the
Court of Justice has ruled on it. In this respect, the possibility of appeal to the
European Court of Human Rights and other treaty monitoring bodies may
serve to emphasize the obligation of the Member States to assess the scope
and content of their obligations under international law, autonomously from
any obligations under European asylum law. 
9.5 Strasbourg review of European asylum law
The Court of Justice is competent to rule on the “accordance” of Member
State acts with international asylum law. Could this judicial competence have
consequences for the individual’s access to the monitoring bodies that are
attached to the instruments of international law? The consequences of overlap
between the scopes of jurisdiction of the Court of Justice and of the European
Court of Human Rights have been addressed in the case law of both courts. As
far as I know, neither the Committee against Torture nor the Human Rights
Committee ever addressed the issue. The discussion below therefore focuses
on the European Court of Human Rights. 
For present purposes, we can distinguish three types of cases that will be
discussed below. First, acts by Member State authorities executing
Community law that leaves them (some) discretion. Second, such acts based
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on Community law that leaves no discretion. And third, acts by Community
organs where no executive Member State act is involved.
9.5.1 Review of Member State acts based on Community law that
leaves discretion
[706] The European Court of Human Rights does review Member State acts
that are based on Community law that leaves (some) discretion. This follows
from Cantoni v France.114 Cantoni had been convicted for violating a provision
of domestic law that was allegedly too imprecise, and therefore in breach of
Article 7 ECHR. The relevant provision of French law was based on a provi-
sion of a Community Directive. The French government had pointed out that
the “finding that the [domestic law provision] was defective would amount to
making the same finding in respect of [the Directive provision].”115 But this
circumstance had no consequences for the review by the European Court of
Human Rights. It observed that 
“[t]he fact, pointed to by the Government, that [the domestic law provision]
is based almost word for word on Community Directive 65/65 […] does
not remove it from the ambit of Article 7 of the Convention”,116
and decided on the matter without any further allusion to the Directive. 
The European Court of Human Rights confirmed this view in the Grand
Chamber judgement Bosphorus, where it ruled “that a State would be fully
responsible under the Convention for all acts falling outside its strict interna-
tional legal obligations”; hence, there will be “review by this Court of the exer-
cise of State discretion for which EC law provided.”117
All present European asylum law leaves the Member States a certain amount of dis-
cretion when implementing or applying it. It follows from the above that Member
States are “fully responsible” for any implementation or application of such law;
therefore, complaints of violations of Articles 3 or 13 ECHR due to Member State
acts that implement or apply European asylum law are (other conditions fulfilled)
subject to full judicial scrutiny by the European Court of Human Rights. 
9.5.2 Member State acts based on Community law that leaves no 
discretion
[707] The matter may be different when it comes to Member State acts that
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apply Community law that leaves no discretion. As we saw in paragraph 2.1.6,
it follows from Bosphorus that the question of whether an interference with (in
any case) Article 1 ECHR Prot 1 is justified is not subject to full scrutiny the
legal basis for the interference is an obligation under Community law that
leaves the Member State no discretion, and the Community legal order pro-
vides for protection that is “equivalent” to that under the Convention.
Arguably, the Bosphorus approach could very well apply to Article 13 ECHR
cases, even though the text of the provision does not state that interferences
may be justified. Although Article 6(1) ECHR does not contain a limitation
clause, it appears from the Court’s case law that interferences with the right to
a fair trial may nevertheless be justified if they serve a legitimate aim and are
proportionate to it,118 and the same approach could apply to Article 13 ECHR.
But it is unclear how this approach should be applied to cases under Article 3
ECHR, as this provision, according to well-established case law, does not
allow for “justification” of interferences (cf. number [98c]). In the discussion
of the implications of the notion of “equivalent protection” and its application
in Bosphorus below, I will for briefness’ sake speak of interferences with
Convention rights in general. 
[708] It appears from Bosphorus that fundamental rights protection must satis-
fy two requirements in order to be “equivalent”, that is, “comparable” to
Convention protection (cf. number [98b]). First, “substantive guarantees”
must be provided: fundamental rights, as those set out in the Convention must
apply as standards. The European Court of Human Rights is satisfied that fun-
damental rights protection in the Community legal order meets this require-
ment. In this context it refers to Article 6(1) TEU and the standing case law of
the Court of Justice on fundamental rights, as well as to the Charter and even
to the Constitution for Europe.119 Second, there must be “mechanisms of con-
trol in place to ensure observance of such rights” if the protection is to be
“equivalent”. In this context, the European Court of Human Rights observes
that “access to the [European Court of Justice] is limited”, but identifies two
circumstances that make up for that limitation. First, “actions initiated before
the ECJ by the Community institutions or a Member State constitute impor-
tant control of compliance with Community norms to the indirect benefit of
individuals”.120 Second, “it is essentially through the national courts that the
Community system provides a remedy to individuals against a Member State
or another individual for a breach of EC law”, and “the ECJ maintains its con-
trol on the application by national courts of EC law, including its fundamental
rights guarantees, through the procedure” of Article 234 TEC.121 In this con-
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text “[i]t is further recalled that national courts operate in legal systems into
which the Convention has been incorporated, albeit to differing degrees”.122
Consequently, “the Court finds that the protection of fundamental rights by
EC law can be considered to be, and to have been at the relevant time, “equi-
valent” […] to that of the Convention system”. 123
In summary, the assumption that the Community legal order provides for
“equivalent protection” applies in general; therefore, Member State acts
implementing Community law that leaves no discretion are presumed to be in
accordance with the European Convention of Human Rights. 
[709] Do the criteria discussed above establish the “equivalence” of
Community protection of fundamental rights in a meaningful kind of way? In
the first requirement, the presence of substantive guarantees, it may be
observed that the Charter and the Constitution do not provide for any legal
guarantee at all as they are not (yet) binding. But as argued in paragraph 2.2.2,
the general principles of Community law provide for standards for observance
of fundamental rights that are indeed compatible to those set out in the
European convention of Human Rights. 
As to the second criterion, the European Court of Human Rights in fact
states that the review by domestic courts combined with supervision by the
European Court of Justice amounts to a control mechanism that is “equiva-
lent” or “comparable” to the Convention observance system. Observance of
the rights and freedoms laid down in the European Convention falls primarily
to domestic courts (or otherwise independent authorities as meant in Article
13 ECHR), and subsidiairily to the Strasbourg Court (see number [413]). So
the reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights amounts to stating that
the supervision by the European Court of Justice is “comparable” to its own
supervision. Four objections can be made to this statement. 
Firstly, individuals can appeal themselves to the European Court of Human
Rights. In contrast, direct appeal by individuals to the European Court of
Justice is quite limited. Appeal by Member States or Community institutions
or references for preliminary questions by domestic courts may “constitute
important control of compliance with Community norms” by the Court of
Justice, but these devices do not secure the possibility of asking for redress in
individual cases. 
Secondly, the nature of preliminary rulings is quite different from the
nature of the European Court of Human Rights’ own judgements. In
Bosphorus the Strasbourg Court acknowledges that “the ECJ’s role is limited
to responding to the interpretative or validity question referred by the domes-
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tic court”, but it continues to observe that, “the response will often be deter-
minative of the domestic proceedings”.124 Indeed they “often” do, that is, not
always. Moreover, it is left to the domestic court to apply the rule as illumina-
ted or formulated by the Court of Justice to the case – whereas the European
Court of Human Rights will apply the rule itself. In the case of direct appeals
to the European Court of Justice, another objection applies. In such cases, the
Community judiciary is itself the primary instance of observance – that is, in
such cases no supervision by an external court takes place. 
Thirdly, as Lawson has observed,125 the nature of the equivalent protection
test is flawed. This is an abstract test – does the Court of Justice generally
afford equivalent protection in a particular type of cases? If so, the state is not
responsible for examining accordance with the European Convention of
Human Rights unless the manifest deficiency test is satisfied. The oddity of
this reasoning becomes manifest when one applies it to states party to the
Convention. Should we presume that expulsion allegedly resulting in torture
should be considered to be in accordance with Article 3 ECHR because
domestic law states “substantive guarantees” against expulsion and the indi-
vidual can rely on those guarantees before domestic courts? 
Fourthly and finally, the Strasbourg Court is specialized in human rights
cases, whereas the Luxembourg Court is not. If faith is put in the quality of
supervision of observance of human rights, it is unclear why the Luxembourg
Court deserves more credit than, for example, the far more specialised
Constitutional Court of Germany. 
It should be noted that none of these objections address the quality of the fun-
damental rights protection by the Community legal order in general or by the
Court of Justice in particular. As stated above, in my view the Court of
Justice’s testing against fundamental rights is most satisfactory. But as far as
protection of Convention rights in individual cases is concerned, its position is
simply not on a par with the European Court of Human Rights’ own position. 
[710] The presumption that the Community system of protection of funda-
mental rights is equivalent to that under the Convention is rebutted if, in the
circumstances of the particular case, the Community fundamental rights pro-
tection was “manifestly deficient”. The Court does not state in the abstract
when the “manifest deficiency” criterion is satisfied, but addresses three cir-
cumstances. First, “the nature of the interference”; second, “the general interest
pursued by the impoundment and the sanctions regime” (i.e. the ending the
war in former Yugoslavia) and third, “the ruling of the ECJ (in the light of the
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opinion of the AG)”.126 This last consideration refers to a preliminary question
stated by the Irish Supreme Court in the domestic proceedings by Bosphorus
against the impoundment of its aircraft. In its preliminary ruling, the Court of
Justice had addressed inter alia the question of whether or not application of
the regulation (the impoundment) was compatible with Article 1 of Protocol 1
ECHR in a somewhat succinct kind of way; the Advocate-General on the other
hand had addressed the matter quite extensively. – On the basis of these three
considerations, the European court of Human Rights “considers it clear that
there was no dysfunction of the mechanisms of control of the observance of
Convention rights”.
As to these considerations, the question comes up of whether they apply
cumulatively or not. In particular, would the outcome have been the same if no
preliminary question had been put to the Court of Justice? If not, the implica-
tion of the judgement would be that only if the European Court of Justice has
already addressed the compatibility of the application of a measure with the
European Convention, would the presumption that application is in accor-
dance with that Convention apply. The European Court of Human Rights has
not stated this, however. 
Furthermore, the reference to the opinion of the Advocate-General for the
preliminary ruling raises questions. If the Court of Justice’s ruling did not make
“clear that there was no dysfunction of the mechanisms of control of the obser-
vance of Convention rights”,127 there is no reason why the Opinion could change
that, as the Opinion does not bear legal consequences for the Member State
whose court referred the question. If the Court of Justice’s ruling was, however,
satisfactory, it is unclear what the reference to the Opinion does purport. 
[711] One may argue that the appraisal above does not do justice to the
Bosphorus judgement for three reasons. First, one may state that the above
objections ignore the fact that the European Court of Human Rights endea-
vours to establish a balance between the interests of co-operation within the
Community legal order and protection of Convention rights. This may be true,
but it should be observed that the balance attained is to the detriment of the
protection an individual may derive from the European Convention – it
remains, hence, questionable whether the balance is fair. Second, one may
state that the approach set out in Bosphorus serves to prevent procedures from
going on quasi-indefinitely – appeal proceedings in Strasbourg after prelimi-
nary proceedings do indeed considerably stretch the length of time during
which the legality of the act of state remains uncertain. But as observed above,
it does not follow from Bosphorus that the presumption of equivalent protec-
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tion applies only if a preliminary procedure has taken place. Third, the judge-
ment may be explained by the wish to decrease (or rather, temper the increase)
of the Strasbourg Court’s caseload. But this consideration could not justify the
disadvantageous treatment of, in particular, acts pursuant to Community law
that leave the Member States no discretion. 
9.5.3 Review of acts by Community institutions 
[712] As yet, Community institutions lack the competence to take decisions on
individual cases, but this might change under future Union law. Therefore, I
will briefly address the standing of persons in need of protection before the
European Court of Human Rights in cases where such decisions are not com-
patible with the European Convention of Human Rights. This situation is dif-
ferent from that addressed in the previous paragraphs because in there is no
Member State “in between” the Community act and its execution. Thus, no
particular Member State can be addressed as the executive agent. 
Complaints against institutions of the Community are not admissible
before the European Court of Human Rights, as the Community is not a party
to the Convention.128 The only available alternative route to bring complaints
of breaches of the Convention before the Court is holding Member States
responsible for those Community acts. No such complaint has as yet been
brought before the Court. They have been brought before the Commission,
who dismissed them, applying the equivalent protection doctrine.129 Since
Bosphorus, it is not unlikely that the European Court of Human Rights will
apply this approach. But does it follow that it will hold Member States respon-
sible for acts that are committed by Community organs, even if those Member
States are not involved in this act at all? 
Arguably, the European Court of Human Rights implicitly answered the
question by asserting that despite the transfer of powers to the Community, the
Member States retained liability (although their responsibility is only “par-
tial”; cf. numbers [98]-[98a]). If the Treaty on European Community enables
a Community institution to commit acts contrary to the European Convention
of Human Rights, the Member States are liable under the Convention by 
having transferred that power to the Community. The transfer of power to the
Community establishes (at least partial) responsibility under the European
Convention. It follows that all States party to this instrument are equally
responsible for the violation, as the ground for liability is the act of transfer of
power, which they all committed. So paradoxically, transfer of power to take
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decisions in individual cases to the Community would not diminish, but
extend the individual’s possibilities for getting access to the European Court
of Human Rights. The same reasoning applies mutatis mutandis to other
instruments of international asylum law. 
[713] Hailbronner observes that the European Court of Human Rights can
review Community legislation that infringes rights laid down in the European
Convention of Human Rights.130 This follows from the judgement Ireland v
UK, wherein the European Court of Human Rights observed that “from the
mere existence of law which introduces, directs or authorises measures incom-
patible with the rights and freedoms safeguarded” a “breach” could result.
Such a “breach” occurs 
“only if the law challenged […] is couched in terms sufficiently clear and
precise to make the breach immediately apparent; otherwise the decision
of the Convention institutions must be arrived at by reference to the man-
ner in which the respondent state interprets and applies in concreto the
impugned text or texts.” 131
Hailbronner argues convincingly that both regulations and directives can meet
this test for review. Locus standi in this type of case is not reserved for states:
in Dudgeon v United Kingdom, the Court ruled that the existence of legisla-
tion on homosexuality (though not yet applied to Dudgeon) was an “inter-
ference” on Article 8 ECHR.132
Could European legislation on asylum successfully be challenged before
the European Court of Human Rights? This is unlikely. Most European asy-
lum legislation that addresses Article 3 or 13 ECHR sets minimum standards
that allows the Member States to apply more lenient standards (cf. number
[257]). Such legislation cannot impose obligations in terms “sufficiently clear
and precise to make the breach immediately apparent”. A possible exception
is the “maximum standard” set by Article 30 read in conjunction with 30B PD,
the obligation to apply the safe country of origin exception (see number
[672]). But it appears that Member States can suspend its application, which
renders a breach of Article 3 ECHR far from immediately apparent. Another
possible exception would be the Dublin Regulation, as it does not necessarily
set minimum standards. But Article 3(2) DR allows the Member States to
examine each appeal that is lodged with them against Article 3 ECHR.
Observation of Article 13 ECHR is made possible by Articles 19 and 20 DR,
which require review of a negative decision on such an appeal which can,
moreover, suspend the expulsion order. 
Moreover, all European legislation on asylum must be interpreted and
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applied in accordance with the European Convention of Human Rights, or
with general principles of Community law reflecting its provisions.
Consequently, European asylum legislation cannot violate the European
Convention of Human Rights. 
9.5.4 Assessment
[714] Present European asylum law leaves decision making to the Member
States, and leaves them (a certain amount of) discretion for its implementation
and application. It follows from settled case law by the European Court of
Human Rights that Community law that leaves some discretion in no way
affects the access of individuals to the European Court of Human Rights. In
case of (hypothetical) future legislation on asylum that would leave the
Member States that apply it no discretion, Member States are not responsible
unless the human rights protection provided within the Community legal order
turned out to be, in the particular circumstances of the case, “manifestly defi-
cient”. If, under (even more hypothetical) future European law, Community
institutions take decisions on applications, those institutions could not be held
responsible for violation of Articles 3 or 13 ECHR (as long as the Community
(or the Union) does not accede to the European Convention of Human Rights).
But then, all Member States would be liable for a breach, on the basis of their
transfer of this power to the Community. Complaints of breaches of Article 3
or 13 ECHR by current European legislation on asylum, finally, would not be
successful, if only because this legislation leaves too much discretion for its
application to make a breach sufficiently evident. 
9.6 Conclusions
[715] In this Chapter I have discussed the system and scope of judicial
supervision under Community law, as far as it is relevant for interpretation
and application of international law. Conclusions on the several topics
addressed were drawn in the concluding paragraphs, which are summarised
below.
Community law requires that effective judicial protection in accordance
with Articles 6 and 13 ECHR is available if rights under European asylum law
are affected (paragraph 9.1.1). Therefore, effective remedies must be available
even where not stated in secondary European asylum law. This is relevant for,
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in particular, the denial of subsidiary protection status and denial of the deriva-
tive statuses of family members of European asylum status beneficiaries. 
Domestic courts must give indirect effect to all European asylum law, that is,
interpret domestic law in accordance with it. The obligation to do so is limited
by, inter alia, the principle of legal certainty. But these are of little relevance
where rules on interpretation or application of international asylum law are con-
cerned (paragraph 9.2.1). A considerable number of provisions of European asy-
lum law have direct effect, or set limits to the exercise of discretion by domes-
tic authorities that are amenable to judicial review (paragraph 9.2.2). 
Secondary Community law can be invalid because of a lack of accordance
with international asylum law only if it does not state minimum standards. The
only standard that raises serious doubts in this respect is the safe country of
origin exception laid down in Article 30 read in conjunction with 30B PD (see
number [672]). Only the Court of Justice can declare secondary Community
legislation invalid. Direct appeal to it by individuals is not possible (number
[635]), but domestic courts can ask questions on the validity in the prelimi-
nary rulings procedure. 
The Court of Justice’s review of international asylum law is restricted to
issues that fall within the scope of secondary Community law. The discussion
of some relevant rules of European asylum law showed that many parts of
international asylum law fall within the scope of review of the Court of Justice
(see paragraph 9.3.3). But restraints on the competence to refer and on the
obligation to refer questions on interpretation of Community law to the Court
may result in a modest number of preliminary rulings on issues of internatio-
nal asylum law (paragraph 9.3.4). The lack of competence of courts whose
decisions are not open to review under domestic law does not affect their com-
petence to interpret European asylum law, but raises some difficulties as to
allegedly invalid Community legislation (see number [690]). 
If the Court of Justice ever ruled that Article 30B PD or some other (future)
European asylum law provision that imposes an obligation to take negative
decisions on applications for asylum is in accordance with international law,
domestic courts may face an insoluble conflict between European and interna-
tional asylum law. If the relevant rule is based on Article 63(1) TEC, Article
307 TEC cannot serve as a solution for the conflict (number [704]). But for
practical purposes, outright conflicts between European asylum law and inter-
national asylum law are, for the present, unlikely. Rather, European asylum
law may have adverse effects on the legal position of aliens in another way.
Domestic authorities may be unwilling to address the proper sense and mea-
ning of international law and mistake the minimum standards of European
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asylum law for it (number [703]). Therefore, the treaty monitoring bodies, and
especially the European Court of Human Rights, will remain important for the
assessment of scope and content of the Member States’ obligations under
international law. 
Member State acts based on Community law that leaves them (some) discre-
tion are amenable to review by the European court of Human Rights on the same
footing as acts based on ‘purely’ domestic law. Member State acts based on
Community law that leaves no discretion are however presumed to be in accor-
dance with the European Convention, as the Community legal order is presumed
to offer protection of fundamental rights that is equivalent to protection under
the Convention. This presumption is however open to rebuttal, in case of ‘mani-
fest dysfunction’ of the Community’s fundamental rights protection.
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In paragraph 1.2, the object of this inquiry was defined as the relation between
European law on asylum and international law, and in particular the effects of
European asylum law on the legal position of persons entitled to asylum under
international law. I first addressed the way in which the two systems of law
affect each other (Chapter 2), and the extent of competencies and obligations
of the Community as regards international asylum law (Chapter 3). The main
findings on both issues will be summarised and commented on in paragraph
10.1. Subsequently, the European legislation on asylum was analysed, and its
conformity with international asylum law discussed (Chapters 4 to 8), as well
as the judiciability advantages that Community law may offer the individual
(Chapter 9). The findings on these matters are discussed in paragraph 10.2.
Some remarks on future developments will be made in paragraph 10.3. 
10.1 European asylum law and international asylum law
[716] The rules of international law and primary Community law discussed in
Chapters 2 and 3 suggest that the legal position of third country nationals
could only exceptionally be adversely affected by Community law on asylum
for several reasons. To begin with, the transfer of powers on asylum to the
Community has not brought change to the scope or content of the Member
States’ obligations under international asylum law.1 The Refugee Convention,
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention Against Torture
and the European Convention on Human Rights were all concluded well
before the Treaty of Amsterdam, and count among their signatories many non-
Member States. Thus, claims by third country nationals to the Member States
in their capacity as states party to the instruments of international asylum law
cannot, in principle, be adversely affected by European asylum law. In princi-
ple, for this statement is subject to three exceptions (addressed below).
[717] When a rule of European law on asylum conflicts with some rule of
international asylum law, the latter has precedence. This precedence is not
due to hierarchical superiority – hitherto, the international community of
states has not accepted the peremptory nature of rules of international asylum
law.2 Rather, conflicts should be solved by conciliatory interpretation of the
rule of European law with the rule of international law.3 European law gives
ample opportunity for such conciliatory interpretation. To begin with, pur-
suant to Article 63 TEC as well as to relevant general principles of
Community law, European rules on asylum should be applied and interpreted
in accordance with the Refugee Convention and relevant treaty law.4 Further,
most of the rules that address international asylum law can, according to the
Treaty on European Community, only set ‘minimum standards’, which by
nature allow Member States to diverge in favour of the person to whom they
owe protection under international law.5 Rules that preclude domestic legisla-
tion that deviates from European law in order to comply with obligations
under international asylum law would not be minimum standards, and there-
fore invalid.6
[718] However, not all rules of European asylum law are necessarily minimum
standards. The Treaty on European Community allows for exhaustive rules on
the allocation of applicants for asylum within the European Union, and the
Constitution for Europe allows for such ‘maximum standards’ on many more
issues.7 Thus, European asylum law may in the future contain rules that require
treatment of applicants at odds with the Member States’ obligations under
international law. Then, conciliatory interpretation may prove impossible.
According to Article 307 TEC (and its successor Article 435 CfE), in such a
case European law cedes precedence to the obligations flowing from the
instruments predating the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam.8
The priority of international law pursuant to this provision is subject to two
restrictions. First, according to the Court of Justice “it cannot be excluded”
that Member States are obliged to adjust or even denounce an instrument of
international law if conflicts with European law cannot be solved in another
way.9 In practice, it is most unlikely that this ultimum remedium would apply
to international law on asylum, if only because of the strong commitment of
the Community to these instruments. Second, if the Court of Justice rules that
a certain rule of European asylum law is in full accordance with international
law, Article 307 TEC may not apply.10 In such a case, domestic courts face a
conflict between two obligations for which international treaty does not offer
a solution.11 But under present European asylum law such a conflict is hard to
imagine for the reasons set out above.
[719] Another reason why it would appear that European asylum law could not
negatively affect the legal position of persons entitled to protection under
international law, is the strong commitment to observing international law,
expressed in primary Community (and Union) law. Regulations and directives
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based on Article 63(1) TEC must be “in accordance with the Refugee
Convention and other relevant treaties”; those based on Article 63(3)(a) must
be compatible with international agreements.12 A similar clause on Article
63(2) is absent, but the relevant rules of international law may further serve as
a standard of review by inspiring “general principles of Community law”,
which review would amount to the same thing.13 This review of “accordance”
with international law applies not only to acts by Community organs, but also
to implementation acts by the Member States.14
These requirements should secure that European asylum law and executive
acts based on it are in conformity with international asylum law.15 Moreover,
this standard of review reinforces the juridical position of persons within the
scope of international asylum law because of the judiciability advantages of
Community law. To begin with, Community law requires an effective remedy
for infringement on Community rights.16 Moreover, the Court of Justice
reviews compliance by Community institutions as well as Member States 
(acting within the scope of Community law) with Community law – including
compliance with the obligation to act in accordance with international asylum
law. So, the Court of Justice may supervise interpretation and application of
the instruments of international law, which is of particular interest as regards
the Refugee Convention as there is no treaty monitoring body attached to this
instrument that could address application in individual cases. 
[719a] It follows from recent case law by the European court of Human
Rights that under certain circumstances, human rights protection provided for
by the Community legal order replaces to a certain extent such protection as
established by the European Convention of Human Rights. Acts by Member
States which are based on Community law that leaves them (some) discretion
are subject to the usual judicial supervision by the Strasbourg Courts. But
acts based on Community law that leaves no discretion are not, or rather, not
necessarily. According to the European Court of Human Rights, the
Community legal order provides for both substantive guarantees as well as
mechanisms that provides for protection of fundamental rights that is “equiv-
alent’ or “comparable” to that under the Convention. Member State acts
based on Community law leaving no discretion are therefore presumed to be
in accordance with the European Convention. This presumption is open to
rebuttal, however, if the Community protection of human rights was mani-
festly deficient.
Arguably, this notion of equivalent protection is flawed, if only because the
Community protection system does not provide for appeal by individuals to a
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supranational court. It is questionable whether this equivalent protection
notion would apply to asylum law. If it does, and if the Community issues asy-
lum law that leaves member States no discretion, the position of the individual
would be adversely affected. 
[720] Finally, the legal position of applicants may be reinforced by the Charter
of Human Rights.17 Although the current legal status of this instrument is
unclear, by virtue of explicit references to it in European legislation on asylum
its provisions may be applied as means of interpretation of those instruments.18
The Constitution for Europe, moreover, settles all uncertainty by incorpora-
ting the Charter, and hence granting it the status of primary Union law. 
Charter provisions cannot adversely affect the legal position of persons
within the scope of international asylum law, as its provisions may not be
interpreted as restricting the rights laid down in (inter alia) the instruments of
international law to which all Member States are party.19 On the other hand,
several provisions extend the scope of protection as compared to international
asylum law. It requires compliance with the requirements on fair trial ex
Article 6 ECHR, which provision does not apply to migration law.20 And
maybe most remarkable, it recognises a “right to asylum”, which is absent in
international law. The scope of obligations implied by the duty to “guarantee
the right to asylum” is somewhat insecure. Arguably, it implies that refugees
(or other persons who have a “right to asylum”) may not be expelled to a third
country unless it is certain that he will be treated there in accordance with
basic human rights standards, and that if they cannot be expelled, they are 
entitled to a settled status and secondary rights.21
In summary, it appears that European asylum law could only exceptional-
ly detract from protection under international asylum law, as it must be in con-
formity with it. Moreover, it extends the scope of protection as compared to
international asylum law in several respects. 
10.2 The Community legislation 
The Treaty basis
[721] These favourable effects of European asylum law materialise only if and
insofar as legislation on asylum is adopted. For Article 63 TEC, general princi-
ples of Community law, and the Charter do not impose a prohibition of refoule-
ment, confer a right to asylum and so on, but set standards for review of
Community law and Member States acts within the scope of Community law. 
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The legal basis for secondary Community law on asylum, Article 63 TEC,
implies few if any restrictions for the material scope of asylum legislation.
Article 63(1) and (2) TEC neatly delimit on which topics measures had to be
adopted before 1 May 2004: standards on qualification, procedures, reception
standards of applicants, mechanisms and criteria for allocation of applicants,
and rules on temporary and subsidiary protection.22 But these provisions do
not exhaustively address asylum matters. Article 63(3)(a) TEC functions as a
residual competence for other issues concerning asylum,23 and has indeed
served as the legal basis for rules on the secondary rights of refugees and sub-
sidiary protection beneficiaries, and, arguably, criteria for considering a third
country “safe”.24 Likewise, Article 266 CfE contains no restrictions on the
substantial scope of secondary Union legislation.25
The objectives of legislation on international protection as defined in
Article 61, reinforcing the freedom of movement by reducing secondary
movements of third country nationals, and the safeguarding of their human
rights, both allow for a high level of harmonisation.26 The characterisation of
most measures on international protection as “minimum standards” in Article
63 TEC does not restrict this level: the characterisation as minimum standards
addresses the division of powers between the Community and the Member
States, not the content of the Community legislation.27
The scope of Article 63(1), (2) and (3) TEC may be relevant over the next
few years, as different decision making procedures apply to the various sub-
paragraphs.28 The delimitation of scope in the provision is further of interest as
it provided for the basic layout of the Common European Asylum System,
established by the present legislation.29
The concept of the ‘Common European Asylum System’ was introduced
by the European Council Tampere Conclusions, which exerted far-going
impact on the present legislation in three respects.30 First, these Conclusions
stated far more explicitly and far more emphatically than Article 61, that safe-
guarding the human rights of applicants and other CEAS status beneficiaries is
a central objective of Community legislation on asylum. Second, it defined
quite ambitious levels of harmonisation that the legislation should bring about.
Third, by introducing the concept of a Common European Asylum System it
suggested that the Community legislation should show coherence. 
The Common European Asylum System
[722] The Common European Asylum System that resulted, establishes (main-
ly)31 four statuses: refugee status, subsidiary protection, applicant and tempo-
rary protection status.32 For each of these statuses European asylum law sets
607Assessment
rules on qualification, and on secondary rights: reception or residence condi-
tions as well as rules on family unity.33 The legislation further establishes rules
on asylum procedures and rules on allocation for applicants for asylum and for
temporary protection.34 The rules on allocation are based on the exception of
the safe third country. Together, the five Directives and three Regulations on
asylum hitherto adopted address most aspects of international asylum law.
But do the rules laid down in these instruments form a system, a set of
rules that make up a more or less coherent whole? To a certain extent, they do.
All instruments share the same objectives. They apply common definitions
and concepts. Moreover, they relate in the sense that rules laid down in one
instrument serve to define scope or content of rules laid down in another one.
Thus, the Procedures Directive defines the scope of beneficiaries of the
Reception Standards Directive, as well as the geographical scope (and partial-
ly, the personal scope – see below) of the rules on qualification laid down in
the Qualification Directive.35 The latter instrument sets rules on the founded-
ness of claims for protection, as meant in the Procedure Directive.36 And the
decision that installs temporary protection may address qualification for sub-
sidiary protection.37
[723] But the discussion of the rules on qualification, procedures, allocation
and secondary rights also revealed a lack of coherence in the European legis-
lation on asylum. To begin with, the instruments show a lack of technical
coherence. The relation between temporary protection and applications for
asylum is quite unclear, which leads to uncertainty on the scope of application
of the Procedures Directive and of the Dublin rules for allocation.38 Further,
different meanings are attached in various instruments or even within one
instrument to identical terms or concepts (“international protection”, “exami-
nation”, family members, “determining authority”).39 All this results in a lack
of clarity on scope and content of rules on asylum. 
Secondly, and more seriously, the present body of legislation on asylum
shows a number of gaps and inconsistencies that result from the apparent lack
of a clear concept of what issues should be addressed in order to achieve the
objectives of this legislation. Most conspicuously in this respect, the Dublin
Regulation, the Procedures Directive and the Reception Standards Directive
apply to applicants for protection under the Refugee Convention only.
Applicants for subsidiary protection fall outside the scope of these instru-
ments in Member States that happen to run separate procedures for the two
forms of protection.40 If rules on procedures are needed for achieving the
objectives of this legislation, preclusion of secondary movements and safe-
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guarding the rights of third country nationals, there is no justification for this
result. 
The same applies to the absence of rules on the withdrawal of subsidiary
protection; the absence of harmonisation on benefits for family members of
subsidiary protection beneficiaries and applicants as opposed to those of
refugees; the absence of rules on family reunification of subsidiary protection
beneficiaries; and the absence of rules on procedures concerning grant or
denial of secondary rights for refugee and subsidiary protection benefi-
ciaries.41 Perhaps most striking is the absence of a coherent view on the nature
of refugee status determination. Whereas the Qualification Directive explicit-
ly acknowledges that such determination is “declaratory”, the standards of
treatment set for applicants and, partially, temporary protection status benefi-
ciaries rather evince a constitutivist reading of Refugee Convention provisions
that should however be read in the declaratory sense.42
These inconsistencies and gaps may be partially explained by the odd order
of adoption of the various instruments. The instruments that address the core
issues of qualification for refugee and subsidiary protection status and of asy-
lum procedures were adopted later than the ones on more peripheral issues,
like temporary protection, reception standards for applicants, and family
reunification.43 Unwillingness on the part of (some) Member States to adapt
their domestic law on asylum also may explain a part of these inconsistencies.
In particular, the Procedures Directive and the Reception Standards Directive
in many respects confirm existing disharmony rather than provide for a com-
mon approach. In this respect, the second phase of the harmonisation may
bring change because of the new rules on decision-making.44
Conformity with international asylum law
[724] An assessment of the degree to which European legislation secures com-
pliance with international asylum law should start with the observation that a
number of issues relevant for protection under international law are not
addressed by present European legislation on asylum. This holds true for a
number of the gaps signalled above, such as the absence of rules on proce-
dures for qualification for subsidiary protection status in some Member States
and on withdrawal of this status. It also holds true for issues like the concept
of group persecution, the causal nexus between Convention grounds and
absence of protection, or the grounds for rebuttal that the Member States are
safe third countries.45 These gaps do not, in themselves, affect the scope of pro-
tection: the relevant subject matter is simply left to domestic legislation, as it
was before. Whether it is wise to leave these matters to domestic law in view
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of the objectives of European asylum law is another matter. Here, we should
assess how far the standards that are set are in conformity with (or exceed) the
level required by international law, and where they set lower standards.
[725] On the credit side, the first thing to be mentioned is the right to asylum
established by European asylum law. The Dublin Regulation and the
Procedures Directive require that each application lodged within the European
Union be examined; if the applicant qualifies for protection under the
Qualification Directive, he must be granted refugee or subsidiary protection
status.46 Although subject to a number of exceptions (that will be addressed
below), this right to asylum contributes considerably to observance of the
Refugee Convention. The denial of examination when the temporary protec-
tion regime applies is limited in time, and does not preclude ensuing exami-
nation for the non-temporary statuses.47 Moreover, the standards of treatment
do to a considerable extent secure that refugees are treated in accordance with
the Refugee Convention.48 Persons within the scope of Articles 3 ECHR (and
7 CCPR) are, under international law, entitled to protection from refoulement
only, whereas subsidiary protection status ensures them a set of secondary
rights.49
Further, European asylum legislation requires compliance with interna-
tional asylum law on a number of important points. The definition of persons
eligible for subsidiary protection codifies the prohibition of refoulement ex
Article 3 ECHR.50 The Qualification Directive further provides for regulations
on issues like agents of persecution or serious harm and of the Convention
ground “particular social group” that are, arguably, in conformity with inter-
national law.51 As to asylum procedures, the Procedures Directive requires an
effective remedy to a court or tribunal against negative decisions.52 The
requirement that applicants should, in principle, have the opportunity to a per-
sonal hearing may also contribute to examination in accordance with relevant
rules of international law.53 Of particular interest, finally, is the extension of
the scope of subsidiary protection beyond the scope of protection offered by
the prohibitions of refoulement, pursuant to Article 15(c) QD.54
[726] On the other hand, some provisions of European asylum law suggest a
level of treatment that falls below the standards set by international asylum
law. In particular, the definition of “actors of protection” for the purposes of
qualification for refugee status and, arguably, subsidiary protection status is
too wide; hence, it suggests that Member States may turn down applications
of persons who qualify for refugee status under Article 1 RC.55 Article 27 and
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even more so Article 35A PD suggest or explicitly allow for arrangements for
rebuttal of the presumption of safety of third countries that are at variance with
relevant international law.56 Individual access of applicants to asylum proce-
dures is not sufficiently secured, and the grounds for refusal of “subsequent”
applications, or waiving examination of “dependant” applicants are likewise at
odds with international law.57
These provisions all suggest treatment of applicants (or other CEAS status
beneficiaries) at variance with international law. Of course, the relevant rules
of Community law must be interpreted and applied “in accordance with the
Refugee Convention and other relevant treaties”. On issues that fall within the
scope of Community law, the Court of Justice can be approached to rule on
the interpretation of this deficient secondary legislation – among other things,
on the rules on agents of protection, and the standards for rebuttal set by
Articles 30B and 33 PD.58 But other issues are explicitly left to domestic law,
such as the suspensive effect of appeal against negative decisions, and the
issue of individual access. Here, European law offers no protection. 
[727] On balance, then, does European asylum law deteriorate or improve the
legal position of persons entitled to international protection? The answer
depends on the view on European law one chooses to take. One can conceive
of European asylum law as another set of standards on the treatment by the
Member States of persons in need of international protection, next to interna-
tional asylum law. As these European standards must be interpreted and
applied in accordance with international asylum law, they can only improve
the position of the alien. Thus perceived, only the rules that reinforce the legal
position of refugees and others in need of protection count. There are many
such rules: the requirements on application of the safe third country exception
that are stated, some rules on qualification for refugee and subsidiary protec-
tion status, the requirements on the granting of secondary rights, the rules on
family reunification, the requirement of an effective remedy before a court,
the right to have one’s claim examined and finally, if the third country excep-
tion does not apply, to the granting of a status. Together, these standards make
up a body of law that in a comprehensive way addresses and secures protec-
tion for those in need of it – arguably, the most important source of protection
in the European Union next to the Refugee Convention. 
The assessment, however, will be quite different if one primarily conceives
of European asylum law as a framework or blueprint for the asylum law sys-
tems of the Member States. Then the gaps in the legislation and the rules that
suggest standards falling short of international law raise concern. True, most
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rules are minimum standards that may be exceeded by domestic law, and must
moreover be interpreted and applied by the organs of the Member States in
accordance with international law. But will they be read and applied accor-
dingly? One may doubt this, especially where European legislation suggests
that its standards address issues of international law comprehensively, and in
accordance with relevant treaties.
For example, after the adoption of a list of safe third countries of origin by
the Council, the Member States are obliged to consider the application by a
national of such a country as unfounded, unless the applicant submits “serious
grounds” for considering his country unsafe in his particular case.59 This stan-
dard may be at variance with international law. Arguably, this arrangement
may be construed as a minimum standard: Member States may apply a more
lenient standard for rebuttal, and they may suspend the obligation to consider
the application as unfounded by requesting removal of a country from the list.
But European law gives no incentives for doing so – rather the opposite.
Likewise, according to Article 35A PD applications by third country nationals
that are safe pursuant to some general assessment by the Council need not be
examined. Member States may provide for an arrangement under domestic
law that allows applicants to rebut this presumption of safety, as international
law requires.60 But the Directive does not secure it – rather, it quite strongly
suggests that Member States may do without. 
[728] In this respect, we may observe that European asylum law allots the
Council a role in the interpretation of the Member States’ obligations under
international asylum law. By qualified majority voting, the Council may draw
up the minimum common list of countries of origin that must be regarded as
safe, and of neighbouring third countries that are safe for the purposes of
Article 35A PD.61 Further, it may provide for “guidance” on the identification
of actors of protection that Member States must take into account.62 Such acts
may exert pressure to line up with the common approach. If anything, they
provide for a strong incentive for individual Member States not to assess for
themselves whether a country of origin or a neighbouring third country is
indeed safe, or whether some “actor” actually does provide for protection as
required by the Refugee Convention. 
Further, the present legislation on asylum authorises numerous devices for
examination of applications without addressing all aspects that may be rele-
vant for the foundedness of the claim. The variants of the exception of the safe
third country, the various arrangements for dealing with subsequent applica-
tions, and the safe country of origin concept may all result in the proliferation
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of devices that restrict access to qualification on the merits of the claim.
Moreover, European asylum law provides for various arrangements on these
issues that differ as to the safeguards or requirements that apply. Such dif-
ference can not be justified under international law.63 Again, the Member
States may implement and apply these variants in conformity with their obli-
gations under international law. But they are tempted to adjust their domestic
law to the variant that states the lowest level of protection. 
[729] To a certain extent, some of the above-mentioned negative effects of
European asylum law for the legal position of persons entitled to protection
under international law may be precluded by a review by the Court of Justice.
Arguably, there is no reason to doubt the conformity of its case law with inter-
national law standards.64 Nevertheless, the role of the Court may turn out to be
modest. In asylum matters, it cannot be approached by individual claimants,
only by domestic courts in the preliminary procedure.65 Access to the Court of
Justice is curtailed by Article 68 TEC, according to which, courts of first
instance cannot ask preliminary questions on interpretation of European asylum
law (at least as long as the validity of this law is not brought into question).66 In
addition, Courts that could and should refer may be reluctant to do so.67
[730] Finally, standards in European asylum law may negatively affect inter-
national asylum law itself. The interpretation of any treaty is informed by state
practice and this is an important means especially for the Refugee
Convention.68 The legislation on the reading of this Convention in European
asylum law may in this way influence the reading of that instrument. As to the
other instruments of international law, this effect may be countered by views
and rulings of the monitoring bodies, in particular of the European Court of
Human Rights.69 In the past, its reading and application of the European
Convention proved not to be informed by European legislation or by the
Dublin Convention, the forerunner of the Dublin Regulation.70
In summary, European asylum law importantly contributes to the protec-
tion of persons within the scope of international asylum law, but there are
good reasons to suppose that it will also negatively affect this protection. The
scope of these negative effects depends on the courses of action that Member
States will take. They may accept European asylum law for what it is: a set of
basic rules from which their domestic law can and must depart in order to
secure compliance with their obligations under international law. But they may
also apply Community law rules on asylum as standards that need not be sur-
passed. The supervisory role of the Court of Justice also stands or falls with
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the willingness or unwillingness of the (highest) domestic courts to refer ques-
tions on interpretation. 
10.3 Future developments 
[731] The present body of European legislation on asylum is the result of only
the first stage of establishing the Common European Asylum System. “In the
long term”, after the second stage, this system should, according to Tampere
Conclusions, encompass “uniform asylum status” and “common proce-
dures”.71 These objectives are codified in the Constitution for Europe that
added “uniform subsidiary protection status” and a “common system of tem-
porary protection”.72
This second stage started on May 1st 2004, but so far no new proposals for
legislation have been submitted. The European Council adopted “The Hague
program” on 5 November 2004, wherein it evaluated the results of the first
stage and set out some aims for the second stage.73 The second generation of
legislation on asylum is not due before 2010, after evaluation of the imple-
mentation of the present instruments in 2007.74 Meanwhile, co-operation
between Member States in asylum matters should be pursued.75
[732] The aims for the second generation are those set out in the Tampere
Conclusions: a common asylum procedure and uniform statuses for refugee
and subsidiary protection.76 The European Council provides for only a few
new guidelines for the layout of this second stage of the Common European
Asylum system. The Commission is asked to issue a study on the “joint pro-
cessing of asylum applications” outside the European Union.77 This suggestion
takes up previous initiatives by in particular the United Kingdom to establish
processing centres outside the European Union.78 Unlike those UK proposals,
the Hague Program states that such processing abroad be “complementary” to
the Common European Asylum System, i.e. complementary to the processing
in the Member States. 
Further, the European Council invites the Commission 
“to present a study on the appropriateness, the possibilities and the diffi-
culties, as well as the legal and practical implications of joint processing of
asylum applications within the Union.”79
Does “joint processing” mean that processing and hence allocation of appli-
cants may be centralised? This is hardly likely, as the European Council also
invites the Council and the Commission “to establish in 2005 appropriate
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structures involving the national asylum services of the Member States with a
view to facilitating practical co-operation.” These structures should “assist”
the Member States 
“inter alia, in achieving a single procedure for the assessment of applica-
tions for international protection, and in jointly compiling [...] information
on countries of origin. […] After a common asylum procedure has been
established, these structures should be transformed, on the basis of an eva-
luation, into a European support office for all forms of cooperation
between Member States relating to the Common European Asylum
System”.80
Thus, it appears that examination will still be done by the Member States after
2010, with the assistance of a “European office”. The objective appears to be
enhanced co-operation, rather than centralisation. Finally, the Hague Program
speaks of a “single procedure for the assessment of applications for interna-
tional protection”, which may suggest that the Procedures Directive should
apply to applicants of subsidiary protection in all Member States.81
[733] The “level of ambition” of the Hague Program was inspired by the
Constitution for Europe.82 Whether this instrument will enter into force in its
present form is as yet uncertain, but arguably, most aims of the second stage
legislation, common procedures, uniform statuses and the single procedure,
could be realised just as well on the basis of the present Treaty on European
Community.83
The Commission observed in its “assessment of the Tampere program” that
“the constraints of the decision-making process and of the current institutio-
nal context preclude the effective, rapid and transparent attainment of certain
political commitments”.84 In this respect, the circumstances have changed,
even without the Constitution entering into force. Since “legislation defining
the common rules and basic principles governing” the issues mentioned in
Article 63(1) and (2) has been adopted, the normal decision-making procedure
applies.85 Thus, measures can be proposed only by the Commission, and are
co-decided upon by the European Parliament and the Council, voting by quali-
fied majority. If up till now decision-making was “constrained” by the peculi-
arities of the decision-making procedure, there is no need to wait for evalua-
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430, 431, 436, 437, 438, 440, 444, 448, 454,
458, 460, 461, 465, 473, 474, 610, 642, 650,
652, 654, 659
Article 24 250, 372, 374, 375, 384, 387, 401, 403-405, 654
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Article 33 373, 374, 401, 435-438, 379, 380, 390, 395, 439,
440, 441, 444, 465, 474, 651, 683, 688, 726
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530, 532-536, 538-540, 633, 651, 659, 660, 684,
688, 726-728
Article 36 468, 469, 472, 669
Article 37 468, 469, 470, 472
Article 38 384, 398, 401, 405, 421-426, 468, 470, 527, 538,
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296, 297, 302, 313, 316, 321, 324, 325, 330,
335, 339, 342, 350, 354, 393, 432, 456, 460,
554, 575, 580, 589, 591, 593, 594, 596, 598, 
678
Article 3 259
Article 4 279-284, 286, 307, 322, 325, 335, 344, 347, 350,
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Article 30 575, 578, 596, 609, 621
Article 31 575, 577, 596, 655, 656
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Article 7A (old) 41, 42, 73, 207
Article 10 56, 213, 244, 636, 640, 660, 692, 694
Article 14 41, 73, 172, 173, 207
Article 17 174, 261
Article 18 118, 211
Article 39 116, 204, 205
Article 64 204
Article 61 59, 172-176, 178-179, 181, 184, 185, 225, 226,
253-254, 478, 721
Article 62 59, 205, 225, 549
Article 63 47-49, 59, 63, 127-139, 144, 148-150, 175-179,
202, 205, 212, 219, 221, 225, 228-232, 243, 246,
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196, 203, 208-210, 221-224, 234-235, 249, 268,
448, 602, 620, 625, 630, 646, 665-666, 701, 704-
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252, 266, 541, 674
Article 63(1)(c) 60, 169, 184-185, 189, 210, 215-217, 218, 223,
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Article 63(3)(a) 60, 66, 189, 201, 208, 221, 242, 249, 251, 252,
541, 575, 674, 719
Article 63(4) 215-217, 218
Article 63 second 
last clause 84, 99, 100, 127-128, 130-131, 135, 136, 139,
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The numbers refer to the numbering in the text between straight [brackets].
abolition of border control 41-47
accelerated procedure 
see asylum procedures, accelerated
access 
to asylum procedures 151, 369, 394-396, 447, 462, 478, 485, 486, 497,
500, 524, 536, 681, 726, 728
to courts 18, 407, 409, 418, 419, 423, 426, 551, 630, 635, 692, 705, 708,
712, 714, 729
accession 
of states to the European Union 81, 87-88, 90, 449
of the European Community/Union to international treaties 100, 102, 289
accommodation 382, 577-578, 584, 587, 591, 596, 607-608, 610, 621, 628,
655-656, 687
accordance with international law 127-137




actors of persecution see agents of persecution or serious harm
actors of protection see protection from persecution or serious harm; see
also internal `flight/protection alternative
admissibility 
and asylum procedures 373, 378, 398, 404, 413, 421-422, 426-428, 436,
440, 473, 475, 531, 580
in proceedings before the Community judiciary 631, 634, 635, 639
in proceedings before the ECtHR 37, 96, 369, 413, 712
Advocate-General 70
agents of persecution or serious harm 308-313
airport 481, 501
see also normal border procedure; special border procedure
allocation of applicants for asylum 185, 219, 224, 240, 249, 251, 363, 495,
506, 718, 721, 732
criteria for 476-483 
instruments for 489-493
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of temporary protection beneficiaries 484, 485
see also safe third country
Amsterdam, Treaty of 47-51, 109, 219
appeal and review 
domestic asylum procedures 421-425, 527
European Court of Human Rights 94-98, 706-73 
European Court of Justice 631-637, 664-705
international law on 408-416
suspensive effect in domestic asylum procedures 412, 425
application for asylum 186, 394, 262-264
by dependants 394, 399, 435, 440
by minors 395, 399, 440 
extraterritorial 7, 185, 266-267
fraudulous 346-347, 431, 468, 585, 603
subsequent 433-444 
applicant status 251, 263 
secondary rights 600-619
area of freedom, security and justice 172-177, 253-255
Article 3 CAT/3 ECHR/7 CCPR see CAT, Article 3; ECHR article 3; CCPR,
Article 7
association of Iceland, Norway and Switzerland 42-43, 203, 265, 475-477,
487
asylum 6-7, 11-12, 183, 234
law see European asylum law; international asylum law 
seekers see application; applicant status
see also first asylum, country/principle of; right to asylum
asylum procedures
accelerated 376, 458, 490, 493
and Article 3 ECHR 365, 368-369, 393, 411, 414, 416 
at first instance, organisation 376-378
at first instance, safeguards 387-406
international law on 365–370, 407-411 
single 239, 362, 477, 732-733
see also admissibility; appeal and review; normal procedure; normal bor-
der procedure; preliminary procedure; safe third neighbouring country
procedure; special border procedure
border 
control, abolition of 41-47
procedures see normal border procedure; special border procedure
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Bulgaria 449
burden sharing 198, 244, 479, 483-484
CAT, Article 3 15, 272-273, 285, 295, 311-312
and procedures 367, 393
and safe third country 507, 513-514, 517
risk assessment 278-281
torture 295
see also agents of persecution and serious harm
CCPR, Article 7 272-273 
ill-treatment 295, 523n
risk assessment 278 
Charter of Fundamental Rights for the European Union 142-160
and international law 143-144
human dignity 146
prohibition of refoulement 153-155
relevance for European asylum law 156-160 
right to asylum 147-152, 504
civil war 299-306
Committee against Torture 35
cessation of protection statuses 189, 271, 274-276, 346-348, 351, 353,
356, 468, 483, 580, 668-670
Common European Asylum System 
coherence 721-722
concept 12, 49-51, 53, 63, 248, 731-732
Constitution for Europe 232-233, 235-236, 246
hierarchy among statuses 349-358




compatibility with international law 127-137
conciliatory interpretation 83-84
see also indirect effect
conflicts between European and international law 80-94
conscientious objectors 292
Constitution for Europe 53, 225-247
Convention against Torture see CAT Article 3
677Index 
Convention refugees see refugee status
Coreper 68
Council of Europe 36
Council (of the European Union) 68, 99, 238, 449, 454, 533, 634, 664, 727-
728
counsel, right to 396, 424
country of first asylum see first asylum, country/principle of
Court of First Instance 70, 158
cruel treatment see CCPR Article 7, ill-treatment
customary international law 9-10, 24, 57, 74, 79-80, 105-107, 166
death penalty 16, 294
declarations of the Council 73-74, 316n, 451n





of EC asylum law 646-658
displaced persons 178, 180-183, 192-195, 234, 238, 241, 249, 276, 286-287,
306, 323
domestic courts
and interpretation of Community law 689-690
and treaty conflicts 80-94
and validity of Community law 689, 691-694
as Community courts 636-637
obligation to state preliminary questions 689, 697-698 
of first instance 695
supervision by ECJ 700-705
whose decisions are not subject to review 689, 695
domicile see incremental system of Refugee Convention benefits
Dublin Convention 43, 48, 61, 475-478 
Dublin criteria see allocation of applicants for asylum
due process see appeal and review, international law on
ECHR article 3 15, 272-273, 275, 335
ill-treatment 295-297, 299, 301, 303
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risk assessment 278-280, 282-285, 303-305
safe third country exception 496, 499, 501-502, 507, 511-512, 517
see also agents of persecution and serious harm; asylum procedures and
Article 3; humanitarian grounds and qualification; proof; protection from
persecution and serious harm 
education 17-18, 566, 577, 585, 593, 596-597, 608, 619, 621, 624, 655-656,
674
employment 206, 546, 577, 585, 595, 597, 609, 621, 655-6, 658
entry
and responsibility criteria 481
illegal 204, 383, 481, 483, 486, 503, 535, 548, 593, 603, 605-606 
Eurodac 62, 215, 229, 489, 491-2





European Commission 65-68, 75, 156, 203, 238, 449, 454, 533, 634, 664,
732-733
European Commission for Human Rights 37
European Council 44, 68, 739
European Court of Human Rights 
competence 36-37 
and Community law 95-98, 706-74 
European Court of Justice 70-71, 77-78, 205
direct appeal to 532-633
preliminary questions 664-675
review of Member State acts 113-118, 676-688, 729-730
see also domestic courts, supervision by ECJ 
European law see Community law
European Parliament 69
exclusion 274, 351, 359, 592-595, 668-670, 689
from refugee status 189, 290, 292, 337-338, 341-342; see also refugee
status, for refugees to whom compelling reasons of national security
apply; refugee status, for refugees who represent a danger to national
security 
from dependant status 580
from subsidiary protection status 275, 339, 343, 351
from temporary protection status 276, 340, 353
679Index 
Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Program 32, 366, 497,
502-504, 603
extraterritorial application see application for asylum, extraterritorial
false documents 347 see also fraud
family 121, 481, 627-629
and asylum seekers 611-617
and refugees 579-589
and subsidiary protection 598
and temporary protection 622-623
standards on respect for family life in international law 570-574
see also application for asylum, by dependants 
fingerprints see Eurodac
first asylum, country/principle of 344, 475, 494, 506, 529-531, 536-537, 651
see also safe third country
flanking measures 170, 176, 253, 478
fraud 346-348, 431, 468, 587, 603
freedom of movement 237, 242, 596, 657
of applicants 18, 603-606
of EU nationals 41, 49, 73, 116-117, 173, 175-177, 184, 205, 207, 211,
253, 257, 725
of refugees 546, 554, 577
gender see women
general principles of Community law 57, 63, 108-125, 131, 136-37, 157,
159, 161, 223, 529
and international law 110-112, 120-125, 217
and procedures 410, 417, 420, 472, 631, 663, 666
scope of application 113-118
group persecution see persecution, group; see also individualisation 
Handbook 32, 279, 28, 283, 288, 292, 325, 346, 365-366, 390, 392, 396,
416, 554




host third country see safe third country; first asylum, country/principle of
housing 502, 607, 621, 657
Human Rights Committee 15, 33-34, 94, 123
humanitarian grounds 
and allocation criteria 482, 485, 616, 629
and qualification 272, 296-297, 304, 678, 688
and safe third country 534, 651
Iceland see association of Iceland, Norway and Switzerland
illegal entry see entry, illegal
incremental system of Refugee Convention benefits 543-553, 576-577, 592-
595, 599, 601-610, 620-621
domicile 544, 551-552, 569
lawfully present 546-548, 576, 601, 620
lawfully resident 550, 576, 601, 620
refugee tout court 545, 559
resident 549-550, 576, 592-593, 601, 620
indirect effect 641-642
indiscriminate violence in situations of armed conflict 293, 301-306
individualisation 301-302, 305-306, 355; see also persecution, group
information
on applicants 402, 469, 492, 610 
on asylum procedures 376, 396, 424, 654
on country of origin 281, 283, 423, 469, 732
on entitlement to benefits 578, 596, 621, 655
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment see CCPR Article 7, ill-treat-
ment; ECHR Article 3, ill-treatment
initiative for measures on asylum 65-66, 361
integration 230, 243, 253, 578, 595, 597
intergovernmental co-operation 41-46, 51
interim measures 692
internal flight/protection alternative 317-324
international asylum law 8-10, 20
international protection 
in Article 63 TEC 137, 193, 195
in European asylum legislation 249-250, 259-260, 262-264, 272, 276, 477
in the Constitution for Europe 227-229, 234
international zone 481, 501, 605
681Index 
interpretation 
of international law, by the European Court of Justice 132-137, 676
of international law, hierarchy among means 24-25
of international law, means 21-39, 365; see also Refugee Convention,
travaux préparatoires
of international law, relevance of European law 38, 730
of European law, means 70-78, 143
interpreter, right to 396, 397, 401, 404, 406, 423, 473, 654
inter-state trust, principle of 509-518
and Member States 520-522, 531
and third countries 526-528, 530, 533-535
interview 398-404, 406, 429, 443, 448, 458, 460-461, 463, 469, 471, 654, 681
Ireland, special position of 43, 170, 215, 220, 245, 265, 270
judicial review
by Member State courts 407-426, 631, 636-638
see also European Court of Human Rights; European Court of Justice
jus cogens 85-86
Justice and Home Affairs Council 68
lawfully present or residing or staying refugees see incremental system of
Refugee Convention 
benefits 
legislative procedures see procedures for adoption of Community measures 
long-term residents 151, 182, 251n
manifestly unfounded applications 44, 373, 378, 411, 421, 430-432, 436,
438, 440, 448, 458, 462, 464-465, 473
margin of appreciation 124, 133-134, 415, 572-574
mass influx 194, 199, 204, 209, 246, 250, 276, 306, 349, 364, 381-382, 622,
628, 630, 634
medical cases see humanitarian grounds and qualification
minimum standards 211-218, 260, 459, 666-675
minors 
allocation criteria 615-617
and procedures 387, 401, 404
682
secondary rights 571-572, 578, 580, 583, 596, 607-611, 621-622, 629,
657
national courts see domestic courts
national security 86, 233, 346, 377, 423-424, 431-432, 465-467, 556, 560-
561, 568, 576, 580, 584, 594-595, 597, 603
see also refugee status, for refugees to whom compelling reasons of
national security apply; refugee status, for refugees who represent a dan-
ger to national security 
naturalisation 563
non-derogable rights 
and persecution 291 
and safe country of origin 450-451, 453
non-refoulement 15-16, 19, 106, 153-155, 254, 392-393, 401, 497-499, 559-
562, 576, 592-594, 596, 621, 678
see also safe third country; safe country of origin; ECHR Article 3; CAT,
Article 3; CCPR, Article 3; asylum procedures, international law on
non-state agents of persecution see agents of persecution or serious harm




normal border procedure 
guarantees 403
organisation 381 
Norway see association of Iceland, Norway and Switzerland
objectives 
of European asylum law 253-255, 272, 478-479, 680, 721-724, 731-732
of the Refugee Convention 558-563
obligations
during transposition period 660-662
of Member States under international law 8-16, 79-84, 89, 95-98, 706-
711
of the Community under international law 101-107
of the Community under the ECHR 108-125, 712-713
positive 572-582
683Index 
opt-in/opt-out see Ireland, special position of; United Kingdom, special posi-
tion of




group 282, 285, 355, 359, 459, 724
past 282





membership of particular social group 326-329




see also domestic courts
principles 
of Community law see general principles of Community law
of international law 19, 365
procedures 
for adoption of Community measures 64-69
see also asylum procedures; termination procedures
prohibition of refoulement see non-refoulement
proof 
burden of 279-280, 429, 439, 510
standard of 278, 281-283, 438-439, 456-457, 515-518
proportionality 56 
and Community measures 181, 214
and exclusion 86, 340








from persecution or serious harm 314-316; see also internal flight/protec-
tion alternative
seeker see application; applicant status
public order see national security; ordre public
qualification see subsidiary protection, qualification for; temporary protec-
tion, qualification for; refugee status, qualification for
readmission agreements 241, 246-247, 489, 516
real risk see ECHR Article 3, risk assessment
reception standards 605-618
recognition of refugee status see refugee status, determination
refoulement see non-refoulement
refugee 
in orbit 478, 525, 532
sur place 335
see also incremental system of Refugee Convention benefits
Refugee Convention 12-14
benefits 542-553; see also incremental system of Refugee Convention
benefits; refugee status, secondary rights 
Member States party to 16, 89
travaux préparatoires 26, 500, 547
see also refugee status, cessation of; refugee status, exclusion from;
refugee status, qualification for
refugee status 
basis in TEC 183-185, 189, 201
cessation of 346-347; see also termination procedures 
determination (constitutivist and declaratory view) 554-566, 601, 620
exclusion from 337-339, 346 
for refugees to whom compelling reasons of national security apply 594-595
for refugees who represent a danger to national security 592-593
obligation to determine 567-568
qualification for 272, 274, 277-279, 335-338, 341-345; see also internal
flight/protection alternative; proof; persecution; protection from persecu-
tion; agents of persecution or serious harm
685Index 
secondary rights 575-591
refusal of protection status 
see subsidiary protection, exclusion; refugee status, exclusion; temporary
protection, exclusion; withdrawal; 
remedy, right to see appeal and review
repeated application see application, subsequent
residence permit
and admission 404 
and (admission to) safe third countries 497, 514, 519
and asylum 151
and family reunification 572, 575, 580, 583-588
and ‘lawful presence’ 550-553, 569
and responsibility for examining applications 480
for applicants 392, 602
for refugee status beneficiaries 576
for subsidiary protection beneficiaries 597-598
for temporary protection beneficiaries 266, 620-621
legal basis for Community legislation 181, 191-192, 201, 221, 242 
refusal/withdrawal 338, 466, 470, 593-595
see also incremental system of Refugee Convention benefits
right to asylum 
for EU nationals 184, 261, 446, 453, 462
in Community law 147–162, 254, 478, 504, 540, 630, 659, 725
in international law 11, 20
Romania 449
Rome, Treaty of (2004) see Constitution for Europe
safe country of origin 445-
and international law 447-448
of third country nationals 449-452, 454-461
of EU nationals 446, 453, 462
safe third country
assessment of safety 506-518, 522526-528, 533-535
conditions on third country 496-505, 523, 529, 532
international law 494-519
Member States as 520-522
non-Member States as 523-528, 532-535 
see also allocation of applicants; first asylum, country/principle of
686




serious crime 20, 339, 341, 343
see also exclusion
serious harm 274, 293-305; see also ECHR Article 3, ill-treatment; agents of
persecution or serious harm
social group, membership of 326-329
sources
of EC law 57-58




state sovereignty 2, 33, 98
stateless persons 184, 261
subsidiarity 56, 145, 181, 214, 231-233, 425, 578, 636, 663, 671
subsidiary protection status 193, 195-196, 249-251
and asylum procedures 362
and international law 272-273
and other protection statuses 350-352
basis in TEC 193, 195-197
cessation 346-347
exclusion 339, 346
qualification for 275, 277-285, 293-305, 313-316, 320-322, 335 
secondary rights 596-599
substitution and succession theories 103-104, 107, 139
sudden inflows 199
suspensive effect see appeal and review, suspensive effect in domestic 
asylum procedures
Switzerland see association of Iceland, Norway and Switzerland
Tampere Conclusions/European Council of 49-50, 248
temporary protection
and asylum procedures 364, 471
and international law 620
and other protection statuses 350, 353
basis in TEC for 193-194, 196-197




territorial scope of European asylum legislation 185, 197, 219-220, 
265-269
The Hague, European Council of/Program 731-733
third country national 184, 261
Title IV TEC 170-171
torture see CAT Article 3, torture; CCPR Article 7, ill-treatment ECHR
Article 3, ill-treatment
Trafficking 228, 282n
transposition of Community law
terms 62
obligations of Member States during transition period 660-662
travaux préparatoires
see interpretation of international law, means; Refugee Convention,
travaux préparatoires
UNHCR 12, 3, 337-338, 340, 467, 517, 526, 530
right of access to 401-402, 404, 423, 470
see also Executive Committee; Handbook 
United Kingdom, special position of 43, 170, 215, 220, 245, 265, 270
UNMIK 316
validity of European asylum law 666-675 
visa 59, 180, 201, 221, 242, 382, 481, 500, 547, 549, 601, 615
welfare 502, 554, 577, 595, 607, 621, 655-656, 658
withdrawal
of application 429, 441-442
of protection status see termination
women 327-329
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